

Sep 2009

See Distribution

**TASK FORCE 81 (ROTATION 1) OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE 001
EMPLOYMENT OF TF 81 ON OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
(OP WĀTEA)**

See Distribution

References:

- A. CDF Operational Directive 21/2009 - Commitment of NZSAS to AFGHANISTAN – OPERATION WĀTEA dated Aug 09
- B. Military Technical Arrangements between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- C. HQJFNZ OPINST 118/09 dated 31 Aug 09
- D. DDIS SMTA 01/09 Afghanistan: Kabul Security dated 15 Jul 09
- E. HQ ISAF SOF/WNGO/443-2009: OPLAN 38302 Revision 4 – ISAF SOF Direction and Guidance.
- F. NZDDP-3.12 New Zealand Special Operations
- G. HQJFNZ OPDIR 133/09: Senior National Officer TF 81 Operation WĀTEA

SITUATION

1. Ref A directs NZDF to provide a SOTF to AFGHANISTAN (AFG) from Sep 09 for a period of 12-18 months in order to maintain stability, defeat the insurgency, partner with the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) Crisis Response Unit (CRU) and enhance the reputation of the NZDF and GONZ. The status of this operation is laid out in Ref A with TF 81 covered by the extant NZ-AFG Military Technical Agreement (MTA) (Ref B).
2. The first rotation of TF 81 personnel (TF 81/1¹) will lay the foundation for a successful ongoing operation. Ref A and Ref C direct the deployment of TF 81 and enable the support required to train, deploy and sustain TF 81. This directive provides the guidance and direction required for TF 81 to operate for the period required of it.

Threat Assessment

3. Insurgents will continue to target RC Capital and are likely to intensify efforts during the election period in August/September 2009, and particularly as operations intensify in the south. Targets are likely to remain government officials and infrastructure, Afghan security forces, ISAF/coalition troops, embassies and hotels. Individual, high-profile incidents will have a disproportionate impact on the perceptions of international actors and the Afghanistan political elite located in Kabul. Criminal activity, in particular as a result of political rivalry or

¹ The designation TF 81/1 is only to be used as an internal control measure within the TF in order to clearly identify which rotation of personnel is referred to, and only where such delineation is required.

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friction, is also likely to increase in the lead up to elections and in the aftermath as the results of political deal-making are played out.

4. The capability of both insurgents and criminals to act will be hindered by improved Afghan security force capacity in the capital and ISAF/National Directorate of Security (NDS) intelligence-led operations to disrupt insurgent networks operating in Kabul. Insurgent and criminal capability will be further inhibited not only by friction between rival local groups operating in RC Capital but also by frictions between eastern insurgents and the Taliban senior leadership. Insurgents will also find safe havens in provinces surrounding Kabul as they become increasingly pressurised by ISAF/coalition operations. Military operations in Pakistan may curtail resources from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that have been used to facilitate high profile mass casualty attacks in the capital. Additionally, if pressure is applied appropriately in the border area, INS leadership movement between AFG/PAK.

5. Ref D (attached at Enclosure 1) provides the basis for the strategic threat appreciation in Afghanistan focussed on Kabul security.

MISSION

6. TF 81 is to enable the AFG MOI CRU capability to disrupt INS networks in order to provide a sustainable security environment that permits viable governance and progressive development.

EXECUTION

SNO TF 81 Intent

7. The focus of TF 81, in the wider counter-insurgency (COIN) operation, must be to assist CRU in creating a secure AFG for the AFGHAN people. In order to do this, we must win the support of the population through:

- a. Creating a secure environment in which their society can operate and rebuild with a focus on returning control of AFG to the AFGHAN people;
- b. Convincing them that ISAF and coalition forces are there to provide the support that they require and will do so in a manner which upholds AFGHAN sovereignty as well as respecting Islam and the diverse culture of the AFGHAN people; and
- c. Convincing them that their security forces are credible and that they can create the secure environment that AFG needs to progress, eventually without the support of ISAF/international forces.

8. Our efforts to counter the insurgency must not focus on the insurgents. While disrupting terrorism and destroying terrorist networks will play a major part in TF 81's employment, operations will only be undertaken where there is clear evidence that our actions will enhance security by contributing to ISAF mission success and where ANSF are

confident of removing target INS by way of a conviction in the AFG judicial system. Most importantly TF operations will be intelligence led, in that all operations must be based on detailed, credible intelligence. The ISAF targeting, planning and approval process supports this approach.

9. COIN is often termed a 'hearts and minds' operation, in that our focus is winning the hearts of the target population by confirming in their minds that conditions will be better should the insurgency be defeated. This should not be seen as solely using 'soft' techniques. While governance and development tasks are part of a multi-agency COIN strategy, they form only two-thirds of the overall solution. The security of the AFGHAN people provides the other third, and it is in this area that TF 81 will have greatest effect. By assisting the AFG Ministry of the Interior (MOI), through the ANP CRU, to disrupt terrorists and terrorist infrastructure, the TF will assist the ANSF in securing AFG for the Afghan people.

10. **TF 81/1 Operational End-state.** TF 81/1 has completed a RIP with TF 81/2, re-deployed to NZ and has reconstituted, having successfully completed its mission.

Concept

11. A four phase operation confirmed as follows:

- a. **Phase 1 – Advance Party Operations** ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3} : ME- set the conditions required for TF 81 to successfully embed within ISAF/ISAF SOF.
- b. **Phase 2 – Conduct** ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3} : ME – Enable CRU capability to disrupt high profile INS attacks.
- c. **Phase 3 – Conduct RIP and Redeploy:** Likely ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3} to include RIP with TF 81/2. ME – Hand over with TF 81/2.
- d. **Phase 4 – Reconstitution:** From RTNZ until complete, including. ME – Reconstitution of equipment.

Tasks

12. The following are enduring tasks for TF 81, IAW Ref E:

- a. Create an effective partnering relationship with MOI CRU;
- b. Prevent spectacular attacks in RC(C);
- c. Disrupt high profile INS attacks;
- d. Disrupt insurgent safe-havens;
- e. Clear insurgent cells from population centres;
- f. Disrupt insurgent staging areas;

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- g. Engage local leadership in security arrangements to deny INS freedom of movement;
- h. Disrupt financial spt to INS field commanders;
- i. Maximise IO opportunities;
- j. BPT to conduct RC(E) and RC(N) shaping operations with and for CJSOTF-A, TF 373, ISAF SOF and RC BSO; and
- k. Develop a credible/trusted AFG agent to ensure targeted dialogue.

13. OC.

- a. Command the tactical elements of TF 81 including SHQ (incl SOCCE and ASIC), TE PILGRIM, TE SUPPORT and TE EXPLOIT;
- b. Command TE SHADOW in the performance of its day to day training tasks with CRU and during tactical operations²;
- c. Lead the tactical planning process for operations in order to produce CONOPs for approval by SNO, and subsequent approval by COM ISAF SOF (Level 1) and DCJOPS (Level 2);
- d. Draft a weekly SITREP for release by SNO TF 81 IAW direction given in para 20 below;
- e. Develop and a comprehensive force protection plan for TF 81; and
- f. BPT provide LNOs to other HQ, TF and organisations as required by SNO TF 81.

14. OC TE Support.

- a. Provide logistic support to TF 81 including operational logistics, base support and contracting;
- b. Carry out the function of TF S1;
- c. Carry out the function of TF S9; and
- d. Act as the OC TF 81 garrison.

² TE SHADOW tactical operations will be commanded by OC TF 81, with operational level coordination of TE SHADOW to meet SNO TF 81 intent conducted by SNO.

15. **TF J2.**

- a. Coordinate all intelligence collection and reporting PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 for the TF;
- b. Coordinate and disseminate all sources intelligence PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3
- c. Coordinate liaison with HQ ISAF, ISAF SOF J2 Cell and other SOTF in theatre to receive and exploit intelligence product;
- d. Provide regular INTREP and INTSUM to SNO and OC, including weekly SITREP product for reporting to NZ;
- e. Develop and manage the TF counter-intelligence plan; and
- f. Develop and implement the TF physical security plan with authorisation from OC TF 81.

16. **OC TE SHADOW.**

- a. Form and sustain a close partnering relationship with CRU;
- b. Develop a comprehensive plan for the CRU, in conjunction with the Comd and staff of CRU and SNO TF 81, IAW para 24 below;
- c. Assist in training the CRU to achieve the CRU mission;
- d. Provide progress reports to SNO and OC TF 81 on the state of CRU training; and
- e. Advise SNO TF 81 and OC without delay should CRU prepare for unilateral operations.

Constraints.

17. The following constraints are placed on TF 81 by SNO TF 81, IAW with CDF direction given in Ref A:

- a. TF 81 elements (including TF SHADOW) are not to conduct operations in support of the CRU unless authorised by SNO TF 81.
- b. SNO TF 81 is to be informed immediately on occurrence of any of the following:
 - (a) Direction by ISAF or ISAF SOF, or request by a RC, another TF or other organisation, for TF 81 to be involved in missions which involve:
 - (i) Counter-narcotics operations; or

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- (ii) Operations beyond RC (C) and its six bordering provinces.
- (b) TF 81 will not conduct cross border operations³ or poppy eradication operations.

CO-ORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

Critical Reporting

18. SNO TF 81 is to receive an initial brief on likely or emerging target packages from OC TF 81 and the J2 in the initial phase of the TF 81 targeting process. These briefs are to take place at least weekly. All TF 81 Level 1 and 2 CONOPs are to be briefed to SNO TF 81, allowing time for directed adjustments to plans, prior to submission to COM ISAF SOF or DCJOPS, HQ ISAF is required.

19. SNO TF 81 is to be informed of any significant act or occurrence requiring action or authorisation by either COMISAF/HQ ISAF, COMJFNZ or CDF (NZ). Such occurrences include, but are not limited to:

- a. The death, injury or serious illness requiring hospitalisation or the of a member of TF 81;
- b. Any event or act which may cause adverse public or coalition reaction to TF 81 operations including collateral damage or civilian casualties;
- c. The detention of non-ISAF persons by TF 81;
- d. Matters of a serious welfare nature involving TF 81 personnel (ie death or serious illness of a family member, serious family matters which may affect the ability of personnel to carry out their duties);
- e. Circumstances requiring the movement of TF 81 pers out of RC Capital and the six surrounding provinces (including international travel);
- f. A serious breach of discipline involving a member of TF 81;
- g. An approach by media or other parties seeking information on TF 81;
- h. Damage, loss, destruction of MCE, class A stores, cash/money or KEYMAT;
or
- i. Any matter which the OC believes requires the attention of SNO TF 81.

³ In the absence of an internationally recognised border, the Durrand Line will be accepted as the de facto border between Afghanistan and Pakistan for the purposes of this deployment.

Outline Battle Rhythm

20. TF 81 is to conduct such planning, IAW the JMAP, as is required to furnish approving authorities (SNO TF 81, COMISAF SOF or DCOS (JOPS)) with appropriate CONOPs. These are to follow the ISAF CONOPs and briefing process as set out in ISAF SOPs. In addition, LNOs are to brief relevant RC and Battle Space Owners (BSO) where TF 81 operations occur in AO's controlled by these authorities.

21. A weekly SNO conference will occur NLT Saturday of each week in order to enable the compilation of a weekly SITREP to TG6/DSO and HQJFNZ. This SITREP is to be submitted to SNO TF 81 by 1200 hrs (local) each Sunday. The format for this is at Annex A.

CRU Partnering and Development

22. The partnering relationship with CRU is crucial to mission success. This is the key aspect of the mission that, if conducted successfully, will allow TF 81 to contribute to a sustainable security environment which is supported by capable ANSF. The basis for the relationship is that TF 81 is partnering with the CRU as equals, clearly understanding that COIN and CBT in AFG are primarily Afghan problems requiring Afghan solutions, supported by the capability and capacity of ISAF.

23. TF 81, through TE SHADOW, offers a highly capable training and partnering element to continue training and developing the CRU. This approach will require significant diplomacy supported by a high level of cultural awareness. This mix should be used to develop the CRU beyond their current level of capability. TE SHADOW should continually seek to develop the CRU using the foundation of NZSAS culture and philosophy, while concurrently being mindful of Afghan/ANSF culture, to guide the partnering relationship.

24. **Development Plan.** OC TE SHADOW is to create a development plan for CRU. This plan is to take into account the following areas for development:

- a. Tactical training and operations;
- b. Operations planning;
- c. Training management and development;
- d. Logistics training and development; and
- e. Infrastructure development.

25. In order to facilitate operational and strategic development so as to ensure that the CRU is meeting the needs and expectations of the MOI/ANSF, the SNO TF 81 will be the TF 81 LNO to the MOI Chief of Counter Terrorism.

Rules of Engagement

26. Rules of engagement (as set out in Ref A) are attached at Enclosure 1. TE commanders are to ensure that their personnel are aware of their responsibilities under the ROE and are to conduct regular familiarisation and refresher training on ROE in order that personnel remain conversant with it. ROE cards are to be carried IAW HQJFNZ direction.

Detention Operations

27. Any persons detained during TF 81 operations in cooperation with the CRU will be detained and processed by the CRU and other Afghan authorities in accordance with Afghan law. If TF 81 personnel detain any persons while conducting national tasks, they will comply with the procedures established during previous deployments to Afghanistan, which are consistent with NATO operating procedures and international law. Detainee procedures, as set out in Appendix 1 to Annex C to Ref A are attached at Enclosure 2.

28. Should TF 81 personnel be required to detain any other person, the SNO TF 81 is to be informed without delay. SNO TF 81 must obtain CDF approval before any detainees are handed over to the ANSF. Once approval is gained detainees are to be handed over to ANSF, without delay and the procedures set out in Appendix 1 to Annex C to Ref A (attached at Enclosure 3) are to be adhered to. If approval is not granted, the detained person is to be released without delay.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

29. **Equipment.** All items deployed on OP WATEA are to be controlled on SAP, less those items not accounted for on the system. OC TE Support is to ensure that all items not on SAP are recorded in an appropriate spreadsheet.

30. OC TE Support is to ensure that all Class A and serial numbered equipment is accounted for, and checked using the appropriate control checks. The issue, control and reporting of deficiencies, loss or damage is to be carried out IAW standard 1 NZSAS Gp procedure with reporting to occur to 1 NZSAS Gp and HQJFNZ if required. The loss of any assets or non-assets in excess of \$1000.00 is to be reported to HQJFNZ, via the SNO.

31. During the course of TF 81/1 deployment, OC TE SUPPORT is to create system allowing a handover certificate to be signed between SNO TF 81/1 and 81/2 during TF 81/1 RIP. The handover certificate is to be IAW DFO(A) Vol 4, Chap 18, Annex B.

32. **Travel.** All travel out of KABUL/BAGRAM area, or beyond the six provinces surrounding KABUL, including international travel, is to be authorised by or through the SNO. Maximum use is to be made of RNZAF or coalition air to support personnel movement.

33. **Leave.** Leave from theatre will only be granted in exceptional circumstances. Leave will be administered IAW DFO (A) Vol 4, Chap 9. HQJFNZ J3 is the approving authority for such leave when recommended by the SNO TF 81.

34. **Finance.** Financial arrangements are set out in Ref C.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

35. **Command and Control.** TF 81 remains under Full Comd of CDF; it is assigned OPCOMD to COMJFNZ for formal routine reporting; COMJFNZ assigns TF 81 OPCON to COMISAF and ISAF SOF. DSO retains Tech Con of TF 81 IAW Ref F.

36. To recognise the specialist nature of this deployment CDF will exercise Full Comd through COMJFNZ (for routine matters) in accordance with the formal relationship expressed above. There will be times, however, when the Tech Con relationship and the priority reporting requirement through DSO/CO 1NZSAS Gp to SNO TF 81 will take precedence when issues of timeliness and clarity are imperative. This arrangement is outlined at Enclosure 4.

37. **Communications Policy.**

- a. **Strategic Communications.** TF 81 will submit SITREPs IAW para 18 of Ref G. Priority or TS reporting will be sent directly to DSO for briefing to CDF as required. All other reporting or communications for the purposes of ongoing administration will be conducted using the relevant IS system, including DTelN.
- b. **Welfare Communications.** Welfare communications will be established once TF 81 is firmly established. Welfare communications including phone and internet services may be shut-down at any stage if there is a risk to operational security or circumstances require the restriction of communications. TF 81 personnel are not permitted to possess or use personal cellular phones. Workplace telephones are not to be used for personal calls.

38. **Casualty Procedures.** The death, injury to or hospitalisation of personnel posted or attached to TF 81 is to be reported to HQJFNZ immediately. OC TE SUPPORT, in conjunction with the MO, is to prepare a TF 81 specific casualty repatriation procedure within the first two weeks of arrival in theatre.

39. **Unit History.** OC TF 81 is to appoint a TF Historian who is to be responsible for coordinating the collection of Unit history articles and photographs. Unit history articles are to be recorded at least fortnightly.

40. **Photography.** Personnel are not permitted to use or be in the possession of personal cameras whilst in AFG, nor are they permitted to retain for their personal use images captured on NZDF cameras in the course of operations. Any personal cameras bought to AFG are to be handed in to the J3 cell. The J3 cell is to secure the camera until departure from AFG.

41. **Public Information Policy.** There is to be no release of any information to any media source by TF 81. All media enquiries are to be directed in the first instance to the SNO, and thereby to Cdr Shaun Fogarty, RNZN (NZDF DCG), telephone: PSR(IC)3 , mobile PSR(IC)3 : e-mail PSR(IC)3

(Signed on Original)

PSR(IC)3

SNO

Annex:

A. TF 81 SITREP format

Enclosures:

1. Strategic Threat Assessment
2. Op WATEA ROE
3. Individual Guidance For The Detention Of Non-ISAF Personnel
4. OP WATEA C2

Distribution:

DSO (for distr in HQNZDF as reqd)
1 NZSAS Gp
ADSF (for distr in HQJFNZ as required)

Internal:
OC TF 81
OC TE SUPPORT
OC TE SHADOW
J2
MSO/ASIC
J33
J6
LNO

SITREP TEMPLATE –TF 81


1. **SITREP Comments.** Any references used in SITREP to be included (eg Signal or E-Mail ref to incident reports)
2. **J1. Personnel Matters.**
 - a. Locations. Location of all personnel;
 - b. Medical. A general statement regarding the health of all personnel;
 - c. Mail. Frequency / efficiency of service; and
 - d. Outstanding S1 issues.
3. **J2. Intelligence.**
4. **J3. Operational Matters.**
 - a. An overview of the previous weeks activities;
 - b. Specific operations being conducted;
 - c. Aircraft status; and
 - d. Outstanding S3 issues.
5. **J4. Logistic Matters.**
 - a. Equipment state;
 - b. Materiel matters;
 - c. Demands; and
 - d. Outstanding S4 issues.
6. **J5. Plans.** An overview of what you expect to happen in-theatre over the upcoming weeks. Include any ops that are likely to conflict with limitations given in the directives for the mission. The expected format is to breakdown intentions into a seven day Programme and a 14 Day Programme and generalised forecast beyond the fortnight.
7. **J6. Communications and Information Systems.**

- a. Equipment state;
 - b. Connectivity issues; and
 - c. Outstanding S6 issues.
8. **J7. Training and Co-ordination.**
- a. Comment on any training conducted or requirements for personnel; and
 - b. Outstanding S7 issues.
9. **J8. Mission observations, issues and evaluation.** Outstanding S8 issues. (Should be included as observations on the SITREP)
10. **J9. Finance Issues.** Outstanding S9 issues.
11. **Command Comment.** Comment by the SNO on any areas (including ops) that are of concern. If necessary, comments on mission matters can be raised here. In addition any administrative or resource matter that may require policy input should be raised.

ENCLOSURE 1 TO
TF 81 OP DIR 001
DATED SEP 09

STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - OP WATEA

Afghanistan: Kabul security



1. (S) This strategic intelligence estimate provides an assessment of the developing security situation in RC Capital. It is produced in support of Op Wātea. The information cut-off date is 14 July 2009.

POC: PSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3

DTelN: PSR(IC)3
DTelN: PSR(IC)3

Assessment base

2. (R) This DDIS SIE on RC Capital draws on a range of available sources. These include secret intelligence and open source reporting as well as allied assessment.

Review of situation

3. (C) The capital region is a target for insurgents keen to generate international headlines and demonstrate their capacity to challenge the authority of the Afghan government and the international community. A number of sophisticated high profile attacks and rising violence in the surrounding provinces have resonated particularly keenly with international actors based in the capital as well as the Afghan political elite. Rampant criminality, including kidnapping and other violent crime, has further contributed to perceptions of widespread insecurity.

Analysis of strategic environment

4. (C) RC Capital covers Kabul province which comprises 15 districts including Kabul city. The city itself occupies a plateau surrounded by mountainous terrain. A number of the outlying districts in the province are connected to surrounding provinces by valley systems and other geographical features enabling insurgent access to and from RC Capital. Kabul city is the base for the majority of the international community, including national embassies, supranational agencies, NGOs and foreign contractors. The large international presence, coupled with the high security threat, has led to a number of road-blocks and traffic-calming measures along with a sizable private security contingent. These visible reminders of the widespread foreign presence in Kabul act as an irritant to the city's Afghan populace but, more recently have also been associated with the relative calm in the capital. Notwithstanding this there have been repeated demands for the removal of road-blocks, the placement of which frequently leads to widespread gridlock. More recently the mayor of Kabul has suggested establishing a green zone in the north of the city in which to locate all foreign embassies. Private security companies, both foreign and Afghan, have attracted similar opprobrium and have been the target of presidential edicts and more recently draft legislation to increase oversight and limit their activities.

5. (C) The presidential palace, both the upper and lower houses of parliament (Meshrano Jirga and Wolesi Jirga) and the swathe of Afghan ministries are also located in Kabul. Consequently, the majority of the country's political elite maintain residences in Kabul including PSR(S)1 and regional and provincial powerbrokers (often former warlords). Both westerners and wealthy Afghans are enticing targets for organised criminal groups. Incidents of kidnapping and assassination, in some cases associated with political motivations, occur frequently.

6. (C) In August 2008 Afghan security forces took over lead security responsibility for most of Kabul province with the exception of Surobi district to the east (see map on p2). The transfer appears to have had no negative impact on local security conditions. Indeed Afghan forces and the NDS have been credited with preventing several attacks. ISAF continues to provide significant support and demonstrate a robust and visible presence in Kabul. The police presence in the city is to be increased by 4,800 in time for the election though new recruits are likely to receive under half the requisite training before the polls in August. Fighters undertaking high profile attacks have frequently masqueraded as members of the

Afghan security forces. PSR(S)1

(C) **Kabul's security force structure** Afghan security forces present for duty in RC Capital number approximately 12,000. The Afghan army in Kabul comprises the Capital division and the headquarters service support brigade with approximately 3,000 present for duty (from an assigned number of 3,700). Police in Kabul number approximately 9,000. As well as the still considerable international troop presence in Kabul city French, Italian and Turkish contingents operate in the outlying districts of the province.

7. (S) Insurgents have been more active in provinces surrounding Kabul since 2008. The area around Kabul was a HIG stronghold up until the Taleban drive on Kabul in 1996 and reporting over the past 18 months has indicated the reactivation of some of these dormant networks. But many insurgents operating in the area have nominal and fluid allegiances, often seeking funding and direction from multiple sources, including the Taleban's eastern command shura in Peshawar (nominally responsible for the insurgent campaign in the east including Kabul), the Haqqani network and possibly Al Qaida. PSR(S)1

Stakeholder capability

8. (S) **Insurgent:** The number of insurgents assessed as active in the capital region is relatively low. Reporting indicates that different groups have offered greater potency by combining resources in order to conduct operations and attacks within the city itself are often a result of insurgent cooperation and collusion at senior levels. It is important to note that such cooperation can be short-lived and at times limited to individual attacks. Insurgents from the surrounding provinces of Kapisa, Laghman, Nangarhar, Parwan and Wardak compose the majority of insurgents active in Kabul at any one time. But the bulk of high profile attacks are influenced by actors from outside the Kabul region. For suicide bombings in the capital reporting indicates collaboration between the Haqqani network, Al Qaida affiliates and Taleban elements, as well as Pakistani militants within the FATA, in planning and training. Delivery and facilitation is then provided by local HIG and Taleban elements.

(S) **Most recent high profile attack** The sophisticated and coordinated attacks on February 11 are the most recent manifestation of insurgent capability in RC Capital. 21 Afghans, including government personnel and security forces, were killed when eight attackers targeted three government buildings. Five gunmen attacked the Ministry of Justice whilst two suicide bombers targeted the Prisoner Affairs Department. A separate suicide bomber also attacked the Ministry of Education. The attacks occurred within 30 minutes of each other in different areas of the capital. The media were quickly made aware of the incidents by insurgents. The Taleban publicly claimed responsibility for the attack, ostensibly in response to mistreatment of Taleban prisoners in Afghan prisons, but subsequent reporting suggested Haqqani network involvement. The incidents exhibited many of the hallmarks of previous complex attacks in Kabul. They demonstrated insurgent intent and capability and indicated the existence of an IED network within the capital with a panel of targets.

9. (S) Within RC Capital itself the districts of Surobi, Musahi and Paghman have been safe havens for insurgents. Surobi district, the only district in which lead security responsibility was not transferred to Afghan security forces, is connected by two valley systems (Uzbeen and Tagab) to neighbouring Kapisa. This allows ease of ingress and egress to the capital and also sits astride the key Kabul-Jalalabad highway. Persistent reporting points to the presence of foreign suicide bombers being harboured in the district prior to launching attacks in Kabul and along the Kabul-Jalalabad highway. In August 2008 10 French soldiers were killed and 21 wounded in the district during an insurgent attack (Norwegian special forces were part of the reaction force that evacuated the wounded) though this attack was likely to have been a purely local initiative undertaken in defence of a previously untrammelled sanctuary area.

10. (S) **Criminal activity:** Whilst there is likely to be some degree of overlap between insurgent and criminal activity in and around Kabul our understanding of the criminal networks in RC Capital remains limited. Alongside likely insurgent-criminal relationships, reporting suggests links between criminal groups in the capital PSR(S)1

Many of these

individuals are likely to be connected to the narcotics industry. Consequently many criminal groups are likely to have access to substantial funding and PSR(S)1

Kidnappings, probably for ransom purposes, are the most frequently

occurring manifestation of organised crime in Kabul.

11. (S) **Afghan security forces:** International actors and Afghan officials are united in their belief that the transition of lead security responsibility (in all but one district of Kabul) has been a success. In spite of consistently high levels of threat reporting there have been no major incidents for five months. The Afghan response to the most recent large-scale attack in February reportedly exhibited an increased level of professionalism and an improved efficiency in terms of a swift, decisive follow-up. The removal of four senior police officials in Kabul in February, associated with charges of incompetence or corruption, and their replacement with apparently professional and competent officers has also improved the prospects for policing in the capital.

(S) **Ali Shah Paktiawal** The PSR(S)1 head of Kabul's Criminal Investigation Division Ali Shah Paktiawal was one of the Kabul police officials removed in February. Paktiawal is a former mujahideen commander with reportedly close links to the upper echelons of the Afghan government (President Karzai has referred to him in the past as a 'Pushtun hero'). PSR(S)1

Paktiawal's activities and connections are judged

to be characteristic of the close inter-connections at play in Kabul's security sector, and its political elite. Despite his removal Paktiawal to maintain PSR(S)1 and will probably preserve his access to senior officials.

12. (S) **ISAF/Coalition:** Despite the transition of lead security in Kabul, ISAF/Coalition troops continue to provide high levels of support in the capital, including crucial intelligence capability for targeting insurgent networks. ISAF/Coalition forces have also conducted

operations to disrupt insurgent freedom of movement and staging areas. Operations in districts within RC Capital such as Surobi are judged to have curtailed some insurgent activity though in most cases these areas remain viable safe havens. Increased ISAF operations outside the capital region in surrounding provinces such as Wardak, where incident levels remain high, are also likely to have contributed to a more stable security environment in Kabul.

Vulnerabilities

13. (S) **Insurgents:** Local insurgents have complained of harassment from rival groups and it is likely that competing interests and parochial objectives amongst local groups have hindered the formation of a monopolising insurgent movement. Reporting in the past has also highlighted constraints imposed on insurgents by a lack of finances and materiel. More significant tensions between the Taleban's Peshawar shura and senior Taleban leaders based out of Quetta may have a still greater impact on insurgent capabilities in and around the capital. PSR(S)1

14. (S) Improved intelligence-led operations in the capital are also a risk for insurgent operations. The arrests in June of seven individuals alleged to have been carrying out suicide attacks in Kabul suggest that insurgent networks operating in the capital are increasingly vulnerable. The increasing confidence and competence of Afghan security forces in Kabul means this trend is likely to continue. Separate anecdotal reporting suggests that outside the capital some insurgents in provinces around Kabul are struggling in the face of renewed ISAF and Afghan security force pressure in recent months. PSR(S)1

15. (S) We assess that the critical enabler for insurgent groups attempting to carry out high profile mass casualty attacks is the support and resources from both Afghan and Pakistani insurgent groups in Pakistan. These include the Haqqani network, Al Qaida affiliates and Pakistani militants in the FATA. Military operations represent a threat to this insurgent centre of gravity. PSR(S)1

, sustained operations against Pakistani militants and their Al Qaida guests are likely to reduce tangible support for high profile attacks around Kabul. The Haqqani network will continue to provide training and recruits for suicide bombers and IED attacks in the capital though supply routes for these resources will also be affected as long as military operations continue in the FATA. But despite calls from Mullah Omar for insurgents of all stripes to focus efforts on fighting in Afghanistan we judge that most Pakistani groups will remain focused on internal struggles or peace deals rather than supporting operations across the border.

16. ~~(S)~~ **Afghan security forces:** Afghan security forces appear to have improved since the transition of security responsibility in 2008. But collusion between the security sector and insurgents, as witnessed in previous successful high profile attacks in the capital, remains a risk and recent reporting suggests that insurgents are keen to increase their infiltration of Afghan security forces. PSR(S)1

Estimate

17. ~~(S)~~ Insurgents will continue to seek to target RC Capital and are likely to intensify efforts as elections approach as a means of demonstrating the incapacity of the Afghan government and ISAF/coalition forces to provide security. Targets are likely to remain government officials and infrastructure, Afghan security forces and ISAF/coalition troops and embassies. As operations intensify in the south the Taleban will also look to divert attention from increased pressure on their principal battlegrounds in Helmand and Kandahar. Individual, high-profile incidents will have a disproportionate impact on the perceptions of international actors and the Afghanistan political elite located in Kabul. Criminal activity, in particular as a result of political rivalry or friction, is also likely to increase both as elections near and in the aftermath as the results of political deal-making are played out.

18. ~~(S)~~ But the capability of both insurgents and criminals to act will be hindered by improved Afghan security force capacity in the capital and ISAF/NDS intelligence-led operations to disrupt insurgent networks operating in Kabul. Capability will be further inhibited not only by friction between rival local groups operating in RC Capital but also by frictions between eastern insurgents and the Taleban senior leadership. Insurgents will also find safe havens in provinces surrounding Kabul increasingly pressurised by ISAF/coalition operations. Targeting these operations may be perceived by local insurgents as a greater imperative to undertaking attacks in the increasingly unsympathetic environment within the capital. We assess that Afghan insurgent groups based in Pakistan will continue to provide resources for 'spectacular' attacks in Kabul. But military operations in Pakistan against Pakistan militant groups in the FATA may curtail resources that have been used to facilitate high profile mass casualty attacks in the capital

**OP WĀTEA RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
(FROM ANNEX C TO 090812 CDF DIRECTIVE OP WĀTEA)**

Application

1. The following Rules of Engagement (ROE) apply to all members of the NZSAS TF (TF 81) deployed as part of **Operation WĀTEA** within the territory or airspace of Afghanistan.

Definitions

2. The following definitions apply to these ROE:
 - i. **ANSF** means the Afghan National Security Forces.
 - ii. **PSR(S)3**
 - iii. **Collateral damage** means the unintended destruction of property, which occurs incidental to the authorised and legitimate use of force.
 - iv. **PSR(S)**
 - v. **CRU** means the Critical Response Unit of the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.
 - vi. **Designated persons** means:
 - a) All members of ISAF other than TF 81;
 - b) All members of the CRU while they are acting in cooperation with ISAF;
 - c) All members of the ANSF while they are acting in cooperation with ISAF;
 - d) Any persons designated by either the Commander ISAF (COM ISAF), or Commander ISAF Spécial Operations Forces (COM ISAF SOF), and approved by the Commander Joint Forces NZ (COMJFNZ); and
 - e) Any persons designated by COMJFNZ in respect of a national task.
 - vii. **Designated property** means property (including areas) designated by:

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- a) COM ISAF, or COM ISAF SOF, and approved by COMJFNZ; or
 - b) COMJFNZ in respect of a national task.
- viii. **Detention** means the arrest or apprehension of a person and the deprivation of the person's liberty.
- ix. **Hostile act** means the use of force by any person or group against one or more members of TF 81, **designated persons** or **designated property** where death or serious injury is likely to result.
- x. **Hostile intent** means that there is an imminent intent to commit a **hostile act**. The existence of **hostile intent** may be judged by either:
- a) The threatening individual or unit's capability and preparedness to inflict imminent or immediate damage; or
 - b) Information, particularly intelligence, which indicates an intention to conduct an imminent or immediate attack.
- xi. **Incidental casualties** means the unintended death or injury of civilians, which occurs incidental to the authorised and legitimate use of force.
- xii. **ISAF** means the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.
- xiii. **Deadly force** means force that is intended or likely to cause death or serious injury.
- xiv. **Minimum force** means the minimum degree of force that is necessary, reasonable and lawful under the circumstances to achieve the objective. It includes the full range of force, up to and including **deadly force**.
- xv. **Self defence** means the use of reasonable force to protect any member of TF 81 or any other **designated person** against a **hostile act** or **hostile intent**.

Rules of Engagement

3. The following specific numbered ROE are authorised:
- A Use of **minimum force**, up to and including **deadly force**, is permitted for individual or unit **self defence** or in defence of **designated persons** against a **hostile act** or demonstration of **hostile intent**.
 - B Use of **minimum force**, up to and including **deadly force**, is permitted in defence of **designated property**.

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- C Use of **minimum force**, up to and including **deadly force**, to achieve the mission is permitted.
- D PSR(S)3 TF81 personnel were permitted to use approved weapons systems for authorised purposes
- E Entry into territory or airspace outside of Afghanistan for the purpose of conducting operations PSR(S)3 is prohibited.
- F PSR(S)3 TF81 personnel were authorised to operate within a particular area of operation (AOO) Entry into territory or airspace outside of AOO not permitted without requisite approval
- G Identification of targets is accepted if made by visual means or PSR(S)3 other specified objective means
- H Attack on PSR(S)3 is permitted, as they have been declared hostile.
- I Actions which could result in **incidental casualties** and **collateral damage** are permitted if the action is essential for mission accomplishment and the expected **incidental casualties** and **collateral damage** are proportionate to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
- J PSR(S)3 TF81 personnel were authorised to conduct systematic observations of various areas, places, persons or things by the use of various means
- K PSR(S)3 TF81 personnel were authorised to conduct operations in a particular manner provided they conformed with IHL/LOAC at the appropriate juncture
- L PSR(S)3 Rule permitting specified category of operations only where essential
- M Unrestricted carriage of small arms is permitted.
- N PSR(R)1, PSR(S)3 The use of certain devices was permitted
- O Unrestricted use of visual illumination is permitted.
- P PSR(S)3 Rule controlling a method of warning
- Q PSR(S)3 Rule controlling a method of warning

PSR(S)3

- R** PSR(S)3 Rule controlling a method of warning
- S** Seizure of any property in the possession of a person who is **detained** is permitted if no member of the **CRU** or **ANSF** is present to effect the seizure.
- T** Questioning of any person who is **detained** is permitted if no member of the **CRU** or **ANSF** is present to conduct the questioning.
- U** Search of any person who is **detained** is permitted if no member of the **CRU** or **ANSF** is present to conduct the search.

Note: Any **search** conducted by the TF 81 under this ROE is to be conducted in accordance with the NZFOR ISAF Individual Guidance for the Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel, which is issued separately (see Appendix one).

- V** **Detention** of a person is permitted if:
- (a) No member of the **CRU** or **ANSF** is present to detain the person; and
 - (b) The person has demonstrated **hostile intent**, is committing a **hostile act**, or is interfering with mission accomplishment.

The person must either be released when he or she poses no further threat to the mission or, with the prior approval of COMJFNZ and CDF, handed over to an appropriate Afghan authority.

Note: Any person who is **detained** by the TF 81 under this ROE is to be handled in accordance with the NZFOR ISAF Individual Guidance for the Detention of Non-ISAF Personnel, which is issued separately (see App One).

- W** Observed indirect fire is permitted.
- X** PSR(S)3 Rule governing use of sensitive equipment
- Y** Unrestricted use of non-explosive land barriers and obstacles is permitted.
- Z** PSR(S)3 Rule governing use of specified non-lethal technique
- AA** PSR(S)3 Rule governing use of specified non-lethal technique
- AC** Action to secure the recovery of PSR(S)3 taken hostage is permitted with the prior approval of PSR(S)3

Additional Orders

4. The Commanding Officer 1 NZSAS Group and the Senior National Officer (SNO) of Operation WATEA are to ensure that personnel under their command are familiar with the law of armed conflict (LOAC), particularly as it applies in a non-international armed conflict, and with these ROE.
5. The SNO may promulgate additional ROE and/or amplified ROE guidance applicable to units under his command. Prior to this the SNO is to submit them through COMJFNZ to CDF for review and approval.
6. NZDF commanders are to ensure that all modified or supplemental ROE:
 - i. remain compatible with the intent of these ROE; and
 - ii. result in more definitive guidance to subordinate commanders.

**INDIVIDUAL GUIDANCE FOR THE DETENTION OF NON-ISAF PERSONNEL
(FROM ANNEX C TO 090812 CDF DIRECTIVE OP WATEA)**

Authorisation

1. NZ ISAF personnel are only authorised to search and detain a person in accordance with this card where Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are not present or reasonably available to do so. If an arrest and/or detention is effected by ANSF in the presence of ISAF personnel, then the individual is not considered to be an ISAF detained person and the provisions of this card do not apply.

2. **Authority to Detain.** You are authorised to detain non-ISAF personnel if necessary for:

- i. The defence of any personnel or property you are authorised to protect;
- ii. The accomplishment of the mission.

3. **Detention Authority.** As soon as practicable after a detention has taken place, the decision to continue to detain must be considered by an appropriate ISAF Detention Authority. A Detention Authority includes a NZ Senior National Officer (SNO), a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Commander, Base Commander or a Patrol Commander.

Immediate Actions at the Scene of Detention

4. **Documentation.** Full details of the individual and the circumstances surrounding detention are to be recorded including: DTG of detention, place of detention, reasons for detention, name and unit of the detaining soldier/officer, name and unit of officer authorising detention, details of the detained person including name, gender, home and home of record and whether or not the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) have been informed. Such information is to be transmitted to the relevant NZ SNO without delay. The NZ SNO is to allocate each detainee a national detainee number.

5. **Use of Force.** Minimum force may be used to effect a detention or restrain a violent detainee. The use of plasticuffs by NZFOR ISAF personnel, who have been trained in their use, is authorised. NZFOR ISAF personnel are authorised to use minimum force to stop a detainee escaping. In any circumstance requiring the use of force against a detainee, deadly force is not to be used unless necessary to prevent an act which constitutes an immediate threat to life of personnel you are authorised to protect. Persons detained by ISAF are to be treated with respect and dignity and in compliance with applicable international law and human rights law standards. No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment, including the use of stress positions.

6. **Search.** The detainee is to be searched for any articles of evidential value, or items which may be used to inflict self-injury or injure those effecting the detention. Such items are to be removed. In all cases receipts are to be provided. Weapons or contraband found in a detained person's possession shall be retained for the period of detention. Direction on the disposal of weapons and contraband, such as drugs, will be issued by the chain of command. Precise details of all searches are to be recorded and retained. In all circumstances the dignity of persons being searched shall be respected.

- i. *Gender Considerations.* Female detainees are only to be searched by female members of NZFOR ISAF (unless there are pressing operational reasons which makes this impracticable, in which case all such searches are to be witnessed by one other member of NZFOR ISAF).
- ii. *Juveniles/Children.* Extreme care is to be taken when searching juveniles and children and all searches are to be witnessed by one other member of NZFOR ISAF.

7. **Rights of a Detainee.** The detainee must be informed, in a language that he or she understands, of the reasons for detention and given an information sheet detailing his or her rights as a detainee. Where this is not possible, then the detainee is to be given this information at the earliest opportunity.

8. **Release.** If there is no requirement for continued detention, the detainee is to be released. When a detainee is being released, detainees should be returned to their home, or to their place of original detention. Detainees are not to be left in remote locations to fend for themselves.

Transfer and Movement

9. Personnel detained by NZFOR ISAF personnel are not to be transferred or handed over to ANSF or other ISAF coalition forces without the prior approval of COMJFNZ or CDF.

10. If there is a requirement to transport detained persons between locations, full details of the individual and the circumstances surrounding the detention are to be maintained and are to be transported with the detained individual. As a general rule, the detaining unit/sub unit is required to provide the guards and transport to move a detained person between locations.

11. Wherever possible detained persons should be moved in a vehicle/aircraft. Movement on foot should be a last resort and only conducted over short distances.

12. Where the transfer/movement of a detainee is conducted over a large distance or prolonged period of time, then the guarding unit is to ensure that regular breaks are taken and that food and water is available. A detainee may be restrained by the use of plasticuffs or handcuffs whilst being transported provided that they are fitted only by individuals trained in their use. A detainee is not to be secured to any part of a vehicle or any other static object.

OP WATEA COMMAND DIAGRAM AND REPORTING
LINES

