



NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM BAMYAN

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13 November 2011

NZPRT BAMYAN WEEKLY INTSUM 004/11

Period: 050800D* NOV 2011 - 120800D* NOV 2011

Executive Summary

TALA WA BARFEK: ANP Checkpoint at ANADARAH attacked. 1

Report of Qari MUSA in TWB. 2

KAHMARD:


Attempted assassination of DSG KAHMARD. 3

Cache handed into COP ROMERO. 4

RC receiver/decoder handed into COP ROMERO. 5


NGO convoy engaged by an IED IVO CHARTOK village. 6

ANP positions in ISH PESTA attacked by INS. 7



AREA OF INTEREST

Attack on ANP Checkpoint in ANADARAH

1. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ TALA WA BARFEK:  At approximately 061915D* Nov 11, a reliable source contacted KIWI Coy and reported that INS had recently attacked an ANP Checkpoint IVO ANADARAH village¹ with RPG and small-arms fire. He stated that the checkpoint was near a bridge and that he was unaware of any casualties.²
2. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ On 10 Nov 11, a meeting was held between PSR(sen)1 and the NZPRT. PSR(sen)1 stated that he had recently returned from ISH PESTA and TALA WA BARFAK (TWB) after visiting relatives, and has seen the checkpoint in ANADARAH that had been attacked on 06 Nov 11. He said that one of his relatives (a local contractor in TWB) had received a call from the group responsible for the attack, warning him not to provide information relating to the ambush to CF or ANSF. PSR(sen)1 stated that PSR(sen)1 was one of the INS involved in the attack on the checkpoint, and that PSR(sen)1 is the brother of PSR(sen)1. PSR(sen)1 surmised that PSR(sen)1 planned this attack to acquire money for the construction project.³
3. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT: It is PROBABLE that an attack occurred against ANP IVO ANADARAH. ANP have historically been targeted in the ANADARAH/ISH PESTA area. The timing of this attack is LIKELY linked to Eid Al-Adha which has been assessed as a time when INS were LIKELY to intensify their efforts. PSR(sen)1 report of the ANADARAH ANP CP being attacked corroborates other reliable reporting.⁴ The PSR(sen)1 mentioned by PSR(sen)1 is assessed as LIKELY to be the INS leader known to NZPRT.⁵ It is LIKELY that PSR(sen)1 is linked to the attack on the ANADARAH CP, due to the proximity of the attack site to PSR(sen)1 reported residence in ANADARAH, which is assessed as a POSSIBLE INS safe-haven/lay-up point.⁶ **END COMMENT.**

Movement of INS into TALA WA BARFEK

4. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ TALA WA BARFEK:  On 07 Nov 11, an NDS source told the NZPRT that Qari MUSA⁷ is currently at his compound IVO JALMEI Mosque in TWB (unknown loc). The source stated that MUSA and up to 30 INS are planning to conduct attacks, possibly including attacks in DO ABE (NFI). He also stated that INS killed an ANP officer in TWB on 06 Nov 11 (NFI).

¹ ANADARAH Village, TALA WA BARFEK District, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

² Refer 111106 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 021/11

³ Refer 20111110 KIWI COY INTREP 021/11 and 111106 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 021/11

⁴ Refer 111106 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 021/11

⁵ The INS leader ISLAMUDDIN is OBJ RICIES, IS4411


⁶ Refer 20111029 NZPRT BAMYAN WEEKLY INTSUM 002/11

⁷ Qari MUSA, OBJ MUESLI, RTAF 1861.

5. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) TALA WA BARFEK: On 07 Nov 11, PSR(sen)1 told the NZPRT that between 45 and 50 TB fighters under the command of Maulawi NEMATULLAH⁹ and Qari MUSA were moving north from PARWAN Province into PAJMAN VILLAGE¹⁰. PSR(sen)1 stated that locals from KHAWALAK and ZIABAGH Villages (unknown locations) were leaving their villages prior to the INS arrival. PSR(sen)1 also stated that the TB were moving to TALA¹¹ and that the INS may be planning to target the TALA DISTRICT CENTRE.¹²
6. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT: The two reports are uncorroborated; however both pers have previously provided reliable information. If these INS groups are operating in TWB, the INS numbers are PROBABLY exaggerated and the strength of the INS group is LIKELY between 10-15. It is POSSIBLE that the INS mentioned in these reports are linked to the attack on the ANP Checkpoint at ANADARAH.¹³ This report corroborates other recent reporting of INS leader Qari MUSA having returned to AFGHANISTAN from PAKISTAN.¹⁴
7. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) There has been previous, unconfirmed reporting that MUSA's family has recently returned to AFGHANISTAN from PAKISTAN. MUSA has previously been linked to a safe house in ZIABAGH village, though the exact location of that village is unknown.¹⁵ END COMMENT.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

Assassination Attempt on PSR(sen)1

8. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) KAHMARD:  At approximately 061200D* Nov 11, there was an assassination attempt on the KAHMARD District Sub-governor (DSG), PSR(sen)1¹⁶. The attack occurred in an area of SANGCHEL village¹⁷ called SARE KOCHI AGHA (unknown loc), in KAHMARD DISTRICT. The attack was reportedly conducted by three males armed with AK-47 rifles. After the attack the three pers withdrew south along the DANDAN SHEKAN VALLEY¹⁸ towards ASR 47 CORNERS. One of the attackers died during the pursuit, LIKELY as the result of falling off a cliff. He was identified by ANP as PSR(sen)1; a 20 year old INS from the RU-YE SANG (RYS) area.²⁰ There has been no further information on the identity or location of the other two attackers. There

⁸ PSR(sen)1 is a regular cache provider to the NZPRT.

⁹ Mulawi NEMATULLAH, OBJ NOVA, RTAF 2306

¹⁰ PAJMAN VILLAGE, TALA WA BARFEK District, MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

¹¹ TALA Bazaar, TALA WA BARFEK District, MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

¹² Refer 111107 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 022/11

¹³ Refer 20111107 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 021/11

¹⁴ Refer 20111107 KIWI COY INTREP 016/11

¹⁵ Refer 100819 NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 231/10

¹⁶ Refer: 111106 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 020/11

¹⁷ SANGCHEL village, KAHMARD district. MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

¹⁸ DANDAN SHEKAN VALLEY leads south from RU YE SANG to the 47 CORNERS PASS. LAGHAKI VILLAGE sits inside this valley.

¹⁹ The dead PSR(sen)1 is PROBABLY PSR(S)1

²⁰ Refer: 111108 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 023/11

were no GIRoA or LN casualties. An AK-47 and Russian style webbing were recovered from the firing point.

9. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) There have been two reports linking PSR(sen)1 to this attack. PSR(sen)1 ANSF stated on 06 Nov 11 that PSR(sen)1 and two others had attempted to ambush the DSG. KAHMARD ANP were later given PSR(sen)1 cell phone number by DSG PSR(sen)1 which the ANP then called, with the caller impersonating a Mullah to gain information from PSR(sen)1. PSR(sen)1 gave the ANP caller his alleged location, said it was PSR(sen)1 who had fallen to his death, and admitted his part in the assassination attempt.
10. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) At 101800D* Nov 11, PSR(sen)1 2IC KAHMARD ANP, told the NZPRT that PSR(sen)1 a religious leader at the Madrassa in DODARI village²⁴, is in regular contact with PSR(sen)1 and that PSR(sen)1 will attend the Madrassa to study when he is in the area. PSR(sen)1 said that the ANSF are keeping a watch on the Madrassa in case of PSR(sen)1 still being in the area, and would report any updates on information particularly relating to PSR(sen)1.²⁵
11. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT: This attack was PROBABLY a well-planned, deliberate INS attack specifically targeting the DSG. Given the poor outcome of the ambush and increased level of CF and ANSF activity in RYS and LAGHAKI, it is LIKELY INS have withdrawn from that area, possibly to safe havens in E KAHMARD or TWB. It is LIKELY that PSR(sen)1 remains a key target for INS.
12. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) Reporting indicates PSR(sen)1 has recently returned from PAKISTAN.²⁶ It is PROBABLE that PSR(sen)1 was involved in this attack. It is PROBABLE that the dead INS is PSR(sen)1. His death is LIKELY to disrupt INS IED capability in KAHMARD. It is LIKELY that the INS utilised a support network in the RYS area to conduct this attack, including PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 familial ties.
13. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) Previous reporting of PSR(sen)1 links him with PSR(sen)1 from PAIN'BAGH village, and he has been reported as spreading anti-CF/GIRoA propaganda.²⁹ **END COMMENT.**

²¹ PSR(S)1

²² Refer: 111106 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 020/11

²³ Refer: 111108 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 023/11

²⁴ DODARI village, KAHMARD district, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

²⁵ Refer 20111110 KIWI COY INTREP 020/11

²⁶ Refer: 111031 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 018/11

²⁷ PSR(sen)1 is assessed by the NZPRT as being a significant negative influence in KAHMARD DISTRICT.

²⁸ PAIN'BAGH village, KAHMARD district, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

²⁹ Refer 081216 Patrol Daily INTSUM 342/08

Caches handed in to COP ROMERO

14. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) ⁴KAHMARD: At 090730D* Nov 11, Cache provider PSR(sen)1 handed in a cache to the PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 operator at COP ROMERO. The quality of the cache was assessed as poor-average. PSR(sen)1 said the cache had come from TWB. The cache consisted of:

- a. 2 x 107mm HE rockets
- b. 2 x 82mm Mortar rounds and
- c. 2600 rounds (boxed) 12.7mm

15. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT: This cache, consisting mainly of poor-quality munitions, is LIKELY to be of limited use to INS. **END COMMENT.**

16. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) KAHMARD: ⁴ At approximately 091400D* Nov 11, cache providers PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 handed in a RCIED receiver (see Figure 1) to the NZPRT at COP ROMERO. The component was allegedly transported into TWB District from PAKISTAN. Both men said that there are more of these types of components in TWB. PSR(sen)1 also stated that INS in TWB are planning to attack the TALA District Centre on either 09 or 10 Nov 11, but neither could say who is behind the planned attack.³⁰



Figure 1. Remote Control Receiver handed to NZPRT on 09 Nov 11

17. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT: This is assessed as being a Mod receiver (unknown series), PROBABLY set up for use as part of a RCIED. There are numbers and a letter, which LIKELY indicates a firing or safe-arm code. On 25 Oct 11, both men discussed these components and said they wanted to sell them to the NZPRT. They stated that the INS have no use for the components PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

³⁰ Refer 20111110 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 024/11


PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

18. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

. It is also LIKELY that both men have presented only one receiver at this time in order to gauge the value of the components, prior to selling the rest at a later date, either to NZPRT or INS. It is POSSIBLE that the Mod receiver came with other IED components. It is of concern that there are LIKELY more IED devices in TWB, and there is the potential that INS will attempt to modify these IEDs to victim- or command-operated devices to better target CF. This device has been sent to ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3} for further analysis.

19. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ To date the NZPRT has not received any information on an INS attack on the TWB district centre. A report from ^{PSR(sen)1} on 07 Nov 11, stated that there were 45-50 INS in TWB, and that the TALA district centre may have been one of their targets.³² **END COMMENT.**

IED Detonated at CHARTOK VILLAGE

20. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~  **KAHMARD:** On 11 Nov 11, ANP and NDS reported to the NZPRT that an IED was detonated at 110800D* Nov 11 IVO CHARTOK Village³³, KAHMARD District. The IED was detonated on an NGO convoy, consisting of two vehicles (including at least one white car). The IED detonated in front of the first vehicle, and the convoy drove through the incident. No injuries were reported. The convoy was travelling from SAYGHAN to ISH PESTA³⁴, KAHMARD District, and then to PUL-E-KHUMRI, BAGHLAN province.³⁵

21. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ The ANP described the device as being a standard oil container of approximately eight litres, which left a hole of approximately 500mm x 250mm in the road after detonation. A wire was also found at the scene. The ANP stated that they are willing to escort the NZPRT to the incident area. ANP later provided images of the detonated IED (see Figure 2).

22. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ The NDS stated that the IED was probably used to target GIRoA officials and workers returning to work after the Eid al-Adha holiday. The NDS also believe that it is one of the IEDs reported to the NZPRT earlier.³⁶

23. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ NDS ^{PSR(S)1} told the NZPRT that INS were planning to hit an NZPRT patrol that was in BAGHAK village³⁷, SHIBAR district. ^{PSR(sen)} also

³¹ Refer 20111029 NZPRT BAMYAN WEEKLY INTSUM 002/11

³² Refer 20111107 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 022/11

³³ CHARTOK Village, KAHMARD district, MGRS ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}

³⁴ ISH PESTA village, KAHMARD district, MGRS ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}

³⁵ Refer 20111111 NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 025/11

³⁶ Refer 20111029 NZPRT BAMYAN WEEKLY INTSUM 002/11


said that the person responsible for the IED was Qari MUSA and that Abdullah KALTA³⁸ is currently in TWB.



Figure 2. Recovered IED components

24. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT: This information is currently uncorroborated by the NZPRT, as no NZPRT elements have been out to CHARTOK to conduct any TSE of the alleged IED site. Due to the recent spike in INS activities in BAMYAN and TALA WA BARFEK it is POSSIBLE that there was an IED detonated in CHARTOK as reported. If an IED was detonated, reporting indicates the IED was a command-wire IED (CWIED) utilising Home Made Explosive. It is POSSIBLE that INS would purposely target an NGO convoy; however it is more likely that the INS mistook this target for a CF/ANSF/GIRoA convoy. It is POSSIBLE that further IEDs will be employed against CF/ANSF/GIROA or civilian convoys in NE BAMYAN and TWB in the next 7 days. It is POSSIBLE that MUSA and KALTA are currently in TWB, as various sources have recently reported. **END COMMENT**

INS Attacks IVO ISH PESTA

25. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) KAHMARD:  On 12 Nov 11, the NZPRT was informed by DO ABE ANP that at 120130D* Nov 11 there was an attack on the PSR(S)1 ANP at the mining area at ISH PESTA³⁹, and also an attack on the ISH PESTA ANP

³⁷ BAGHAK Village, SHIBAR district, MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

³⁸ Commander Abdul KALTA, OBJ BURNHAM, RTAF 2307

³⁹ ISH PESTA Village, KAHMARD district, MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

CHECKPOINT⁴⁰ at 120300D* Nov 11. The second attack reportedly lasted 30 minutes, and included AK-47s, PKMs and up to five RPGs. There have been no INS, ANSF or LN casualties reported. Local ANP requested immediate assistance from the NZPRT.

26. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ As at 120830D* Nov 11, the BAMYAN OCC-P and Provincial-level ANP were not aware of these attacks. The NDS Provincial HQ reported that these attacks were conducted by the same INS group that conducted the attempted assassination of KAHMARD ~~PSR(sen)1~~ on 06 Nov 11.

27. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ **NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT:** The reported attacks PROBABLY occurred. It is assessed that these attacks were LIKELY conducted by INS, as criminal elements are unlikely to attack static ANSF locations; it is unlikely that ANSF would fabricate multiple attacks in a short timeframe and it is also unlikely that disaffected LN would conduct multiple attacks against manned ANP positions.

28. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ Both ISH PESTA town and the ANP ISH PESTA CHECKPOINT have been previously attacked by INS on multiple occasions. These locations are close to the Provincial Boundary, which provides attackers quick access to safe havens in TWB that CF and ANP cannot easily enter. There is also a degree of support for INS amongst LN in the area, including from civil leaders at ISH PESTA. The conduct of this attack in the early morning suggests a degree of reconnaissance, planning and forethought, indicating a level of professionalism amongst the attackers.

29. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ No reporting on these specific attacks mentions who was responsible. It is assessed that they may also POSSIBLY have led these attacks. This attack is LIKELY linked to the 11 Nov 11 IED attack at CHARTOK. Reporting on the 11 Nov 11 attack mentioned Abdullah KALTA and Qari MUSA as possible INS leaders responsible. All three alleged attacks are within a six kilometre area and within 24 hours thus it is assessed that either the same group conducted all three attacks, or that the attacks were conducted by separate groups but synchronised by higher leadership. **END COMMENT.**

NZPRT S2 ASSESSMENT

30. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ This reporting period has seen a significant increase in INS activity within the NZPRT AO and AI. A POSSIBLE reason for this spike is INS using the end of Eid al-Adha as a trigger to commence a round of kinetic activity, LIKELY part of a last series of attacks prior to the onset of winter.

31. ~~(SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ The assassination attempt on ~~PSR(sen)1~~ occurred in the same week as three LIKELY attacks in BAMYAN E of DO ABE, and one in ANADARAH. Also during the week, there was increased reporting of fighters moving into TWB. That these three reporting streams occurred in the same week indicates a LIKELY synchronisation between INS activity in RYS, ISH PESTA/CHARTOK, and TWB. The

⁴⁰ ISH PESTA ANP Checkpoint, KAHMARD district, MGRS ~~PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3~~

exact nature of these links is unconfirmed, however it is assessed that there is LIKELY a degree of higher leadership directing this activity.

32. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) To date, both the assassination attempt and other INS activity in CHARTOK, ISH PESTA, ANADARAH and BARFAK has been largely unsuccessful from an INS perspective, with no CF, ANSF or LN deaths or major injuries. This lack of obvious success is assessed to be a LIKELY motivation for INS to conduct further attacks in the next 7 days. This motivation is linked to the LIKELY INS requirement to inflict significant casualties in order to maximize financial reward from higher leadership in PAKISTAN.

33. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) Previous assessments have estimated INS strength in the area as approximately 15-20 fighters, with access to moderate amounts of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The only report of INS casualties over this period is PSR(sen)1 death, and with only one recently reported IED detonated (at CHARTOK), it is assessed that BAMYAN/TWB INS still have sufficient weapons, ammunition, IEDs and motivated fighters to conduct at least one more attack in 2011.

34. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) The location of the attempted assassination of PSR(sen)1 in RYS, was LIKELY selected as PSR(sen)1 rarely travels from that area, and PSR(sen)1 is assessed as a key INS target. The bulk of the other INS activity remains focussed in the area of BAMYAN E of DO ABE, and into TWB. This is LIKELY due to the proximity to INS safe havens and an increased level of LN support in that area. Thus further attacks, if they occur against CF/ANSF convoys, are LIKELY to be along MSR PSR(S)1 from TOGHAY through to TALA DISTRICT CENTRE. Attacks against static locations remain LIKELY to be focussed on ANP checkpoints, POSSIBLY at DAHANE SAYGHAN, DAHANE ISH PESTA, SANGPAR, in DO ABE or in TWB. It is assessed that whilst INS POSSIBLY prefer to attack CF, they will choose to attack ANP in these areas rather than moving further into BAMYAN to attack CF convoys or static locations.

35. (~~SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO~~) It is POSSIBLE that Qari MUSA and/or Abdul KALTA have returned to TWB (or, less likely, BAMYAN), and are coordinating INS activity in person.


Threat Courses of Action

MLCOA: A complex attack by a small group of INS (four to ten) initiated with an IED and reinforced with SAF that targets an NZPRT or ANSF patrol in the north east of BAMYAN Province on MSR **PSR(S)1** from GHANDAK⁴¹ to DO ABE⁴² and east to ISH PESTA Check Point⁴³, and along ASR **PSR(S)1** from DASTE SAFED⁴⁴ to DO ABE.

MDCOA:

- a. **Force:** A complex attack that is initiated to isolate elements of an NZ patrol so that the insurgents are able to capture a PRT member. This would be likely to be coupled with setting a secondary device aimed at first responders to maintain isolation effect.
- b. **Mission:** Loss of confidence by the people of Bamyan in the ability of the PRT/ANSF to provide for their security during the Transition process.

ROUTE THREAT STATE ASSESSMENT



⁴¹ GHANDAK: **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

⁴² DO ABE MGRS: **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

⁴³ ISH PESTA Check Point: MGRS **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

⁴⁴ DASTE SAFED: MGRS **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

Comd TU CRIB XIX Priority Intelligence Requirements

PIR 1. What is the INS threat to the NZPRT personnel, assets and Lines of Operation?

PIR 2. What is the INS threat to GIRoA organisations, personnel, assets and effectiveness?

PIR 3. What is the INS threat to the NZPRT LofC?

PIR 4. What is the capacity and effectiveness of GIRoA agencies?

PIR 5. What is the public perception of, and relationship with, the key government and influence groups?

PIR 6. What are the other negative influences that have the potential to create instability within BAMYAN?

PIR 7. What foreign (other than ISAF) states, groups or agencies are engaged within BAMYAN?

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INTOP

A/S2

LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE	
CONFIRMED	Approximately 95 per cent or greater
PROBABLE	Approximately 75 per cent or greater
LIKELY	Approximately 50 per cent or greater
POSSIBLE	Approximately 15 per cent or greater
DOUBTFUL	Approximately 14 per cent or less

List of internal and external recipients of this Intsum

DISTRIBUTION

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3