Page 1 of 5



NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN

Kiwi Base, Bamyan Airfield, Bamyan, AFGHANISTAN Telephone: +PSR(IC)3 Email: PSR(IC)3

(Unclas)

NZPRT 2050-1-1

21 March 2010

NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 080/10

Period: 20 1830D MAR 10 - 21 1830D MAR 10

Executive Summary

KAHMARD: Reporting of INS activity in PAJMAN Valley area, TALA-WA BARFEK District, BAGHLAN Province changing their focus from ANP to CF and NGO and demonstrating final co-ordination plans. PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3; NZPRT PIR 1 and 2).

BAMYAN: F6 HUMINT report stating LN requesting delay in INS activity until completion of development and linkages to Legal Authorities in BAMYAN Province. PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 NZPRT PIR 1 and 2).

BAMYAN: NZPRT KLE with relative of known INS operating in the TALA-WA BARFEK District indicating they wish to commence dialogue with GIRoA. PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Area of Interest

NSTR


Area of Operation

- 1. (S//REL-ISAF, NATO) KAHMARD. On 20 Mar 10, NZPRT elms met with ANSF (NDS PSR(sen)1) to discuss security issues. ANSF passed on the following information.
 - a. Twenty days ago PSR(sen)1 , Comd KALTA and Maulawi NEMATULLAH received written approval from the people of BARFEK Village (TALA-WA BARFEK Village, GR 42S VE 28889 16131) that they will support them and not CF. Villagers will reportedly receive some form of financial support from the TB under the agreement.

SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO

Page 2 of 5

- Qari MUSA was recently in BARFEK for four days, but has now returned to PAKISTAN. MUSA allegedly went to the village to deliver money to PSR(sen)1, KALTA and NEMATULLAH (NFI).
- c. The three men have gathered 100 fighters, mainly from KHENJAN District, BAGHLAN and nine from SHAMOLY District, PARWAN (NFI).
- d. Finally ANSF stated, the source of this information had said the INS were no longer planning attacks on the ANP but are shifting their focus towards CF and NGOs.



2. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) NZPRT S2 COMMENT. PSR(sen)1, KALTA and NEMATULLAH have all previously been identified as probable anti–GIRoA members, with recent reporting indicating all three individuals possibly active in the PAJMAN Valley/TWB area. With BARFEK Village positioned at the NORTHERN end of PAJMAN Valley, it is likely that MUSA is directly involved in the coordination and support of the INS elms within the PAJMAN Valley. Whilst the information passed on by ANSF is consistent with other reporting, PSR(S)1

. NZPRT has a meeting with Comd ABDULLAH (aka KALTA) on Mon 22 Mar; personalities in this report are likely to see what drops out of this meeting, before proceeding with any attacks. **END COMMENT.**

¹ Also known as PSR(sen)1

Page 3 of 5

- 3. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) BAMYAN. An F6 HUMINT report indicates that as of 16 Mar 10. TB Comd Qari MUSA was ordered by PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 not to attack coalition forces until the completion of a road construction project in BAMYAN Province. The order was allegedly passed on through PSR(sen)1 by ANSF BAMYAN) during a meeting held by a group of unidentified elders. NZPRT S2 COMMENT. It is probable that recent development initiatives in the TWB area have generated elements of public support toward GIRoA. This support will likely continue until there completion, upon which the public will revert back to TB sympathy for fear of retribution. Reporting on 09 Mar 10² stated that PSR(sen)1 and MUSA could not be influenced by the orders of . In light of this new reporting, it is possible that INS elms are operating under a separate command structure to what has traditionally influenced INS activity.
- 4. **(S//REL ISAF, NATO)** This report of PSR(sen)1 directing INS/Criminal elements to hold off attacks is possibly true as senior members of the community, be they political or charismatic, will have a vested interest in the completion of the road which will not happen if the security situation deteriorates. PSR(sen)1 strong association with PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 could be seen at the recent Security Development meeting in DO ABE. PSR(sen)1 provided an ANP escort for PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1. This particular road will provide an influx of traffic and provide an alternative to the SALANG Tunnel. It is therefore assessed that their primary motivation for seeing the road completed will be the smuggling and 'revenue gathering' opportunities and are therefore unlikely to negatively influence the security situation. **END COMMENT.**
- (S//REL ISAF, NATO) BAMYAN. On 21 March 2010, NZPRT met with PSR(sen)1 5. (phonetic). The discussion centred on the and PSR(sen)1 brothers of PSR(sen)1, Qari MIRAJ and PSR(sen)1. They are both currently living in PAKISTAN and have remained there since last year when their houses were searched by CF. The both of them have indicated they wish to commence dialogue with GIRoA and NZPRT to enable integration back into the local community. NZPRT S2 COMMENT. Over the last month, three local nationals with reported TB associations have surrendered their weapons to show their support for GIRoA. This has included PSR(sen)1 A combination of the development initiatives and the breaking down on perceptions has made more locals in the TALA-WA BARFEK District more informed about the direction of GIRoA. Given the linkages between the people of this district, whether by blood or marriage, continued momentum on reintegration will likely encourage other INS to commence dialogue as well. END COMMENT.

DRAFTED BY: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 RELEASED BY: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

INT OP S2

Priority Intelligence Requirements (at 4 Nov 09)

³ Refer NZPRT BAMYAN INTREP 005/10.

² Refer NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 069/10.

Page 4 of 5

- PIR 1. What are the kinetic threats to stability within BAMYAN Province?
- PIR 2. What are the non-kinetic influences that have the potential to create instability within BAMYAN Province?

Information requirements concerning local sentiment towards NZDF and Afghan Government

LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE	
CONFIRMED	Approximately 95 per cent or greater
PROBABLE	Approximately 75 per cent or greater
LIKELY	Approximately 50 per cent or greater
POSSIBLE	Approximately 15 per cent or greater
DOUBTFUL	Approximately 14 per cent or less

Distribution: List of NZ and partner entities in receipt of this report

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1

Page 5 of 5

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1

SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO

1(2)/989n)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1