



Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee

ERD Ag (09) 1

10 February 2009

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Agenda

8:30am

Wednesday, 11 February 2009

Cabinet Committee Room (8.4), 8th Floor, Beehive

- 1 United Nations Review of New Zealand's Human Rights Situation: Draft Report for Public Consultation

ERD (09) 5

- 2 Afghanistan: New Zealand's Contributions Beyond September 2009

ERD (09) 3

- 3 Malaysia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement: Closing Mandate

ERD (09) 1

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Saphron Powell
for Secretary of the Cabinet

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Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee

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Afghanistan: New Zealand's Contributions Beyond September 2009

Portfolios Foreign Affairs / Defence

Purpose This paper seeks agreement to extend New Zealand's current military, police, and intelligence contributions in Afghanistan for one year to September 2010, and also seeks agreement to review New Zealand's Afghanistan commitment beyond September 2010.

Previous Consideration In November 2007, the previous government agreed to the continued deployment of military, police, and intelligence personnel in Afghanistan for one year to 30 September 2009 [CAB Min (07) 42/13]. Five 12-month extensions of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF)-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) have been agreed to date.

Summary The current mandates and funding arrangements for the NZDF, the New Zealand Police (the Police), and intelligence deployments to Afghanistan expire in September 2009. The development assistance programme is funded to 2011.

It is proposed that the military, police, and intelligence mandates be extended to September 2010. An extension will be challenging, particularly for the NZDF (i.e. pressure on equipment and personnel), but manageable.

New Zealand's continued presence in Afghanistan to 30 September 2010 would comprise:

- deployment of the PRT of up to 140 NZDF personnel, based mainly in Bamiyan province with associated support staff at Bagram airbase and in Kabul;
- deployment of up to five NZDF personnel to maintain the New Zealand facilities at PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2 Replace with 'name of base'
- attachment of up to five personnel to various operational headquarters in Afghanistan;
- provision of one military advisor to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan;

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Replace with:
"continued
contribution of
NZSIS personnel
to assist the wider
in-country
intelligence support
effort"

- attachment of up to two medical specialists to the Multi-national Medical Unit in Kandahar;
- attachment of two NZDF non-commissioned officers working with the United Kingdom providing command and leadership training to the Afghan National Army;
- continued provision of intelligence support by the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) to NZDF elements;
- continued **PSR(R)1 PSR(R)(2)**
- continued attachment of three Police trainers to the European Union Police and involvement in training and mentoring the Afghan National Police in Bamyán province.

It is also proposed that a review be undertaken of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan beyond September 2010. The findings of the review, including any financial implications, will be reported to Ministers by mid-2009.

If Ministers decided to downsize the PRT or to withdraw, it would be necessary for New Zealand to signal its intentions and begin planning at least one year in advance, to allow another contributor to be identified and given time to take over.

The threat to New Zealand personnel in Afghanistan ranges from MEDIUM to HIGH. A paper seeking approval, for security reasons, to increase the number of personnel deployed to the PRT in Bamyán Province, will be submitted in the near future.

Annexes 1-5 on pages 22-35 provide background information on aspects on New Zealand's involvement in Afghanistan.

Baseline Implications

The estimated cost of the proposed extension to September 2010 (listed in a table on pages 12-13) is:

- \$41.553 million for the NZDF from Vote Defence Force;
- **PSR(R)2&3** for the GCSB from Vote Communications Security and Intelligence;
- **PSR(R)2&3** for the NZSIS from Vote Security Intelligence.

The Police are funded by New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency.

Defence funding issues relating to operationally deployed forces will be addressed in an upcoming paper.

Legislative Implications

None.

Replace with "name of country and base"

Timing Issues	The Memorandum of Understanding with PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2 covering PSR(R)1&2 will need to be renewed by April 2009.
Announcement	There will be appropriate publicity for the decisions taken by Cabinet.
Consultation	<p>Paper prepared by MFAT. NZAID, Defence, NZDF, Police, DPMC, EAB, NZSIS, and GCSB were consulted.</p> <p>The Minister of Police was consulted. The Minister of Foreign Affairs indicates discussion is not required with the government caucus or with other parties represented in Parliament.</p>

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence recommend that the Committee:

Background

- 1 note that New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan began as a gesture of solidarity with the United States of America (US) after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and has been transformed subsequently into a broader commitment involving international organisations, including the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and a substantial number of countries with which New Zealand is allied or enjoys close relations;
- 2 note that, despite some improvements in Afghanistan since early success against Al Qa'ida and the Taliban in 2001, the overall situation remains of major concern and requires an ongoing and substantial international programme of security and development assistance to the government of Afghanistan;
- 3 note:
 - 3.1 the continuous involvement of New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) personnel and assets in Afghanistan since December 2001, with the focus on the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan Province [CAB Min (02) 23/2; CAB Min (02) 30/20; CAB Min (03) 19/12; CAB Min (04) 8/5 and CAB Min (04) 41/31; CAB Min (05) 40/1; CAB Min (06) 12/15; and CAB Min (07) 8/3];
 - 3.2 that in November 2007, the previous government agreed to the continued deployment of military, police, and intelligence personnel in Afghanistan for one year to 30 September 2009 [CAB Min (07) 42/13];
- 4 note that New Zealand's contributions in Afghanistan since 2001, through both military and development assistance, total more than \$160.0 million;
- 5 note New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency's (NZAID) current three-year (2009-2011) \$21.0 million programme of assistance to Afghanistan;
- 6 note that New Zealand's security and development efforts in Afghanistan are intended to be transitional, assisting the government of Afghanistan to be able to wield effective authority and good governance throughout the country;

- 7 note that the political and security environment for the New Zealand effort in Afghanistan remains of concern, with threat environments ranging currently from MEDIUM to HIGH;

Extension of New Zealand contribution in Afghanistan

- 8 note that, based on the current level of international deployments and the re-rolling of combat support units, the New Zealand security effort in Afghanistan, with particular reference to the PRT in Bamyan Province, remains sustainable until November 2010, but that beyond September 2009 the PRT deployment will increasingly impact on the NZDF's other commitments such as:

- 8.1 training;
- 8.2 combat support core skills;
- 8.3 the Defence Sustainability Initiative and Defence Long-Term Development Plan projects;
- 8.4 other deployed missions and contingency support operations;

- 9 agree to the continuation of New Zealand's current security effort in Afghanistan, for one year from 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010 at an estimated cost of \$41.443 million, comprising the following elements:

- 9.1 deployment of the PRT of up to 140 NZDF personnel, based mainly in Bamyan province with associated support staff at Bagram airbase and in Kabul;
- 9.2 deployment of up to five NZDF personnel to maintain the New Zealand facilities at ^{PSR(R)1} ^{PSR(R)2} [redacted] - Replace with: "name of base"
- 9.3 attachment of up to five personnel to various operational headquarters in Afghanistan;
- 9.4 provision of one military advisor to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan;
- 9.5 attachment of up to two medical specialists to the Multi-national Medical Unit in Kandahar;
- 9.6 attachment of two NZDF non-commissioned officers working with the United Kingdom providing command and leadership training to the Afghan National Army;

- 10 agree to the continued provision of intelligence support by the Government Communications Security Bureau to deployed NZDF elements for one year, from **1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010** at a total additional cost (in Vote Communications Security and Intelligence) of \$ **PSR(R)2&3**

- 11 agree to **PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3** [redacted] until 30 September 2010, at a total additional cost (in Vote Security Intelligence) of ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} [redacted]

Replace with "continued contribution of NZSIS personnel to assist the wider in-country intelligence support effort."

- 12 agree to the continued attachment of three Police trainers to a European Union policing programme and involved in training and mentoring the Afghan National Police in Bamyan province for one year, from 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010, at a cost of up to \$1.0 million to be funded by NZAID;

Provincial Reconstruction Team issues

- 13 note that, because of deteriorating security conditions, the NZDF has taken steps within the current mandate to mitigate ongoing risks but that a separate paper will be submitted shortly to the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee (ERD) seeking approval to raise the current authorisation for personnel deployed to the PRT above 140;
- 14 note that the options listed above both directly support the PRT and also contribute to other important areas such as co-ordination and capacity building, support for the UN and assistance to New Zealand's security partners, thus greatly enhancing New Zealand's overall profile and reflecting the multifaceted nature of operations in Afghanistan;
- 15 note the potential need for additional finance to cover infrastructure and capability costs associated with the extension of the Bamyan PRT beyond September 2009;
- 16 note that urban encroachment on the PRT base during the next two-to-three years may force New Zealand to consider substantial rebuilding or even relocation of the base which, if or when it becomes necessary, will incur significant additional costs;

Defence funding issues

- 17 note that the current level of appropriation and future baseline funding will be inadequate to fully support the marginal costs of all future NZDF deployments beyond 2009/10;
- 18 note that defence funding issues relating to operationally deployed forces will be addressed in an upcoming paper to ERD;
- 19 note that the Singapore Armed Forces units will again co-locate with the New Zealand PRT, subject to conclusion of suitable arrangements between Singapore and New Zealand, and with NATO/International Security Assistance Force;
- 20 note that, with the exception of the redeployment of the New Zealand Special Air Service, the NZDF has limited capacity at present to consider additional options beyond the current mix of commitments;

Next steps

Replace with: "name of country and base"

- 21 note that the Memorandum of Understanding with **PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2** covering **PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2** was extended in April 2008 and will need to be renewed by April 2009;

- 22 22.1 agree that a review of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan beyond September 2010 be undertaken to examine more deeply the needs and opportunities for change, taking account of:
- 22.1.1 developments in Bamyan Province and other parts of Afghanistan;
 - 22.1.2 moves towards Afghanistan and the re-balancing of military and non-military effort by other international contributors;
 - 22.1.3 the policies of the new US Administration and its expectations of partners;
 - 22.1.4 addressing options for smaller, more focussed military contributions beyond the PRT commitment, and international benefits derived from ongoing engagement;
- 22.2 note that the findings of the review, including the financial implications of recommended options, will be reported to relevant Ministers by mid-2009.

Saphron Powell
for Secretary of the Cabinet

Copies to:

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Tony Lynch, DPMC
Director, EAB
Director, NZSIS
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Secretary to the Treasury
Commissioner of Police
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Simon Murdoch, Chief Executive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Secretary of Defence
Chief of Defence Force

Chair,
Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee

AFGHANISTAN: NEW ZEALAND CONTRIBUTIONS BEYOND SEPTEMBER 2009

Proposal

This paper proposes that Cabinet agree to extend New Zealand's current military, police and intelligence contributions in Afghanistan for one year to September 2010, and that a review be undertaken during 2009 of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan beyond that date. It also foreshadows another submission seeking approval, for security reasons, to increase the number of personnel deployed to the Provincial Reconstruction team in Bamyan Province beyond the 140 currently authorised.

Executive Summary

2 New Zealand participation in the international effort to promote security, governance and development in Afghanistan has military, police, intelligence and development assistance components. The current mandates and funding arrangements for New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), New Zealand Police (NZ Police) and intelligence deployments expire in September 2009 [CAB Min (07) 42/13]. The development assistance programme, which is delivered largely through partnerships with governmental and non-governmental development agencies, is funded for three years (2008-11).


3 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and bilateral agreements with Afghanistan provide the legal basis for the New Zealand presence. The main New Zealand contribution is the 140 strong Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Bamyan province which provides a security assurance for local communities, undertakes small assistance projects on behalf of the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) and larger United States-funded projects, and supports provincial government governance initiatives (see maps on following pages). NZDF personnel in Kabul, at Bagram airbase and in PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 provide logistic and other support to the PRT. Small numbers of NZDF personnel also serve in operational headquarters in Afghanistan, in United Kingdom (UK) units training the Afghan National Army (ANA), in a multinational medical unit in Kandahar, and as military advisor to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).

PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Three NZ Police trainers attached to a European Union (EU) policing programme work from the Bamyan PRT. Replace with: "Description of GCSB support to NZDF, and NZSIS personnel to contribute to the wider in-country intelligence support effort."

Replace
with:
"name of
country"





Replace with: "intelligence."

4 It is proposed to extend the mandates of all these NZDF, ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} and NZ Police elements for a further year, to September 2010. An extension will be challenging, especially for the NZDF, but is manageable. The NZDF continues to operate at a higher level than the agreed forces commitment under the NZDF Output Plan and faces increasing pressure on mission critical equipment and experienced and specialist military personnel.

5 The estimated costs of the proposed extensions are NZ\$41.553m for the NZDF components, ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} for the GCSB component and ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} for the NZSIS component. The NZ Police deployment is funded separately by NZAID.

6 Although New Zealand's military commitments are small in the context of the overall international effort, they are highly valued by the United States and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), which now leads the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) through which our contributions are made. There are frequent requests for New Zealand to contribute more, and these may increase under a new US Administration that gives a higher priority to Afghanistan, but such requests have to be weighed against domestic priorities and commitments and contingencies in the Pacific and Asia. A decision to reduce New Zealand's military contribution, especially to the PRT, will need to be signalled at least a year in advance to enable the US and ISAF to identify alternative contributors.

7 Despite improvements reflected in a number of economic and social indicators, the outlook for Afghanistan remains uncertain, and significant levels of international support will be needed for some time to come. The overall security situation is worrying, hampering development efforts and limiting the reach of the Afghan government. Counter-insurgency operations have enjoyed considerable tactical success but have not translated into the broad-based security necessary for economic development, good governance and political reconciliation. Bamyan is among the more peaceful, stable and secure provinces but has experienced some negative trends during the past year, and the situation is likely to deteriorate further during 2009. The NZDF has taken steps to mitigate these risks within the current mandate but additional personnel will be required to bolster patrols and meet increasing threat levels. The threat to New Zealand personnel operating in Bamyan Province is currently assessed as **MEDIUM**.

8 The pressures on NZDF, the prospect of policy adjustments under a new US Administration, initiatives in NATO/ISAF planning and through the UN to improve coordination of the international effort in Afghanistan make the next few months opportune to re-examine New Zealand's current policy settings and the nature of our commitment. The scope of such a review is canvassed in this paper.

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Background

New Zealand's Involvement in Afghanistan

9 New Zealand became involved in Afghanistan as a gesture of solidarity with the United States in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Our engagement began as a military operation in a purely military context, the US-led counter-terrorism intervention, under a Chapter VII UNSC mandate, against Al Qaida and the Taleban in Afghanistan. Our initial contribution was made by deployment of the Special Air Service (SAS). After early success against the Taleban, the Afghanistan venture was transformed into a different operation, a combination of security, development and peace-building. In this context, we agreed to take over the Bamyán PRT to enable the US, which established it, to replicate the PRT in another region. New Zealand currently operates under the ISAF mandate. We remain in Afghanistan as part of international state building efforts, led by NATO and the United Nations, to assist Afghanistan meet its massive security, political and development challenges. This commitment, which is an important element in our relations with the US and other security partners, involves a wide range of our allies and friends. Annex 1 contains more information on the background to New Zealand's involvement.

Situation in Afghanistan

10 Despite improvements in a number of areas, the situation and outlook for Afghanistan are dogged by major uncertainties. Afghanistan remains socially and politically divided. Brutalised and impoverished by decades of war, neglect and mismanagement, Afghanistan is still overwhelmingly a tribal society with tribal allegiances and frictions that work against aspirations to a more effective national government. Political parties are not legally recognised, and alliances of interest in the lower house of the National Assembly follow familiar ethnic lines: Pashtun vs non-Pashtun. President Karzai has not succeeded in the extremely difficult task of melding his disparate nation together and has lost ground politically, not just because of the difficult tasks before him **PSR(R)1**

As he has moved to shore up Pashtun ethnic support, his broader national support has declined. There seems not to be a viable contender to replace Karzai in the 2009 presidential elections, but he is unlikely to poll as well as in 2004. It is premature to speculate about the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elections.

11 There have been some improvements in governance and economic performance, but there is a long way to go and the basics are lacking in many areas, particularly in the south. Education levels, the key to a better future, remain very low, though there are ongoing improvements in both education and health care. While there has been some success in low-level attempts at reconciliation, it has lacked a strong thrust. **PSR(R)1**

12 The overall security situation is worrying. Since 2006/7 there has been a significant rise in insurgency-related violence, including suicide attacks, and attacks have spread to previously quieter areas. The security situation has been hampering development and limiting the reach of the Afghan government, while increasing numbers of civilian casualties from coalition military action have lessened Afghan public support for international efforts. An anti-narcotics strategy involving interdiction, eradication, justice and alternative livelihoods has made progress in some areas during 2008 but at the cost of many lives and not in the crucial areas in the south of the country where the bulk of the fighting takes place. The geographical overlap between the regions of opium cultivation and zones of insurgency shows the link between the drugs trade and the ongoing conflict.

13 Counter-insurgency operations have enjoyed considerable tactical success but have not translated into strategic outcomes such as the broad-based security necessary for political reconciliation and economic development to prosper. ISAF is finding it difficult to counter insurgent asymmetric tactics and information operations or the ability of the insurgents to use Pakistan as a haven and supply base. The overall sustainability of coalition operations in Afghanistan requires consent from a stable government in Pakistan, which is facing its own internal security risks. Significant improvements in security in Afghanistan are unlikely unless the international military and security presence is greatly increased. Troop numbers remain well short of what is needed; some estimates suggest that success will require five to six times the 50,700 currently deployed. Most ISAF members have expressed a commitment for the long term but a number of countries, for domestic political reasons, place restrictions on the use of their troops. Annex 2 provides more information on the overall security situation.

Security Situation in Bamyan

14 Bamyan remains one of the most peaceful, stable and secure provinces in Afghanistan but the operating environment is best described as permissive, with expanding pockets of instability. Criminal activity, notably drug trafficking, is increasing across the province, and there has been an increase in insurgent movement in the North and East of the Province, particularly near the border with Baghlan Province. Bamyan is currently well served by its senior officials, especially Governor Sarabi and the Provincial Police Chief, but **PSR(R)1**

and its sustainability in Bamyan cannot be guaranteed

15 The threat of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks has also grown during the past 12 months, especially on the road to Bagram. The Afghan national Police (ANP) have been targeted on several occasions and NZDF patrols were subjected to IED attacks in March and October 2008. As a result of these increased threats, the PRT has stepped up patrols in the North and North East of the province with the ANP, and taken steps to ensure the security and safety of personnel. Late last year the PRT took delivery of twelve up-armoured vehicles (under the same twelve-month lease arrangement as previously) .

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Replace with: "with improved defensive measures."

16 Bamiyan's major ethnic group, the Hazara, who suffered considerably under the Taliban, are well disposed towards international forces. There are localised tensions between Hazara and other ethnic groups which occasionally result in armed confrontations. The security situation in Bamiyan can be influenced by security developments in neighbouring provinces. Because of higher security risks, ISAF forces in neighbouring provinces do not conduct the same presence patrols as New Zealand does in Bamiyan. During the past year, six of the eight adjacent provinces – Ghazni, Dai Kundi, Sar-I Pul, Baghlan, Parwan and Wardak – have seen deteriorating security conditions and more insurgent activity.

International Strategy

17 At the NATO Bucharest Summit on Afghanistan in April 2008, ISAF contributor governments approved a new strategy for the medium-term through a Public Declaration and an internal Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan. Both underlined the need for a comprehensive approach with a balance between security, governance and development interventions, burden-sharing, enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility, a strengthened UN role, and better coordination within the international effort and between the international community and the Afghan Government. The need for increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan, was also identified.

18 The Bucharest Summit was followed in June 2008 by the Paris Conference on Afghanistan which launched the new Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), and adopted a Declaration identifying the key elements essential for the future security and prosperity of the Afghan people. It also underlined the expanded role of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative (UNSGSR) and of UNAMA in coordinating international efforts and improving coordination between the Afghan Government and the international community. Assistance totalling approximately \$US20 billion was pledged at the Paris Conference.

New Zealand Engagement

19 As a small player, New Zealand cannot have a major influence on, let alone determine, the peacebuilding strategy in Afghanistan but was represented at both major strategy conferences: in Bucharest the former Prime Minister led the delegation. New Zealand's total effort at the national level in Afghanistan is modest by comparison with the efforts of other countries, with Afghan needs, and with New Zealand's efforts in the aid and diplomatic spheres in other contexts. There is no permanent New Zealand diplomatic or aid presence in Afghanistan to support the NZDF and NZ Police deployments. This is a major difference from our involvement in Timor Leste or Solomon Islands, where we have resident diplomatic missions. Occasional visits by Ministers, by the non-resident Ambassador, and by Wellington-based personnel from a range of interested agencies, provide opportunities for consultations with Afghan authorities and

international agencies and for monitoring the effectiveness of New Zealand's effort.

20 The bulk of this effort is concentrated in Bamyan Province, where the PRT is located. Up to 140 NZDF and three Police personnel are stationed there. They provide a security assurance for local communities, undertake small assistance projects with New Zealand Official Development Assistance (NZODA) funding and support larger US-funded projects, and assist provincial government governance initiatives. Small numbers of NZDF personnel perform liaison roles with ISAF in Kabul and with US forces in Bagram. The PRT has hosted a small detachment of personnel from the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) since 2007 and anticipates this continuing during 2009. NZAID channels assistance to the province through UN agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and directly to national institutions. Wherever possible this is done in collaboration with other donors.

Security Assistance – Military and Police

21 A major part of the international security assistance effort in Afghanistan is devoted to building up and training the Afghan National Army (ANA) so that it can take on more of the burden of combating the insurgency and providing security for Afghanistan's citizens. Success in this endeavour will allow multinational forces to withdraw. Although NZDF provides two trainers in Kabul, it has no training role in Bamyan, where there is no current ANA presence. We understand that deployment of a small ANA unit to Bamyan is being considered, it would be non-Pashtun (as is the bulk of ANA) to accommodate ethnic sensitivities of the primarily Hazara population of Bamyan.

22 The second pillar of international security assistance is directed at improving the professional competence and capabilities of the Afghan National Police, a critical ingredient for long-term stability and prosperity. New Zealand Police provides some training and capacity building for the ANP in Bamyan under a European Union Police (EUPOL) programme which is focused on training of trainers and mentoring to produce Afghan owned training capacity; strengthening ANP law enforcement capacity; and rule of law and investigation skills. The New Zealand Police presence in Bamyan is funded by NZAID (up to NZ\$1m a year) and supported by the PRT, without which it could not be sustained.

23 A transition of the New Zealand effort in the Bamyan PRT away from security towards a greater development focus would become possible if credible Afghan security forces were available to replace them, which is one of the ultimate aims of the international assistance effort. The most likely option at present, deployment of a small ANA/ANP coordination unit to Bamyan, would not be sufficient to maintain security. As Bamyan is more secure than other provinces in Afghanistan, it would make more sense for the ANP, rather than the ANA, to deploy there, in which case the PRT could hand responsibility for security to them. However, the ANP **PSR(R)1** and requires a lot more training and development before this would be a feasible option.

Development Assistance

24 A large number of donors provide support to Afghanistan. UNAMA is tasked with overall coordination between international donors, including ISAF, and the Government of Afghanistan. Greater efforts are being made to deliver a more coherent and better coordinated programme of assistance that is closely aligned with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). All New Zealand funded programmes are aligned with the ANDS, the Bamyan Provincial Development Plan, and, where they exist, Ministry of Foreign and Trade (MFAT) strategies. Programmes also seek to build capacity of provincial government staff and civil society actors as well as to create an environment supportive of private sector activity. These are done in concert with international NGOs, UN agencies, funds and programmes, and through working directly with provincial organisations.

25 The NZ PRT has received NZ\$1m annually of NZODA funds to carry out work in support of the provincial government in Bamyan. This has included construction of district offices for the ANP and provision of essential policing equipment in collaboration with NZ Police. More recently the PRT has focussed construction work primarily on flood protection activities, drawing on available engineering skills and capabilities, with a view to improving and sustaining community access to schools and clinics during the spring thaws and reducing damage from floods and landslides. The PRT also provides extensive support to US-funded construction projects, particularly of primary and secondary roads that aim to connect Bamyan districts to each other and to Kabul. The US plans to make available a further US\$22m from the Commanders Emergency Response Programme (CERP) for future projects in Bamyan.

26 NZAID has a separate assistance programme to Afghanistan focussed largely on Bamyan. Before 2005, New Zealand made a number of one-off grants to organisations such as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF), and the World Bank managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The ARTF pools and manages donor funds in support of the Afghanistan government's operational budget (first priority) and development budget (second priority).

27 After an NZAID scoping mission in late 2005, Ministers agreed to channel assistance through a select group of organisations working in Bamyan Province and to target assistance to sustainable rural livelihoods and relevant sectors: education, health and development of provincial government and civil society capacity to deliver services. Empowerment of women and observance of human rights are central concerns. Much of the annual budget (NZ\$5m in 2005 and NZ\$7m in 2008) is committed for three year programmes. By working through partners NZAID seeks to ensure continued delivery of its programmes even if the PRT was to withdraw. Annex 3 provides more information about the current ODA programme.

Current and Future Military Engagement

28 The NZ PRT spends about 70 percent of its time on security and about 30 percent on development, reconstruction and governance. Security work includes long-range patrolling, facilitating meetings, gathering information for surveys and investigating and responding to security incidents. In the worsening security environment, more attention has to be paid to protection of the PRT.

29 The NZDF has progressively improved force protection measures across a range of areas throughout 2008 in response to this increased threat. Improved 'protected mobility' has now been implemented with the addition of twelve up-armoured vehicles with PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3. A Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE) comprising PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 has also been deployed alongside the extra security staff approved in March 2008 to reinforce patrols. Despite difficulties for the NZDF in sustaining the current commitment, increases in personnel and equipment are viewed as inevitable given the increased need for force protection measure to mitigate future risks. **Replace with: "Defensive measures."**

30 A greater number of up-armoured vehicles, spread across three separate geographical locations, requires another mechanic, driving instructor and technician to maintain the vehicles PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3. This three person increase fits within the current mandate. The technician has already been deployed to Afghanistan. The driving instructor and mechanic will be deployed with CRIB 14. All three positions have been added to the CRIB 14 establishment to deploy in April 2009. **Replace with: "Defensive measures."**

31 Despite these measures, the security situation may warrant the addition of further personnel to the PRT to reinforce patrol activity, particularly in the north-eastern corner of Bamyan, and other support staff, including an extension of the PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3. Maintaining and extending this capability is considered prudent, given the requirement for ongoing close liaison with US and coalition special operations staff.

32 This potential increase to the current personnel limit will be the subject of a separate paper once a detailed feasibility study has been completed.

33 On the development, reconstruction and governance side the PRT has a facilitation, enabling and reporting role (otherwise known as an 'enhanced military observer' role) with coordination a central component. The PRT is facing challenges in capacity building because the NZDF personnel in the PRT lack experience or expertise in fields such as education. More rapid progress with capacity building and other aspects of Bamyan's development could be made if specialists were undertaking these tasks instead of NZDF, but these people would still require security support.

34 The PRT contingent receives logistic support from NZDF personnel at Bagram Airbase and at PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3. In addition the NZDF currently has a mandate for up to five staff in operational headquarters and liaison roles. An

Replace with: "name of country and base."

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First sentence
replace with:

11 "Description
of GCSB
support to
NZDF."
Second
sentence
replace
with: "NZSIS
personnel to
contribute to
the wider
international
intelligence
support
effort."

NZDF staff presence helps to lift New Zealand's profile and provides New Zealand with insights into operational and strategic level issues. The positions held by the New Zealand staff vary according to ISAF's needs and to NZDF's judgement as to which posts provide the most professional benefit, profile and situational awareness. NZDF also contributes a military advisor to UNAMA; up to two medical specialists to a multi-national medical unit in Kandahar; and two non-commissioned officers to a British unit providing command and leadership training for the ANA. PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Annex 4 provides more information about these NZDF

35 This paper proposes to extend all these NZDF, PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 commitments for one year, to September 2010. This suite of deployments is making a broad-based contribution to Afghanistan's security that is earning New Zealand good international recognition. The PRT is providing a highly visible and effective security force in the centre of Afghanistan. Our military staff and liaison officers, medical specialists, and intelligence personnel are making highly valued contributions in niche areas. In the critical security sector we are contributing both police and military personnel to the reform efforts.

Replace with:
"and
intelligence"

36 If it was decided to downsize the PRT or to withdraw, it would be necessary to signal our intentions and begin planning at least one year in advance. This is to allow another contributor to be identified and given time to prepare to take over, if the ANA or ANP are not able to assume responsibility for security in Bamyán. The proposed one year extension of the current commitments acknowledges this reality.

Sustainability

37 Cabinet has agreed to five twelve-month extensions of the NZDF-led PRT. The current six month rotation is the thirteenth. Assessed against the current level of international deployments, mitigation strategies have been developed to sustain the PRT until September 2010.

38 This proposed extension, plus subsequent proposed additions, will be challenging, but manageable. The NZDF is continuing to operate at a higher level than the agreed forces commitment under the NZDF Output Plan. This is especially so for land-based operations. Sustaining commitments to Afghanistan alongside the NZDF's other operational commitments, especially to Timor Leste, is becoming increasingly problematic. The demands of these operations limit the NZDF's capability and capacity to respond to contingencies in New Zealand's region and contribute to new missions outside it, including UN missions. They are also slowing recovery under the Defence Sustainability Initiative, and inhibiting the ability to meet outputs under the Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP) projects. An extension would place further pressure on key specialist positions, such as medics, intelligence and communications staff, and on middle management/leadership positions (Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors). However, should

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Ministers wish to consider additional contributions, limited Special Forces deployments could be contemplated after taking into account the need to retain a local regional contingency response capability.

39 Current finance allocated to the NZ PRT only covers standard operating costs; it does not take into account potential infrastructure and capability costs that will arise out of an extension beyond September 2009. A number of projects will need to be undertaken at Kiwi Base to enhance and develop infrastructure to meet the increasing security threat and extended use. These include water re-engineering, sewerage upgrade, a fire suppressant system and force protection improvements.

Replace
with
"Defensive
measures."

40 Medium to long term plans include the relocation of Forward Patrol Base (FPB) Romero (in the northern Kahmard District), re-engineering of Communication Information Systems (CIS) infrastructure, ongoing upgrades to PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 and up-armoured patrol vehicles (the current twelve month lease on vehicles will need to be reviewed). The ongoing costs of these projects and procurements is likely to be substantial.

41 Of considerable concern is the potential for urban encroachment on the PRT base as the Bamyan township expands during the next two to three years. The extent of this encroachment may force us to consider substantial rebuilding or even relocation of the base which, if or when it becomes necessary, will incur significant costs that will need to be weighed against expectations of New Zealand's commitment to Bamyan province. As part of the new township plans the Provincial Government is considering relocation of the airport, which is in very bad condition, to the Band-I Amir lakes region, 50 kms west of Bamyan township. This would affect our ability to sustain operations in the Province.

Costs

42 If current logistic and in-extremis support from NATO and the US continue, the costs of extending the PRT and other NZDF units listed above until 30 September 2010 is estimated to be NZ\$41.553m. The cost breakdown is as follows:

Role	2009/10 \$M (GST excl)	2010/11	Total Costs
<i>PRT and Associated Enablers</i>			
PRT & support	28.960	9.654	38.614 ¹
PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2	1.337	0.446	

Replace
with
'Name of
base'

¹ This figure includes costs associated with the PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 and for vehicle leases. It also takes into account the need to maintain higher numbers at the PRT during the winter months than previously. Replace with 'enhanced defensive measures.'

Movements Operator			1.783
Operational Headquarters	0.425	0.142	0.567
<i>Complementary options</i>			
UNAMA Military Advisory Unit	0.068	0.023	0.091
Medical specialists	0.135	0.045	0.180
Training ANA	0.238	0.080	0.318
Total Costs²	31.163	10.390	41.553

The cost of extending the GCSB component until 30 September 2010 is estimated to be ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} from Vote Communications Security and Intelligence. The cost of the NZSIS deployment, from Vote Security Intelligence, is ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3}. The cost breakdown is as follows:

Role	2009/10 \$M (GST excl)	2010/11	Total Costs
GCSB ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3}			
NZSIS ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3}			

Legal Issues

43 The legal basis for New Zealand's current deployments in Afghanistan stems from UN Security Council resolutions on ISAF and UNAMA, as well as the consent of the Governments of Afghanistan. The presence of international forces in Afghanistan was reaffirmed by the Government of Afghanistan in the Afghanistan Compact launched in January 2006. NZDF personnel serving in ISAF are covered by a Military Technical Arrangement (MTA) between ISAF and the Afghan Government. In addition to and overlapping with the ISAF MTA we have a bilateral status of forces arrangement with Afghanistan which applies to the PRT in Bamyán, the two NZDF personnel helping to train the Afghan National Army in Kabul, to other New Zealand personnel providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan, and to the NZ Police trainers in Bamyán. Negotiations

² The values in this table exclude infrastructure and capability costs that will arise out of an extension beyond September 2009, and any costs associated with the possible future relocation of the PRT.

are underway with the Government of Afghanistan to extend the cover of the MTA to all NZDF personnel in Afghanistan and to formalise assurances that the death penalty will not be applied to any detainee transferred to the Afghan authorities.

44 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) formalising our basing arrangements at PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2 the key transit point for our operations into Afghanistan where five NZDF personnel facilitate PRT rotations and maintain our facilities, was renewed in April 2008. It will require updating again in April 2009. PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2

Replace with: "name of base and country."

Annex 5 contains more detail on legal issues.

Command and Control

45 The existing command and control arrangements would be extended: these are described in Annex 5.

New Zealand Police Deployment

46 NZ Police currently maintains a deployment of three officers in Afghanistan funded by NZAID and attached to the NZPRT in Bamyan. They deployed initially in 2005 as part of the German-led Police Project but, since late 2007, have operated within the European Union's Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) which has incorporated the German-led programme and is now working in conjunction with the US Police programme to improve harmonisation and standardisation of police practice in Afghanistan. The NZ Police team currently provides one officer in a mentoring role for the provincial police chief and other senior Afghan police and two in training roles in the US-funded, Dyncorp-managed, Regional Training Centre (RTC) in Bamyan. The Police deployment has Cabinet approval until 30 September 2009. It is proposed to extend it for a further year, to September 2010.

47 In March 2007 the EU sought informal indications of New Zealand's willingness to make an increased Police contribution in Afghanistan. After some consideration, NZ Police concluded that it would be difficult to provide additional personnel to Afghanistan given existing domestic demands, other offshore commitments, and the absence of a dedicated budget or staffing pool for overseas deployments. As current deployments are funded by NZAID, any increase in such commitments may reduce funds available for long term development programmes.

International Expectations and Implications for New Zealand

48 The Bucharest Summit in April and the Paris Conference in June reinforced the long-term commitment of countries assisting Afghanistan; endorsed broad goals and specific plans to achieve them; emphasised the need to improve coordination of the international effort between international community and Afghan Government activities; and gave guidance on ways to achieve this by, among other things, enhancing the role of the UN Secretary General's Special Representative and UNAMA. They also highlighted the many challenges that

remain, including corruption, combating illegal narcotics production, promotion of sustainable development, and weak government performance.

49 There is a sense of unease within the international community about recent trends. The conflict shows no sign of abating but few contributing countries are willing to offer the additional troops that military commanders consider necessary. The persistent insecurity inhibits development and governance improvements, making it hard to win and retain popular support for the Afghan government and the international intervention, especially in contested areas of the country. With elections approaching, the Afghan government is publicly more ambivalent about the role of the international community. US President-elect Obama has signalled his intention to give greater priority to Afghanistan, especially in the military sphere, but this turns on a clear and clean exit from Iraq.

50 New Zealand receives frequent approaches to consider additional military assistance, such as redeploying the SAS; providing army trainers in Kabul; mounting a new PRT in Dai Kundi province; and contributing personnel to Operational Mentoring and Liaison teams (OMLTs) to help train the ANA. Annex 6 summarises these requests. Such approaches can be expected to continue, especially if the US focus on Afghanistan increases, but are unlikely to be pressed vigorously as long as we are leading the Bamyán PRT and remain heavily committed elsewhere (Solomon Islands, Timor Leste). If it were to be decided to reduce our contribution to, or withdraw from the PRT, some of these alternatives – or others, such as bringing other troop contributors into the PRT to share the burden – would have to be contemplated, given Afghanistan's vulnerability and our strong public expressions of support for the international effort there.

Comment

51 Despite these questions there is no obvious call or need for New Zealand to make sudden changes to its current approach to assistance to Afghanistan, centring on the Bamyán PRT and a worthwhile programme of development assistance. This represents an appropriate balance for a small contributor with limited resources.

52 However, there are good reasons to be actively considering future changes to our involvement in Afghanistan. The international effort in Afghanistan is intended to be essentially transitional, enduring (at current substantial levels) only until Afghanistan is able to stand on its own feet. It follows a peacebuilding model under which security assistance would progressively give way to increasing development assistance. In northern and many western parts of Afghanistan reasonable progress has been made in implementing that model: the security situation is relatively stable, and development challenges are being addressed. In the south and east of Afghanistan, implementing the model is more problematic, with severe security threats inhibiting reconstruction and development. Unless the insurgency can be dealt with effectively, this situation is likely to continue.

53 Bamiyan province is often cited as one of the most peaceful and secure provinces of Afghanistan. Reconstruction and development are impeded there by the absence of Afghan Government activity and by limited international development assistance rather than by insurgent attacks. If more interest can be generated, Bamiyan offers promising scope for moving more quickly along the peacebuilding continuum, with security and stabilisation being taken over by the Afghan Government and its agencies, and greater effort being made in development. Paths to this end could involve the progressive civilianisation of the Bamiyan PRT, and its eventual disbandment. This transition cannot be achieved, or even attempted, without increased participation by the Afghan Government in security and development efforts in the province.

54 New Zealand would in principle be able to consider options that replace security assistance to a greater or lesser extent with development assistance but is currently not well placed to manage such changes at the Afghan end. The Bamiyan PRT has only NZDF and NZ Police personnel. There is no MFAT or NZAID presence nor any specialist personnel, although the PRT hosts a US State Department advisor and a US Agency for International Development (USAID) advisor with a local counterpart, none of whom reports to New Zealand, and has hosted a USDA advisor in the past. The Ambassador accredited to Afghanistan (resident in Tehran) visits roughly once a year. These factors limit New Zealand's capacity to monitor and influence the direction of policy developments in Bamiyan province or more widely in Afghanistan, and means that we depend heavily on others for information upon which key New Zealand decisions are made.

55 Accordingly, it is recommended that New Zealand should maintain its proposed level and mix of effort until September 2010, using the period until September 2009 to examine more deeply the need and opportunities for change. This will include recommendations for our engagement in Bamiyan Province and in Afghanistan more broadly beyond September 2010, taking account of the pace and direction of developments in Afghanistan, especially of progress in Afghanisation and of moves to re-balance military and non-military efforts by other international contributors. It will also include options for smaller and more focussed military contributions other than the PRT, along with comment on NZDF sustainability and on the international benefits to be derived from ongoing engagement at either the same or reduced levels of total effort. The findings of this examination, including the financial implications of the possible options, will be reported to Ministers in 2009 in time for any changes to be implemented in a non-disruptive way for partners and allies.

Consultation

56 This submission was prepared through an inter-agency process under the whole of government approach to off-shore deployments. Participating agencies were Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Police, Department of the Prime Minister & Cabinet, External Assessments

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Bureau, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau.

Financial Implications

57 The estimated marginal cost of the continuation of New Zealand's current security effort in Afghanistan, for one year from 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2010, is NZ\$41.553m. This comprises all costs including allowances, travel and accommodation in theatre that will be met from Vote Defence Force, Departmental Output Expense Operationally Deployed Forces, for the 2009/10 and 2010/11 financial years.

58 Vote Defence Force, Departmental Output Expense Operationally Deployed Forces has a current appropriation of \$54.110 million (2008/09), and baseline funding of \$49.137 million (2009/10) and \$51.594 million (2010/2011) to meet the marginal costs of all deployments approved by Government.

59 Based on the extension proposed in this paper and likely extensions to other NZDF deployments into 2009/10 and beyond, the current level of appropriation and future baseline funding will be inadequate to fully support the marginal costs of all future deployments. Defence funding issues relating to operationally deployed forces are being addressed in an accompanying paper.

60 The estimated cost of continuing current GCSB support to the security effort in Afghanistan for one year from 1 October 2009 to 30 September 2010 is NZ\$^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} of which \$^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} would be incurred in FY 2009/10 and \$^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} in FY2010/11. For NZSIS the estimated cost of extension to 30 September 2010 is NZ\$^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3}, of which \$^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} would be incurred in FY 2009/10, and \$^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} in FY 2010/11.

Human rights, legislative implications, regulatory impact and compliance cost statement

61 This paper has no inconsistencies with the Human Rights Act 1993. There are no legislative implications or regulatory impacts arising from the recommendations in this submission.

Publicity

62 Appropriate publicity will be given to the decisions taken by Cabinet.

Recommendations

63 It is recommended that the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee:

- 1 note that New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan began as a gesture of solidarity with the United States after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and has been transformed subsequently into a broader commitment involving international organisations, including the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and a substantial number of countries with which New Zealand is allied or enjoys close relations;
- 2 note that despite some improvements in Afghanistan since early success against Al Qa'ida and the Taleban in 2001, the overall situation remains of major concern and requires an ongoing and substantial international programme of security and development assistance to the Government of Afghanistan;
- 3 note the continuous involvement of NZDF personnel and assets in Afghanistan since December 2001, with the focus on the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyán Province [CAB Min (02) 23/2; CAB Min (02) 30/20; CAB Min (03) 19/12; CAB Min (04) 8/5 and CAB Min (04) 41/31; CAB Min (05) 40/1; CAB Min (06) 12/15; CAB Min (07) 8/3; CAB Min (07) 42/13; and CAB Min (08) 10/3];
- 4 note that New Zealand's contributions in Afghanistan since 2001, through both military and development assistance, totals more than NZ\$160m;
- 5 note that New Zealand's security and development efforts in Afghanistan are intended to be transitional, assisting the Government of Afghanistan to be able to wield effective authority and good governance throughout the country;
- 6 note that the political and security environment for the New Zealand effort in Afghanistan remains of concern, with threat environments ranging currently from **MEDIUM** to **HIGH**;
- 7 note that, based on the current level of international deployments and the re-rolling of combat support units, the New Zealand security effort in Afghanistan, with particular reference to the PRT in Bamyán Province, remains sustainable until November 2010, but that beyond September 2009 the PRT deployment will increasingly impact on the NZDF's other commitments such as training, combat support core skills, the Defence Sustainability

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Initiative and Long Term Development Plan projects, and other deployed missions and contingency support operations;

- 8 note NZAID's current 3-year (2008-2011) NZ\$21m programme of assistance to Afghanistan;
- 9 agree to the continuation of New Zealand's current security effort in Afghanistan, for one year from 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010 at an estimated cost of NZ\$41.553m, comprising the following elements:
 - 9.1 deployment of the PRT of up to 140 NZDF personnel, based mainly in Bamyan province with associated support staff at Bagram airbase and in Kabul;
 - 9.2 deployment of up to five NZDF personnel to maintain the New Zealand facilities at ^{PSR(R)1,}_{PSR(R)2} **Replace with: "name of base."**
 - 9.3 attachment of up to five personnel to various operational headquarters in Afghanistan;
 - 9.4 provision of one military advisor to UNAMA;
 - 9.5 attachment of up to two medical specialists to the Multi-national Medical Unit in Kandahar; and
 - 9.6 attachment of two NZDF non-commissioned officers working with the British providing command and leadership training to the Afghan National Army;
- 10 agree to the continued provision of intelligence support by the Government Communications Security Bureau to deployed NZDF elements for one year, from 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010, at a total additional cost (in Vote Communications Security and Intelligence) of NZ\$^{PSR(R)2,}_{PSR(R)3} **Replace with: "NZSIS personnel to assist the wider in-country intelligence support effort."**
- 11 agree to the continued contribution of ^{PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3} until 30 September 2010, at a total additional cost (in Vote Security Intelligence) of NZ\$^{PSR(R)2,}_{PSR(R)3} **Replace with: "NZSIS personnel to assist the wider in-country intelligence support effort."**
- 12 agree to the continued attachment of three Police trainers to EUPOL and involved in training and mentoring the Afghan National Police in Bamyan province for one year, from 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010, at a cost of up to NZ\$1m to be funded by NZAID;
- 13 note that, because of deteriorating security conditions, NZDF has taken steps within the current mandate to mitigate ongoing

risks but that a separate paper will shortly be submitted seeking approval to raise the current authorisation for personnel deployed to the NZPRT above 140

- 14 note that the options listed above both directly support the PRT and also contribute to other important areas such as coordination and capacity building, support for the United Nations and assistance to our security partners, thus greatly enhancing New Zealand's overall profile and reflecting the multifaceted nature of operations in Afghanistan;
- 15 note the potential need for additional finance to cover infrastructure and capability costs associated with the extension of the Bamyān PRT beyond September 2009;
- 16 note that urban encroachment on the PRT base during the next two to three years may force us to consider substantial rebuilding or even relocation of the base which, if or when it becomes necessary, will incur significant additional costs;
- 17 note that the current level of appropriation and future baseline funding will be inadequate to fully support the marginal costs of all future NZDF deployments beyond 2009/2010;
- 18 note that defence funding issues relating to operationally deployed forces are being addressed in an accompanying paper
- 19 note that the Memorandum of Understanding with ^{PSR(R)1,}_{PSR(R)2} was extended in April 2008 and will need to be renewed by April 2009.
- 20 note that the Singapore Armed Forces units will again co-locate with the New Zealand PRT, subject to conclusion of suitable arrangements between Singapore and New Zealand, and with NATO/ISAF;
- 21 note that, with the exception of the redeployment of the SAS, the NZDF has limited capacity at present to consider additional options beyond the current mix of commitments; and
- 22 agree that a review of NZ's commitment to Afghanistan beyond September 2010 be undertaken to examine more deeply the needs and opportunities for change, taking account of: developments in Bamyān Province and other parts of Afghanistan; moves towards Afghanisation and the re-balancing of military and non-military effort by other international contributors; the policies of the new US Administration and its expectations of partners; and addressing options for smaller,

Replace with:
"name of country
and base."

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more focussed military contributions beyond the PRT commitment, and international benefits derived from ongoing engagement. The findings, including financial implications of recommended options, will be reported to Ministers by early to mid 2009.




Hon Murray McCully
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
Minister of Defence

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more focussed military contributions beyond the PRT commitment, and international benefits derived from ongoing engagement. The findings, including financial implications of recommended options, will be reported to Ministers by early to mid 2009.

Hon Murray McCully
Minister of Foreign Affairs



Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
Minister of Defence

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Annex 1: Background to New Zealand's Involvement in Afghanistan

1 New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan began as a military operation in a purely military context, the post 9/11 counter-terrorism intervention against Al Qaida and the Taleban in Afghanistan under a Chapter VII UNSC mandate. The initial contribution was the deployment of the SAS.

2 On 1 October 2001, Cabinet [CAB MIN (01) 30/28] "noted the advice of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade on recent progress in developing a considered response by the United States, other countries and the United Nations, to the terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001". Cabinet also noted the US' "appreciation of New Zealand's readiness to contribute military support in the form of deployment of special forces" [CAB MIN (01) 29/26].

3 On 17 December 2001, the Permanent Representative of New Zealand delivered a statement to the UN Security Council which summarises well New Zealand's reasons for joining the Afghanistan engagement: "in accordance with Article 51 (Chapter VII) of the Charter of the United Nations, New Zealand had joined other states in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence following the terrorist attacks in the United States of America on 11 September 2001"; and New Zealand "fully supports in particular Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), which reaffirm the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence and call upon all States to work together to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the terrorist attacks".

4 The statement added that "On 21 September the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Rt Hon. Helen Clark, announced New Zealand's willingness to make a military contribution in response to calls by the United States of America and the Security Council for effective action to combat terrorism. That offer was supported by the New Zealand Parliament on 3 October." In conclusion, the statement noted that "New Zealand's military contribution has been employed in support of military operations directed against Osama bin Laden and the Qaeda terrorist organization, and the Taleban which supported and harboured them. New Zealand's involvement is in no way directed at civilian populations or against Islam".

5 After the initial defeat of the Taleban, the Afghanistan venture was transformed into a different operation, a combination of security, development and peace-building. In this context, New Zealand agreed to take over the Bamyán PRT to enable the US, which established it, to replicate the PRT in another region. New Zealand, which was the first country after the US to take a PRT lead role, currently operates under the ISAF mandate. New Zealand remains engaged as part of international state-building efforts to assist Afghanistan meet its massive security, political and development challenges.

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Annex 2: Security Situation

1 At the NATO Bucharest Summit on Afghanistan, governments contributing to ISAF approved a new NATO strategy for the medium-term through the Public Declaration and the internal Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan. The Plan underlined the need for a comprehensive approach – with a balance between security, governance and development interventions, burden-sharing, enhanced Afghan leadership and responsibility, and a strengthened UN role. The need for increased cooperation and engagement with Afghanistan's neighbours, particularly Pakistan, was also identified.

2 Afghanistan continues to face a wide range of serious, inter-connected security problems. Levels of violence experienced in Afghanistan during August this year show a 44% increase over the comparable period last year. Insurgent groups remain focused, resilient and resourceful, adopting new tactics and techniques, designed to increase damage while avoiding direct confrontation. This move to asymmetric tactics has seen the number of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks increase substantially, including the number of actual and thwarted suicide attacks. Kidnappings are increasing and indicate a sustained effort by insurgents to intimidate the civilian population. Most support for the insurgency is based on fear or disillusionment, and the Afghan population will back whoever they believe will prevail. Attacks against aid workers have increased and are assessed to be the result of local insurgent commanders' initiative seeking soft, high profile targets. While the number of violent incidents has increased this also reflects an increase in operational tempo of Coalition and Afghan security forces.

3 Most violence continues to be focused in the southern and eastern regions of the country and in particular the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and main communication routes. Kabul remains a frequent target for insurgents with two objectives; firstly undermining day-to-day security with small scale IED, mortar and rocket attacks; and, secondly carrying out high profile attacks to maximise the propaganda impact and demonstrate ability to challenge the government and international authority. There has been progress in developing the Afghan Army's strength and capabilities, but overall the Afghan Security Forces are weak and are reliant on the assistance of international forces. The Afghan National Police is still largely incapable of contributing to effective law enforcement and security. The overall threat level for NZDF personnel in Afghanistan is assessed as HIGH.

4 Developments in neighbouring Pakistan continue to have far-reaching consequences for the Afghan insurgency. The ability to **PSR(R)1** play a key role in sustaining the insurgency, and the presence of international terrorist groups in the region enables some co-operation. The Pakistani military, deployed into the region after 2001 when then-President Musharraf aligned himself with the United States in combating terrorism, has been **PSR(R)1**

PSR(R)1

Pakistan's new civilian

government has indicated that it will pursue a more multi-pronged approach to counter-terrorism, although the recent deployment of the military back into the tribal areas has prompted a wave of retaliatory attacks within Pakistan. PS

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Afghan Security Forces

5 There are two main components to Afghanistan's security forces, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Neither is yet capable of defeating the Taliban insurgency or providing security for Afghanistan's population. Significant efforts are being made by the international community to build the strength and develop the capabilities of both forces, with a view to handing over progressively the responsibility for maintenance of security and thereby facilitating phased withdrawals of international forces.

6 ANA personnel number almost 68,000 and plans envisage an increase to 134,000 within two years. The ANA is generally trusted and well regarded as a professional force by the Afghan population. At present the ANA has a leadership role in the majority of military operations across Afghanistan, and participates in nearly all military operations in Regional Command East and Regional Command South.

7 The ANP is a developing force, numbering about 80,000, with serious capability problems caused by poor training, lack of infrastructure, PSR(R)1

These problems are being exacerbated by the ANP's role in fighting the insurgency, which, apart from seeing a number of ANP personnel killed and police posts destroyed, diverts personnel from traditional policing roles. The international community's police reform efforts have been hampered by a lack of agreement about the appropriate policing model for Afghanistan. It is hoped that the International Police Coordination Board (IPCB) will help to ensure a shared vision for the form and function of the ANP, as well as increased Afghan ownership of the police reform process.

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Annex 3: New Zealand Development Assistance to Afghanistan

1 NZAID began implementing a programme of assistance in Afghanistan in late 2005, focusing on sustainable rural livelihoods, health, education, capacity development of government and non-government organisations and human rights as directed by Government. Women's empowerment is factor in all programming and promoted through ensuring access to and participation in all New Zealand funded activities. A 3-year budget of NZ\$15m agreed in 2005 has been increased by NZ\$1m in each year and now stands at NZ\$7m p.a. Bamyán University and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) are both directly funded and contributions to larger programmes are channelled through Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN FAO). Within the budget, NZ\$1m p.a. is provided to New Zealand Police (NZP) who assist with training and mentoring of Afghan National Police (ANP) and a further NZ\$1m to the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team to facilitate development in Bamyán Province.

2 AKF programming focuses on health, education and capacity development. It includes support for basic services and the Bamyán Provincial Hospital and institutional strengthening of the recently established Bamyán Teachers Training College. A recent contribution provides support for the Provincial Government and AKF to work together to re-establish a tourism industry. This forward looking programme provided at the request of Governor Sarabi, Bamyán's Provincial Governor, depends on peace in the long run but has attracted much interest and attention. In the first instance it will meet needs of national tourists, including international staff working in Afghanistan, but has a long term aim of attracting back international tourists.

3 The UN FAO programme to which NZAID contributes is a United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) funded initiative focused on sustainable rural livelihoods. The mid-term review of the programme identified a need for women's literacy and associated income generation opportunities, which was initiated with NZAID funding. The DFID programme provided a sound platform and credible programme partners which was important to women's participation in a conservative area such as Bamyán. An end of term project review found positive impacts and has recommended another phase.

4 NZAID has chosen to work with and through partners on the ground in order to get greater impact from relatively small contributions. By funding additional components we not only benefit from other project infrastructure but also from the credibility established by other partners and programming. AKF, for example, has been working in Bamyán for at least 10 years and is committed for the long term. The contributions to Bamyán Hospital build on substantial work of AKF and provide a provincial level hospital of benefit to all those in Bamyán Province. Similarly, the DFID funded programme has develop a sound reputation over the past 4 years in particular through its work piloting the establishment of Community Councils to manage access to pasture, a very fraught issue in Bamyán

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and neighbouring provinces. The work has resulted in reduced land-related conflict in the province and contributed to development of land tenure legislation.

5 In addition to contributing to larger programmes NZAID provides core contributions to Bamyan University and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The former programme was developed following recommendations from a New Zealand education consultant. A recent review of all education funded activities has shown that boys and girls are almost equally represented in Bamyan primary schools; there was an increase in girls passing the university entrance exam from three in 2005 to 29 in 2007; and the participation of women at the Bamyan University has increased from eight in 2006 to 27 in 2007. Student accommodation has been a key factor in facilitating University access for young women.

6 The AIHRC remains one of the few Afghan organisations that operate nationally, recognising the limitations of ongoing conflict, and is staffed by nationals. The Commission is coming to the end of implementing its 3-year 2006-08 plan and is working on revising the plan and associated budget. An independent evaluation is being planned and NZAID's view is that this is likely to find that the Commission is highly effective at its core mission of promoting and protecting human rights within the limitations of working in a situation of armed conflict.

7 Capacity development is a key area of work and is built into all programming as well as being provided for through the NZAID-funded Programme for Professional Development (PPD). PPD provides for needs-based basic quality training to provincial government and non-government staff in Bamyan. NZAID is regularly thanked by those who have accessed training opportunities. Governor Sarabi chairs the Steering Group that oversees the programme and this has been key to ensuring good coordination between all capacity development initiatives including those offered under civil service reform. A recent successful initiative is the attendance at a Leadership course by Afghan National Police staff from the Bamyan Regional Training Centre facilitated by New Zealand Police.

8 Following discussions with Governor Sarabi and AKF in 2005, NZAID agreed to fund an advisor to support provincial planning. The first incumbent provided excellent support and it was agreed that a replacement would be found on his resignation. Dr Harish Vashistha, previously international faculty at the PPD has recently been appointed to this position. This appointment along with others made under a USAID programme means the Governor's office will have capacity to support her engagement with Kabul Ministries. In the long run this will serve to ensure Bamyan departments are supported to deliver basic services.

9 A number of reviews and evaluations have been carried out of programmes to which NZAID contributes funding. In addition to those mentioned above NZAID and New Zealand Police conducted a joint review of NZAID-funded police activities. NZAID and NZP are awaiting the final report.

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10 In addition, NZAID is planning a programme implementation review in November 2008 to be undertaken by an NZAID advisor and independent consultant. The Review will consider effectiveness and efficiency of programme implementation to date. It will not consider impact at this early stage outside of findings available from other reviews and evaluations. It will consider the programme in terms of Cabinet direction that agencies develop whole-of-government approaches to peace operations. Ministers will be informed of the findings.

11 The Embassy in Tehran covers Afghanistan but visits infrequently. NZAID personnel undertake biannual visits of up to six weeks each year to monitor civilian programmes, to advise the PRT on development and humanitarian matters, and to coordinate with other donors.

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Annex 4: Role and Functions of NZDF Personnel

1 In addition to personnel deployed in the Bamyan PRT, the NZDF provides the following personnel to ISAF directly, or in support of ISAF activities. It is proposed to extend all deployments for 12 months.

Role	Mission	Numbers	Location	Threat
<i>Provincial Reconstruction Team and Associated Enablers</i>				
Provincial Reconstruction Team	ISAF	Up to 140	Bamyan	Medium-high
PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2	ISAF	Up to 5	PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2	Medium
Movements Operator	ISAF	1	Kandahar	High
Operational Headquarters	ISAF	Up to 5	Kabul & Bagram	High
<i>Non-military support</i>				
PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3				High
NZSIS PSR(R)2				High
Training and mentoring Afghan National Police	EUPOL	3 (NZ Police)	Bamyan	Medium
<i>Complementary options</i>				
UNAMA Military Advisory Unit	UNAMA	1	Kabul	High
Medical specialists	ISAF	Up to 2	Kandahar	High
Training Afghan National Army	ISAF	2	Kabul	High

Replace with: "name of base."

Replace with: "name of country."

Staff officers

2 The NZDF currently has a mandate to deploy up to five staff officers to headquarters roles. Deploying officers to these roles lifts New Zealand's profile, is valued by our security partners, and provides New Zealand with insight into operational and strategic level issues.

3 The positions held by the New Zealand officers vary according to ISAF's needs and the NZDF's judgement as to which roles provide the most professional benefit, profile, and situational awareness.

4 The following headquarters positions are currently filled by NZDF personnel:

- Combined Joint Plans Branch: a Lieutenant Colonel based in Kabul leading a land based planning team responsible for coordinating and planning military operations across Afghanistan. This officer also acts as the Assistant Defence Attaché in Kabul and New Zealand Senior National Officer (SNO) within ISAF Headquarters.
- Civil Military Affairs Liaison Officer: a Captain/Major equivalent, responsible for building relations between ISAF and International and local

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development agencies, including Government of Afghanistan agencies, in the Kabul area.

- Civil Military Affairs Liaison Staff: A senior non commissioned officer who fills the role of senior driver for the Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) team and assists the Civil Military Affairs Officer and the New Zealand Senior National Officer in his/her tasks.
- Intelligence support: a Captain/Warrant Officer equivalent fills an intelligence function in Combined Joint Task Force-101 in Bagram.

One further position is currently under review.

5 The NZDF continues to experience shortages in the Lieutenant Colonel equivalent / Major equivalent rank brackets. Despite high demand for these officers in management positions at home and on other overseas missions these ISAF appointments can be filled. If Ministers extend the current level of deployment of staff officers to ISAF, the ability of the NZDF to meet other agreed outputs would not be directly affected. There would, however, be limited scope for the NZDF to take on new international commitments where officers from this rank level were required.

Training the Afghan National Army

6 Two NZDF non-commissioned officers are working with a UK contingent in Kabul providing command and leadership training to the Afghan National Army. The NZDF's current training staff commitment to Afghanistan is a valuable contribution and requests have been received to increase the NZDF commitment in this area. Given current NZDF deployments to Afghanistan and elsewhere, there is no capacity to increase our contribution to training the ANA. Training staff are specialists and the potential requirement for trainers to be deployed to other theatres, such as Timor Leste, further exacerbate this situation.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan Military Advisor

7 The military advisor (Major/Lieutenant Colonel equivalent) fills the Chief of Staff position within the Military Advisory Unit. The unit provides expert military advice to UNAMA and is an important strategic interface between the multinational forces and the Afghan authorities.

8 The position provides New Zealand with good profile within UNAMA. The officer interacts regularly with senior ISAF and Afghan government officials and regularly travels throughout Afghanistan to meet with local officials and military commanders. UNAMA's wide mandate and coordination role gives the liaison officer excellent and independent insight into the broad range of challenges that Afghanistan faces, including coordination issues between the international community and Afghan government and the need for better security and more effective development.

Medical specialists

9 In March 2007, Cabinet agreed to the deployment of two medical specialists for tours of up to six months, until September 2009 to the Multinational Medical Unit at Kandahar. The first medical specialists arrived in Kandahar in September 2007.

10 The Multinational Medical Unit, located at Kandahar Airfield, is staffed by specialists from Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Denmark. Deploying NZDF medical specialists to the Multinational Medical Unit is a useful contribution to ISAF, and is valued by ISAF and by Canada, which has suffered approximately 100 fatal casualties in Afghanistan since 2002.

11 The threat level for Kandahar province is **HIGH**, due to significant ongoing insurgent activity. For security and safety reasons NZDF medical specialists are not permitted to travel outside the Kandahar Airfield perimeter.

12 The NZDF has the capacity to extend this deployment to September 2010.

PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2 Replace with: "name of base and country."

13 **PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2** is the key transit and logistics point for our operations into Afghanistan. The five NZDF personnel based there facilitate PRT rotations, and maintain our facilities. They also support other NZDF operations in the region such as ship and aircraft deployments.

14 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) formalising our basing arrangements was renewed in April 2008. It will require updating again in April 2009. **PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2**

15 The host Government is generally pro-Western and its active support for the international campaign against terrorism has caused Al Qaeda to develop plans for a significant terrorist attack there, possibly against the leadership. The threat to NZDF personnel based at **PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2** is therefore assessed as **MEDIUM**.

Replace with: "name of base."

Related Non-Military Contributions

16 **PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3**

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Replace with: 'personnel to contribute to the wider international intelligence support effort.'

NZSIS PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Singapore Deployment to NZPRT

17 New Zealand has helped to draw in another contributor to the Afghanistan campaign by hosting Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) personnel in the NZ PRT at Bamyah. From May to October 2007 the SAF deployed two teams to Bamyah on three month rotations. The first was a dental team which worked in Bamyah Hospital. The second was an engineering team which undertook operational tasks within range of the PRT Quick Response Force. PSR(R)1

18 From May to October 2008 the SAF deployed two light engineering teams to Bamyah and in July deployed two light armoured SUVs with PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 support its contingent. The NZPRT provides force protection, accommodation and logistics support to the SAF contingent.

19 Singapore has indicated that it will again deploy personnel to Bamyah in 2009.

Previous Force Element Contributions

20 NZDF has in the past deployed Special Forces, RNZN frigates, and RNZAF P-3 Orion and C-130 Hercules aircraft in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) operations related to Afghanistan and the international counter-terrorism campaign. Any future deployments of these assets will be conditional on other commitments and sustainability issues.

21 Because of platform system and self defence upgrades, the earliest that an ANZAC frigate could return to the operational area would be September/October 2010. Current commitments and the upgrade program preclude any deployment of the P-3 Orion in the near future.

22 NZDF will continue to make the C-130 available for tasking whenever it is deployed in support of the New Zealand deployments, but the support it provides is limited by national caveats and the length of time it remains in theatre. Lengthy C-130 deployments will not be possible until the bulk of the NZDF air transport fleet is reconstituted following the upgrade program.

23 The SAS has also been deployed three times in Afghanistan; for twelve months following the September 2001 attacks in the United States and for six month tours in 2004 and 2005.

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Annex 5: Legal Issues and Command and Control

This material will be released once waiver of legal privilege is obtained from the Attorney-General

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This material will be released once waiver of legal privilege is obtained from the Attorney-General

Command and Control

9 The Chief of Defence Force (CDF) retains full command of all NZDF personnel and assets deployed to Afghanistan. To enable the CDF to maintain full visibility of NZDF operations, all deployed personnel and assets are placed under the operational command of the Commander Joint Forces New Zealand (COMJFNZ). In October 2006, operational control was transferred from OEF to Commander ISAF. Following normal practice, the Commander Joint Forces appoints a Senior National Officer (SNO) to oversee the activities of deployed NZDF personnel. Deployed personnel and assets are only employed in those locations and on specific tasks and duties agreed between the CDF and the Commander ISAF.

10 The employment of NZDF personnel and assets on tasks other than those agreed would require prior consultation and New Zealand national approval. Any tasks or locations considered inconsistent with the government's national policy objectives, or that may cause undue risk to NZDF personnel and assets, would be vetoed by the SNO, on behalf of the Chief of Defence Force.

11 While deployed in Bamyán, the three NZ Police officers come under the control of the officer in command of the NZ PRT in respect to the PRT compound, security and support. The NZ Police Commissioner retains command. In all other respects, the programme which the officers are engaged in is agreed between NZ Police and NZAID.

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Annex 6: Invitations for New Zealand to Contribute Additional Forces to Operations in Afghanistan.

Since 2007, a number of invitations and requests have been received for additional military assistance to international efforts in Afghanistan. These include:

a. Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT): On 11 May 2007 General Sir John Reith KCB CBE, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) invited the NZDF to consider providing personnel to the Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) programme in support of the ANA. In June 2007, the [PSR(IC)3, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4] demarched MFAT/Defence requesting New Zealand consider providing OMLTs. The [PSR(IC)3, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4] reiterated its request for training assistance at a 19 October meeting between [PSR(IC)3, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4]

In 2008 New Zealand received two more formal requests: [PSR(IC)3, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4] to New Zealand met with former Minister of Defence Goff on 17 March to ask for a NZDF contribution, and the Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) made the same request on 7 May 2008. Other requests have been informally conveyed during routine calls.

Meeting these requests would have entailed the deployment of an integrated team of NZDF trainers and force protection personnel (approx. 25-30 specialist personnel). Under current commitments this is unsupportable but is an indicator of potential future options in Afghanistan once security in Bamyán can be handed over to Afghan forces and NZDF deployments in other theatres scale back.

b. Special Forces: Our international partners, particularly the United States and Australia, have stressed the value they would place on a special forces deployment. Requests are routinely received at meetings with [PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4]

[PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4] On 31 October 2007, DSACEUR wrote to the Chief of Defence Force requesting the deployment of New Zealand special forces. DSACEUR noted ISAF's increased reliance on special forces, noted the particular value ISAF places on the NZSAS [PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4]

At present this is the only feasible option that could be considered in addition to current commitments, if Ministers so direct.

c. US Request for additional assets: In September 2007, the Minister of Foreign Affairs met with [PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4] who requested that New Zealand consider deploying trainers or Special Forces.

d. Assistance to [PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4] training teams: [PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4] in a letter to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in September

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2007, requested that New Zealand consider providing additional appropriate military assets to support [PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4]

e. **PRT in Day Kundi Province:** ISAF and UNAMA have continued to stress the importance of establishing a PRT in Day Kundi Province, RC South. Both organisations have conveyed these requests directly to New Zealand as a PRT-lead nation in an adjacent province, including most recently in August during the Chief of Army's visit to Afghanistan.

At the request of ISAF and UNAMA the NZDF has previously carried out presence patrols in the north of the Province (from May to November 2005). There is currently no ISAF presence and the Province [PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3]

Replace
with:
"Assessment
of insurgent
activity."

[] Day Kundi is, however, a very isolated province with limited access to key support facilities. Establishing a PRT here would be a high risk activity for which the NZDF in Afghanistan is not currently equipped.

GLOSSARY

- AIHRC** - Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
- AKF** - Aga Khan Foundation
An international NGO whose work focuses on development activities in South and Central Asia, including Afghanistan, Africa and the Middle East.
- ANA** - Afghan National Army
- ANDS** - Afghan National Development Strategy
- ANP** - Afghan National Police
- CDF** - Chief of Defence Force
The commander and head of the NZDF, and the primary military adviser to the Minister of Defence.
- CERP** - Commander's Emergency Response Programme
A US military development assistance budget, to be administered in the provinces by PRT Commanders, and largely covering infrastructure projects.
- CIMIC** - Civil-Military Cooperation
The military function through which a PRT or patrol commander liaises with civilian agencies active in a theatre of operations.
- CIS** - Communication Information Systems
Restricted systems that deliver information and communication services on, and in support of operations, in both fixed and mobile environments.
- COMJFNZ** - Commander Joint Forces New Zealand
Controls all overseas operational deployments and most overseas exercises.
- CSPMP** - Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan (NATO)
A key NATO-ISAF plan agreed by leaders at the NATO Bucharest Summit on Afghanistan in April 2008. The plan underlined the need for a comprehensive approach with a balance between security, governance and development.
- Dyncorp**
Private security company contracted by US Department of State to deliver training to Afghan National Police recruits.
- DFID** - Department for International Development (UK)
- DPM&C** - Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

- EAB** - External Assessments Bureau
- ECM** - Electronic Counter Measures (Counter IED)
A subset of electronic warfare which includes any sort of electronic device designed to jam communication signals, for example to counter remotely-detonated Improvised Explosive Devices.
- EUPOL** - European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan
The EU Police Mission was established in June 2007 to support the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards. The Mission has a monitoring, mentoring, advisory and training role with the ANP.
- FPB** - Forward Patrol Base
A secure forward position that is used to support tactical operations. FPBs may be used for an extended period of time and are supported by main operating bases that provide backup support. A FPB reduces the reaction time to an incident and increases time on task.
- FY** - Financial Year
- GCSB** - Government Security Communications Bureau
- GoA** - Government of Afghanistan
- IED** - Improvised Explosive Device
A makeshift bomb, usually roadside, that may be partially comprised of conventional military explosives, such as an artillery round, and attached to a detonating mechanism such as a mobile phone or pressure plate.
- IPCB** - International Police Coordination Board
The Board was established to improve coordination among countries providing training to the ANP.
- ISAF** - International Security Assistance Force
The NATO-led 50,700-strong military force originally set up by UN mandate (UNSCR 1386) in December 2001 to help the Afghanistan Interim Authority combat the Taliban and secure the Afghan provinces.
- LTDP** - Long Term Development Plan
A planning tool to enable decisions on defence acquisitions to be taken in the context of the Government's defence policy, the priority of projects and affordability
- MFAT** - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- MoD** - Ministry of Defence

MOU - Memorandum of Understanding

MTA - Military Technical Arrangement

An agreement between New Zealand and Afghanistan outlining specific details regarding the deployment, operations and conduct of NZDF military personnel in Afghanistan.

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NZAID - New Zealand Agency for International Development

NZDF - New Zealand Defence Force

NGO - Non-Governmental Organisation

NZP - New Zealand Police

NZODA - New Zealand Official Development Assistance

OEF - Operation Enduring Freedom

A US-led military operation initiated in October 2001 to counter terrorism and bring security to Afghanistan in collaboration with Afghan forces, and which includes maritime operations in the Gulf. OEF is separate from ISAF although the two operations run in parallel and now come under the joint command of US General McKiernan.

OMLT - Operational Mentor and Liaison Team

A group of 16-24 ISAF soldiers organised in multidisciplinary teams to support and mentor a specific formation of the ANA.

PPD - Programme for Professional Development

A New Zealand funded programme to build capacity of provincial government officials and staff on civil society organisations to implement development programmes.

PRT - Provincial Reconstruction Team

A unit consisting of military personnel, and ideally diplomats and reconstruction matter experts, working to support security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The NZ PRT in Bamyan conducts frequent presence patrols throughout the province, supports the provincial and local government by providing advice and assistance to the Provincial Governor, the ANP and district sub-governors, and identifies, prepares and provides project management for NZAID projects within the region.

QRF - Quick Reaction Force

The New Zealand QRF works with local police and interpreters to process all workers, guests and NZDF personnel moving in and out of Kiwibase. The QRF also responds to security incidents within the local area.

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- RNZN** - Royal New Zealand Navy
- RTC** - Regional Training Centre
The Bamyan Regional Training Centre is a temporary facility erected adjacent to the NZPRT compound that provides training to Afghan National Police.
- SAF** - Singapore Armed Forces
- SAS** - Special Air Service (Special Forces)
- SNO** - Senior National Officer
The most senior New Zealand military officer in theatre whose role is to represent the New Zealand contingent at headquarters level.
- SOFA** - Status of Forces Arrangement
(See MTA for definition)
- SRSG** - Special Representative of the Secretary General
The current Special Representative, Mr Kai Eide, was appointed on 10 March 2008. Eide is also head of UNAMA.
- UNAMA** - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMA was established under UN Security Council Resolution 1401 in March 2002, and its current mandate extends to March 2009. Its task is to coordinate all activities of the UN system in Afghanistan, to promote peace and stability, and to strengthen governance and build the capacity of Afghan institutions
- UN FAO** - United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation
Founded in 1945, the UN FAO assists countries to modernise and improve agriculture, forestry and fisheries practices and ensure good nutrition among their populations. The FAO's Afghanistan programme is focused on achieving household food security.
- UNSC** - United Nations Security Council
- UNSCR** - United Nations Security Council Resolution
- US** - United States
- USAID** - United States Agency for International Development

Consultation on Cabinet and Cabinet Committee Submissions

Certification by Department:

Guidance on consultation requirements for Cabinet/Cabinet committee papers is provided in the CabGuide (see Procedures: Consultation): <http://www.cabguide.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/procedures/consultation>

Departments/agencies consulted: The attached submission has implications for the following departments/agencies whose views have been sought and are accurately reflected in the submission.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Ministry of Defence, New Zealand Defence Force, New Zealand Police, Department of the Prime Minister & Cabinet, External Assessments Bureau, New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau.

Departments/agencies informed: In addition to those listed above, the following departments/agencies have an interest in the submission and have been informed:

Others consulted: Other interested groups have been consulted as follows:

Name, Title, Department: Michael Green, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Date: 28/January/2009

Signature



Certification by Minister:

Ministers should be prepared to update and amplify the advice below when the submission is discussed at Cabinet/Cabinet committee.

The attached proposal:

Consultation at Ministerial level

- ☐ **has been** consulted with the Minister of Finance
[required for all submissions seeking new funding]
- ☒ **has been** consulted with the following portfolio Ministers: *Defence ; Police*
- ☐ **did not need** consultation with other Ministers

Discussion with National caucus

- ☐ **has been** or ☐ **will be** discussed with the government caucus
- ☒ **does not need** discussion with the government caucus

Discussion with other parties

- ☐ **has been** discussed with the following other parties represented in Parliament:
- ☐ Act Party ☐ Maori Party ☐ United Future Party
- ☐ Other [specify]
- ☐ **will be** discussed with the following other parties represented in Parliament:
- ☐ Act Party ☐ Maori Party ☐ United Future Party
- ☐ Other [specify]
- ☒ **does not need** discussion with other parties represented in Parliament


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