He Uiuinga i a
Inquiry into
OPERATION BURNHAM

Inquiry bundle for resumed hearing
15 - 18 October 2019

Documents relevant to the resumed hearing for Module 4

Doc Date	Title	Document type	Page
Jan-05	Extract from Defence Force Orders 51 Volume 1: Protective Security - Chapter 7: Security of Documents - Annex G of Chapter 7	Declassified document	1
	Extract from OCDF Directorate of Coordination register	Extract of register	43
26-May-11	CDR for OCDF Entry 387 Redacted	Extract of register	47
Dec 2011	Extract from Office of the MINDEF's register for 2011	Extract of register	49
	Diary notes for Hon Dr Wayne Mapp	Diary extracts	51
1-Sep-10	"FW: First take: 1 Sep"	Declassified email	61
Undated	PP_media reporting_2 Sep.doc	Declassified document – attachment to above.	62
1-Sep-10	"FW: First take: 1 Sep "	Declassified email	67
23-Sep-10	"FW: Report"	Declassified email	69
12-Dec-10	"PM RELEASE"	Declassified email	71
	20101213 Release ref Baghlan Operations.doc	Declassified document – attachment to above.	72
	20101213 Risks Baghland Release.doc	Declassified document – attachment to above.	74
16-May-11	"PQ 3678 (2011). Keith Locke to the Minister of Defence"	Parliamentary Question	75
	Holding pages.		77
22-May-11	"RE: PQs Keith Locke and Maryan Street, Due 20 May"	Declassified email	81
	Holding pages.		87
1-Sep-11	"From NZSAS SNO at the time…"	Declassified document	89
1-Sep-11	Metadata for document "From NZSAS SNO at the time"	Metadata for above document	90
2-Sep-11	"Statement from VCDF"	Declassified email	91
8-Sep-11	"RE: Key Messages"	Declassified email	93
25-Oct-11	"FW: OIA - 1586-2011 SABIN: RECOMMENDED RESPONSE"	Declassified email	99
6-Dec-11	"FW: OIA - 1586-2011 Brook Sabin re AFGH casualties"	Declassified email	101
Dec-11	*DRAFT*: OIA-1586-2011 Brook Sabin re AFGH casualties	Declassified document – attachment to above.	104
8-Dec-11	"URGENT: OIA-1586-2011 Brook Sabin re Afghan Casualties TD 9 Dec 11"	Declassified email	105
30-Jun-14	"FW: From COS"	Declassified email	107

Doc Date	Title	Document type	Page
29-Aug-10	2010-08-CA-326-Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian ca…pdf	News release – attachment to above.	108
20-Apr-11	NZDF Media Release.doc	Media release – attachment to above.	109
1-Sep-11	"Hager book"	OIA release	110a
30-Jun-14	"FW: From Ross Smith"	Declassified email	111
30-Jun-14	"1 doc re Baghlan op"	Declassified email	112a
13-Dec-10	2010-12-13 NTM – CRU and NZSAS Ops in Baghlan Province Aug and Sep 2010.pdf	Declassified document – attachment to above	112b – 112n
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op"	Declassified email	112o
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Docs Part 1 of 5"	Declassified email	112p
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Part 3a"	Declassified email	112q
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Part 3aa"	Declassified email	112r
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Part 3ab"	Declassified email	112s
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Part 3b"	Declassified email	112t
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Part 4a"	Declassified email	112u
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Part 4aa"	Declassified email	112v
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Part 4b"	Declassified email	112w
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Docs Part 4 of 5"	Declassified email	112x
30-Jun-14	"Docs re Baghlan op - Docs Part 5 of 5"	Declassified email	112y
1-Jul-14	"ISAF Op Assessment Summary"	Declassified email	112z
1-Jul-14	"FW: From COS"	Declassified email	113
29-Aug-10	2010-08-CA-326-Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian ca…pdf	News release – attachment to above.	115
20-Apr-11	NZDF Media Release.doc	Media release – attachment to above.	116
1-Jul-14	"521/2010"	Declassified email	116a-116b
1-Jul-14	"Email regarding IAT Report"	Declassified email	117
2-Jul-14	"FW: ISAF IAT Report 2010"	Declassified email	119
11-Jul-14	"RE: SCI BR RFI"	Declassified email	121
Undated	S116 Bundle OCDF 387/2011 (with handwritten note on front page) – *12 pages*	Declassified bundle	127
Undated	S116 Bundle OCDF 387/2011 "133" – *15 pages (3 omitted in bundle due to classification)*	Declassified bundle	139

CHAPTER 7

SECURITY OF DOCUMENTS

Introduction

7.1 This chapter deals with the security of documents. It is important that this chapter is read in conjunction with Chapter 6, which deals with the security of official information.

Definition of a Document

7.2 Any form of recorded information constitutes a document. Apart from printed, written or reproduced papers, the items listed below and others of similar type are to be treated as documents and subjected to the appropriate security measures:

a. Files, branch folders, manuscripts, notebooks (including shorthand notebooks), and drafts.

b. Maps, charts and graphs.

c. Vu-foils.

d. Imagery records, photographs, negatives, film slides and films (see para 7.61).

e. Stencils, matrices, carriers, masters and litho plates.

f. Plain language and machine-readable paper.

g. Recording tapes and discs, including CD-R, CD-RW and DVD.

h. Removable USB memory sticks, 'pen' drives, 'thumb' drives.

i. Removable ADP magnetic storage media, of all types.

j. Paper tape and punched cards.

k. Microform material (see Annex A).

l. Typewriter ribbons and carbon papers (see para 7.3).

7.3 Typewriter ribbons, which can only be used once, are to be treated as classified documents and accounted for as such. Reusable typewriter ribbons and carbon paper are not accountable as permanent documents, when used for classified work they require protection equal to the document classification.

7.4 Although items such as VDU which displays a document is not technically a document, the screen is to be protected from overview. When the VDU is used for a classified presentation, the classification is to be clearly visible at the beginning and end of the presentation.

7.5 All documents containing official information must be protected from unauthorised disclosure, see paras 6.1. and 6.2.

Document Security Measures

7.6 **Control**. The object of document control is to deter and impede access by unauthorised persons, to assist security investigations into espionage and breaches of security, and to reinforce the application of the 'need-to-know', 'need-to-hold' and 'need-to-take' principles. Control must be maintained by an orderly and readily auditable system of paper keeping which enables a headquarters or unit to know what classified information it has; where it should be found; where it is; and who has or has had access to it. Such systems of accounting and control must be uniformly applied and are to be consistent with those derived from this DFO and taught by SMIS or approved Service training providers.

Originators of Documents

7.7 Originators of documents are those individuals who are charged with:

a. Preparing documents, or signing or releasing documents.

b. Dictating to a typist, or on a tape, material for eventual reproduction.

c. Authorising the production of documents by electronic or mechanical means.

Responsibilities of Originators of Documents

7.8 Originators are responsible for ensuring that:

a. Documents are correctly classified (see para 6.5) and the classifications are correctly authorised (see para 6.6). Examples of subjects that normally require classification are at Annex B.

b. Documents are clearly marked with the security classification, identifying reference, date of origin and endorsement markings (where necessary) before issuing or copying (see paras 7.17 to 7.25).

c. Drafts are properly controlled (see para 7.60).

Application of Security Classifications

7.9 In applying security classifications to documents (see para 6.6) it is necessary to ensure that:

a. As far as administratively possible, information classified CONFIDENTIAL or above or that requiring endorsement markings (see para 7.21) is segregated from other matter according to its classification or endorsement marking.

b. Both the external and the internal distribution of classified documents is limited to those who have a need to see or hold them.

c. Documents remain classified only as long as their contents merit it.

Overall Classification of Documents.

7.10 A document is to be classified in accordance with the highest classification of its contents. The classification should be reduced, where practicable, as follows:

a. **Use of supplements**. Those parts of documents requiring security protection should be placed in supplements and issued separately from the main document.

b. **Distribution**. Individual parts of large and complex documents should be classified in accordance with the merits of their contents, and distributed separately to addressees on the basis of the need to know and hold.

c. **Aggregate of classifications**. Where an aggregate of low classified items in one document warrants a higher overall classification, individual items should, where practicable, be endorsed with the classification to be applied when separated from the rest of the document, e.g. SECRET but CONFIDENTIAL when detached'.

d. **Itemised documents**. Itemised documents (e.g. reports, minutes of a meeting, etc) although classified in accordance with their contents as a whole, should have separate classifications applied to the individual items in order to ensure that recipients use the correct classification for extracts and follow-up action.

e. **Annexes and appendices**. These should be classified according to their content and, where appropriate, carry a different classification from their parent paper. The reverse side of the final page of the whole document must carry the highest classification used in the document.

f. **Amendments**. Amendments should be classified in accordance with the merits of their contents and not necessarily the same as the documents to which they **relate**.

g. **Titles**. Titles of classified documents should not disclose classified matter in order to obviate the need to classify other documents, which refer to them.

h. **Paragraph Grading Indicators (PGI).** Where a document contains paragraphs of varying security classification levels, each paragraph is to be marked with its appropriate security classification. The security classification is to be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation for the classification. The abbreviation is to be inserted immediately after the paragraph number e.g. 7.24 (U) 'In order to…' etc or 7.24 (TS) 'The unit

must....' etc. The Defence Service Writing Templates (DSWT) available on DIXS and SWAN has a PGI function on the DSWT toolbar.

i. **Title Grading Indicators (TGI).** The security classification of a title of a publication or other document is to indicated by the appropriate abbreviation and inserted in brackets immediately after the last word of the title e.g. EXERCISE BLUEJAY (C).

Re-grading.

7.11 Where the security classification of a document has a limited life, or the contents will eventually become public knowledge, the document should be endorsed in the top left-hand comer of its first page as follows:

a. 'Declassify to.....after ..... (date)', (see paras 7.88 to 7.92).

Over-grading

7.12 Over-grading of classified material must be avoided as it may result in:

a. Properly graded documents being inadequately protected as a result of the proliferation of classified documents.

b. Unnecessary and expensive arrangements being made to protect material that does not warrant such protection.

c. Classification and security procedures being devalued.

Under-grading

7.13 Under-grading of documents can carry substantial risk of breach or compromise, particularly where the material has been graded as RESTRICTED and subsequently upgraded to CONFIDENTIAL or higher.

Covering Letters

7.14 Covering letters to classified enclosures must be classified according to the sensitivity of their own content, not that of the enclosures. On their own, covering letters may well have a lesser classification than the enclosures they cover. In this case covering letters must be marked in bold capital letters clearly denoting the classification of both the covering letter and the document to which it pertains,e.g., RESTRICTED covering SECRET', or in the case of an unclassified covering letter, simply 'covering CONFIDENTIAL' or whatever the classification of the main document requires.

7.15 Classified covering letters are to be itemised separately on MD 27 Classified Document Supply/Receipt form.

Classification of Extracts.

7.16 Extracts from documents may not require a protection as high as that of the complete document and they are to be classified according to their content, if necessary after consultation with the originator of the document.

Layout and Marking of Documents

7.17 The rules and conventions governing the layout and marking of Service papers are laid down in the Joint Service Publication (AS) 102 - Service Writing (JSP AS 102 and NZDF Supplement) and are to be applied to all printed, typewritten and copied documents. Many types of documents, for one reason or another, cannot be made to conform strictly to these rules. The essential markings must, however, always be applied to these items when their content merits a security classification or endorsement markings, i.e. they must be:

a. Identifiable (see para 7.31).

b. Clearly marked with the security classification.

c. Carry endorsement markings where appropriate.

Marking of Security Classifications

7.18 All classified documents are to be marked in such a way that the document's security classification can be seen at a glance and cannot be overlooked. The following rules apply:

a. All classified documents are to have their security classification printed or typewritten in bold capitals clear of all text in the centre of the top and bottom of the front and back covers and each page of text; or in such other position that, when the pages are fastened together, the classification will not be obscured.

b. It is not necessary to overstamp printed or typed classifications except on the first and last pages.

c. Over-stamping is not necessary on documents produced on paper with pre-printed classifications on both sides, or photo-reproduction copies of documents, which are already over-stamped provided the classification is clear on the reproduction copy.

7.19 The methods of marking security classifications on documents which do not conform to Service writing conventions such as permanently bound printed books, manuscripts, notebooks, completed forms, signal messages, drawings, photographic prints, negatives, films, translucents, vufoils, tracings, maps, charts, recording tapes and discs, are given at Annex C.

7.20 Documents which consist of parts carrying different individual classifications (see para 7.10) are to be marked as follows:

a. Any component of a classified document, which is likely to be separated or used in a different context to the main document, must be completed in itself so that it can be removed from the document without affecting any other component. The classification must be clearly marked on all pages in accordance with para 7.18.

b. The overall classification of a document is to be marked at the top and bottom of every page. Every part, section, or paragraph, if appropriate, should have its own classification inserted at the beginning and end of the related text.

Endorsement Markings

7.21 Endorsement Markings are not security classifications. They are phrases, words or abbreviations applied to documents as warnings that special precautions are required. They are additional to and do not modify any security classifications allotted. Endorsement markings consist of:

a. **National and International Caveats**. These are markings such as phrases, words etc used to indicate that the handling and circulation of documents must be limited to those persons who are authorised to have access to them. In certain cases documents so marked are subject to special handling procedures, for example, those marked 'EYES ONLY'.

b. **Restrictive markings**. These are used to limit distribution to maintain the 'need to know' principle.

c. **Privacy markings**. These are markings used for administrative **convenience** to indicate that documents should be protected from casual observation or disclosure in order to avoid embarrassment.

d. **Additional markings**. These are markings such as security warnings notices, prefixes etc used to indicate the conditions of issue/release, origin **or** ownership of documents.

National and International Caveats

7.22 National and International Caveats are normally only applied to documents classified CONFIDENTIAL and above. Details with meanings and the requirements for special handling procedures, where appropriate, are notified to those concerned on a need to know basis. National caveats include NEW ZEALAND EYES ONLY and composite caveats (which denote information is not to be released to other countries except those imposing the caveat) such as AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND EYES ONLY (AS/NZ EYES ONLY).

Use of NEW ZEALAND EYES ONLY

7.23 Documents containing information which is to be restricted to personnel (including Civil Staff) of the NZDF, employees of the New Zealand Public Service and other New Zealand nationals specifically authorised by DDIS but excluding any

person who does not hold New Zealand citizenship, is in the employ of a foreign government or private interest, are to be marked NEW ZEALAND EYES ONLY (NZ EYES ONLY may be used but not NZEO). Personnel on exchange or attachment to the NZDF are not, for the purposes of this instruction, personnel of the NZDF. Single Service orders and procedures are to ensure that access to documents or material marked NEW ZEALAND EYES ONLY is restricted to authorised personnel.

Restrictive Markings

7.24 Restrictive markings should be employed to limit the circulation of a classified or privacy marked paper or file in order to enforce strictly the 'need to know' principle especially in Government Departments. While departments should always use a restrictive marking in appropriate cases, their indiscriminate use causes unnecessary practical difficulties and a lack of confidence in the restrictive marking arrangements. Only the following three restrictive markings should be used:

a. **Personal**. To be seen only by the person to whom it is addressed. No copy of such a document should be made without the permission of the originator.

b. **Controlled Distribution Required**. To be made available, or copies made, only in accordance with an explicit handling instruction given by the originator. Examples of handling instructions are:

(1) This document should be copied only to officials directly concerned with handling the subject of the document.

(2) This document should be copied only to persons named by the originator.

(3) No further copies should be made of this document, and it should only be made available to other officials with a strict 'need to know' of its contents.

c. **Exclusive**. The restrictive marking EXCLUSIVE is to be used when it is necessary, for 'need to know' reasons, for a document to be seen only by a specified individual or an authorised representative. Action on documents marked EXCLUSIVE may only be initiated by the person addressed. The inner envelope containing the document must be addressed "EXCLUSIVE FOR" an officer by name or appointment (see also paras 7.57e and 7.100b). The rules for the positioning of restrictive markings at para 7.25 do not apply to EXCLUSIVE, which is to be positioned as required by the originator on letters. On messages it is in the "Message Instructions" box of the signal message form and at the beginning of the text, such as "EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJOR JONES FROM WG CDR SMITH"

Positioning of Endorsement Markings

7.25 Endorsement markings (National and International Caveats, and Restrictive markings) must be positioned at the top of each page of a document, either below or after the classification marking, and at the bottom of each page either above or after the classification marking but see para 7.24c for the positioning of EXCLUSIVE. When a document bearing a special marking is enclosed in a file or folder the cover is also to be endorsed with the endorsement marking.

Removal of Endorsement Markings

7.26 Where a document ceases to require a endorsement marking, it must be removed. The use of Correcting Fluid or pasting on paper to cover the marking does not suffice. A new copy or photo-copy of the document omitting the marking is to be made and the original is to be destroyed. Where copy-numbered documents are concerned, the originator is to be consulted beforehand.

Privacy Markings

7.27 Privacy markings are used to indicate the need for special protection or special handling of documents, which do not involve the national interest in a defence or security sense. They are documents which by their nature (e.g. reports on staff, medical reports, or commercial information) are sensitive and could cause personal or corporate embarrassment if published without some form of protection. Where a document which merits a privacy marking also needs a security classification, this must be given (see also para 7.17) and the document treated in accordance with that classification. Privacy markings of general application are contained at Annex B.

Transmission of Documents Bearing Privacy Markings

7.28 When a document bearing a privacy marking is transmitted by New Zealand Post or other external means (e.g., civil courier service), it is to be double enveloped. The inner envelope is to bear the privacy marking shown on the document and the name or appointment of the addressee. The outer envelope is not to be marked with the privacy marking. When the document is sent by Defence Messenger Service, a single envelope, marked with the privacy marking shown on the document and the name or appointment of the addressee, is to be used.

Positioning and Removal of Privacy Markings

7.29 The rules for the positioning and removal of privacy markings are the same as those for endorsement markings given at para 7.25.

Release of Documents to Foreign Governments, Foreign Personnel or Civilian Companies

7.30 DFO 70 contains the rules for the release of documents to foreign governments; to foreign personnel attending courses or on exchange; or a person or organisation not part of the armed or civil services of New Zealand (e.g. contractors, consultants, voluntary organisations etc).

Identification of Documents

7.31 **Document Reference.** All classified (i.e. those CONFIDENTIAL and above which must be recorded in an MD 392) documents are to bear an identifying reference and a date of origin. Documents created in a series are to have as part of their reference as a serial number so that holders can notice any missing items.

7.32 For national documents the reference will normally be the file number, unless the document has been uniquely identified, as in the case of Chiefs of Staff papers (COSC 15180) etc.

7.33 **Copy Numbering.** Individual copy numbers are to be given to certain classified documents where control of distribution justifies it, such as those with a long life to which amendments are made (see para 7.50). The following documents are always to be copy-numbered:

a. All TOP SECRET and SECRET documents.

b. Operation and administrative/logistic orders (irrespective of security classification).

c. Those requiring special handling procedures, e.g. EXCLUSIVE.

d. CONFIDENTIAL where the originator decides there is a special requirement.

7.34 Copy numbers are to be marked as follows:

a. At the top right-hand corner of the cover or first page.

b. On the first page of each annex, appendix or trace forming part of a copy -numbered document.

c. In the form, 'Copy No 1 of 20', i.e., the first copy of a total of 20 copies.

7.35 The full distribution showing the disposal of all copies is to be recorded on the file copy.

Reproduction of Copy-Numbered Documents

7.36 Copies of copy-numbered documents are not to be made without the authority of the originator. The originator is to supply additional copies or authorise the making of extra copies, which are to be numbered in a separate series, being marked 'REPRODUCTION COPY No..... of..... reproduction copies'. When an authorisation to make extra copies is passed by telephone, a written record is to be made on the file copy.

7.37 All copy numbered documents, and non-copy numbered documents where the originator wishes to reserve authority to copy, are to be marked under the security classification as follows:

"No copy to be taken without reference to and agreement by .....

7.38 When the quality of the reproduction is poor, and if the original copy number cannot be readily seen, the reproduction copies should be marked 'REPRODUCTION COPY No of reproduction copies of ORIGINAL COPY No. When a reproduction is entered in MD 392 (Classified Document Register) the copy number of the original should be included in the detail recorded.

Extracts from Copy-Numbered Documents

7.39 Extracts from copy-numbered documents are not to be made without the authority of the originator. Extracts are to bear a separate series of copy numbers, not that of the original document, eg 'EXTRACT COPY No..... of .....'

Reproduction of Non-Copy Numbered Classified Documents

7.40 Non-copy numbered documents may be copied without reference to the originator unless specified otherwise (see para 7.37).

Spoiled Copies

7.41 All copies of classified documents spoiled during reproduction are to be destroyed immediately.

Page Numbering

7.42 The system of page numbering of each classified document must be such as to indicate clearly whether any pages are missing when it is physically checked.

Non Copy Numbered Classified Documents

7.43 All pages of all classified documents, other than single page documents, are to be numbered at the top centre, immediately above the title line, by:

a. The pages of the main part of a document being numbered consecutively from beginning to end of the part.

b. The pages of each additional part (Annex, Appendix, etc) being numbered in separate series consisting of the annex letter or annex letter and appendix number followed by the page numbers, e.g. A-2 (i.e. page 2 of Annex A) or B 1-3 (i.e. page 3 of Appendix 1 to Annex B).

Copy Numbered Classified Documents

7.44 In all copy-numbered documents, including those of a single page, pages are to be numbered as follows:

a. The total number of pages of the whole document (including annexes, etc) is to be given on the front page immediately below the copy number, e.g. 'Total pages .....'

b. The total number of pages in the main part (excluding annexes, etc) is to be given on the front page at the top centre below the security classification and special marking, e.g. '1 of 9'.

c. The total number of pages of each accompanying enclosure, annex and appendix is to be given on the first page, e.g. 'A- 1 of 1' or 'B2-1 of 3'.

Books and Printed Documents

7.45 Books and printed documents may be given separate page numbering series for chapters apart from annexes and appendices prefixed with the chapter number, e.g. '3-1' (page 1 of Chapter 3). When such documents are copy-numbered they are to show the total number of pages of the whole document under the copy number, and the total number of pages in each chapter, annex and appendix on its first page.

Security Classification Colour Code

7.46 When classified documents are placed in files, file covers or are made into book form, the outside covers are to be coloured in accordance with Table 1 below.

SERIAL	CLASSIFICATION	COLOUR
1	TOP SECRET	Red
2	SECRET	Blue
3	CONFIDENTIAL	Green
4	NZ RESTRICTED Allied RESTRICTED	Buff
5	UNCLASSIFIED	Any colour other than red, blue or green

Table 1 - Security Classification Colour Codes

7.47 The security classification is to be printed on the front and back of the covers and they are to be given the protection merited by their contents.

7.48 Covers of unclassified documents available to the public need not conform to this system, nor does it affect issues of Service magazines/newspapers.

CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS

Distribution Lists

7.49 Distribution lists issued for permanent use or for individual documents can disclose information unless they have been appropriately classified. This disclosure can be avoided by the issue of standard distribution lists, suitably classified, to all normal addressees, or as part of standing operating procedures arranged to suit a particular series of documents and referred to as 'List X' etc.

Regular Wide Scale Distributions of Copy Numbered Documents

7.50 For regular distributions of copy numbered documents issued on a wide scale, or amendments to them, the same numbered copy should be sent each time to the same addressee wherever practicable.

Distribution of TOP SECRET Documents

7.51 TOP SECRET documents must be kept segregated from other classified material in a container approved for such storage. Access to containers holding TOP SECRET material is to be strictly controlled. TOP SECRET documents are:

a. Never to be issued on a standard distribution list.

b. Never to have spare copies.

Distribution of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL Documents

7.52 SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents may only be issued on standard distribution lists when it is possible to eliminate addressees which do not need copies, eg 'List A less serials 19, 25-30', etc. The lists must be scrutinised each time a document is distributed to ensure that copies are not sent to addressees who do not really need them. Lists must be pruned whenever possible.

Restrictions on photocopying

7.53 Where authority to copy is reserved to the originator of a highly classified or other sensitive document, it is to be marked underneath the classification marking as follows:

"No copy is to be taken without reference to and agreement by....."

7.54 Copies are to be made only on the written authority of an officer not below the specified ranks at Chapter 6 para 6.6. The written authority is to show the reference of the document and the number of copies authorised. Officers authorising copies are to annotate the document, before it is copied, to show the number of copies to be made and their proposed distribution. The person actually making the copies (if other than the authorising officer) is also to initial the document before it is copied.

Amendments to Classified Documents

7.55 When a document classified CONFIDENTIAL or above is likely to be subject to amendment, it is to incorporate an amendment sheet as shown at Annex E.

7.56 When an amendment is issued to a large or complex document classified CONFIDENTIAL or above which involves the removal and/or insertion of pages, the following is to occur:

a. The document which introduces the amendments is to be prefaced as follows:

(1) All pages, old and new, are to be checked and ultimate disposal recorded before the superseded pages are destroyed'.

(2) The new pages are to bear the amendment number.

(3) The amendment is to include a revised list of effective pages for insertion at the front of the document.

(4) An amendment checklist is to be issued by the originator to indicate the compilation of the final document after the amendment to it has been carried out. An example of a checklist is at Annex E Appendix I.

(5) A full and complete page check of the document is to be carried out before waste resulting from the amendment is destroyed. It is important that this is done with great care because once destruction has been carried out no further effective check is possible.

Accounting and Control

7.57 **Receipt of documents**. An individual (normally the Chief Clerk or Unit Registrar and appropriately security cleared), is to be nominated to receive and route all incoming documents in accordance with the following rules:

a. In large headquarters and other establishments where large numbers of documents are handled, receipt action may be delegated to branches or departments.

b. In the case of Safehand offices where the classified material is received in bulk for distribution to unit registries, the Safehand office is not considered the ultimate addressee. MD 27 receipt action is the responsibility of the ultimate addressee.

c. All incoming documents classified CONFIDENTIAL or above, or magnetic media classified CONFIDENTIAL or above, are to be registered in the MD 392 immediately, and the document receipts (MD 27), where appropriate, are to be returned to originators without delay (see para 7.112).

d. Envelopes carrying a special marking, to which special handling procedures apply, are to be passed to and opened by the appropriate Control Officer.

e. TOP SECRET documents are to be opened only by the addressee officer or authorised deputy and passed immediately to the TOP SECRET Control Officer (TSCO) for registration. Instructions for the control of TOP SECRET documents including the duties of the TSCO are given at Annex F.

f. Classified and unclassified documents addressed 'EXCLUSIVE FOR' named individuals or appointments are to be opened only by the addressees or their authorised deputies, who are to ensure that documents classified CONFIDENTIAL or above, are registered in MD 392 immediately. If necessary in the interests of privacy, documents marked 'PERSONAL' should be kept in a separate file by the addressee in an appropriate container.

g. Where there are local procedures in place for checking magnetic media for malicious software and for authorising its use, all incoming magnetic media should be directed to the authorising officer.

h. Documents classified CONFIDENTIAL and above are to be page counted, and page checked for completeness, before receipt is formally acknowledged (or at the time of registration in MD 392).

Action On Receipt Of Damaged Envelopes

7.58 If, on receipt, an envelope containing classified documents shows signs of having been tampered with in transmission, the envelope is to be left as it was received and security staff informed immediately. Security staff are to open the envelope, in order to extract and hand to the addressee the contents, in such a way that the opening made is distinct from the area of suspected tampering. An investigation is then to take place by security staff into the suspected tampering. If it appears that tampering has occurred, the original envelope and a copy of the contents is to be forwarded to Assistant Director Security – Protective (AD Sy Prot), HQ NZDF, without delay.

Filing Of Classified Documents On Receipt

7.59 To reduce the risk of loss or compromise, all classified documents are to be placed in identifiable files appropriate to their subject and security classification on receipt. Where this is impracticable because of size, bulk or type, after registration in the MD 392 suitable alternative measures are to be taken. Classified documents are not to be held loose by individuals.

Control Of Drafts and Manuscripts

7.60 Drafts and manuscripts are to be classified appropriately. Originators of documents are responsible for the overall control of manuscripts, drafts and notes, tapes or discs when passed for typing, and for their subsequent destruction or registration and filing.

Security Of Classified Imagery

7.61 Classified imagery is to be handled in accordance with the following procedures:

a. Units, which produce slides from their own classified photography, are to send classified undeveloped films by appropriate cover to the nearest

RNZAF Photographic Flight for processing. PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

b. Rolls of original classified film are to be left intact bearing the classification marking at each end of the roll. Production of slides from original classified film is to be subject to the following rules:

(1) Individual frames are not to be cut out of an original or duplicated negative roll of classified film unless each frame is then marked with the appropriate classification.

(2) The security classification marked on any slide created from a classified film is to be not lower than that marked on the film without the authority of the originator.

(3) The appropriate security classification marking is to form an integral part of any slide. For this purpose a special security classification film overlay is to be used in the photographic process of slide production.

(4) The MD 392 register number and entry serial number relating to a slide are to be marked on the mount by means of an adhesive label or permanent felt pen and the slides are to be treated similarly to classified documents not on file.

(5) Mounts containing classified slides are to bear the security classification of the slides and are to be marked with the classification using a coloured felt pen.

7.62 Regrading of slides may involve re-grading the original film and the creation of a new slide because the classification marking may be an integral part of the slide, which cannot be removed satisfactorily.

Classification of Slides

7.63 Any questions or doubts regarding the correct classification of a slide or photograph should be referred to the originator.

Control of Classified Publications

7.64 Classified publications are issued direct to units by Support Services HQ NZDF. They normally have a long life, and with subsequent amendments are too bulky to file with other documents. They are usually copy numbered and controls for handling and circulation must be similar to those for other classified documents. Units holding a large number of classified publications should maintain a centralised system of storage and control to ensure that these publications are properly

accounted for and that they are kept up to date with amendments. The following standards are to be maintained:

a. A separate classified document register or portion of a register is to be allotted to record publications classified SECRET or above, and their amendments.

b. Extracts or copies are never to be made without the authority of the originator.

c. When authority is given for the destruction of one of these publications, destruction will be carried out by the holder and a destruction certificate, giving the copy numbers, will be sent to AD Support Services HQ NZDF.

d. Publications classified CONFIDENTIAL which are too large to be placed on a file, should be allocated a file number. This file number is to be included in the master file list.

Registration of Classified Documents

7.65 The authorised classified document register for use by all headquarters and units is the MD 392. Instructions for the use of MD 392 is at Annex G. The receipt, production, disposal, re-grading, declassification, destruction, and dispatch of every copy of every document classified CONFIDENTIAL and above is to be recorded in the MD 392. The MD 392 is to provide a complete record of the holdings and disposals of these documents in any headquarters or units.

7.66 Separate registers are to be kept for TOP SECRET documents.

Classified Registry

7.67 An appropriately cleared service or civilian individual is to be nominated in every unit to be responsible for the compilation and maintenance of the classified document register. In addition a second appropriately cleared individual of Officer, Warrant Officer or Senior NCO rank (or civilian equivalent) is to be nominated in every unit as the Supervising Officer with the task of supervising the control of the register by weekly inspection. This interval may be extended for up to 3 months, once all MD 27 Receipt forms have been returned and entries reconciled.

TOP SECRET Document Control

7.68 A control officer with the appropriate security clearance is also to be appointed in each unit, as necessary, to be responsible for TOP SECRET documents, and documents with endorsement markings for which special handling procedures are authorised.

Computerisation of Classified Document Registers

7.69 Headquarters and units wishing to computerise their classified documents registers are to use the Electronic Classified Document Register (ECDR). The ECDR is available though normal channels from HQ NZDF (AD Sy Prot).

7.70 A record of all files, boxes or containers holding classified documents is to be kept of:

a. TOP SECRET documents.

b. SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL documents.

c. Microfilm material classified SECRET or above.

d. Classified publications classified SECRET or above.

e. Classified shorthand notebooks classified SECRET or above.

f. Recording tape classified CONFIDENTIAL or above.

g. Computer storage devices classified CONFIDENTIAL or above.

File records

7.71 The following detail concerning each file held is to be readily available in the file records system:

a. Reference number.

b. Volume number.

c. Title.

d. Security classification.

e. Special markings.

f. Date opened.

g. Date closed.

h. Disposal.

i. Date of disposal.

j. Changes such as reclassification, renumbering, etc.

Record of Classified Document Registers

7.72 A master record of all MD 392s containing details of all current, open, and closed registers is to be maintained in every unit by the nominated supervising officer

(see para 7.62) in the form shown at Annex G Appendix 2. Instructions for maintaining, mustering, retaining, closing, disposing of and handling over registers are given at Annex G.

7.73 All files are to:

a. Be coloured in accordance with the security colour code, see para 7.46.

b. Be marked with the highest security classification and with any special marking allotted to their enclosures in accordance with para 7.18.

7.74 Files classified CONFIDENTIAL or above are to:

a. Include a minute or contents sheet recording:

b. Reference number, volume number and title of the file to which it relates.

c. Reference number, date of origin, classification, MD 392 serial number and folio number of each TOP SECRET and below enclosure.

d. Have, on the front cover, a record of all branches, sections or individuals to which files are referred for action. When files are re-covered, its record is to be retained as part of the files. Alternatively, the file is to be allocated a card on which a record is maintained of all branches, sections or individuals to which files are referred for action. The card is to record the date on which files are issued and returned.

Movement of Classified Files

7.75 Unit security orders are to provide for:

a. A record of movement of all files classified CONFIDENTIAL and above including movement within the headquarters or unit itself so that they are traceable at all times.

b. Where separate branch registries are maintained, separate file records are also to be kept.

c. Where files classified SECRET and above are transmitted between branches, hand-to-hand receipts are to be obtained and the movement recorded in the appropriate classified document registers. Hand-to-hand receipts are not necessary for the movement of CONFIDENTIAL files between branches, but a record of transmission must be kept.

Checks and Musters

7.76 **Checks**. Checks of classified material are an essential part of the system for the physical protection of classified material. The detailed requirement for checking is to be included in unit security standing orders which must lay down:

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific tasks required as part of checks and musters. For example, frequency and amount of material checked. As well as details of personnel authorised to conduct these checks.

7.77 **Daily Checks**. In all offices and areas where classified documents are used or stored, daily checks are to be carried out by occupants when work ends to ensure that all classified documents including waste are correctly locked in appropriate security containers.

7.78 **Checks by security survey and inspection teams.** During all unit protective security surveys and inspections, security personnel are to make a physical check of all aspects of the security of classified documents.

7.79 **Page Checks.** Classified documents are to be page checked to ensure that the document is complete on the following occasions, and any discrepancies are to be reported immediately to HQNZDF (DSyD):

a. On receipt from the issuing authority.

b. Prior to issue to another unit.

c. TOP SECRET and SECRET every six months - CONFIDENTIAL every twelve months.

d. On change of the appointee responsible for classified documents.

e. On completion of amendments action incorporating page changes. The page check is to be conducted before the pages removed from the document are destroyed.

Minimum Standards for Checks and Musters

7.80 Checks and musters of documents classified SECRET and above are to be carried out to the following minimum standards:

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

PSR(R)3

Explanation of the standards required to conduct checks and musters of documents at varying classifications.

PSR(R)3

Records of Checks and Musters

7.81 Permanent records of checks and musters are to be kept by units. These records are to be listed in the front of the MD 392 Classified Document Register (or electronic equivalent) and in the Unit Security Register. These records are to show:

a. The type of check or muster, with dates, carried out.

b. The files and documents seen and by whom.

c. Details of any irregularities found and action taken to rectify them.

7.82 Completion by units of the checks and musters at para 7.76 a to c is to be confirmed as part of the annual report on a unit.

Loss or Compromise of a Classified Document

7.83 If a document classified CONFIDENTIAL or above cannot be physically produced or its disposal correctly accounted for, the search and reporting procedure detailed at paras 6.38 to 6.47 is to be carried out immediately. Similarly, if a document is compromised, or is suspected of having been compromised, reporting action as set out at para 6.41 (or 6.43 if appropriate) is to be taken without delay.

Storage of Classified Documents

7.84 Strong rooms and secure rooms are specially constructed rooms, which provide a specified degree of security protection, according to their structural detail, for the storage of classified material. Details of strong and secure rooms are contained in the PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3
Security containers are items of security equipment ranging from safes and security cupboards to security briefcases which have been approved by the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) for the protection of classified material. In arranging storage the following conditions are to be applied:

a. Access to the contents of security containers (i.e., availability of keys or knowledge of combination settings) is to be limited to those who are authorised and have a need to know.

b. TOP SECRET documents are always to be segregated from others (see para 7.51).

c. Documents to which special handling procedures apply are to be stored in accordance with the appropriate instructions.

d. Cash, valuables and other attractive items are never to be stored in the same containers as classified documents.

7.85 Documents classified CONFIDENTIAL and above are to be kept in appropriate security containers, strong rooms, or secure rooms at all times when not in use (but see Chapter 11 para 11.4 for absences in excess of 10 minutes). Allied RESTRICTED documents are to be kept under lock and key and are not to be displayed in public. Offices and stores where Allied RESTRICTED documents are displayed are to be locked when vacated. Allied RESTRICTED documents are not to be displayed in offices where non government employees such as contract cleaners have access (see Chapter 11 para 11.6).

7.86 Any document with a restrictive or caveat marking, such as NEW ZEALAND EYES ONLY, is to be kept in a security container commensurate with its classification when not in use.

7.87 Minimum standards for the custody of classified material are based on:

a. The protection afforded by the security container, i.e. by its construction and its lock. Each type of security container has been tested to establish its degree of resistance to both surreptitious and forcible attack. Surreptitious attack means the unauthorised opening of a container in such a way as to leave no evidence, which would be discernible in normal use. It is the threat of this type of attack, which is most general. Each security container has been allocated one of four classes; Class A consists of those containers which provide the greatest protection and Class D the least. Locks approved by NZSIS for the direct protection of material classified CONFIDENTIAL and above and suitable for use on security containers have been allotted two classes: A and B. Class A (combination locks) and Class B (key locks) are designed for maximum resistance to all known forms of surreptitious attack. A third category of locks, Class C, are key locks designed for substantial resistance to surreptitious attack. Category C locks are approved for use only on doors (other than doors to secure rooms).

b. The protection given to the container by its position to minimize the period which an unauthorised person could have undisturbed access to it. Containers are said to be in Positions 1, 2 or 3 according to the protection given to them by control of entry, physical barriers, surveillance by patrols, and intruder detection systems, or a combination of these. Positions 1, 2 and 3 are defined at Annex H.

c. The list of security equipment, which has been approved by the NZSIS, is listed within the Approved Products List (APL). The APL is available from AD Sy Prot or is contained on the DSyD Website on the NZDF Intranet.

Review of Classified Documents

7.88 **Frequency of Reviews**. All holders of classified documents are to review their holdings at frequent intervals to carry out re-grading with the aim of downgrading whenever possible. Reviews of classifications are to be carried out on the following occasions:

a. **On receipt of documents**. If there is doubt, the originator is to be challenged and asked to justify the classification.

b. In the case of TOP SECRET documents, twice a year in accordance with the procedure laid down at Annex F para 9.

c. During weeding of files.

d. On closure of a file.

e. When classified enclosures in files are transferred to other files.

f. When originators are spot-checking their own holdings and mustering individual documents (see para 7.80 to 7.82).

Responsibility for Re-grading

7.89 Responsibility for the classification and re-grading of documents rests with the originator who is to notify recipients of copies of TOP SECRET, SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents when they are re-graded.

7.90 Holders of copies of documents are to consult the originator when they consider that particular TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL documents should be re-graded. In cases where:

a. The originator has ceased to function, then the unit, staff or appointment acting as successor for the subject matter concerned becomes responsible for the classification and re-grading of the information.

b. It is impossible to trace the originator or successor, then copies of documents may be re-graded, after consultation with other addressees, by the holders in accordance with the normal criteria (see Chapter 6 para 6.6).

Procedure for Re-grading

7.91 When a document is re-graded:

a. The existing classification is to be deleted and the document marked with the new classification, signed and dated by an officer.

b. The connected entry in the classified document register is to be amended, signed and dated by the appropriate nominated individual or appointment holder responsible for the compilation of the register.

c. The classification of the file enclosing the document is to be reviewed and, in the case of TOP SECRET and SECRET documents, the connected entry on the contents or minute sheet amended.

Review of Files

7.92 When files are reviewed or closed and the enclosures cease to merit the current classification, they are to be downgraded as follows:

a. The file is to be enclosed in a new jacket and the front cover of the old one retained in the file.

b. The contents or minute sheet is to be checked and entries amended as necessary.

c. The file record is to be amended.

Classification of Documents from other Government Departments and External Agencies

7.93 Classified documents from other government departments, those firms and contractors which are authorised to have access to classified information, and foreign governments must be handled strictly according to the classification marked on them, or as requested by the external agency concerned.

7.94 From time to time, NZDF will receive information, usually from other NZ Government or overseas Governments which carries the marking of HIGHLY PROTECTED or PROTECTED. Such information is to be treated as SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL respectively. Where practicable, this material is to be separated from other documents.

Dispatch and Transmission

7.95 **General**. All classified material must be protected during every stage of handling and transmission. Appropriate safeguards are to be adopted by originators, dispatch clerks, couriers, messengers and recipients, all of whom must play their respective part in safeguarding classified matter entrusted to their care. Commanding officers are to ensure that those authorised to receive or despatch classified material have been formally trained in these duties, have appropriate security clearances and have the necessary experience, or are adequately supervised.

7.96 The stages of handling and transmission between inception by the originator, and registration and filing by the receiving authority are:

a. a. Origination and classification (see para 7.97).

b. Recording dispatch (see para 7.98).

c. Preparation for dispatch (see paras 7.99 to 7.102).

d. Transmission (see paras 7.95 to 7.96 and 7.103 to 7.111).

e. Receipt (see paras 7.112 and 7.57 to 7.58).

f. Registration and filing (see paras 7.59 to 7.74).

7.97 **Origination and classification**. The originator is responsible for the secure handling of classified material until it is handed over to the dispatching authority. The rules for supplying security classifications are given at paras 6.5. The ranks and appointments of those authorised to apply these classifications are given at para 6.6.

7.98 **Recording dispatch**. The movement of each TOP SECRET and SECRET document is to be recorded in accordance with the procedures set out in the following paragraphs. The disposal of these documents to addressees is to be recorded in a classified document register (MD 392) in accordance with the instructions given at Annex G.

7.99 **Preparation for dispatch**. The detailed rules for preparation of classified documents for dispatch are given at Annex I. Regardless of the method of transmission, no more than two coverings are necessary while classified documents are in transit. These are:

a. **Inner covering**. The inner covering, normally an envelope, is to be provided by the originator and remains intact until opened by the ultimate addressee. It is used to protect the information given in the document it contains, and shows details of the addressee, the security classification, and endorsement markings.

b. **Outer covering**. The outer covering is to consist of an approved security container such as a briefcase or a courier bag, or, in the circumstances described at sub-para 7.95c below, an envelope. The purpose of the outer covering is to conceal the classification and endorsement markings, which are shown on the inner covering.

7.100 **Contents of the inner covering**. Several documents may be included within one inner covering with the following exceptions:

a. TOP SECRET documents and documents to which special handling procedures apply are to be in separate individual inner coverings unless they are intended for the same control officer. No items of other classifications are to be included with TOP SECRET documents.

b. Documents addressed 'EXCLUSIVE' or marked 'PERSONAL' are to be in separate inner coverings.

7.101 **Contents of the outer covering**. The outer covering may contain several inner coverings and it is only required during transmission from dispatch point to receipt point. In order to avoid unnecessary double-enveloping, security staffs and USO's, in conjunction with the Defence Safehand Service (DSS) staff, are to ensure that local arrangements are clearly understood by all units. The following points on outer coverings should be noted:

PSR(IC)3

Details of specific operational practices

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

d. Transmission (see paras 7.95 to 7.96 and 7.103 to 1.111).

e. Receipt (see paras 7.112 and 7.57 to 7.58).

f. Registration and filing (see paras 7.59 to 7.74).

7.102 When an envelope is used as an outer covering for documents classified CONFIDENTIAL or above, it is to be unused. The detailed rules for covering and addressing documents (including enveloping, sealing, and packaging) prior to transmission are given at Annex I.

Transmission of Classified Material

7.103 The means of transmission for classified documents used by the NZDF together with the classification of the documents which may be carried are given below:

a. Within New Zealand

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

b. Overseas

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

Transmission by Secure Facsimile

7.104 In effect, transmitting a document by facsimile creates a copy for which some accounting action is required. Only approved equipment, with keymat appropriate to document classification, is to be used for the facsimile transmission of classified documents. The process for transmission is:

a. a. A document entry is to be made in the despatching registry's MD 392 register. The 'Final Disposal' column (column 'M') is to be annotated 'Sent [or] Received By Fax'.

b. b. Despatching registry is to ensure that a person of the appropriate clearance level is at the receiving end to take possession of the document.

c. c. The Facsimile Transmission receipt produced after transmitting the document becomes the MD 27 and is annotated with the document details and filed with other MD 27 receipts.

d. The document entry is ruled through with a red line.

Privacy Markings

7.105 Documents carrying privacy markings are to be transmitted in accordance with their security classification. Unclassified documents bearing privacy markings are to be treated as Allied RESTRICTED. Where originators consider that privacy justifies it, documents so marked may be enclosed in two envelopes and transmitted by registered letter post or by an approved civil courier.

Carriage of Classified Documents by Hand

7.106 When documents classified CONFIDENTIAL or above are carried by hand outside secure areas they are to be sealed in an envelope marked with the security classification (or placed in the appropriate file) and carried in a locked container of approved pattern, e.g. a briefcase. The container is to be in good state of repair, and

if a briefcase is used, it is to be locked. The key is to be carried separately and not attached to the container. The container is to carry a label marked:

a. **On the front:** 'If found please see instructions on the reverse side of this label'.

b. **On the back:** 'Anyone finding this container (bag, briefcase) is asked to telephone..... or contact the nearest New Zealand Defence Force Establishment, or hand it to the nearest police station.'

7.107 The individual carrying classified documents is responsible for their protection at all times until they are returned to the couriers unit or stored under official arrangements. The documents are to remain continuously in the individual's possession and must never be housed in premises open to the public (e.g. a hotel or club).

7.108 Classified documents, including NZ/Allied RESTRICTED, SENSITIVE and IN CONFIDENCE, must never be read in a public place.

7.109 NZ/Allied RESTRICTED, SENSITIVE and IN CONFIDENCE documents are to be properly covered and safeguarded at all times to prevent unauthorised access.

7.110 Within New Zealand the Defence Mail Service should be used, in preference to New Zealand Post or civilian commercial courier service. (See also Chapter 8)

7.111 Where units have to make their own arrangements for the collection and delivery of classified documents, they are to ensure that the requirements for the protection of documents are fully implemented, and that couriers, who are to be security cleared to the appropriate level status, are properly instructed in carrying out such duties. Details of methods of transmission for each security classification are tabulated at Annex I.

Receipt Form Procedure

7.112 A receipt from (MD 27) is to accompany CONFIDENTIAL and above and all other copy-numbered documents. Where an ultimate addressee receives a MD 27, receipt action is to be taken without delay. Individuals nominated to supervise the maintenance of classified document registers are to check that receipts are returned to senders by addressees without delay. Reminders are to be sent if the MD 27 has not been returned within a reasonable time (e.g. total normal transmission time (i.e., to destination and return) plus one week), taking into consideration postal conditions and distances involved. The date the receipt is returned is to be entered in MD 392 or on the duplicate MD 27 as applicable. Completed MD 27 are to be retained by the dispatching unit for a minimum period of three years from the date of issue before destruction. Detailed action on receipt of a classified document is given at paras 7.57 to 7.58.

7.113 On the occasion where a MD 27 receipt is deemed lost, the receiving unit is to verify the document has been received, either by email or signal message.

7.114 RESTRICTED documents and publications that are deemed accountable are to be accompanied by form MD 121 "Transmission of Documents'.

Documents Carried Abroad

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

Carriage of Classified Documents by Casual Couriers

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Temporary Appointment as a New Zealand Government Diplomatic Courier

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Defence Procedures for a Temporary New Zealand Government Diplomatic Courier

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

Application for a Laissez Passer

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Preparation of Documents for Transmission by Diplomatic Courier

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3
Details of specific operational practices

Stopovers and Break of Journey En Route

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3
Details of specific operational practices

Multiple Destinations

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3
Details of specific operational practices

Return Journey

PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Details of specific operational practices

Annexes:

Annexes withheld. Out of Scope.

G. Notes for Maintenance and Disposal of Form MD 392 - Classified Documents Register (CDR)

Appendices:

1. Record of Particulars of Supervising Officers
2. Master Record of Form MD392-Classified Document Register
3. Format for Classified Document Register (MD 392) Closure Certificate

ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 7 TO
DFO 51 (1)

NOTES FOR MAINTENANCE AND DISPOSAL OF FORM MD 392 - CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS REGISTER (CDR)

1. The CDR is to contain a complete record of holdings and disposal of documents classified CONFIDENTIAL and above received by, or created in a headquarters, Unit or establishment. All movements of TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL documents are to be recorded in such a manner as to enable them to be traced at any stage.

2. A nominated individual or appointment holder is to be responsible for the compilation and maintenance of the register. In a headquarters this person would normally be the Chief or Branch Clerk. In small Units the Administrative officer would be appropriate.

3. A specified individual or appointment holder other than the one in para 2 above, is to be nominated as supervising officer and is to supervise the keeping of the register by weekly inspection. The supervising officer is also to ensure that all documents classified CONFIDENTIAL and above are recorded in the MD 392 and that all receipt forms (MD 27) have been returned within a reasonable time, initiating action to hasten any outstanding.

4. Names of both the nominated appointment holder and the supervising officer are to be entered on the facing page of the MD 392 or on the form at Appendix 1 to this annex.

5. Registers must be classified according to their content, not the documents they record and are to be numbered in series (immediately below the top security classification box on the front cover); individual registers may be allotted to each classification and for receipt and despatch, where the volume of documents justifies it, but separate registers are to be kept for:

a. TOP SECRET PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

b. Documents to which Special Handling procedures apply.

c. Separate registers are not required for documents bearing a NATIONAL CAVEAT marking.

d. In large Headquarters, where several MD 392's are being maintained, a master record of registers (see form at Appendix 2), containing details of all current open and closed registers is to be maintained.

Maintenance of Registers

6. All entries are to be made in BLACK or BLUE ink or ballpen, and:

a. The date of entries is to be stamped or written in column (b) immediately below the last entry before entries are made each day.

b. Serial numbers allotted in column (a) are to be entered on the connected documents.

c. Columns (a) to (i) are to be completed immediately documents are received or created. Every copy of any one document is to be recorded by a separate entry.

7. The type of document, abbreviated e.g. L - Letter/Memo, M – Minute, S – Signal, etc, is to be entered in Column (b) under the date.

a. Column (i) the initial letters TS S or C are usually sufficient. If the document bears a special marking e.g. a NATIONAL CAVEAT, this should also be included (e.g. C NZEO).

b. The supervising officer is to check columns (j), (k), and (l) to ensure that documents are not on temporary disposal for an extended period, and that when temporary disposal is completed, the entry is closed and transferred to final disposal.

c. Columns (m) and (n) are to be completed for all entries to show disposal to file (with folio number) box or container (not to an individual) or outside addressee and the date. Amendments will be endorsed quote incorporated into ..... on .... and crossed off the register.

d. Column (o) is to be completed immediately Forms MD 27 are returned.

e. Column (p) is to contain appropriate details of destruction of documents. Destruction of documents is the responsibility of the custodian. All documents classified CONFIDENTIAL and above are to be destroyed in the presence of a witnessing officer who is cleared to the appropriate level. (See Chapter 12) Other entries in this column (in pencil) could include the review date of TOP SECRET documents, or the date on which limited life documents are due for downgrading.

f. Care is to be taken in registering covering letters, which are permanently retained with the classified documents they cover. The following points are to be noted:

(1) Classified Covering Letter. Where the classified covering letter is classified CONFIDENTIAL or above separate entries are to be made.

(2) RESTRICTED or Unclassified Covering Letter. Care is to be taken to ensure that the classified document registered and not the RESTRICTED or Unclassified covering letter.

8. Entries in the MD 392 are to be ruled through in red ink, when the document has been forwarded to another addressee and the MD 27 has been received back, when the document has been destroyed or when the document has been downgraded to RESTRICTED or below.

9. Inspections by the supervising officer are to be recorded on the facing page and contained on a locally produced register if necessary. A separate record is to be kept of checks and musters of documents against the MD 392 and vice versa.

10. The MD 392 is to be stored separately from the documents to which it refers.

Closing an MD 392

11. Whenever the nominated individual or appointment holder responsible for the compilation and maintenance of a MD 392 hands over his/her/her post, the incoming holder is to check against the master record of MD 392 that all current and open registers, and those that have been closed within the previous 10 years, are held. A record that this has been done is to be entered across columns (a) to (e) in the master record of registers. Any discrepancies are to be reported and investigated and, where appropriate, the form of report at Chapter 21 is to be used.

12. Registers are only to be categorised as closed when all entries have been accounted for and closed by the following means:

a. By striking through an entry with a distinctive line and entering in the remarks column the appropriate details as indicated below:

(1) **Destruction.** Date of destruction and signature of the destroying officer (and witness) where necessary.

(2) **Transfer.** Details of the current MD 392 entry to which the document has been transferred.

(3) **Receipt completed.** Date receipt (MD 27 was received back from the addressee (in the case of a document dispatched).

(4) **Error.** The supervising officer certifying the entry as an error with a note of explanation.

(5) **Downgrading.** The document being downgraded to RESTRICTED or unclassified and this being noted by an entry in the remarks column with the authority for downgrading action and date.

(6) **Lost.** Written off as lost, after a security investigation, with appropriate security staff authority.

13. A closure certificate as at Appendix 3 is then to be completed by the supervising officer and retained with the closed MD 392. All unused pages or parts of pages are to be ruled through with a diagonal line, and the closed register is then to be retained for 10 years from the date on which the register was closed.

**APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 7 TO
DFO 51 (1)**

RECORD OF PARTICULARS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS

PARTICULARS OF SUPERVISING OFFICERS					
Date	Rank or Grade	Name and Initials of officer maintaining this register	Rank or Grade	Name initials of supervising officer	Signature of Supervising officer

APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 7 TO
DFO 51 (1)

MASTER RECORD OF FORM MD392-CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT REGISTER

UNIT .....

MD 392 Serial No	Dates		Status of MD392 (Current, Open, Closed)	Register Used for
	Opened	Closed		

APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX G TO
CHAPTER 7 TO
DFO 51 (1)

FORMAT FOR CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT REGISTER (MD 392) CLOSURE CERTIFICATE

1. This MD 392 Serial No..... Unit..... has been inspected by:

Rank and Name ..... (USO)

2. There are no extant entries in this register.

3. This register was closed on .....(date) and can be destroyed on .....(date 10 years after date of closure).

Date.....

Signature..... Supervising Officer

This page has been deliberately left blank.

This page has been deliberately left blank.

This page has been deliberately left blank.

This page has been deliberately left blank.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

MD392
SMALL

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT REGISTER

Headquarters/Unit/Branch: DIRECTORATE OF COORDINATION, OCDF

Date Opened: 19 JULY 2004

Date Closed:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF THIS REGISTER ARE CONTAINED OVERLEAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

RECEIPT OR ORIGIN									DISPOSAL						
Serial Number	Date of Entry	Sender or Originator	Date of Origin	Reference Number	Title (or Subject)	Total No. Received or Produced	Copy No.	Classification	TEMPORARY: Referred to or Returned to	TEMPORARY: Received On (date)	TEMPORARY: Received Receipt	FINAL: Despatched to (address details) or Enclosed in (ref. number of files etc.)	FINAL: Date	FINAL: Date Receipt Returned	REMARKS (To include destruction particulars when applicable or signature of recipient if receipt form not used)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
S115	7 Sep 11	OCDF	~~30~~ 4 Sep 11	PSR(R)1	Suspension of Detainee Transfer	1		S							
S116	7 Sep 11	OCDF	1 Sep 11		Briefing Pack on Civ Casualty - Kabul Aug 2010	1		S	~~SLO Office~~ PSR(IC)3	~~13/10/14~~ Not required Entered in error.		Sir Office PSR(IC)3	~~30/09/15~~	PSR(IC)3	1 ~~Six Copies:~~ Copy 1 ~~12~~ pp Copy 2 ~~15~~ pp 12 pp
(S116) 13C	30/6/14	OC DSF	1/9/11	OP RATHBAR OP BURNHAM	OP WATCH - PAPERS RELATING TO 20/21/9 2010 ops in Tala Wa Bagh	1		S	Mil Sec	30/6/14					

PSR(IC)3

PSR(IC)3

RECEIPT OR ORIGIN									DISPOSAL						
Serial Number	Date of Entry	Sender or Originator	Date of Origin	Reference Number	Title (or Subject)	Total No. Received or Produced	Copy No.	Classification	TEMPORARY			FINAL			REMARKS
									Referred to or Returned to	Received On (date)	Received Receipt	Despatched to (address details) or Enclosed in (ref. number of files etc.)	Date	Date Receipt Returned	(To include destruction particulars when applicable or signature of recipient if receipt form not used)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
133	1/7/14	DCoord	22/8/10	NN	Papers relating to Ag 21-20 area in Talawerbangsu	1	NN.	NATO S	MA TO MINDEF	1/7/14		CIA office PSR(IC)3	30/09/9		
1324	1/7/14	DCoord	25/8/10	NN	OP WATGA: HQ ISAF CIVIL CASUALTY INVESTIGATION INTO OP BURNHAM		5 of 9	S	MA TO MINDEF	1/7/14					

This page has been deliberately left blank.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

~~SECRET~~

~~NATO~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

~~SECRET~~

~~NATO~~

MD 392
LARGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

~~SECRET~~

~~NATO~~

CLASS[illegible]MENT

No further entries
into this MD392

MD392 Vol 1
Dated 20 Oct 17
is the current
register

Headquarters Unit/Branch: Office of Chief of Defence Force

Date Opened: 26 MAY 2011

Date Closed:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF
THIS REGISTER ARE CONTAINED OVERLEAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

~~SECRET~~

~~NATO~~

RECEIVED OCDF
Date
ID Number

RECEIPT OR ORIGIN								DISPOSAL							
									TEMPORARY			FINAL			REMARKS
										Received					
Serial Number	Date of Entry	Sender or Originator	Date of Origin	Reference Number	Title (or Subject)	Total No. Received or Produced	Copy No.	Classification	Referred to or Returned to	On (date)	Receipt	Despatched to (address details) or Enclosed in (ref. number of file etc.)	Date	Date Receipt Returned	(To include destruction particulars when applicable or signature of recipient if receipt form not used)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
~~386/11~~	~~1/9/11~~	~~DSO.~~	~~1/9/11~~	~~—~~	~~BAGHLAN PROVINCE BRIEF FOR MINDEF (2 SECRET DOCS)~~	~~1~~	~~1~~	~~S~~	~~Docs~~			~~MINDEF.~~	~~11/9/11~~	~~Hoey.~~	~~No. 0207181b.~~
387/11	1/9/11	DSO.	1/9/11	—	— " — " —	1	1	S	DOCS	08	1/9	Hoey folder			

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

MD392
LARGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

RESTRICTED

CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT REGISTER

Headquarters/Unit/Branch OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE

Date Opened: JAN 2010

Date Closed:

INSTRUCTIONS FOR MAINTAINING AND DISPOSING OF THIS REGISTER ARE CONTAINED OVERLEAF

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (See Instruction 7)

RESTRICTED

RECEIPT OR ORIGIN								DISPOSAL							
								TEMPORARY			FINAL			REMARKS
Serial Number	Date of Entry	Sender or Originator	Date of Origin	Reference Number	Title (or Subject)	Total No. Received or Produced	Classification	Referred to or Returned to	Received On (date)	Received Receipt	Despatched to (address details) or Enclosed in (ref. number of files etc.)	Date	Date Receipt Returned	(To include destruction particulars when applicable or signature of recipient if receipt form not used)
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h) (i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)	(o)	(p)
5704	2/12/11	HQNSOPC	22/8/10	OCDF 386/11	NATO/ISAF (S) OP RAHBARI OBJ BUXHAM	1	S							Shredded Fudge 3 12 11

Monday, 30 August 2010

9:15am - 9:15am	VIP - Beehive Basement to Te Papa.
9:30am - 10:30am	Open The Kermadec Science Symposium - 8.15am powhiri / 9.30am opening and welcome / 9.40am speech : *ICON Room, Te Papa, Cable Street, Wellington.* *Bronwen Golder*
10:30am - 11:00am	VIP - Te Papa to Beehive Basement.
11:00am - 2:00pm	Cabinet
2:30pm - 3:00pm	Marlborough Express TBC - ph call
3:00pm - 4:00pm	Dr Brook Barrington. *Yr office.*
4:00pm - 4:30pm	student journalist - telephone call re Afghanistan trip / *Yr office.*
4:30pm - 5:30pm	Senior Manager, Science and Technology, and IBM Fellow, IBM Almaden Research Centre, and IBM Wellington / *Yr office.*
5:30pm - 6:30pm	CDF. *Yr office.*
6:30pm - 7:00pm	Call

Tuesday, 31 August 2010

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

Monday, 13 September 2010

All day	UK/Battle of Britain Commemorations [redacted]
5:45am - 6:15am	Silver Sedans - Home to Auckland Airport. *confirmed.*
7:00am - 8:00am	[redacted] Auckland to Wellington. *Ref:* [redacted]
8:00am - 8:30am	VIP - Wellington Airport to Beehive Basement. *ref.* [redacted]
8:45am - 9:15am	Cabinet conference call - earthquake response - Phone: [redacted] Pin: [redacted]
9:00am - 9:30am	Weekly meeting - [redacted]
9:30am - 10:00am	State Services Commissioner [redacted] - update on MSI Chief Executive appointment. *Yr office.*
11:00am - 3:00pm	Cabinet
3:30pm - 4:00pm	Hon McCully/CDF. *6.1 Exec Wing.*
4:15pm - 4:30pm	VIP - Beehive Basement to Customhouse Quay. *ref.* [redacted]
4:30pm - 6:00pm	Address Chief Financial Officers special interest group - business R&D [redacted]
6:00pm - 6:30pm	VIP - Customhouse Quay to Beehive Basement. *ref.* [redacted]
6:35pm - 7:05pm	VIP - Beehive Basement to Wellington Airport. *ref.* [redacted]
7:30pm - 8:30pm	[redacted] 76 Wellington to Auckland booked as part of int'l travel. *Booking ref* [redacted]
8:30pm - 8:30pm	Info - North Shore Electorate Executive meeting. *EO.*
8:30pm - 9:00pm	VIP Auckland domestic to main entrance of international terminal. *ref.* [redacted]
11:15pm - 11:15pm	Depart Auckland for Hong Kong/London - [redacted]

Tuesday, 14 September 2010

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

[redacted]

Wednesday, 22 September 2010

[redacted]

Thursday, 23 September 2010

All day	Acting Minister for Hon Tim Groser
7:00am - 8:00am	[redacted]. *Defence House.*
8:30am - 9:00am	Hon English re investment statement. [redacted]
9:00am - 9:15am	VIP - Beehive Basement to Queens Wharf. *ref.* [redacted]
9:15am - 11:00am	Attend powhiri and welcome ceremony for HMNZS Wellington hosted by Mayor Kerry Prendergast. *No 1 Queens Wharf, Wellington.* [redacted]
11:00am - 11:30am	VIP - Queens Wharf to Beehive Basement. *ref.* [redacted]
12:00pm - 12:30pm	[redacted], Victoria University / [redacted]. *Yr office.*
12:30pm - 1:15pm	Defence weekly meeting (DWM) - WM, Defence CEs and deputies
2:00pm - 3:00pm	Questions
2:30pm - 3:00pm	VIP - Beehive Basement to Wellington Airport. *ref.* [redacted]
3:35pm - 4:40pm	[redacted] Wellington to Hamilton. *Ref.* [redacted]

[redacted]

4:40pm - 5:00pm	Hire car pick up - Hamilton Airport. [redacted]
5:00pm - 5:30pm	O/night accommodation - Novotel Tainui. *Alma Street, Hamilton* - [redacted] *NOVOTEL TAINUI* *Alma St* *Hamilton* [redacted]
6:00pm - 10:00pm	Guest speaker (4-6mins) at Kudos Awards - Hamilton Science Excellence Awards / [redacted]. *Southwell School Auditorium, Peachgrove Road, Hamilton* / [redacted]

Friday, 24 September 2010

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

Wednesday, 15 December 2010

All day	Info only - Naval fleet arrival Devonport
9:00am - 9:30am	Mtg with PM and Defence officials
9:15am - 9:45am	Cabinet Committee mtg - SOC
9:30am - 10:00am	Phone interview with North Shore Times / [redacted]
9:30am - 10:30am	MoRST officials weekly meeting
11:00am - 11:30am	Cabinet Committee mtg - EGI
1:30pm - 1:45pm	[redacted] *Yr office.*
2:00pm - 3:00pm	Questions
3:30pm - 4:00pm	[redacted] Herald / Geoff x [redacted]
3:30pm - 4:30pm	Reschedule - VCDF and [redacted] re Defence Transformation Plan ERP IT project / [redacted] *Yr office.*
4:30pm - 5:00pm	[redacted] and photographer, Fairfax / [redacted] *Yr office.*
5:00pm - 5:30pm	Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (DES)
5:30pm - 7:30pm	[redacted]
6:00pm - 11:30pm	[redacted]

Thursday, 16 December 2010

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

Sunday, 15 May 2011

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

Monday, 16 May 2011

All day	Acting Minister of Labour and Food Safety for Hon Wilkinson
5:45am - 6:15am	Silver Sedans - Home to Auckland Airport. *confirmed.*
7:00am - 8:00am	[redacted] Auckland to Wellington. *Ref.* [redacted]
8:00am - 8:30am	VIP - Wellington Airport to Beehive Basement. [redacted]
9:00am - 10:00am	[redacted]
9:00am - 9:30am	Weekly meeting - [redacted]
10:00am - 10:30am	VCDF, Brigadier Riordan and Col Mike Thompson / [redacted] *Yr office.*
11:00am - 2:00pm	Cabinet
2:00pm - 3:00pm	MSI re Investment Processes. *Yr office.*
3:00pm - 4:00pm	MSI officials weekly meeting
4:00pm - 5:00pm	Colonel Jim Blackwell / [redacted] *Yr office.*
4:45pm - 5:00pm	Defence - speeches / [redacted]
5:00pm - 5:30pm	VIP beehive basement to Wgtn Airport. *booking ref* [redacted]
6:00pm - 7:00pm	[redacted] Wellington to Auckland. *ET booking ref* [redacted]
7:00pm - 7:30pm	Silver Sedans airport to EO. *confirmed.*
7:30pm - 9:00pm	NS Electorate Executive meeting. *EO.*
9:00pm - 9:30pm	Silver Sedans EO to home. *booked.*

Tuesday, 17 May 2011

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

August 2011

Monday, 8 August 2011

Tuesday, 9 August 2011

All day	Acting Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control for Hon te Heuheu
9:00am - 9:30am	Cabinet Committee - ECC [Defence papers]
10:00am - 1:00pm	Caucus. *Parliament House.*
1:10pm - 2:00pm	Speak to Australian Staff College. *Defence House.*
2:00pm - 3:00pm	Questions
3:30pm - 4:10pm	Col Blackwell, Special operations update / Capt Hoey x *Yr office.*
4:10pm - 4:30pm	. *Yr office.*
4:30pm - 6:00pm	House Roster
5:30pm - 8:30pm	
6:00pm - 6:10pm	VIP beehive basement to Aust HC. *booking ref*
6:10pm - 7:15pm	Attend reception for Australian Defence College Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies tour participants. *Australian High Commission, 72-76 Hobson Street, Thorndon.*
7:00pm - 7:15pm	VIP Aust HC to beehive basement. *booking ref*

Saturday, 20 August 2011

Sunday, 21 August 2011

Monday, 22 August 2011

All day	Acting Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control for Hon te Heuheu
5:45am - 6:15am	Silver Sedans home to Auckland airport. *confirmed.*
7:00am - 8:00am	Auckland to Wellington. *Ref.*
8:00am - 8:30am	VIP Wellington airport to beehive basement. *ref*
9:00am - 10:00am	
11:00am - 11:30am	Press conference. *Defence House.*
11:00am - 2:00pm	Cabinet
1:30pm - 2:00pm	Attend final Executive Council meeting
2:30pm - 3:00pm	CDF re NZDF alcohol policy/strategy / Capt Hoey x *Yr office.*
3:00pm - 3:30pm	Hon Hekia Parata and CDF
3:30pm - 4:00pm	Col Blackwell / Capt Hoey x *Yr office.*
4:00pm - 4:45pm	
5:00pm - 5:30pm	
5:35pm - 6:05pm	VIP beehive basement to airport. *booked.*

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Tuesday, 6 September 2011

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Wednesday, 7 September 2011

All day	Info : Pacific Forum. *Auckland.*
8:30am - 9:00am	Cancelled : Cabinet Committee - ERD
9:15am - 9:45am	Cabinet Committee mtg - SOC
9:30am - 10:30am	MSI officials weekly meeting
11:00am - 11:30am	Cabinet Committee mtg - EGI
11:30am - 12:00pm	Col Mike Thompson and Brigadier Riordan. *Yr office.*
12:30pm - 1:00pm	[redacted]
1:00pm - 1:15pm	[redacted]
1:30pm - 1:30pm	Phone interview : [redacted]
2:00pm - 3:00pm	Questions
3:30pm - 4:00pm	[redacted] *Yr office.*
6:00pm - 7:00pm	Represent govt : Brazil National Day reception. [redacted]
7:30pm - 8:45pm	House roster
7:30pm - 8:45pm	House roster

Thursday, 8 September 2011

[redacted]

[redacted]

Saturday, 10 September 2011

Sunday, 11 September 2011

Monday, 12 September 2011

5:45am - 6:15am	Silver Sedans home to Auckland airport. *confirmed.*
7:00am - 8:00am	Auckland to Wellington. *Ref.*
8:00am - 8:00am	Radio interview -
8:00am - 8:30am	VIP Wellington airport to beehive basement. *ref*
9:00am - 9:10am	VIP beehive basement to Majestic Centre. *ref*
9:00am - 9:30am	Weekly meeting -

9:10am - 9:30am	15 min speech : MSI establishment planning session / [redacted] *Majestic Centre, Willis Street, Wellington.*
9:40am - 9:40am	VIP Majestic Centre to Beehive Basement. *ref* [redacted]
10:00am - 10:30am	Witness signing ceremony : agreement between MSI and UK Dept for Business Innovation & Skills / Jeremy Browne, UK Minister of State also attending / [redacted]. *Yr office and 5.5 meeting room.*
11:00am - 2:00pm	Cabinet
1:30pm - 2:00pm	Attend Executive Council [redacted]
2:00pm - 2:30pm	Hon McCully re Bamiyan transition security strategy / Capt Hoey x [redacted] *6.1 Exec Wing.*
3:00pm - 3:20pm	[redacted]
3:45pm - 4:15pm	Col Jim Blackwell / Capt Hoey x 9290. *Yr office.*
4:30pm - 5:00pm	ERD [Defence papers]
7:30pm - 9:30pm	Electorate Executive Meeting. *Jonmer.*

Tuesday, 13 September 2011

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

Wednesday, 14 September 2011

[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]
[redacted]	[redacted]

[redacted]

This page has been deliberately left blank.

Achive Manager Export

From: KELLY PETER, COL Sent: Wed, 01 Sep 2010 22:14:58 GMT
To: MCKINSTRY RIAN, LT COL ; PARSONS CHRIS, LTCOL ; CUMMINS KARL, LTCOL
Subject: FW: First take: 1 Sep

Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

PP_media reporting_2 Sep.doc (46Kb)

PSR(IC)3 is tracking this info for us.

PK

Defence Intelligence Officer

From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Sent: tember 2010 9:20 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MAJ; KELLY PETER, COL
Sub e: 1 Sep

Gentlemen - FYI

Nothing new of note.

Defence Intelligence Officer

From: PSR(IC)3 MR
Sent: Thursday, 2 September 2010 9:10 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Subject: FW: First take: 1 Sep

Defence Intelligence Officer

From: PSR(IC)3 [mailto: PSR(IC)3 @dpmc.govt.nz]
Sent: Thursday, 2 September 2010 8:31 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MR
Subject: First take: 1 Sep

~~[SEEMAIL][RESTRICTED]~~

First lot of reporting (in date order) from both factiva and OSC.

Will forward anything else if/when it comes through,

cheers
PSR(IC)3

Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail.

Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian casualties in Baghlan
296 words
31 August 2010
The Times of Central Asia
TCASIA
English

KABUL, August 30 (NATO News Release) -- In response to Baghlan provincial governor's concerns about civilian casualties, a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the ministries of interior and defense, and International Security Assistance Force officials, conducted a full assessment of an operation on Aug. 22 in Talah wa Barfak district, Baghlan province.

The team determined that several rounds from coalition helicopters fell short, missing the intended target and instead striking two buildings, which may have resulted in civilian casualties. Insurgents were using the building as a base of operations; however, it was not the intended target.

The team discovered the accidental short rounds during an examination of the air weapons team video. The assessment determined a gun site malfunction was the cause of the errant rounds.

"We regret any possible civilian loss of life or injury. Our first objective is to protect the people of Afghanistan, and in this case we may have failed," said U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Timothy M. Zadalis, ISAF Joint Command director of plans and projects and team lead. "Our thoughts and concerns are with the family and friends of those civilians who may have been injured or killed."

During their assessment, the team received operational briefings, met with the provincial governor and chief of police and reviewed weapons-system video.

Initial reports from the ground operation indicated 13 insurgents were killed, with no civilian casualties, however close examination of the weapons system video showed the errant rounds striking the unintended buildings.

"This is exactly why we send assessment teams to look into all civilian casualty allegations," said Zadalis. "We want to be sure we understand exactly what happened, review all information available and set the record straight."

Document TCASIA0020100901e68v0000d

ISAF to probe allegations of civilian casualties
133 words
30 August 2010
Pajhwok Afghan News
APAFGH
English

Pajhwok Report - Aug 30, 2010 - 17:53

KABUL (PAN): The International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Monday ordered an investigation into allegations of civilian casualties during an August 22 operation in northern Baghlan province.

In a statement, the NATO-led force said The ISAF Joint Command commander had ordered the investigation based on information contained in the joint initial assessment team's report.

The assessment team determined several rounds from coalition helicopters fell short, missing the intended target and instead striking two buildings, which might have resulted in civilian casualties.

"We are here to protect the people of Afghanistan. Civilian casualties reduce the confidence of the Afghan people and erodes trust placed in us," said US Army Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, ISAF Joint Command commander.

Document APAFGH0020100831e68u0000b

Afghan violence reverses gains; 7 soldiers are killed after weeks of decline in NATO casualty rate
BY ROD NORDLAND
426 words
30 August 2010
International Herald Tribune
INHT
5
English

Seven American soldiers were killed in fighting in eastern and southern Afghanistan over the weekend, after several weeks of declining death tolls among NATO forces.

In western Afghanistan, in Herat Province, police officers found the bullet-riddled bodies of five missing campaign workers for a female candidate in next month's parliamentary elections, and a body was found of another candidate for Parliament who had been shot and killed, Afghan officials said Sunday.

The American servicemen were killed in five separate incidents, according to statements from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF. On Sunday, an American soldier was killed by an improvised explosive device in southern Afghanistan, while another died as a result of an insurgent attack in southern Afghanistan, the NATO force said.

On Saturday, attacks by militants in eastern Afghanistan killed two American soldiers in one incident and one in a separate incident, while two other Americans were killed by an improvised explosive device in southern Afghanistan.

NATO officials did not release any further details.

The incidents brought the monthly death toll among coalition soldiers to 62 as of Aug. 29, compared with 88 in July, according to icasualties.org, which tracks coalition fatalities. In June, the bloodiest month of the nine-year war, 102 NATO soldiers were killed, according to icasualties.org figures.

At the same time, NATO forces have nearly tripled in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009, with a total of 123,000 now. About 100,000 of them are Americans.

In the Herat Province incident, the police said 10 campaign workers for Fawzia Gilani, a current member of Parliament who is running for re-election, had been abducted in the Adraskan District last week. Five of them were discovered shot and killed on Sunday, said Col. Noor Khan Nikzad, a spokesman for the provincial police.

Elsewhere in Herat, in the Shindand District, Abdul Manan, a candidate for Parliament who was on his way to a local mosque, was shot and killed by a gunman on a motorcycle, according to Colonel Nikzad.

In northern Baghlan Province, a NATO investigation gave credence to reports from local officials that eight civilians were killed during a night raid last week.

ISAF said in a statement released Sunday that a "full assessment" of the incident early last week in Talah wa Barfak district had determined that a helicopter that fired into the wrong building "may have resulted in civilian casualties."

Document INHT000020100830e68u00001

People protest against civilians death in US forces operation in Afghan north
216 words
29 August 2010
19:33
BBC Monitoring South Asia
BBCSAP
English

Text of report by privately-owned Afghan Arzu TV on 28 August

[Presenter] A number of residents of Tala wa Barfak District of Baghlan Province [in northern Afghanistan] have staged a demonstration to protest against the killing of civilians in an operation of US soldiers. The protesters claim that at least 20 civilians had been killed as a result of the US forces' operation in the district.

[Correspondent] Protesters, who were chanting slogans of death to America, demanded the central government, the international community and human rights organizations to stop such operations. They claim that if this practice is continued they will close the Bamian-Baghlan road which passes through Tala wa Barfak District. According to them, five civilians were killed and 16 others injured in the US forces' operation in the Tirgaran area of Tala wa Barfak. It is reported that children and women were among the victims of the incident.

The protesters said that the [US] forces had attacked the village at night and the protest ended after two hours following issuing a resolution.

[Video shows an angry demonstration on a street, people stepping on a US flag]

Source: Arzu TV, Mazar-e Sharif, in Dari 1500 gmt 28 Aug 10

ac7ec22a

Document BBCSAP0020100829e68t001md

People protest against civilians death in US forces operation in Afghan north

SAP20100829950033 Mazar-e Sharif *Arzu TV* in Dari 1500 GMT 28 Aug 10

People protest against civilians death in US forces operation in Afghan north

Text of report by privately-owned Afghan Arzu TV on 28 August

[Presenter] A number of residents of Tala wa Barfak District of Baghlan Province [in northern Afghanistan] have staged a demonstration to protest against the killing of civilians in an operation of US soldiers. The protesters claim that at least 20 civilians had been killed as a result of the US forces' operation in the district.

[Correspondent] Protesters, who were chanting slogans of death to America, demanded the central government, the international community and human rights organizations to stop such operations. They claim that if this practice is continued they will close the Bamian-Baghlan road which passes through Tala wa Barfak District. According to them, five civilians were killed and 16 others injured in the US forces' operation in the Tirgaran area of Tala wa Barfak. It is reported that children and women were among the victims of the incident.

The protesters said that the [US] forces had attacked the village at night and the protest ended after two hours following issuing a resolution.

[Video shows an angry demonstration on a street, people stepping on a US flag]

[Description of Source: Mazar-e Sharif Arzu TV in Dari -- privately-owned television station launched in 2007 by Kamal Nabizada who is said to have good ties with Balkh provincial governor Atta Mohammad Nur.]

Two NATO soldiers, eight civilians killed in Afghan violence
Sardar Ahmad
588 words
25 August 2010
03:01
Agence France Presse
AFPR
English

Two foreign soldiers died Tuesday fighting insurgents in Afghanistan, the NATO alliance said, as Afghan authorities said international forces had killed eight civilians in a recent operation.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said it was aware of the charges by some Afghan officials that its soldiers had killed civilians during a raid against Islamist rebels in the northern province of Baghlan.

"On Sunday we saw 11 helicopters coming," Mohammad Ismail, the district chief for Tala Wa Barfak, where the incident took place, told AFP.

"Some of the helicopters landed deploying troops. They carried out attacks there. They killed eight people, all civilians," he said.

Tala Wa Barfak is a remote district in Baghlan, where Taliban insurgents have established a significant presence in recent months.

The district chief said that about a dozen other people, "all of them civilians," were injured in the raids, which he said had lasted for "hours".

An ISAF spokesman said the claims were being investigated, adding: "However, current operational reporting does not support any civilian casualties."

Civilian casualties caused by foreign forces have fallen this year, with NATO troops responsible for about 22 percent of more than 1,200 non-combatant deaths in the first half of 2010, a recent UN report said.

Afghan civilian casualties in the war launched against the Taliban regime in October 2001 is a sensitive issue that sometimes leads to violent anti-West protests.

President Hamid Karzai has long been calling on his Western backers, the US and NATO members with 141,000 troops in Afghanistan, to protect non-combatants during operations against rebels.

Karzai has said that civilian casualties erode public support for his administration, already unpopular among Afghans because of rampant corruption among its officials and its failure to provide security.

Meanwhile, ISAF said two foreign soldiers were killed in southern Afghanistan Tuesday, bringing to 13 the number of troops killed in the country since the weekend.

An American soldier was killed by a bomb in southern Afghanistan, and an ISAF soldier whose nationality was not disclosed was killed in fighting against insurgents, also in the south, the NATO-led force said.

The latest deaths bring to 458 the number of international soldiers killed in the Afghan war so far this year, compared with 520 for the whole last year.

Thirteen international soldiers have been killed since Saturday, seven of them Americans, according to an AFP tally based on that kept by the icasualties.org website.

The force said it had killed 35 rebels during operations east of Kabul launched to secure troubled regions ahead of Afghanistan's September parliamentary elections. The figures could not independently be verified.

The violence is worsening as the militants spread into the north and west of the country from their traditional strongholds in the south and east.

The head of the US Marine Corps, speaking in the United States after a visit to Afghanistan, said he believed Afghan forces would not be ready to take over from US troops in Afghanistan's southern provinces for a few more years.

"It will be a few years before conditions on the ground are such that turnover will be possible for us," General James Conway told reporters, referring to Marines deployed in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.

His comments were the latest sign from US military leaders that a major troop withdrawal remained a long way off, despite the July 2011 deadline set by President Barack Obama.

burs/bsk/dk

Document AFPR000020100824e68o006mx

Afghan official says six civilians killed in NATO strike

SAP20100823950060 Kabul *Pajhwok Afghan News* in English 1203 GMT 23 Aug 10

Afghan official says six civilians killed in NATO strike

Text of report in English by Afghan independent Pajhwok news agency website

Pol-e Khomri: Six civilians, including a woman and a child, were killed and as many wounded during a NATO airstrike in northern Baghlan Province, an official said on Monday [23 August].

NATO helicopters pounded the Tirgaran village of Tala wa Barfak District, killing and wounding the civilians and burning 20 houses, the district chief, Mohammad Esmail, told Pajhwok Afghan News.

There were no militants in the area at the time of the predawn strike, he said, adding International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers did not inform district officials prior to the air raid.

"NATO helicopters struck our village at about 2:00am, killing six and wounding as many. Twenty houses were torched and foreign troops arrested four residents," said Mullah Mohammad, a local imam. All victims were civilians, he alleged.

Meanwhile, the alliance said a dozen individuals killed in the operation were insurgents and two Taleban commanders, known to lead attacks on Afghan and coalition forces, were the target of the operation.

"Combined forces located and destroyed a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, several RPGs and several boxes of small arms ammunition," the International Security Assistance Force said.

[Description of Source: Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News in English -- independent news agency]

Achive Manager Export

From: PARSONS CHRIS, LTCOL Sent: Wed, 01 Sep 2010 22:19:26 GMT
To: KELLY PETER, COL ; MCKINSTRY RIAN, LT COL ; CUMMINS KARL, LTCOL
Subject: Re: First take: 1 Sep

Ack. Cheers

From: KELLY PETER, COL
To: MCKINSTRY RIAN, LT COL; PARSONS CHRIS, LTCOL; CUMMINS KARL, LTCOL
Sent: Thu Sep 02 10:14:58 2010
Subject: FW: First take: 1 Sep

PSR(IC)3 is tracking this info for us.

PK

From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ Defence Intelligence Officer
Sent: Thursday, 2 September 2010 9:20 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MAJ; KELLY PETER, COL
Subject: FW: First take: 1 Sep

Gentlemen - FYI

Nothing new of note.

From: PSR(IC)3 MR Defence Intelligence Officer
Sent: Thursday, 2 September 2010 9:10 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MAJ Defence Intelligence Officer
Subject: FW: First take: 1 Sep

From: PSR(IC)3 [mailto PSR(IC)3@dpmc.govt.nz]
Sent: Thursday, 2 September 2010 8:31 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MR Defence Intelligence Officer
Subject: First take: 1 Sep

~~[SECMAIL][RESTRICTED]~~

First lot of reporting (in date order) from both factiva and OSC.

Will forward anything else if/when it comes through,

cheers
PSR(IC)3

Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail

This page has been deliberately left blank.

Achive Manager Export

From: Edward Poot (MIN) Sent: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 03:54:48 GMT
To: THOMPSON MIKE, COL
Subject: FW: ~~[SEEMAIL]~~: Report

Mike,

Apparently PSR(IC)3 says people were also looking at you. Sorry - not being there does not help.

Best regards,
Edward

Edward Poot
Group Captain
Military Secretary
Office of Hon Dr Wayne Mapp

Ph: +PSR(IC)3
Mobile: +PSR(IC)3
Email: PSR(IC)3

From: Edward Poot (MIN)
Sent: Thursday, 23 September 2010 3:42 pm
To: 'KELLY PETER, COL'
Cc: STEER JACK, R ADM; PSR(IC)3 (MIN)
Subject: ~~[SEEMAIL]~~: Report

Pete,

Many thanks for the below. The only critical issue that remains opaque is as follows. NATO put out a press release at the time. Our recollection is that it talks about an investigation. How does NATO close the loop with the wider public in Afghanistan (and troop contributing nations) to advise the outcome of the investigation?

Best regards,
Edward

Edward Poot
Group Captain
Military Secretary
Office of Hon Dr Wayne Mapp

Ph: +PSR(IC)3
Mobile: +PSR(IC)3
Email: PSR(IC)3

From: KELLY PETER, COL PSR(IC)3
Sent: Thursday, 23 September 2010 3:33 pm
To: Edward Poot (MIN)
Subject: Unclassified: VCDF FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Importance: High

Ed,

VCDF just came and spoke to me about part of the discussions this morning with the Minister on casualty allegations.

What we know is that the ISAF Joint Command HQ (IJC) raised an Interim Assessment Team (IAT) headed by a Brig to assess the veracity or otherwise of the allegations that there were civilian casualties resulting from a coalition operation that we participated in. As a result of the IAT assessment it was found that there were no civilian casualties (this incl viewing all the helo/plane gun tapes, visiting the local hospital and checking the claims that there were two female casualties, these in fact turned out to be fighting age males who were likely insurgents). This corresponds with what our forces assessed and those of the other participating nations.

As a result of the IAT assessment, all forces were cleared of causing civilian casualties, the matter was closed and no formal investigation initiated. The SNO was advised of this and he saw the written report. PSR(IC)4

That's what we know. Happy to discuss over the phone. If the Minister wishes to pursue release of the assessment perhaps this could be done via the upcoming VIP visit to theatre, however the SNO was adamant that ISAF will not be releasing the report even after he reinforced the national interest angle.

Peter Kelly
Colonel
Director Special Operations
HQNZDF

Wk: PSR(IC)3

Achive Manager Export

From: KELLY PETER, COL Sent: Sun, 12 Dec 2010 23:54:10 GMT
To: STEER JACK, R ADM ; SHORT KEVIN, AIRCDRE ; STOCKWELL PETER, AVM ; KEATING TIMOTHY, BRIG ; PSR(IC)3 , CAPT ; PARSONS CHRIS, LTCOL ; MCKINSTRY RIAN, LT COL
CC CUMMINS KARL, LTCOL ; PSR(IC)3 MAJ ; BRADSHAW PHIL, CDR ; WRIGHT CHRISTOPHER, MR ; COLEMAN PETER, MR
Subject: ~~Restricted:~~ PM RELEASE

Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

20101213 Release ref Baghlan Operations.doc (34Kb) 20101213 Risks Baghland Release.doc (28Kb)

Gentlemen,

Last week the PM req that the CDF provide an unclassified version of events around the SF TF operations in Baghlan province and I was tasked with preparing this. This morning CDF signed-off on the one page release below (with associated risks) and it is possible that the PM will make some comments this afternoon following on from his regular Monday cabinet meeting.

20101213 Release ref Baghlan Operations.doc 20101213 Risks Baghland Release.doc

Peter Kelly
Colonel
Director Special Operations
HQNZDF

Wk: PSR(IC)3

CRU AND NZSAS OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND OCTOBER 2010

1. On 3 August 2010, a daytime NZPRT Patrol led by Lt O'Donnell was ambushed in the North Eastern region of Bamian province by an insurgent group that had an active history of targeting Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and coalition forces within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. This insurgent group was based in the neighbouring province of Baghlan, centred on the Talewa Berfak district (approx 20km away).

2. Following this attack, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) Crisis Response Unit (CRU) supported by the NZSAS Task Force and other ISAF coalition partners, commenced planning to disrupt this insurgent group's capacity and capability to target coalition forces, including the NZPRT within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. The Chief of Defence Force Lieutenant General Mateparae approved operation and it was launched on the night 21 August after gaining additional approval from the MOI and Commander ISAF. The MOI issued Arrest Warrants for the two principal insurgent commanders, which were to be enforced by the CRU.

3. The force for the operation consisted of a combined ground force PSR(S)1 PSR(S)1 CRU personnel and PSR(S)1NZSAS personnel) supported by coalition helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft (including Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or UAV). The ground force landed near a village of Tigiran in Baghlan province at 00.30am on Sunday 22 August. The force was on the ground for approximately three hours, and during that time a large number of armed insurgents, operating in small groups attempted to outflank the force and fire on it from high ground. The armed insurgents were engaged by coalition helicopters and aircraft. The ground force searched three buildings and destroyed a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives, but did not locate the two insurgent leaders. The ground force departed at approx 3.30am. During the operation nine armed insurgents were killed by the supporting coalition helicopters and aircraft, and one NZSAS soldier was injured when a wall collapsed on him. The soldier was evacuated and has subsequently returned to NZ for further medical treatment.

4. Following the operation allegations were made that up to twenty (20) civilians had been killed by aerial bombardment and twenty (20) houses destroyed by fire[1]. Based on these allegations a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the Afghan MOI and Defence and ISAF officials conducted a full assessment of the operation. The assessment team visited the provincial and district capitals, the hospital where the alleged casualties were receiving treatment, viewed the "gun tapes" from the coalition aircraft and spoke to NZSAS personnel. As a result of their investigation the assessment team concluded that "having reviewed the evidence there is no way that civilian casualties could have occurred" and the actions of the ground force and coalition air were cleared of all accusations.

5. Headquarters ISAF assessed that as a result of this operation the insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations had been disrupted. A follow-on operation was conducted on the night of 2 October, but passed without incident. No insurgents were encountered and no shots fired.

Note:

1. During the operation on 22 Aug, two of the three buildings searched caught fire, the first was caused by explosives igniting the structure and the second was caused by an unattended cooking fire left burning when the local inhabitants departed.

Risks ~~(Not For Release)~~

Associated with Releasing Information

If New Zealand is identified as the main coalition ground force on these operations, then the risks are:

- Insurgent groups will be more motivated to conduct a retaliatory attack targeting the NZPRT along similar lines to their attack on 3 August 2010. **[Medium]**

- The release may undermine the cooperation from locals who interact with the NZPRT. However it has been reported that some locals have distanced themselves from the actions of the insurgents operating in their area. **[Low]**

- The release may compromise future operations by coalition forces including those of the NZDF within the Baghlan province. Insurgent groups may analyse the previous actions of the coalition force in an attempt to predict the likely tactics and techniques of any future action potentially denying the element of surprise to the coalition. **[Low]**

- The release may also have a positive effect by demonstrating New Zealand's resolve and high capability to strike insurgent groups that seek to undermine the GIRoA, ISAF and NZPRT.

- The release will place more pressure of the NZ Government to release more information about NZSAS operations in Afghanistan. (Release of information on NZSAS operations is on a case by case basis). **[Medium]**

From the Environment and Insurgents

The Talewa Berfak insurgent group operating within the Baghlan province still possess an ability to target Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and NZPRT operating within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. These groups have recently been reported threatening to target ANSF, coalition forces and the NZPRT.

Assessed risk remains as **Medium** and is unchanged from the current threat posed from insurgent activity in the Baghlan-Bamian border region

Risk Mitigation

As a result of the ambush on 3 August and recent threats by these insurgent groups, the NZDF and NZPRT have taken active measures to increase their force protection when operating in this border region. These have included such measures as; PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3
PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

Article Information	
Article Title	Keith Locke to the Minister of Defence
Source	Parliamentary Questions
Date Published	16/05/2011

Keith Locke to the Minister of Defence

https://www.parliament.nz/en/pb/order-paper-questions/written-questions/document/QWA_03678_2011/3678-2011-keith-locke-to-the-minister-of-defence

3678 (2011). Keith Locke to the Minister of Defence

3678 (2011). Keith Locke to the Minister of Defence

3678 (2011). Keith Locke to the Minister of Defence (16 May 2011): What Afghan civilian casualties, if any, have resulted from New Zealand SAS operational activity in Afghanistan since the unit was re-deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 broken down by figures, or estimates, of both the numbers killed and the numbers wounded?

Dr Wayne Mapp (Minister of Defence) replied: Any persons killed in Afghanistan as a result of NZSAS operational activity have been those persons taking direct part in hostilities, and thereby presenting a direct threat to the lives of NZDF personnel, Coalition forces, Afghan security forces, or Afghan or international citizens.

This page has been deliberately left blank.

Holding page.

Holding page.

Holding page.

Holding page.

Achive Manager Export

From: STEER JACK, R ADM Sent: Sun, 22 May 2011 02:33:42 GMT
To: BLACKWELL JAMES, COL ; RIORDAN KEVIN, BRIG ; CUMMINS KARL, LTCOL
CC PSR(IC)3 PSR(IC)3 Coordinator-DSO
Subject: RE: PQs Keith Locke and Maryan Street. Due 20 May

I need a discussion on this with DGDLS and DDSO Monday. Nothing should be released until after that discussion

Thanks

JRS

RA J.R. Steer
VCDF

DTelN PSR(IC)3
Mob PSR(IC)3

From: BLACKWELL JAMES, COL
Sent: Saturday, 21 May 2011 10:25 a.m.
To: STEER JACK, R ADM
Subject: Fw: PQs Keith Locke and Maryan Street. Due 20 May

Sir,

I am sorry to bother you with a long list of emails (below) however I am deeply concerned that we are about to go down a path that we will be unable to return from.

The fundamental issue here is the definition of civilians. Legally, Brig Riordan is, of course, quite correct, however this will never be portrayed in context by the media to the public.

There is no doubt that the headlines will read ..."XXX CIVILIANS KILLED BY NZSAS"... .
Journalists commonly refer to this as 'selective reporting'.

This all comes down to the definition of civilians but there is no doubt the media will ignore that and therefore irreparably damage the reputation of the NZDF.

I reiterate that we should not answer this question and in my opinion that position needs to be represented directly to the minister, and the PM office.

Jb

PSR(IC)6

PSR(IC)6

From: PSR(IC)3 Coordinator-DSO
Sent: Friday, 20 May 2011 3:15 p.m.
To: BLACKWELL JAMES, COL; RIORDAN KEVIN, BRIG; PSR(IC)3 CUMMINS KARL, LTCOL
Subject: RE: PQs Keith Locke and Maryan Street. Due 20 May

Having had a chat with PSR(IC)3 the sense is we could use an OIA defence as ground to refuse to provide figures, but we need more concrete arguments than just "a number of reasons". Jim, would you clarify what some of your reasons are for withholding? We should be able to work them into a plausible argument.

The other alternative may be to go halfway, i.e.:

"Yes, there have been persons killed and wounded as a direct result of NZSAS operational activities, however I decline to release exact figures because...

All such casualties, although classed as civilians because they were not entitled to combatant status, were either taking a direct part in hostilities or posed an immediate threat to members of the NZSAS or persons it was their duty to protect."

Comments, please.

PSR(IC)3
Coordinator
Directorate of Special Operations

DTeIN: PSR(IC)3
DDI: PSR(IC)3

From: BLACKWELL JAMES, COL
Sent: Friday, 20 May 2011 2:55 p.m.
To: RIORDAN KEVIN, BRIG; PSR(IC)3 Coordinator-DSO PSR(IC)3 : CUMMINS KARL, LTCOL
Subject: Re: PQs Keith Locke and Maryan Street. Due 20 May

I am in auckland at the moment looking at the spreadsheet which is nearing completion.

It is my considered opinion that these numbers should NOT be released for a number of reasons and I strongly object to any consideration to do so.

Karl - please discuss with VCDF if there is ANY suggestion this is going to occur. It would be a serious mistake.

Regards
DSO

PSR(IC)6

PSR(IC)6

From: PSR(IC)3
Sent: Monday, 16 May 2011 1:00 p.m.
To: RIORDAN KEVIN, BRIG; PSR(IC)3 Coordinator-DSO
Cc: BLACKWELL JAMES, COL
Subject: FW: PQs Keith Locke and Maryan Street. Due 20 May

My best guess is that:
DSO should lead on PQs 3677 and 3678, with both copied to DLS;
DLS should lead on PQs 3688, 3689, 3691, 3692, 3693, 3694, 3695, 3696 and 3698, all of which should be copied to DSO; and
DSO should lead on PQs 3690 and 3697, with both copied to DLS.

OMD requests drafts by this Friday, 20 May.

I shall e-mail templates for draft responses shortly.

PSR(IC

From: (MIN)PSR(IC)3 @parliament.govt.nz]
Sent: Monday, 16 May 2011 12:27 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , MR; THOMPSON MIKE, COL;PSR(IC)3
Cc: Chris Hoey (MIN); PSR(IC)3 (MIN); PSR(IC)3 (MIN); PSR(IC)3 EA Corporate
Subject: PQs Keith Locke and Maryan Street. Due

03677 (2011) Keith Locke to : Defence
Has the New Zealand Defence Force received evidence from journalist Jon Stephenson that supports his claim that he entered the Crisis Response Unit base at Kabul and interviewed its commander, Colonel "M," as reported in an article published on 2 May, 2010 in The Sunday Star-Times and in the May 2011 edition of Metro magazine?

03678 (2011) Keith Locke to : Defence
What Afghan civilian casualties, if any, have resulted from New Zealand SAS operational

activity in Afghanistan since the unit was re-deployed to Afghanistan in 2009 broken down by figures, or estimates, of both the numbers killed and the numbers wounded?

03688 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
Further to his Radio New Zealand Morning Report interview of 16 August 2010 what reports has the Minister received from the New Zealand Defence Force regarding the British High Court Decision of 25 June 2010 relating to the transfer of prisoners to the National Directorate of Security in Afghanistan?

03689 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
Further to his Radio New Zealand Morning Report interview of 16 August 2010 when will he release the reports he requested from the New Zealand Defence Force regarding the British High Court Decision of 25 June 2010 relating to the transfer of prisoners to the National Directorate of Security in Afghanistan?

03690 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
Has he directed the New Zealand Defence Force to review protocols and procedures regarding operations that see NZDF members interact and cooperate with members of the Afghanistan Police Crisis Response Unit, if so, on what dates were such directives issued?

03691 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
What reports has he received from the New Zealand Defence Force Legal Services Directorate on the potential legal ramifications applying to the NZDF in relation to the British High Court Decision of 25 June 2010 relating to the transfer of prisoners to the National Directorate of Security in Afghanistan?

03692 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
Further to his Radio New Zealand Morning Report interview of 16 August 2010 what were the terms of reference for the investigation he requested on the potential legal ramifications applying to the NZDF in relation to the British High Court Decision of 25 June 2010 relating to the transfer of prisoners to the National Directorate of Security in Afghanistan?

03693 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
What reports, if any, has he received from the New Zealand Defence force on concerns regarding the operations of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan?

03694 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
What reports, if any, has he received regarding Australian Defence Force concerns regarding the operations of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan?

03695 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
What reports, if any, has he received regarding NATO member concerns regarding the operations of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan?

03696 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
Has he received any reports that state the capabilities and standards of the operations of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan with respect to prisoners have been lifted or improved?

03697 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
What reports, if any, has he received from the New Zealand Defence Force regarding any concerns of NZDF staff based in Afghanistan about the operations and methods of

both the Crisis Response Unit and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) in Afghanistan?

03698 (2011) Hon Maryan Street to : Defence
What personal representations, if any, has he personally made to Afghan officials regarding the operations of the National Directorate of Security with regards to the treatment of prisoners?

Due Minister's office 20/05/2011

PSR(IC)3
Private Secretary (Advisory)

Office of Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
Minister of Defence
Minister of Science and Innovation
Associate Minister for Economic Development
Associate Minister for Tertiary Education

Phone(PSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3 @parliament.govt.nz

This page has been deliberately left blank.

Holding page.

Holding page.

From NZSAS SNO at the time...

..." Firstly yesterday I put you wrong in that I stated an Investigation was being conducted. In fact what has been occurring has been an IAT (Initial Assessment Team) has been convened to look at the operation and decide if an investigation into a CIVCAS incident needs to occur. Yesterday the IAT interviewed the District Governor of TWB.PSR(S)1, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

Reference to Content of partner-controlled video of operation

PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)4

This is good news. It has to date verified that our actions were correct and in accordance with the threat presented. This will likely be looked at by IJC from two fronts. Actions by the ground force, (no problems I can see) and actions by the Airborne force. There is no indication at this stage on the evidence presented to the IAT that there was anything other than the correct application of force to a clear and present INS threat, and that any CIVCAS caused by the AWT would be collateral and unintended. This point is still to be verified"....

Information about From_NZSAS_SNO_at_the_time_op_B...

C:\Users\DLS~1.LEG\AppData\Local\Temp\11\pt_mediaf82ecf5a105981f2b9168daa3437033b538718...

Convert

Compatibility Mode

Some new features are disabled to prevent problems when working with previous versions of Office. Converting this file will enable these features, but may result in layout changes.

Protect Document

Permissions

Anyone can open, copy, and change any part of this document.

Check for Issues

Prepare for Sharing

Before sharing this file, be aware that it contains:

- Document properties, author's name and related dates
- Content that cannot be checked for accessibility issues because of the current file type

Manage Versions

Versions

There are no previous versions of this file.

Properties

Size	26.5KB
Pages	1
Words	623
Total Editing Time	9 Minutes
Title	From NZSAS SNO at the time...
Tags	Add a tag
Comments	Add comments
Template	Normal.dotm
Status	Add text
Categories	Add a category
Subject	Specify the subject
Hyperlink Base	Add text
Company	NZDF

Related Dates

Last Modified	1/09/2011 12:58 p.m.
Created	1/09/2011 12:49 p.m.
Last Printed	1/09/2011 12:51 p.m.

Related People

Manager	Specify the manager
Author	New Zealand Defence Force Add an author
Last Modified By	New Zealand Defence Force

Related Documents

Open File Location

Show Fewer Properties

Achive Manager Export

From: Office of Chief of Defence Force Sent: Fri, 02 Sep 2011 02:39:36 GMT
To: @NZDF.All
BCC To all NZDF

The next 42 pages contain the names of each NZDF member as recipients of this email. These names have been removed

To all NZDF

Subject: Statement from VCDF

To all at NZDF

You will be aware of media interest in a book published yesterday about New Zealand in Afghanistan and also Iraq, and you may be asked about it by friends and family. Written by Nicky Hager the book is called "Other People's Wars".

The book makes a range of claims about Defence Force involvement in the region.

As you will be aware we do not under any circumstances comment on intelligence or special forces operational matters. Any disclosures could compromise the safety and security of our personnel deployed on operations, as well as the safety and security of our country, and international relations of the New Zealand Government.

Nor do I propose to rebut each point made in the book.

But what I would like to make clear is that yes we do engage with the United States and other coalition partners in Afghanistan. We make no secret of this. The primary purpose is protection of our troops who are deployed in Afghanistan.

And yes we do contribute information to coalition information gathering and sharing. Again this is standard military practice. But I can assure you that we receive more than we give.

The current nature of operations is that they are intelligence-led. As a small country we have limited resources therefore it is critical to the safety of our troops that we have access to sound intelligence.

The book goes on to make claims about an operation in the Baghlan region in August last year. This matter was fully investigated by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), followed by an investigation by a joint assessment team comprising both Afghani and ISAF officials. After reviewing the evidence the investigation concluded that allegations of civilian casualties were unfounded, and the ground force and coalition air were cleared of all allegations.

Together with CDF and Service Chiefs, we can continue to be proud of our role in helping to establish the security of the region and to rebuild the infrastructure for the people of the Bamiyan province.

R ADM Jack Steer
Vice Chief of Defence Force

Achive Manager

Export

From: PSR(IC)3 , MAJ **Sent:** Thu, 08 Sep 2011 02:17:04 GMT

To: WRIGHT CHRISTOPHER, MR

CC PSR(IC)3 BRADSHAW PHIL, CDR; PSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3

Subject: RE: Key Messages

No

Magic Chris! I will put together for CA to review in the car ride north on Sunday morning so these messages will be fresh in his mind.

Thanks again,

PSR(IC)3

-----Original Message-----
From: WRIGHT CHRISTOPHER, MR
Sent: Thursday, 8 September 2011 1:47 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Cc: PSR(IC)3 BRADSHAW PHIL, CDR;PSR(IC)3

Subject: RE: Key Messages

Hi PSR(IC)3 ,

Here are some key messages for Sunday. All have been out before apart from the last on the UN report. Given that the report isn't out yet, we will need to take a steer from DLS/Mindef before we make comment on this.

AFG PDT key messages:

- The NZ Defence Force is a modern and adaptive organisation that continually seeks to improve its performance. We strive to achieve excellence in all aspects of training, particularly when preparing our personnel for operational deployments.
- Pre-deployment training is structured for individual missions and is not constrained by money or time. We ensure

our people are adequately prepared for a range of situations they may encounter. Afghanistan is a complex environment that requires foresight, initiative and perseverance if we are to be successful and this is one of our longer PDTs.

- The training provided during PDT is demanding and intense, and we are confident that our personnel are up to the challenge. Since we cannot replicate the environment and cannot provide training on all aspects of deployment, we provide in-theatre training as soon as they arrive in theatre.
- Prior to any deployment into theatre, the trained state of our personnel is independently assessed and if they don't meet the required standard then they are no longer considered suitable for deployment. We hold trained reserves to cover for this and those personnel who are returned to NZ during a mission.
- All PDT is modified based on lessons learnt from previous missions incl recommendations made in the O'Donnell Court of Inquiry and our training continues to be modified where appropriate. For example, we have improved some driver, weaponry and communications training before our personnel are sent into theatre.
- NZDF is a learning organisation and we are always seeking to make improvements in how we train and prepare for operations, and this PDT is no different.

AFG general key messages:

- NZ Defence Force continues to support Bamyan Province as it progresses with transition. Bamyan was the first province to hold a transition ceremony last month, marking the transfer of provincial level security and responsibility back to Afghan control.
- NZ Defence Force will continue helping to build the capacity of local security forces in Bamyan Province, training the Afghan National Police to take over the role currently performed by Defence Force military patrols.
- To support the transition process, NZ Government has committed NZ Defence Force personnel through to 2014 to ensure a smooth and measured handover of responsibility.
- NZ Defence Force has played a key role in Bamyan, dating back to 2003 where we led the NZPRT for eight years. We will continue to play a significant leadership role until the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) assumes final control.
- The NZ Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan assists in the establishment of long term development, peace and security by facilitating reconstruction and assists in the provision of a secure environment.

If asked on rotation deploying earlier due to RWC:

- During the RWC period NZDF will be prepared to provide support to any all-of-Govt contingency such as a serious civil

defence event or for inter-agency support tasks required to deliver the RWC tournament.

- The Bamiyan PRT rotation dates were moved by a small margin to ensure the required contingency aircraft will be available during the tournament.
- The careful management of the timing of tasks is a constant and routine practice used by air transport planners to ensure best efficiency and to preserve the ability to deliver contingency response options required by Govt and other agencies.
- There is no impact to the normal operations or effectiveness of this rotation nor on the handover process between PRT contingents.

If asked re Nicky Hager's book Other People's Wars:

Refer to statement made by VCDF to NZDF:

- The book makes a range of claims about Defence Force involvement in AFG.

- We do not comment on intelligence or special forces operational matters. Any disclosures could compromise the safety and security of our personnel deployed on operations, as well as the safety and security of our country, and international relations of the New Zealand Government.

- We do engage with the United States and other coalition partners in Afghanistan. We make no secret of this. The primary purpose is protection of our troops who are deployed in Afghanistan.

- We do contribute information to coalition information gathering and sharing. Again this is standard military practice. But I can assure you that we receive more than we give.

- The current nature of operations is that they are intelligence-led. As a small country we have limited resources therefore it is critical to the safety of our troops that we have access to sound intelligence.

- The book goes on to make claims about an operation in the Baghlan region in August last year. This matter was fully investigated by the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), followed by an investigation by a joint assessment team comprising both Afghani and ISAF officials. After reviewing the evidence the investigation concluded that allegations of civilian casualties were unfounded, and the ground force and coalition air were cleared of all allegations.

- We can continue to be proud of our role in helping to establish the security of the region and to rebuild the infrastructure for the people of Bamyan province.

If asked re anniversary of 9/11:

- This Sunday marks the tenth anniversary of 9/11; it is a time reflect and remember those who lost loved ones ten years ago today.

- It is also a time to pause and remember our personnel who have lost their lives while serving their country in Afghanistan.

- NZ Defence Force has played a key role in the Bamyan province, dating back to 2003. We will continue to play a significant leadership role until the Afghan Govt assumes control following a transition of power..

If asked re death of CPL Dougie Grant:
Refer to CDF's comments to NZDF:

- CPL Dougie Grant died when he was hit by a bullet fired by insurgents while trying to rescue civilians following an attack on the British Council building in Kabul.
- While there is media speculation about events leading up to his death, we are aware of all the factors and have disclosed all relevant information. The circumstances leading up to his death reflect the realities of armed conflict. He was facing a well-prepared and determined enemy in a vicious fight. He acted bravely and correctly. Speculation about other causes leading to his death will lead nowhere.

- Dougie was a professional soldier, a 'soldier's soldier' and a highly regarded member of his unit. He strove for excellence in everything he did. He had a long and successful career with the NZ Defence Force.

- Dougie was passionate about being in the Special Forces. Together with his family he made the difficult decision earlier this year to return to the SAS, and his second tour in Afghanistan. He was a loving husband to PSR(IC)3 who is also a member of the Defence Force, and a father to two young children.

- As a military force we acknowledge the dangers our people face on deployment and in training because of the special nature of what we do, and while we accept these risks the death of a colleague, friend and father is always difficult to take.

- The Defence Force will continue to support Dougie's family, PSR(IC)3, their children and also Dougie's wider family and friends and colleagues.

- Our presence in Afghanistan will continue, however, so long as the Government asks for our presence, and we remain proud of the work we do.

If asked on O'Donnell's death:

- The findings of the Court of Inquiry reveal that LT O'Donnell's patrol was the target of a well planned and complex ambush in the North East of Bamyan province involving an initial IED explosion followed by RPG and automatic fire.
- A number of lessons were learnt from the incident, and these have been used to adapt and modify the way we train our personnel. These lessons, despite influencing the way we respond to complex IED attacks, could not have prevented the unfortunate death of LT O'Donnell.
- The manner in which LT O'Donnell's patrol responded to the incident is testament to his strong leadership and the continued training he provided to those under his command.

If asked on LAV deployment:

- NZ Defence Force deployed Light Armoured Vehicles (LAVs) to Bamyan in April 2011 to support the Provincial Reconstruction Team.
- The vehicles provide us the capability we need to maintain increased safety of our personnel, and operate more effectively in the North East area of Bamyan where the threat from insurgent activity is higher that the rest of the province.
- While we have been able to successfully provide security to the province for eight years, the North East is the most demanding part of our area of operations and requires a higher level of capability.
- The LAVs that have been deployed have undergone an upgrade and enhancement programme which affords a higher level of protection that has enabled its successful deployment to Bamyan.
- Following a successful mobility trial last year in the area and with ongoing improvements to the main roads in Bamyan, the Defence Force has assessed that the LAV is now the best vehicle to provide the optimum mix of protected mobility, firepower and surveillance to meet the mission requirements.

- As we learn and adapt our own tactics techniques and procedures, and to the actions of the insurgent, so too does he in turn adapt. The LAV gives us an edge but no guarantees of safety or success.

UNMA report into prisoner treatment in AFG:

- Any comment on the report will come from the Government at this stage.

If pushed:

- The report raises important issues

- All torture is abhorrent and not tolerated by the NZDF.

- Re SAS involvement with CRU in detaining Afghans - again all torture is abhorrent and not tolerated by the NZDF.

Chris Wright l Media Manager
Defence Communications Group

DDI: PSR(IC)3 l Mobile: PSR(IC)3 l DTeIN: PSR(IC)3
NZDF website: Click here l DCG intranet site: Click here

Think before you print

PSR(IC)3

-----Original Message-----
From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Sent: Thursday, 8 September 2011 10:18 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MR
Subject: Re: Key Messages

Thanksz for remembering this Chris. CA most appreciative.
PSR(IC)3

----- Original Message -----
From: WRIGHT CHRISTOPHER, MR
To: PSR(IC)3 PSR(IC)3
MAJ
Sent: Thu Sep 08 08:47:20 2011
Subject: Key Messages

Hiya PSR(IC)3
US DA will accompany CA to Cribb Dep.
Could we please have some key messages around issues this could bring up if media attend.
EG 9/110anniversary
Hagar"s book
LAVs in NE
Dougie's death.
Could we try and get these by aqround 2pm as I'm off tomorrow.
Thanks for assist.
Chris

Achive Manager Export

From: SCRIVENER MIKE, MR **Sent:** Tue, 25 Oct 2011 23:17:23 GMT
To: PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL ; PSR(IC)3 , SQNLDR
CC PSR(IC)3 W/O ; BRADSHAW PHIL, CDR
Subject: FW: OIA - 1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 ; RECOMMENDED RESPONSE

FYI. Any recall of civilian casualties?

Regards

Mike Scrivener
Senior Ministerial Coordinator OCOS
HQ NZDF Privacy Officer
DTelN PSR(IC)3
DDI (04) PSR(IC)3
emailto: PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Sent: Wednesday, 26 October 2011 11:52 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , MAJ
Cc: SCRIVENER MIKE, MR; Coordinator-DSO, PSR(IC)3 ; PSR(IC)3
Subject: RE: OIA - 1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 ; RECOMMENDED RESPONSE

PSR(IC)3

I can confirm that Strategic Commitments has searched its files here and cannot find any documentation relating to Question 3 of the PSR(IC)3 OIA - that is, no record of civilian casualties incurred during NZDF military operations in Afghanistan.

We would think that any records would be held at HQJFNZ, on the basis that if a civilian were to become a casualty of any NZDF military operations in Afghanistan, it would have to be reported to that HQ in the first instance.

Regards,

Todd.

PSR(IC)3
Lt Col
Dep. Dir. Strategic Commitments - International
SCI Branch - HQNZDF

Ph: PSR(IC)3
DTelN: PSR(IC)3
M: PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Sent: Wednesday, 26 October 2011 11:45 a.m.
To: HART TODD, LTCOL
Cc: SCRIVENER MIKE, MR; Coordinator-DSO, PSR(IC)3
Subject: OIA - 1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSE

Hi Colonel,

Reference:
A. Subject SCRIVENER e-mail dated Thursday, 13 October 2011 2:20 p.m.

Further to our telephone call this morning would you be so kind as to re-send your subject response to our enquiry made at Reference A.

Cheers

PSR(IC)3

Achive Manager Export

From: SCRIVENER MIKE, MR Sent: Tue, 06 Dec 2011 04:04:12 GMT
To: THOMPSON MIKE, COL ; PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Subject: FW: Unclassified: OIA-1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 re AFGH casualties.doc

FYI

Mike Scrivener
Senior Ministerial Coordinator OCOS
HQ NZDF Privacy Officer
DTelN PSR(IC)3
DDI PSR(IC)3
emailto: PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 (MIN) [mailto:PSR(IC)3 @parliament.govt.nz]
Sent: Tuesday, 6 December 2011 4:51 p.m.
To: SCRIVENER MIKE, MR
Cc: Coordinator-DSO, PSR(IC)3
Subject: RE: Unclassified: OIA-1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 re AFGH casualties.doc

Hi Mike

The Minister was going to call DSO about this but he has changed his mind.

He has some concerns with the response to question 2. The way it is worded, combined with the response to question 3, would suggest that there have been civilian casualties. If there are none, then the response will need to state this.

I know this may cause a precedent to reply fulsomely in the future if a casualty is incurred. However, the Minister thinks that this is something that will need to be dealt with at the time. The current approach simply invites further clarification or misinterpretation by the journalist.

Our suggested response would be along the lines of *"We do not release figures on deaths resulting from NZSAS operations. However, to the best of my knowledge no such casualties have occurred."*

Let me know if you have any queries. Grateful if we could see the final reply.

Regards

PSR(IC)3
Private Secretary (Advisory)

Office of Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
Minister of Defence
Minister of Science and Innovation
Associate Minister for Economic Development
Associate Minister for Tertiary Education

PhonePSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3 @parliament.govt.nz

From: PSR(IC)3 (MIN)
Sent: ' ber 2011 4:23 pm
To: Coordinator-DSO, PSR(IC)3
Cc: 'SCRIVENER MIKE, MR'
Subject: FW: Unclassified: OIA-1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 re AFGH casualties.doc

Hi Coordinator-DSO, PSR(IC)3

See attached - as discussed. Minister may call DSO soon.

Regards

PSR(IC)3
Private Secretary (Advisory)

Office of Hon Dr Wayne Mapp
Minister of Defence
Minister of Science and Innovation
Associate Minister for Economic Development
Associate Minister for Tertiary Education

PhonePSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3 @parliament.govt.nz

From: SCRIVENER MIKE, MR [mailto:PSR(IC)3
Sen r 2011 4:02 pm
To: PSR(IC)3
Cc: PSR(IC)3
Subject: IA-1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 re AFGH casualties.doc

<<OIA-1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 re AFGH casualties.doc>> Jonathan, draft referred iaw the consultation requirement.
As ever, rapid feedback will be much appreciated.

Copy of the OIA request to follow.

Regards

Mike Scrivener
Senior Ministerial Coordinator OCOS
HQ NZDF Privacy Officer
DTeIN PSR(IC)3
DDI PSR(IC)3
emailto:PSR(IC)3

OIA-1586-2011
NZDF 1461/4

December 2011

PSR(IC)3
3 News
e-mail: PSR(IC)3

Dear PSR(IC)3

Thank you for your e-mail of 7 October. I shall address each part of your Official Information Act (OIA) request in the same order as you listed them.

- *The number of insurgent deaths resulting from NZ SAS operations in Afghanistan, since their deployment first began.*

This part of your request is declined pursuant to s6(a) of the OIA, to avoid prejudice to the security or defence of New Zealand, or the international relations of the Government of New Zealand. This matter is particularly sensitive because the information sought relates to the operational capabilities of the NZ SAS.

- *The number of civilian deaths, resulting from NZ SAS operations in Afghanistan, since their deployment first began.*

This part of your request is declined for the same reasons as those set out above.

- *Outside the SAS – a brief description of any civilian casualties from military operations in the last 5 years.*

To the best of my knowledge, no such casualties have been incurred in Afghanistan.

You have the right under s 28(3) of the OIA to ask an Ombudsman to review this response to your request.

Yours sincerely

R.R JONES
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Achive Manager Export

PSR(IC)6

From: PSR(IC)3 SQNLDR
Sent: Thursday, December 08, 2011 3:24:33 PM
To: PSR(IC)3 MAJ;PSR(IC)3 CAPT;PSR(IC)3 LTCOL
Cc: PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL;PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL;PSR(IC)3 , MAJ; PSR(IC)3 , GPCAPT;PSR(IC)3 , WO
Subject: URGENT: OIA-1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 re Afghan Casualties TD 9 Dec 11
Importance: High
Auto forwarded by a Rule

All,

We continue to be queried on civilian casualties in Afghanistan as part of the OIA copied below (in bold).

The latest relates specifically to recall of civilan casualities from MVA. While we have stated nil casualities there is a level of corporate recollection of casualities and compensation that must be addressed.

Therefore I would seek to close this off by following the 'compensation' trail to confirm our response:

J9 - please advise where the financial accounting for any compensation would be visible and confirm nil paid if appropriate?

PSR(IC)6

For information this is the NZDF official recommended OIA-1586-2011 response. SCI branch deferred to HQ JFNZ and we advised nil (Bamyan only as other areas relate to SF ops):

1. This recommended response is supplied in reference to an application by PSR(IC)3 PSR(IC)3 of TV3 News for the following details:
    1. **The number of insurgent deaths resulting from NZSAS operations in Afghanistan, since their deployment first began.**
    2. **The number of civilian deaths, resulting from NZSAS operations in Afghanistan, since their deployment first began.**
    3. **Outside the SAS - a brief description of any civilian casualties from military operations in the last 5 years.**
2. With reference to the Official Information Act 1982 Part 1 Section 6(a), the request for numbers of insurgent and civilian deaths resulting from NZSAS operations in Afghanistan since their deployment first began (questions 1 and 2) is declined.
3. The third question is outside the remit of the DSO, and has been assigned to SCI Branch for answering.

This answer has been approved by the Director Special Operations.

FW: RESTRICTED RE: OIA - 1586-2011 PSR(IC)3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSE _____ FW: RESTRICTED RE: OIA - 1586-2011
SABIN: RECOMMENDED RESPONSE _____ _____
From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Sent: Thursday, ecembe m.
To: ; PSR(IC)3 , SQNLDR; PSR(IC)3 , W/O
Cc: PSR(IC)3 , PSR(IC)3
Subject 011 re Afghan Casualties

I actually have some vague memory of kids on the runway in Bamylan.....although I can't remember anything more than that.....definitely came from my joint days though although Lt Col PSR(IC)3 cannot recall it.....

_____
From: SCRIVENER MIKE, MR
Sent: December 20
To: PSR(IC)3 S PSR(IC)3 , W/O
Cc: PSR(IC)3 AJ; PSR(IC)3 PSR(IC)3 MR
Subject 86-201 Afghan Casualties

There is some recall here of an MVA involving civilian(s) in Afghanistan within the last 5 years, for which compensation was paid.

Can you please verify or disprove this, as a matter of urgency as we are under pressure from the requester for a response.

Regards

Mike Scrivener
Senior Ministerial Coordinator OCOS
HQ NZDF Privacy Officer
PSR(IC)3

Achive Manager Export

From: SMITH ROSS, CDRE Sent: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 09:57:03 GMT
To: SHORT KEVIN, AVM
Subject: FW: From COS

Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

NZDF Media Release.doc (27Kb) 2010-08-CA-326-Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian ca....pdf (88Kb)

Sir,

Find attached the two media releases I referred to. The ISAF News Release of 29 Aug 10 and the NZDF Media Release of 20 Apr 11.

Cheers,

Ross Smith
Commodore, RNZN
Chief of Staff, HQNZDF

-----Original Message-----
From: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
Sent: Monday, June 30, 2014 02:02 PM New Zealand Standard Time
To: MCKINSTRY RIAN, LTCOL
Subject: From COS

Rian,

As discussed.

Regards,

Ross Smith

Commodore, RNZN | Chief of Staff | Office of Chief of Defence Force |

HQ New Zealand Defence Force | p +PSR(IC)3 | dteln PSR(IC)3 |

<<NZDF Media Release.doc>> <<2010-08-CA-326-Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian ca....pdf>>

NEWS RELEASE

ISAF Joint Command - Afghanistan

2010-08-CA-326
For Immediate Release

Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian casualties in Baghlan

KABUL, Afghanistan (Aug. 29) – In response to Baghlan provincial governor's concerns about civilian casualties, a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the ministries of interior and defense, and International Security Assistance Force officials, conducted a full assessment of an operation on Aug. 22 in Talah wa Barfak district, Baghlan province.

The team determined that several rounds from coalition helicopters fell short, missing the intended target and instead striking two buildings, which may have resulted in civilian casualties. Insurgents were using the building as a base of operations; however, it was not the intended target.

The team discovered the accidental short rounds during an examination of the air weapons team video. The assessment determined a gun site malfunction was the cause of the errant rounds.

"We regret any possible civilian loss of life or injury. Our first objective is to protect the people of Afghanistan, and in this case we may have failed," said U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Timothy M. Zadalis, ISAF Joint Command director of plans and projects and team lead. "Our thoughts and concerns are with the family and friends of those civilians who may have been injured or killed."

During their assessment, the team received operational briefings, met with the provincial governor and chief of police and reviewed weapons-system video.

Initial reports from the ground operation indicated 13 insurgents were killed, with no civilian casualties, however close examination of the weapons system video showed the errant rounds striking the unintended buildings.

"This is exactly why we send assessment teams to look into all civilian casualty allegations," said Zadalis. "We want to be sure we understand exactly what happened, review all information available and set the record straight."

-30-

Media Release

20 April 2011

NZ DEFENCE FORCE OPERATIONS IN BAMYAN PROVINCE ON 22 AUGUST 2010

On 22 August 2010 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements, operating as part of a Coalition Force in Bamyan province, Afghanistan conducted an operation against an insurgent group.

NZDF Special Operations Forces combined with Afghan National Security Forces and other coalition elements undertook the operation.

The operation was conducted as part of the wider ISAF mission to improve the security of the Afghan people and to protect the NZ PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) in Bamyan province. The operation was approved by both the Afghan Government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Nine insurgents (not 12 as reported) were killed in the operation which targeted an insurgent group in the area where Bamyan province borders neighbouring Baghlan province.

Following the operation allegations of civilian casualties were made. These were investigated by a joint Afghan Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and International Security Assistance Force assessment team, in accordance with ISAF procedures.

The investigation concluded that the allegations of civilian casualties were unfounded.

Ordinarily the NZDF declines to comment on matters of an operational nature as any release of information can put New Zealanders at risk. In this case, clarification of the facts is warranted.

The NZDF will be making no further comment on this operation.

The NZDF point of contact for this release is Commander Phil Bradshaw, Director Defence Communications Group 021 441 493.

ENDS

This page has been deliberately left blank.

2

From: s.9(2)(a)
To: @DCG.Leadership
Subject: Fw: Hager book

Sent:1/09/2011 5:44:08 p.m.

----- Original Message -----
From:
To: '@dcg.leadership team' <@dcg.leadership team>
Sent: Thu Sep 01 17:42:46 2011
Subject: Hager book

DCOS has advised that PM is only person who can comment on book at this stage.

We'll hear more about govt response tomorrow

Cheers
s.9(2)(a)

Use

This page has been deliberately left blank.

Achive Manager Export

From: SMITH ROSS, CDRE Sent: Mon, 30 Jun 2014 22:17:08 GMT
To: KEATING TIMOTHY, LTGEN ; Quilter Helene, Secretary Of Defence
CC SHORT KEVIN, AVM
Subject: FW: From Ross Smith

CDF, Secretary,

Yesterday I contacted Niels Holm to give him a heads-up ahead of last night's Native Affairs programme on Maori TV. I also provided him the two media statements; the ISAF news release of 29 Aug 10; and the NZDF media release of 20 Apr 11.

Niels email below is provided for information.

Regards,

Ross Smith

Cdre, RNZN
COS, HQNZDF

From: Niels Holm [DPMC] [mailto:Niels.HolmPSR(IC)3
Sent: Tuesday, 1 July 2014 10:04 a.m.
To: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
Cc: PSR(IC)3 [DPMC]; Michael Webster [DPMC]; PSR(IC)3 [GovtHouse]
Subject: RE: From Ross Smith

Dear Ross

Former MinDef Dr Mapp has contacted this office seeking clarification of the briefings he received as minister from the Governor-General in his former role as CDF.

I have relayed to Dr Mapp the Governor-General's advice that he should pursue any matters arising out of the events of 2010 with Hon Dr Coleman.

I should be grateful to be kept informed of any developments arising from last night's Maori TV programme that are relevant to the Governor-General in his current or former role.

Many thanks

Niels Holm
Official Secretary to the Governor-General of New Zealand
Ph: PSR(IC)3 . *or MOB* PSR(IC)3
Email: PSR(IC)3

From: SMITH ROSS, CDRE PSR(IC)3 |
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 2:18 p.m.
To: Niels Holm [DPMC]
Subject: From Ross Smith

Niels,

As discussed.

Regards,

Ross Smith

Commodore, RNZN | Chief of Staff | Office of Chief of Defence Force |
HQ New Zealand Defence Force | p +PSR(IC)3 | dtel PSR(IC)3 |

Achive Manager Export

From: PSR(IC)3, DSO Analyst **Sent:** Mon, 30 Jun 2014 02:01:26 GMT
To: MCKINSTRY RIAN, LTCOL
Subject: 1 doc re Baghlan op

Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

2010-12-13 NTM - CRU and NZSAS Ops in Baghlan Province Aug and Sep 2010.pdf (1584Kb)

There's only one doc on DIXS - the rest will come through on SWAN.

2010-12-13 NTM - CRU and NZSAS Ops in Baghlan Province Aug and Sep 2010.pdf

PSR(IC)3, DSO Analyst
PSR(IC)3 | Special Operations Analyst
Directorate of Special Operations | HQ NZDF
PSR(IC)3 Defence House Building | 2-12 Aitken Street | Private Bag PSR(IC)3 | Wellington
Tel: PSR(IC)3 | DTeIN: PSR(IC)3 | Web http://www.nzdf.mil.nz

~~Covering RESTRICTED~~

COPY

(6)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

COVER SHEET

To accompany documents to
Minister of Defence

Subject:	**CRU AND NZSAS OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2010**		
MOD File No.	MoD Tracking #.	Minister's Tracking#: *(For Minister's office)*	
NZDF File No.	NZDF Tracking # 521/2010		
Priority:	ROUTINE	Request Ministerial response by:	
Contacts:	1 PSR(Sen)1, 2 PSR(IC)3	Tel: PSR(IC)3 Tel: PSR(IC)3	A/H: PSR(IC)3 A/H: PSR(IC)3

Sheet not to exceed one page. Please complete shaded areas.

Purpose:	The purpose of this note is to provide releasable information to the Prime Minister of the operations conducted by the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) and NZSAS Task Force in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan on 22 August and 03 October 2010.
Recommendations:	**Note** the risks associated with releasing the information. **Refer** this note to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for public release.
MOD/NZDF Consultation	NZDF
Minister's comments:	
Minister's Action:	Signed / Noted / Agreed / Approved / Declined Referred to:
Signature:	**Date:**

J MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Date 13 Dec 10

PM & Min agreed not to release the information into the media

PSR(Sen)1, PSR(IC)3

DIRECTORATE SPECIAL OPERATIONS (DSO)
Received: 10 FEB 2011
File No: 3130/DSO/4
Comment:

~~Covering RESTRICTED~~

CRU AND NZSAS OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND OCTOBER 2010

1. On 3 August 2010, a daytime NZPRT Patrol led by Lt O'Donnell was ambushed in the North Eastern region of Bamian province by an insurgent group that had an active history of targeting Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and coalition forces within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. This insurgent group was based in the neighbouring province of Baghlan, centred on the Talewa Berfak district (approx 20km away).

2. Following this attack, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) Crisis Response Unit (CRU) supported by the NZSAS Task Force and other ISAF coalition partners, commenced planning to disrupt this insurgent group's capacity and capability to target coalition forces, including the NZPRT within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. The Chief of Defence Force Lieutenant General Mateparae approved the operation and it was launched on the night 21 August after gaining additional approval from the MOI and Commander ISAF. The MOI issued Arrest Warrants for the two principal insurgent commanders, which were to be enforced by the CRU.

3. The force for the operation consisted of a combined ground force PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 CRU personnel and PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3 NZSAS personnel) supported by coalition helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft (including Unmanned Aerial Vehicle or UAV). The ground force landed near a village of Tigiran in Baghlan province at 00.30am on Sunday 22 August. The force was on the ground for approximately three hours, and during that time a large number of armed insurgents, operating in small groups attempted to outflank the force and fire on it from high ground. The armed insurgents were engaged by coalition helicopters and aircraft. The ground force searched three buildings and destroyed a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives, but did not locate the two insurgent leaders. The ground force departed at approx 3.30am. During the operation nine armed insurgents were killed by the supporting coalition helicopters and aircraft, and one NZSAS soldier was injured when a wall collapsed on him. The soldier was evacuated and has subsequently returned to NZ for further medical treatment.

4. Following the operation allegations were made that up to twenty (20) civilians had been killed by aerial bombardment and twenty (20) houses destroyed by fire[1]. Based on these allegations a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the Afghan MOI and Defence and ISAF officials conducted a full assessment of the operation. The assessment team visited the provincial and district capitals, the hospital where the alleged casualties were receiving treatment, viewed the "gun tapes" from the coalition aircraft and spoke to NZSAS personnel. As a result of their investigation the assessment team concluded that "having reviewed the evidence there is no way that civilian casualties could have occurred" and the actions of the ground force and coalition air were cleared of all accusations.

5. Headquarters ISAF assessed that as a result of this operation the insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations had been disrupted. A follow-on operation was conducted on the night of 2 October, but passed without incident. No insurgents were encountered and no shots fired.

Note:

1. During the operation on 22 Aug, two of the three buildings searched caught fire, the first was caused by explosives igniting the structure and the second was caused by an unattended cooking fire left burning when the local inhabitants departed.

Risks (Not For Release)

Associated with Releasing Information

If New Zealand is identified as the main coalition ground force on these operations, then the risks are:

- Insurgent groups will be more motivated to conduct a retaliatory attack targeting the NZPRT along similar lines to their attack on 3 August 2010. [**Medium**]

- The release may undermine the cooperation from locals who interact with the NZPRT. However it has been reported that some locals have distanced themselves from the actions of the insurgents operating in their area. [**Low**]

- The release may compromise future operations by coalition forces including those of the NZDF within the Baghlan province. Insurgent groups may analyse the previous actions of the coalition force in an attempt to predict the likely tactics and techniques of any future action potentially denying the element of surprise to the coalition. [**Low**]

- The release may also have a positive effect by demonstrating New Zealand's resolve and high capability to strike insurgent groups that seek to undermine the GIRoA, ISAF and NZPRT.

- The release will place more pressure of the NZ Government to release more information about NZSAS operations in Afghanistan. (Release of information on NZSAS operations is on a case by case basis). [**Medium**]

From the Environment and Insurgents

The Talewa Berfak insurgent group operating within the Baghlan province still possess an ability to target Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and NZPRT operating within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. These groups have recently been reported threatening to target ANSF, coalition forces and the NZPRT.

Assessed risk remains as **Medium** and is unchanged from the current threat posed from insurgent activity in the Baghlan-Bamian border region

Risk Mitigation

As a result of the ambush on 3 August and recent threats by these insurgent groups, the NZDF and NZPRT have taken active measures to increase their force protection when operating in this border region. These have included PSR(R)2, PSR(R)3

PSR(R)1

KELLY PETER, COL

From: PSR(Sen) 1 (ISED) PSR(IC)3 @mfat.govt.nz]
Sent: Tuesday, 31 August 2010 8:40 a.m.
To: KELLY PETER, COL
Subject: Media article

~~[SEEMAIL] [RESTRICTED]~~

Morning Peter - the article below might be of interest, if you haven't already seen it (from the "War on Terror" website).

Monday, August 30, 2010

AFG Civilian Casualties in Baghlan Confirmed

Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian casualties in Baghlan

ISAF Joint Command

08.29.2010 KABUL - In response to Baghlan provincial governor's concerns about civilian casualties, a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the ministries of interior and defense, and International Security Assistance Force officials, conducted a full assessment of an operation on Aug. 22 in Talah wa Barfak District, Baghlan province.

The team determined that several rounds from coalition helicopters fell short, missing the intended target and instead striking two buildings, which may have resulted in civilian casualties.

Insurgents were using the building as a base of operations; however, it was not the intended target.

The team discovered the accidental short rounds during an examination of the air weapons team video. The assessment determined a gun site malfunction was the cause of the errant rounds.

"We regret any possible civilian loss of life or injury. Our first objective is to protect the people of Afghanistan, and in this case we may have failed," said U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Timothy M. Zadalis, ISAF Joint Command director of plans and projects and team lead. "Our thoughts and concerns are with the family and friends of those civilians who may have been injured or killed."

During their assessment, the team received operational briefings, met with the provincial governor and chief of police and reviewed weapons-system video.

Initial reports from the ground operation indicated 13 insurgents were killed, with no civilian casualties, however close examination of the weapons system video showed the errant rounds striking the unintended buildings.

"This is exactly why we send assessment teams to look into all civilian casualty allegations," said Zadalis. "We want to be sure we understand exactly what happened, review all information available and set the record straight."

Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian casualties in Baghlan
296 words
31 August 2010
The Times of Central Asia
TCASIA
English

KABUL, August 30 (NATO News Release) -- In response to Baghlan provincial governor's concerns about civilian casualties, a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the ministries of interior and defense, and International Security Assistance Force officials, conducted a full assessment of an operation on Aug. 22 in Talah wa Barfak district, Baghlan province.

The team determined that several rounds from coalition helicopters fell short, missing the intended target and instead striking two buildings, which may have resulted in civilian casualties. Insurgents were using the building as a base of operations; however, it was not the intended target.

The team discovered the accidental short rounds during an examination of the air weapons team video. The assessment determined a gun site malfunction was the cause of the errant rounds.

"We regret any possible civilian loss of life or injury. Our first objective is to protect the people of Afghanistan, and in this case we may have failed," said U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Timothy M. Zadalis, ISAF Joint Command director of plans and projects and team lead. "Our thoughts and concerns are with the family and friends of those civilians who may have been injured or killed."

During their assessment, the team received operational briefings, met with the provincial governor and chief of police and reviewed weapons-system video.

Initial reports from the ground operation indicated 13 insurgents were killed, with no civilian casualties, however close examination of the weapons system video showed the errant rounds striking the unintended buildings.

"This is exactly why we send assessment teams to look into all civilian casualty allegations," said Zadalis. "We want to be sure we understand exactly what happened, review all information available and set the record straight."

Document TCASIA0020100901e68v0000d

ISAF to probe allegations of civilian casualties
133 words
30 August 2010
Pajhwok Afghan News
APAFGH
English

Pajhwok Report - Aug 30, 2010 - 17:53

KABUL (PAN): The International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Monday ordered an investigation into allegations of civilian casualties during an August 22 operation in northern Baghlan province.

In a statement, the NATO-led force said The ISAF Joint Command commander had ordered the investigation based on information contained in the joint initial assessment team's report.

The assessment team determined several rounds from coalition helicopters fell short, missing the intended target and instead striking two buildings, which might have resulted in civilian casualties.

"We are here to protect the people of Afghanistan. Civilian casualties reduce the confidence of the Afghan people and erodes trust placed in us," said US Army Lt. Gen. David M. Rodriguez, ISAF Joint Command commander.

Document APAFGH0020100831e68u0000b

Afghan violence reverses gains; 7 soldiers are killed after weeks of decline in NATO casualty rate
BY ROD NORDLAND
426 words
30 August 2010
International Herald Tribune
INHT
5
English

Seven American soldiers were killed in fighting in eastern and southern Afghanistan over the weekend, after several weeks of declining death tolls among NATO forces.

In western Afghanistan, in Herat Province, police officers found the bullet-riddled bodies of five missing campaign workers for a female candidate in next month's parliamentary elections, and a body was found of another candidate for Parliament who had been shot and killed, Afghan officials said Sunday.

The American servicemen were killed in five separate incidents, according to statements from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, known as ISAF. On Sunday, an American soldier was killed by an improvised explosive device in southern Afghanistan, while another died as a result of an insurgent attack in southern Afghanistan, the NATO force said.

On Saturday, attacks by militants in eastern Afghanistan killed two American soldiers in one incident and one in a separate incident, while two other Americans were killed by an improvised explosive device in southern Afghanistan.

NATO officials did not release any further details.

The incidents brought the monthly death toll among coalition soldiers to 62 as of Aug. 29, compared with 88 in July, according to icasualties.org, which tracks coalition fatalities. In June, the bloodiest month of the nine-year war, 102 NATO soldiers were killed, according to icasualties.org figures.

At the same time, NATO forces have nearly tripled in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009, with a total of 123,000 now. About 100,000 of them are Americans.

In the Herat Province incident, the police said 10 campaign workers for Fawzia Gilani, a current member of Parliament who is running for re-election, had been abducted in the Adraskan District last week. Five of them were discovered shot and killed on Sunday, said Col. Noor Khan Nikzad, a spokesman for the provincial police.

Elsewhere in Herat, in the Shindand District, Abdul Manan, a candidate for Parliament who was on his way to a local mosque, was shot and killed by a gunman on a motorcycle, according to Colonel Nikzad.

In northern Baghlan Province, a NATO investigation gave credence to reports from local officials that eight civilians were killed during a night raid last week.

ISAF said in a statement released Sunday that a "full assessment" of the incident early last week in Talah wa Barfak district had determined that a helicopter that fired into the wrong building "may have resulted in civilian casualties."

Document INHT000020100830e68u00001

People protest against civilians death in US forces operation in Afghan north
216 words
29 August 2010
19:33
BBC Monitoring South Asia
BBCSAP
English

Text of report by privately-owned Afghan Arzu TV on 28 August

[Presenter] A number of residents of Tala wa Barfak District of Baghlan Province [in northern Afghanistan] have staged a demonstration to protest against the killing of civilians in an operation of US soldiers. The protesters claim that at least 20 civilians had been killed as a result of the US forces' operation in the district.

[Correspondent] Protesters, who were chanting slogans of death to America, demanded the central government, the international community and human rights organizations to stop such operations. They claim that if this practice is continued they will close the Bamian-Baghlan road which passes through Tala wa Barfak District. According to them, five civilians were killed and 16 others injured in the US forces' operation in the Tirgaran area of Tala wa Barfak. It is reported that children and women were among the victims of the incident.

The protesters said that the [US] forces had attacked the village at night and the protest ended after two hours following issuing a resolution.

[Video shows an angry demonstration on a street, people stepping on a US flag]

Source: Arzu TV, Mazar-e Sharif, in Dari 1500 gmt 28 Aug 10

ac7ec22a

Document BBCSAP0020100829e68t001md

People protest against civilians death in US forces operation in Afghan north

SAP20100829950033 Mazar-e Sharif *Arzu TV* in Dari 1500 GMT 28 Aug 10

People protest against civilians death in US forces operation in Afghan north

Text of report by privately-owned Afghan Arzu TV on 28 August

[Presenter] A number of residents of Tala wa Barfak District of Baghlan Province [in northern Afghanistan] have staged a demonstration to protest against the killing of civilians in an operation of US soldiers. The protesters claim that at least 20 civilians had been killed as a result of the US forces' operation in the district.

[Correspondent] Protesters, who were chanting slogans of death to America, demanded the central government, the international community and human rights organizations to stop such operations. They claim that if this practice is continued they will close the Bamian-Baghlan road which passes through Tala wa Barfak District. According to them, five civilians were killed and 16 others injured in the US forces' operation in the Tirgaran area of Tala wa Barfak. It is reported that children and women were among the victims of the incident.

The protesters said that the [US] forces had attacked the village at night and the protest ended after two hours following issuing a resolution.

[Video shows an angry demonstration on a street, people stepping on a US flag]

[Description of Source: Mazar-e Sharif Arzu TV in Dari -- privately-owned television station launched in 2007 by Kamal Nabizada who is said to have good ties with Balkh provincial governor Atta Mohammad Nur.]

Two NATO soldiers, eight civilians killed in Afghan violence
Sardar Ahmad
588 words
25 August 2010
03:01
Agence France Presse
AFPR
English

Two foreign soldiers died Tuesday fighting insurgents in Afghanistan, the NATO alliance said, as Afghan authorities said international forces had killed eight civilians in a recent operation.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) said it was aware of the charges by some Afghan officials that its soldiers had killed civilians during a raid against Islamist rebels in the northern province of Baghlan.

"On Sunday we saw 11 helicopters coming," Mohammad Ismail, the district chief for Tala Wa Barfak, where the incident took place, told AFP.

"Some of the helicopters landed deploying troops. They carried out attacks there. They killed eight people, all civilians," he said.

Tala Wa Barfak is a remote district in Baghlan, where Taliban insurgents have established a significant presence in recent months.

The district chief said that about a dozen other people, "all of them civilians," were injured in the raids, which he said had lasted for "hours".

An ISAF spokesman said the claims were being investigated, adding: "However, current operational reporting does not support any civilian casualties."

Civilian casualties caused by foreign forces have fallen this year, with NATO troops responsible for about 22 percent of more than 1,200 non-combatant deaths in the first half of 2010, a recent UN report said.

Afghan civilian casualties in the war launched against the Taliban regime in October 2001 is a sensitive issue that sometimes leads to violent anti-West protests.

President Hamid Karzai has long been calling on his Western backers, the US and NATO members with 141,000 troops in Afghanistan, to protect non-combatants during operations against rebels.

Karzai has said that civilian casualties erode public support for his administration, already unpopular among Afghans because of rampant corruption among its officials and its failure to provide security.

Meanwhile, ISAF said two foreign soldiers were killed in southern Afghanistan Tuesday, bringing to 13 the number of troops killed in the country since the weekend.

An American soldier was killed by a bomb in southern Afghanistan, and an ISAF soldier whose nationality was not disclosed was killed in fighting against insurgents, also in the south, the NATO-led force said.

The latest deaths bring to 458 the number of international soldiers killed in the Afghan war so far this year, compared with 520 for the whole last year.

Thirteen international soldiers have been killed since Saturday, seven of them Americans, according to an AFP tally based on that kept by the icasualties.org website.

The force said it had killed 35 rebels during operations east of Kabul launched to secure troubled regions ahead of Afghanistan's September parliamentary elections. The figures could not independently be verified.

The violence is worsening as the militants spread into the north and west of the country from their traditional strongholds in the south and east.

The head of the US Marine Corps, speaking in the United States after a visit to Afghanistan, said he believed Afghan forces would not be ready to take over from US troops in Afghanistan's southern provinces for a few more years.

"It will be a few years before conditions on the ground are such that turnover will be possible for us," General James Conway told reporters, referring to Marines deployed in the provinces of Helmand and Kandahar.

His comments were the latest sign from US military leaders that a major troop withdrawal remained a long way off, despite the July 2011 deadline set by President Barack Obama.

burs/bsk/dk

Document AFPR000020100824e68o006mx

Afghan official says six civilians killed in NATO strike

SAP20100823950060 Kabul *Pajhwok Afghan News* in English 1203 GMT 23 Aug 10

Afghan official says six civilians killed in NATO strike

Text of report in English by Afghan independent Pajhwok news agency website

Pol-e Khomri: Six civilians, including a woman and a child, were killed end as many wounded during a NATO airstrike in northern Baghlan Province, an official said on Monday [23 August].

NATO helicopters pounded the Tirgaran village of Tala wa Barfak District, killing and wounding the civilians and burning 20 houses, the district chief, Mohammad Esmail, told Pajhwok Afghan News.

There were no militants in the area at the time of the predawn strike, he said, adding International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) soldiers did not inform district officials prior to the air raid.

"NATO helicopters struck our village at about 2:00am, killing six and wounding as many. Twenty houses were torched and foreign troops arrested four residents," said Mullah Mohammad, a local imam. All victims were civilians, he alleged.

Meanwhile, the alliance said a dozen individuals killed in the operation were insurgents and two Taleban commanders, known to lead attacks on Afghan and coalition forces, were the target of the operation.

"Combined forces located and destroyed a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, several RPGs and several boxes of small arms ammunition," the International Security Assistance Force said.

[Description of Source: Kabul Pajhwok Afghan News in English – independent news agency]

PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3
Sent: Wednesday, 8 December 2010 3:29 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3
Cc: BRADSHAW PHIL, CDR; COLEMAN PETER, MR
Subject: FW: Defence - Afghanistan - Injury - unclassified

Merry Xmas PSR(IC)3
OIA from PSR(IC)3

COMPLIANCE DATE 27/1/11

Cheers

OIA-1454-2010
PLEASE LOG AS
OIA MIN PQ
REFER TO: DSO
CC:
FOR DRAFT/DIRECT REPLY
IN 10 WORKING DAYS
IMMEDIATELY

PSR(IC)3 | Media Manager
Defence Communications Group

DDI:PSR(IC)3 | Mobile: PSR(IC)3 | DTeIN: PSR(IC)3
NZDF website: Click here | DCG intranet site: Click here

Think before you print

PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 PSR(IC)3
Sent: Wednesday, 8 December 2010 2:31 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3
Subject: FW: Defence - Afghanistan - Injury - unclassified

Hi PSR(IC)3

On 24 September 2010 NZDF provided information relating to injuries sustained by a New Zealand soldier in Afghanistan.

I make a request under the Official Information Act for a copy of all correspondence between NZDF personnel both here and overseas relating to this incident.

Thanks

PSR(IC)3

TVNZ
Television New Zealand Ltd
Te Reo Tītoki

PSR(IC)3
Political Reporter - Wellington

D PSR(IC)3
M. PSR(IC)3
P: PSR(IC)3

CORRESPONDENCE ABOUT INCIDENT CAUSING INJURY TO NZ SOLDIER IN AFGHANISTAN

8/12/2010

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:04
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: Docs re Baghlan op

Rian, apart from the one that I've emailed on DIXS, these are the docs I pulled up for CDF / MINDEF on the weekend.

2010-08-22 OPJ BURNHAM Stor...
2010-08-12 Op RAHBARI Missio...
2010-08-12 Op RAHBARI.ppt
2010-08-21 Storyboard - Op...
2010-08-22 Baghlan Operati...
2010-08-22 Op RAHBARI - OBJ ...
2010-08-22 OP RAHBARI OBJ B...
2010-08-22 OP RAHBARI OBJ B...
2010-08-31 CDF Ops Brief.ppt
2010-08-23 Int Update Obj BUR...
2010-08-23 Letter - Apology fo...
2010-08-24 CDF Ops Brief.ppt
2010-08-25 Cover Sheet - HQ IS...
2010-08-25 MINDEF Note - ...
2010-08-26 Int Summary Repor...
2010-08-30 Apache Gunship...
2010-08-30 OBJ Burnham Post-...
From NZSAS SNO at the time op ...
2010-09-15 Dot Pt Brief CDF on...
2010-09-23 NZPRT Bamyan ...
2010-12-09 MINDEF Note - ...
2010-12-10 Cover Sheet - NZSAS...
2010-12-10 NTM - NZSAS TF81 Op...
2010-12-12 Release re CRU a...
2010-12-13 Cover Sheet - CRU a...

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:08
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: Docs Part 1 of 5

2010-08-22 Op RAHBARI - OBJ ...
2010-08-12 Op RAHBARI Missio...
2010-08-12 Op RAHBARI.ppt
2010-08-21 Storyboard - Op...
2010-08-22 Baghlan Operati...

112p

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:11
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: Sorry - Parts 3 and 4 were too big...have to break them down (3a)

2010-08-25 Cover Sheet - HQ IS...

2010-08-24 CDF Ops Brief.ppt

112q

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:13
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: (3aa)

2010-08-24 CDF Ops Brief.ppt

112r

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:13
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: (3ab)

2010-08-25 Cover Sheet - HQ IS...

112s

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:11
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: (3b)

2010-08-30 Apache Gunship...

2010-08-25 MINDEF Note - ...

2010-08-26 Int Summary Repor...

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:12
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: (4a)

2010-08-31 CDF Ops Brief.ppt

2010-08-30 OBJ Burnham Post-...

112u

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:13
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: (4aa)

2010-08-30 OBJ Burnham Post-...

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:12
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: (4b)

2010-12-09 MINDEF Note - ...
2010-09-15 Dot Pt Brief CDF on...
2010-09-23 NZPRT Bamyan ...

112w

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:09
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: Docs Part 4 of 5

2010-12-09 MINDEF Note - ...
2010-08-30 OBJ Burnham Post-...
2010-08-31 CDF Ops Brief.ppt
2010-09-15 Dot Pt Brief CDF on...
2010-09-23 NZPRT Bamyan ...

112x

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 14:09
To: NZSAS.CO
Subject: Docs Part 5 of 5

From NZSAS SNO at the time op ... | 2010-12-10 Cover Sheet - NZSAS... | 2010-12-10 NTM - NZSAS TF81 Op... | 2010-12-12 Release re CRU a... | 2010-12-13 Cover Sheet - CRU a...

112y

From: HQNZDF.DSO-SOANLST
Sent: Tuesday, 1 July 2014 10:12
To: HQNZDF.DSO
Subject: ISAF Op Assessment Summary

2010-08-26 ISAF - Incident Ass...

112z

Achive Manager Export

From: MCKINSTRY RIAN, LTCOL Sent: Tue, 01 Jul 2014 00:34:40 GMT
To: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
CC BLACKWELL JAMES, COL
Subject: FW: From COS

Attachments may contain viruses that are harmful to your computer. Attachments may not display correctly.

NZDF Media Release.doc (27Kb) 2010-08-CA-326-Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian ca....pdf (88Kb)

Hello Sir

After having viewed the article on Maori TV last night, and having reviewed the media release made below by the NZDF and the media release made by ISAF, I have the following comment. In the NZDF release the investigation concluded that the allegations of Civ Cas were unfounded. The ISAF release on the other hand in my opinion conforms to standard ISAF protocol of not confirming or denying that Civ Cas has occurred, rather it states that Civ Cas may have occurred and regrets any possible loss of life.

As SNO I departed theatre on 8 Sep 10. At this time TF 81 (NZ) had been cleared of any case to answer by ISAF Joint Command of any Civ Cas allegation. The investigation was not released by ISAF Joint Command to NZ at that time. Not confirming or denying Civ Cas seems a measured approach to a situation by ISAF where an allegation is made and less footage of aircraft rounds impacting on a civilian house, no further evidence to support Civ Cas allegations at that time could be found.

Regards

Rian

Rian McKinstry
Lieutenant Colonel | Commanding Officer
1st New Zealand Special Air Service Regiment
Rennie Lines | Private Bag 25 | Papakura
Tel: +PSR(IC)3 | DTeIN: PSR(IC)3 | Mob: PSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3

From: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
Sent: Monday, 30 June 2014 2:03 p.m.
To: MCKINSTRY RIAN, LTCOL
Subject: From COS

Rian,

As discussed.

Regards,

Ross Smith

Commodore, RNZN | Chief of Staff | Office of Chief of Defence Force |
HQ New Zealand Defence Force |p +PSR(IC)3 | dtetn PSR(IC)3 |

NZDF Media Release.doc 2010-08-CA-326-Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian ca....pdf

NEWS RELEASE

ISAF Joint Command - Afghanistan

2010-08-CA-326
For Immediate Release

Joint assessment team confirms possibility of civilian casualties in Baghlan

KABUL, Afghanistan (Aug. 29) – In response to Baghlan provincial governor's concerns about civilian casualties, a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the ministries of interior and defense, and International Security Assistance Force officials, conducted a full assessment of an operation on Aug. 22 in Talah wa Barfak district, Baghlan province.

The team determined that several rounds from coalition helicopters fell short, missing the intended target and instead striking two buildings, which may have resulted in civilian casualties. Insurgents were using the building as a base of operations; however, it was not the intended target.

The team discovered the accidental short rounds during an examination of the air weapons team video. The assessment determined a gun site malfunction was the cause of the errant rounds.

"We regret any possible civilian loss of life or injury. Our first objective is to protect the people of Afghanistan, and in this case we may have failed," said U.S. Air Force Brig. Gen. Timothy M. Zadalis, ISAF Joint Command director of plans and projects and team lead. "Our thoughts and concerns are with the family and friends of those civilians who may have been injured or killed."

During their assessment, the team received operational briefings, met with the provincial governor and chief of police and reviewed weapons-system video.

Initial reports from the ground operation indicated 13 insurgents were killed, with no civilian casualties, however close examination of the weapons system video showed the errant rounds striking the unintended buildings.

"This is exactly why we send assessment teams to look into all civilian casualty allegations," said Zadalis. "We want to be sure we understand exactly what happened, review all information available and set the record straight."

-30-

Media Release

20 April 2011

NZ DEFENCE FORCE OPERATIONS IN BAMYAN PROVINCE ON 22 AUGUST 2010

On 22 August 2010 New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) elements, operating as part of a Coalition Force in Bamyan province, Afghanistan conducted an operation against an insurgent group.

NZDF Special Operations Forces combined with Afghan National Security Forces and other coalition elements undertook the operation.

The operation was conducted as part of the wider ISAF mission to improve the security of the Afghan people and to protect the NZ PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) in Bamyan province. The operation was approved by both the Afghan Government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Nine insurgents (not 12 as reported) were killed in the operation which targeted an insurgent group in the area where Bamyan province borders neighbouring Baghlan province.

Following the operation allegations of civilian casualties were made. These were investigated by a joint Afghan Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and International Security Assistance Force assessment team, in accordance with ISAF procedures.

The investigation concluded that the allegations of civilian casualties were unfounded.

Ordinarily the NZDF declines to comment on matters of an operational nature as any release of information can put New Zealanders at risk. In this case, clarification of the facts is warranted.

The NZDF will be making no further comment on this operation.

The NZDF point of contact for this release is Commander Phil Bradshaw, Director Defence Communications Group 021 441 493.

ENDS

Achive Manager Export

From: PSR(IC)3 Sent: Tue, 01 Jul 2014 03:08:07 GMT
To: SMITH ROSS, CDRE ; SHORT KEVIN, AVM
Subject: RE: [~~SEEMAIL~~] 521/2010

Ack

From: SMITH ROSS, CDREPSR(IC)3 PSR(IC)3
Sent: Tuesday, 1 July 2014 3:04 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 ; SHORT KEVIN, AVM
Subject: RE: [~~SEEMAIL~~] 521/2010

PSR(IC)3

*** [~~SEEMAIL~~] This message may contain classified information ***

Our man at HQ ISAF is now seeking a copy of full report. He is aware of the importance/urgency.
Regards,

Ross Smith
Cdre, RNZN
COS HQNZDF

-----Original Message-----
From: PSR(IC)3 PSR(IC)3
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2014 02:17 PM New Zealand Standard Time
To: SMITH ROSS, CDRE; SHORT KEVIN, AVM
Subject: RE: [~~SEEMAIL~~] 521/2010

Sir,

Have discussed the signed vrs unsigned notes with Josh. PSR(IC)3 view is the point is around the Executive Summary document. We didn't get asked a question in the House and the feeling is that it should blow over fairly quickly but to expect a mention on the news this evening. I spoke with the Minister just prior to him going into the House..his morale seemed to have improved as the day has progressed.

From: Executive Assistant-CDF [mailtoExecutive Assistant-CDFPSR(IC)3
Sent: Tuesday, 1 July 2014 1:29 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3
Cc: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
Subject: [~~SEEMAIL~~] 521/2010

*** [~~SEEMAIL~~] This message may contain classified information ***

The information contained in this Internet Email message is intended for the addressee only and may contain privileged information, but not necessarily the official views or opinions of the New Zealand Defence Force. If you are not the intended recipient you must not use, disclose, copy or distribute this message or the information in it. If you have received this message in error, please Email or telephone the sender immediately.

Email from NZSAS SNO

HQNZDF.DSO

From: NZSAS.CO PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3
Sent: Tuesday, 1 July 2014 12:06 p.m.
To: HQNZDF.DSO
Subject: EXTERNAL RELEASE Email regarding IAT Report
Attachments: Email. 04 Sep 10.doc

CLASSIFICATION:

Hi DSO

FYI. The email was written by myself on the last few days in theatre on 6 Sept 10. I have highlighted the piece where it states we are still waiting for the IAT report. The attachment also shows that as of 3 Sept ISAF SOF were still awaiting the findings also.

My flights are being booked now. I will see you tomorrow.

RM

From: WAATEA.SNO
Sent: Monday, September 06, 2010 1:32 AM
To: SWAN - HQNZDF.DSO; SWAN - HQNZDF.DDSO; PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3
Cc: WAATEA.ISAF-LNO; WAATEA.SNO
Subject: [~~SECRET~~] External Release Issues External to the Sitrep

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

Gidday Boss / Gents

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 is here the handover is progressing OK. We head to Baghram tomorrow then in the PM I will transfer authority to him and he will have the con from 070001 local.

Attached is the last correspondence we have received on OBJ Burnham. This email from PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)1 ISAF SOF CJ3 to PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 COM ISAF SOF confirms that PSR(IC)4 COM IJC has been briefed on the findings of the Initial Assessment Team and he concurs that TF81 has no case to answer. ISAF SOF will be taking no further action in this matter, however there may still be some fallout for the aviation elements. PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 continues to monitor the status of the IAT report and we are looking to get a copy of this report when and if it is released.

The task force continues to investigate follow up operations in the BAGHLAN region. OBJ YAMAHA may come up on our radar soon and we are getting information through today of an INS training camp further up the TIGIRAN valley that may be developed into a full blown target set. More to follow on these in the coming days/weeks.

TF81 has now commenced operations in Maydan Wardak. All storyboards you should have. These operations have all met with varying degrees of success. We are addressing a key aspect of P4's strategy here and while there are still some de-confliction issues to resolve we anticipate further operations into WARDAK in the coming weeks. The tempo of business will of course be interrupted by Eid 10/13 Sep, Elections 18 Sep and RIP 3-10 Oct however this presents a co-ordination challenge to ensure we can maintain the tempo P4 desires while managing these external inputs.

PSR(S)1

Assessment of partner capabilities.
Update on CRU leadership.

There have been a number of appointment changes at the senior level of the MOI. PSR(S) in total.
PSR(S)1

Update to changes to MOI.

The CRU have taken delivery of PSR(S)1 AK47's this is great! These are reliable weapons and will accept the additions of a Picatinny rail that will allow the weapon to be enhanced through follow on projects. TF81 has conducted Dry training and zeroing of these weapons with the CRU. We were also inspected yesterday and got a tick from the US End User team on the CRU storage facilities and processes. We anticipate that shortly this will translate into the delivery of PSR(S)1 for the CRU. This will allow the Unit to develop enhanced skills for night operations. PSR(S)1 units by P4 after he visited PSR(S)1

PSR(S)1
Concerns for health of CRU raised. Medical in confidence.

We hosted PSR(S)2, PSR(S)23 this week. The visit went well with no significant issues to report.

The Doctor has returned to the task force from Germany.

Email. 04 Sep 10.doc

Achive Manager Export

From: FERRIS LISA, LTCOL **Sent:** Wed, 02 Jul 2014 01:49:18 GMT
To: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
Subject: FW: ISAF IAT Report 2010

Hi Sir,

And to follow up with my last, J09 has done a search of her files and emails (and quizzed the J2 about other entry points at JFNZ) and could not locate anything.
Other options may have been transfer through the DSO chain, or safehanded back by someone although that is pure speculation on my part.

Regards,

Lisa

From: PSR(IC)3 LTCOL
Sent: Wednesday, 2 July 2014 12:58 p.m.
To: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
Subject: ISAF IAT Report 2010

Hi Sir,

I have looked for the document as requested on our legal drives. It has not come through our network.
We did received advice on SWAN from our legal advisor at the time reported back regarding discussing the matter with the ISAF LEGAD.
However, the focus of the discussion was purely focussed on the NZDF force elements. Nothing was raised concerning the other coalition partners.
Our legal advisor on the ground does not recollect to the best of his knowledge ever seeing the report in Afghanistan either.

I have forwarded the request to Joint Force Headquarters Legal as they may have further information. They will also follow up with the J2 shop in case anything came across the hi-side.

Regards,

PSR(IC)3

PSR(IC)3
Lieutenant Colonel | Chief of Staff / Deputy Director Operations Law | Defence Legal Services
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force| Private Bag 39997, Wellington
T +PSR(IC)3 | DTeIN PSR(IC)3 M PSR(IC)3 | E PSR(IC)3

This page has been deliberately left blank.

Achive Manager Export

From: SMITH ROSS, CDRE Sent: Fri, 11 Jul 2014 22:21:29 GMT
To: THOMAS LORENA, WGCDR
CC MCASLAN HUGH, COL ; PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

Lorena,

Thanks. Good work. Copies will be required for DCOORD and DSO records.

Regards,

Ross Smith
Commodore, RNZN
Chief of Staff, HQNZDF

-----Original Message-----
From: PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Sent: Friday, July 11, 2014 10:35 AM New Zealand Standard Time
To: SMITH ROSS, CDRE
Cc: MCASLAN HUGH, COL; PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Subject: FW: SCI BR RFI

Sir please see below from LTCOL Weston in Kabul. I have now received the document via HQ JFNZ and can confirm it is the same as the Executive Report held by your staff.

PSR(IC)3 | Wing Commander
Deputy Director Strategic Commitments - Global
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
DTeIN PSR(IC)3 | DDI PSR(IC)3 | Mob PSR(IC)3
E-mail PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 LTCOL
Sent: Monday, 7 July 2014 11:52 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Cc: MCASLAN HUGH, COL; PSR(IC)3 CAPT; PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

Lorena I have sent the only substantial/official report that can be found on ISAF files. I think it was you already have. We have used the archivists and the Civcas cell to search. Civcas specialists told me that the report I have sent is very likely to be the final piece of staff work for an incident of this nature. The only other information available is the JOC Watch entries – they add little to what is in the report sent. The report should be with PSR(IC)3

Regards

PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Sent: Friday, 4 July 2014 11:51 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 LTCOL
Cc: MCASLAN HUGH, COL; PSR(IC)3 CAPT; PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

Hello PSR(IC)3 I've just spoken with Chief of Staff. While the initial urgency for finding the full report has diminished slightly, it is still very important that we find it as soon as possible. CoS has a copy of the executive summary and from it I can advise the following details over this means.

To: COM IJC, DCOM IJC, IJC COS and IJC DCOS JOPS
Subject: Incident assessment Team Executive Summary 26 August 2010: CIVCAS Allegations during TF-81 level II Deliberate Detection Operations is Tigiran Village Talawe Berfak District Baghlan Province RC North
Op: 22 August 2010

I imagine that the full report will have a similar distribution and title which may aid your search - or at least provide you with some contacts who could have received it. We do not have the full report that the executive summary this covers, and it is that full report we still require.

I have PSR(R)1 access if it can be transmitted over that means
PSR(IC)3

PSR(IC)3 | Wing Commander
Deputy Director Strategic Commitments - Global
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
DTeIN PSR(IC)3 | DDI PSR(IC)3 | Mob PSR(IC)3
E-mail PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Sent: Thursday, 3 July 2014 4:52 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , MAJ; PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

I have started searching the drives in ISAF.....nothing to report so far. Please let me know if you find the document or the imperative dies off, there are millions of documents here and the level of detail provided to date is not making it easier.

SNO KEA

From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Sent: Thursday, 3 July 2014 12:51 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

Yes, and most likely source.

PSR(IC)3

Major PSR(IC)3
Joint Staff Officer Operations Global (J33G-1)
HQ Joint Forces New Zealand I 2 Seddul Bahr Road I Trentham 5018 I New Zealand

IDD: +PSR(IC)3 I Fax: +PSR(IC)3 I Cell: +PSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Sent: Wednesday, 2 July 2014 7:40 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , MAJ; PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

Have we asked TG6/DSO?

From: PSR(IC)3 , MAJ
Sent: Wednesday, 2 July 2014 4:22 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR; PSR(IC)3 , LTCOL
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

Thanks.

PSR(IC)3

Major PSR(IC)3
Joint Staff Officer Operations Global (J33G-1)
HQ Joint Forces New Zealand I 2 Seddul Bahr Road I Trentham 5018 I New Zealand
IDD: +PSR(IC)3 I Fax: +PSR(IC)3 I Cell: +PSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3

From: PSR(IC)3 WGCDR
Sent: Wednesday, 2 July 2014 4:21 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 MAJ; WESTON MATTHEW, LTCOL
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

The only information I can provide is the details of the author which I have sent through on SWAN. I will attempt to find more to help you out when I return to the office and SWAN in the morning.

PSR(IC)3
WGCDR
DDSC-G
DTelN PSR(IC)3 |DDI PSR(IC)3
E-mail PSR(IC)3

-----Original Message-----
From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Sent: Wednesday, July 02, 2014 04:17 PM New Zealand Standard Time
To: PSR(IC)3 LTCOL; PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

SNO has a point to make re what we are looking for. PSR(IC)3 has just arrived back in theatre so will also be handicapped.

I think your best bet is with us and I have sighted near every COMISAF signed doc except the one we are

looking for. I am aware PSR(IC)3 has also been searching.

It is likely the doc came into this HQ as a SITREP attachment as it is not in any J3/J5 Br folder. More guidance please.

PSR(IC)3

Major PSR(IC)3
Joint Staff Officer Operations Global (J33G-1)
HQ Joint Forces New Zealand I 2 Seddul Bahr Road I Trentham 5018 I New Zealand
IDD: +PSR(IC)3 I Fax: +PSR(IC)3 I Cell: PSR(IC)3
PSR(IC)3

-----Original Message-----
From: PSR(IC)3 LTCOL
Sent: Wednesday, 2 July 2014 2:48 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 WGCDR; PSR(IC)3 , CAPT
Cc: PSR(IC)3 MAJ; PSR(IC)3 , MAJ
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI

PSR(IC)3 as I have explained to Maj PSR(IC)3 my SWAN has been packed up at the direction of HQ JFNZ, there is nothing in our folders of hard copies. It would help if some one told us what the document is.....i.e a file, date, author, title. If this document is what I think it is then surely its filed in NZ. I would like to think that accurate archiving occurred at the end of Crib- and all records sent home. I would start with having HQ JFNZ back track through files from the time and Crib TET, and also get CIS to scour SWAN. We will continue with our own TET and RIP until you can provide more info.

Regards

SNO KEA

-----Original Message-----
From: PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Sent: Wednesday, 2 July 2014 2:37 p.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 LTCOL; PSR(IC)3 , CAPT
Cc: PSR(IC)3 MAJ; PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Subject: RE: SCI BR RFI
Importance: High

Hello PSR(IC)3 my apologies for keeping the pressure on regarding our RFI, but we need to be ensure we have taken every possible step to locate the relevant document, including engaging with appropriate pers in ISAF HQ. I am away from SWAN for the rest of the afternoon (NZ time), but MAJ George will be monitoring that means for a response. Could you please provide me with an update by tomorrow morning (NZ time).

Thanks for you efforts with this.

PSR(IC)3 | Wing Commander
Deputy Director Strategic Commitments - Global Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force DTeIN PSR(IC):
| DDI PSR | Mob PSR(IC)3 E-mail PSR(IC)3

-----Original Message-----
From: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Sent: Wednesday, 2 July 2014 8:28 a.m.
To: PSR(IC)3 , WGCDR
Cc: PSR(IC)3 MAJ
Subject: SCI BR RFI

Hi Ma'am
Search for the report by SNO KEA and OC AFG NSE at both locations including both SWAN accounts has

come up with nil result.
No further comms from SNO KEA since.
I am away from the office today and only access DIXIS.

This page has been deliberately left blank.

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2 TF81 [redacted], FSN (3) conducted a partnered Level 2 time sensitive deliberate detention operation (DDO) IOT kill / capture OBJ BURNHAM (B1 - ABDUL KALTA - RTAF 2307) and OBJ NOVA / PSR(S)1 (B2 – NEMATULLAH – RTAF 2306) IVO 42S VD 23036 91463 over the period 212217 – 220500 AUG 10 IOT disrupt INS atk cell, increase the security in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN province, protect ANSF, Coalition Forces and enhance the legitimacy and authority of GIRoA.

Disrupt INS network elements planning attacks on ANSF / Coalition Forces and local population in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Province and enhance the authority and legitimacy of GIRoA.

ISAF and ANSF executed a HAF to TIGIRAN VILLAGE. On infil AWT and AC130 engaged PID armed insurgents moving to target FF. CRU TF81 moved to COI conducting callout and clearance, graduating to EMOE. All COI were cleared and found to be empty. A1 and A3 yielded a qty of INS weapons and ammunition. A2 was an agricultural building. During clearance a collapsed wall resulted in 1 x TF81 cas. Ongoing INS activity resulted in several more engagements. The des of INS ammo by charge in the vic of A1 resulted in a fire within A1. A3 also caught fire due to an unattended cooking fire left by withdrawing INS. All FF exfil by HAF to CW.

KLE conducted.
IO posters placed on COI.

No detainees
13 INS KIA (JACKPOT PENDING)
1 x RPG launcher, 1 x AK47, 7 x RPG rockets, 5 x RPG rocket motors, 1 x bipod (assessed as an RPG bipod), 6 x boxes of small arms ammunition, 2 x RPK belts, 1 x AK-47 magazine (full), 1 x pistol holster, 1 x drum mag. These items were destroyed on the target location.

~~NATO / ISAF SECRET~~

22 AUG 10

OP RAHBARI
OBJ BURNHAM (42S VD 23036 91463)

PSR(S)1



MAMS

PSR(S)1

CALL-OUT UNDERWAY (A1)

~~NATO / ISAF SECRET~~

By O Coore
ISAF 147 Exec Summary (3x(S))
received 23/3/17 &
cor brief.
S116

Classified Register
Ser No: OCDF / 387 / 2011
IN: 119 / 2011
OUT: / /

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

COVER SHEET

To accompany documents to

Minister of Defence

Subject:	**OPERATION WĀTEA: HQ ISAF CIVILIAN CASUALTY INVESTIGATION INTO OPERATION BURNHAM 22 AUGUST 2010**		
MOD File No.	MoD Tracking #.		Minister's Tracking#: *(For Minister's office)*
NZDF File No.	NZDF 03130/DSC/2 NZDF Tracking #		
Priority:	ROUTINE	Request Ministerial response by:	
Contacts:	1. PSR(IC)3 2. PSR(IC)3		

Sheet not to exceed one page. Please complete shaded areas.

Purpose:	The purpose of this note is to inform you that HQ ISAF have initiated a Civilian Casualty Investigation stemming from the operation conducted by the Afghan National Security Forces and TF81 on Sunday 22 August 2010, in Baghlan province, Afghanistan.
Recommendations:	a. **Note** that their have been allegations made by the Governor of the TALA WA BARFAK district that civilians were wounded and killed in the operation conducted by Afghan National Security Forces and TF81 on Sunday 22 August 2010. b. **Note** that HQ ISAF have initiated an investigation into the allegations and appointed a Brigadier as the investigating officer. c. **Note** that the SNO and OC TF81 have been interviewed by the investigating officer. d. **Discuss** this note with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.
MOD/NZDF Consultation	NZDF
Minister's comments:	
Minister's Action:	Signed / Noted / Agreed / Approved / Declined Referred to:
Signature:	**Date:**

J MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Date

NZDF 03130/DSC/2

August 2010

Minister of Defence

OPERATION WĀTEA: HQ ISAF CIVILIAN CASUALTY INVESTIGATION ON OPERATION BURNHAM 22 AUGUST 2010

Purpose

1. The purpose of this note is to inform you that HQ ISAF have initiated a Civilian Casualty Investigation stemming from the operation conducted by the Afghan National Security Forces and TF81 on Sunday 22 August 2010, in Baghlan province, Afghanistan.

Background

2. Afghan National Security Forces (Crisis Response Unit) and TF81 conducted a disruption operation targeting the insurgent group operating within the Bamyan/Baghlan north east border region. This insurgent group conducted the recent fatal attack on the NZPRT patrol on 3 August 2010. During the operation a number of armed insurgents were engaged by the ground and air force and killed. Afghan citizens within the TALA WA BARFAK region have alleged that innocent civilians were killed during the operation and HQ ISAF has commenced an investigation into the allegations.

3. HQ ISAF has a policy of investigating all alleged civilian casualties as a result of operations conducted by coalition forces. A Brigadier has been tasked to lead the investigation into the allegations and he has already spoken to the Senior National Commander (SNO) and Officer Commanding (OC) TF81 on Tuesday evening. He then reviewed the gun tapes from the Apache helicopters and AC-130 Gunship that were involved in the operation to determine if they had adhered to coalition Rules of Engagement (ROE). Over the next two days he plans to travel to Baghlan and speak to the German Commander of Regional Command North, and to the Governor of Baghlan province in order to ascertain the veracity of the claims and gauge the atmospherics of the region. If security permits he will travel to the TALA WA BARFAK region to meet with the local Governor of the district.

4. The investigating officer complimented the SNO and OC for their thorough post operational assessment and for providing extensive, open and honest comment. He explained that the process is not a "witch-hunt", but is intended to ensure that the

coalition treats fairly any civilians casualties that were directly attributed to the operation conducted on Sunday.

5. I will keep you appraised as to any developments and outcomes and would recommend that you discuss this with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

Recommendations

6. It is recommended that the Minister:

a. **Note** that there have been allegations made by the Governor of the TALA WA BARFAK district that civilians were wounded and killed in the operation conducted by Afghan National Security Forces and TF81 on Sunday 22 August 2010.

b. **Note** that HQ ISAF have initiated an investigation into the allegations and appointed a Brigadier as the investigating officer.

c. **Note** that the SNO and OC TF81 have been interviewed by the investigating officer.

d. **Discuss** this note with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

J. MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

COVER SHEET

To accompany documents to

Minister of Defence

Subject:	**CRU AND NZSAS OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2010**		
MOD File No.	MoD Tracking #.	Minister's Tracking#: *(For Minister's office)*	
NZDF File No.	NZDF Tracking #		
Priority:	ROUTINE	Request Ministerial response by:	
Contacts:	1 PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 2	Tel: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 Tel:	A/H: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 A/H:

Sheet not to exceed one page. Please complete shaded areas.

Purpose:	The purpose of this note is to provide releasable information to the Prime Minister of the operations conducted by the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) and NZSAS Task Force in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan on 22 August and 03 October 2010.
Recommendations:	**Note** the risks associated with releasing the information. **Refer** this note to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for public release.
MOD/NZDF Consultation	NZDF
Minister's comments:	
Minister's Action:	Signed / Noted / Agreed / Approved / Declined Referred to:
Signature:	**Date:**

J MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Date

CRU AND NZSAS OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND OCTOBER 2010

1. On 3 August 2010, a daytime NZPRT Patrol led by Lt O'Donnell was ambushed in the North Eastern region of Bamian province by an insurgent group that had an active history of targeting Afghan National Security and coalition forces within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. This insurgent group was based in the neighbouring province of Baghlan, centred on the Talewa Berfak district (approx 20km away).

2. Following this attack, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) Crisis Response Unit (CRU) supported by the NZSAS Task Force and other ISAF coalition partners, commenced planning to disrupt this insurgent groups capacity and capability to target coalition forces, including the NZPRT within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. The mission was launched on the night 21 August and was approved by the MOI and Commander ISAF. The MOI issued Arrest Warrants for the two principal insurgent commanders and these were to be enforced by the members of the CRU.

3. The combined ground force comprising PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2 CRU personnel, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 NZSAS personnel supported by coalition helicopters and aircraft landed at 00.30am on Sunday 22 August. The force was on the ground for approximately three hours and during that time a large number of armed insurgents, operating in small groups attempted to outflank the force and fire on them from high ground. The armed insurgents were engaged by coalition helicopters and aircraft. The ground force searched three buildings and destroyed a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives, but did not locate the two insurgent leaders. The ground force departed at approx 3.30am. During the operation nine armed insurgents were killed by the coalition helicopters and aircraft and one NZSAS soldier was wounded when a wall collapsed on him and he was evacuated and subsequently returned to NZ for further medical treatment.

4. Following the operation allegations were made that up to twenty (20) civilians had been killed by aerial bombardment and twenty (20) houses destroyed by fire[1]. Based on these allegations a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defence and ISAF officials conducted a full assessment of the operation. The assessment team visited the provincial and district capitals, the hospital where the alleged casualties were receiving treatment, viewed the gun tapes from the coalition aircraft and spoke to NZSAS personnel. As a result of their investigation the assessment team concluded that "having reviewed the evidence there is no way that civilian casualties could have occurred" and the actions of the ground force and coalition air were cleared of all allegations.

5. Headquarters ISAF assess that as a result of this operation the insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations had been disrupted. A follow-on operation was conducted on the night of 2 October, but passed without incident with no insurgents encountered nor any shots fired.

Risk Associated with Releasing Information

6. The most obvious risk is posed from the Talewa Berfak insurgent group and others operating within the Baghlan province, who still possess an ability to target the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and NZPRT operating within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. These groups have recently been reported making threats to target ANSF, coalition forces and the NZPRT. Up to this point in time, no ISAF coalition member has been singled out and identified as participating in the operations of 22 August and 3 October. If New Zealand is identified as the main coalition force on these operations, then there is the potential that the insurgent groups will be more determined in their actions to target the NZPRT along similar lines to their attack on 3 August 2010.

7. **Risk Mitigation.** As a result of the ambush on 3 August and recent threats by these insurgent groups, the NZDF and NZPRT have taken active measures to increase their force protection when operating in this border region.

Note:

1. During the operation two of the three buildings searched caught fire, the first was caused by explosives igniting the structure and the second was caused by an unattended cooking fire left burning when the local inhabitants departed.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

COVER SHEET

To accompany documents to

Minister of Defence

Subject:	**NZSAS (TF81) OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2010**		
MOD File No.	MoD Tracking #.	Minister's Tracking#: *(For Minister's office)*	
NZDF File No.	NZDF 3130/DSO/4 NZDF Tracking #		
Priority:	ROUTINE	Request Ministerial response by:	
Contacts:	1 PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 2	Tel: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 Tel:	A/H: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 A/H:

Sheet not to exceed one page. Please complete shaded areas.

Purpose:	The purpose of this note is to inform the Prime Minister of the operations conducted by the NZSAS Task Force and Crisis Response Unit (CRU) in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan on 22 August and 03 October 2010.
Recommendations:	**Note** that the intelligence concluded that the insurgent group responsible for the ambush of the NZPRT patrol on 3 August 2010, was commanded and comprised of personnel from the village of Tigiran, located within the adjacent province of Baghlan. **Note** that the Response Task Force comprising CRU and NZSAS personnel and supported by PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 , ISAF ISR assets and coalition air targeted the insurgent group located within the village of Tigiran on 22 August and 3 October 2010. **Note** that ISAF has determined that the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations has been severely disrupted as a result of the operations. **Note** that the allegations into civilian casualties and destroyed houses were investigated by a joint assessment team and they concluded that the allegations were baseless and cleared the actions of the Response Task Force and coalition air of all allegations. **Refer** this note to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
MOD/NZDF Consultation	NZDF
Minister's comments:	
Minister's Action:	Signed / Noted / Agreed / Approved / Declined Referred to:
Signature:	**Date:**

J MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Date

3130/DSO/4

December 2010

Minister of Defence

NZSAS (TF81) OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND OCTOBER 2010

Purpose

1. The purpose of this note is to inform the Prime Minister of the operations conducted by the NZSAS Task Force and Crisis Response Unit (CRU) in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan on 22 August and 03 October 2010.

Background

2. On 3 August 2010, a daytime NZPRT Patrol led by Lt O'Donnell was ambushed in the North Eastern region of Bamian province by an insurgent group, which operated from the Talewa Berfak district of Baghlan province, approximately 20km away.

3. As a direct result of this insurgent activity, the NZSAS Task Force supported by PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 and ISAF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, commenced active intelligence gathering on this insurgent group. The intelligence gathered over a two week period established that the insurgent group's leadership and base of operations was centred on the village of Tigiran, within the Talewa Berfak district of Baghlan. Commander ISAF, General Petraeus, approved the designation of the two principal insurgent commanders of this group as "medium value targets" and their names were added to the ISAF Joint Prioritisation Effects List (JPEL)[1].

4. From the intelligence provided the CRU, supported by the NZSAS, developed an operation plan targeting the insurgent leadership which was approved by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Commander ISAF to disrupt the insurgent operations centred on Tigiran village. The operation was conducted on the night and early morning of 21/22 August, and a follow-on operation was conducted on the night 2/3 October.

[1] PSR(S)1

Outcome: Operation One 21/22 August 2010

5. The intent of the combined CRU/NZSAS Response Task Force (RTF) operation was to disrupt the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to target coalition forces, including the NZPRT within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. Prior to the launch of the operation the Ministry of Interior Criminal Investigations Division issued two Arrest Warrants for the two principal insurgent commanders and these were to be enforced by the members of the CRU participating in the operation.

6. The combined RTF comprising PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 CRU personnel, NZSAS personnel, and supported by ISAF ISR assets, and coalition air support from helicopters and planes operated in the vicinity of Tigiran village. The RTF landed near the village at 0030 hours on Sunday 22 August. The RTF was on the ground for approximately three hours and in that time sustained one casualty (PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 – please protect). Coalition air support and the RTF engaged a number of insurgents throughout the operation and it is estimated that up to nine insurgents were killed by the coalition air support. The RTF searched three buildings and destroyed a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives. During the operation two of the three buildings searched caught fire, the first was caused by explosives igniting the structure and the second was caused by an unattended cooking fire left burning when the inhabitants departed.

7. Following the operation Afghan citizens from the Talewa Berfak district alleged that up to twenty (20) civilians had been killed by aerial bombardment and twenty (20) houses destroyed by fire. Based on these allegations and reported in the New York Times, a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defence and ISAF officials conducted a full assessment of the operation. The assessment team visited the provincial and district capitals, the hospital where the alleged casualties were receiving treatment, viewed the gun tapes from the coalition air assets and spoke to the NZSAS personnel. As a result of their investigation, the joint assessment team concluded that the allegations were baseless and categorically cleared the actions of the RTF and coalition air of all allegations. The assessment concluded that "*having reviewed the evidence* there is no way that civilian casualties could have occurred". The joint assessment team's report has not been released beyond Headquarters ISAF and our knowledge of the findings are based on the comments provided by the NZSAS Task Force commander, who was permitted to read the report.

8. Furthermore, Headquarters ISAF has determined that the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations has been severely disrupted as a result of the operation, with nine insurgents killed, a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives destroyed and the two insurgent commanders reported to have moved to safer areas, including Pakistan and more remote areas of Baghlan province.

Outcome: Operation Two 2/3 October 2010

9. Following on from the successful operation of 22 August, further intelligence reported that the principal insurgent commander had returned to Tigiran village and was located at his house. The RTF then commenced planning for a follow-on operation based on this new intelligence; this was approved by the Ministry of Interior and Headquarters ISAF. The operation was conducted in a similar style to the previous mission, but utilised different landing and recovery zones. The Task Force comprised PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 PSR(S)3 CRU personnel, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 NZSAS personnel, and was supported by ISAF ISR assets, and coalition air helicopters and planes. Upon landing the Task Force quickly secured the target building and searched the premises, but no Afghans were present and the force extracted from the area without incident.

10. Headquarters ISAF assess that this operation had a further disrupting effect on the insurgent group, notwithstanding the fact that the insurgent commander was not detained by the CRU.

Recommendations

11. It is recommended that the Minister:

a. **Note** that the intelligence concluded that the insurgent group responsible for the ambush of the NZPRT patrol on 3 August 2010, was commanded and comprised of personnel from the village of Tigiran located within the adjacent province of Baghlan.

b. **Note** that the Response Task Force comprising CRU and NZSAS personnel and supported by PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 ISAF ISR assets and coalition air targeted the insurgent group located within the village of Tigiran on 22 August and 3 October 2010.

c. **Note** that ISAF has determined that the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations has been severely disrupted as a result of the operations.

d. **Note** that the allegations into civilian casualties and destroyed houses were investigated by a joint assessment team and they concluded that the allegations were baseless and cleared the actions of the Response Task Force and coalition air of all allegations.

e. **Refer** this note to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

J. MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

From NZSAS SNO at the time...

...” Firstly yesterday I put you wrong in that I ~~stated an investigation~~ was being conducted. In fact what has been occurring has been an IAT (Initial Assessment Team) has been convened to look at the operation and decide if an investigation into a CIVCAS incident needs to occur. Yesterday the IAT interviewed the District Governor of TWB.

PSR(S)1, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

Reference to content of partner-controlled video of operation.

PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)4

This is good news. It has to date verified that our actions were correct and in accordance with the threat presented. This will likely be looked at by IJC from two fronts. Actions by the ground force, (no problems I can see) and actions by the Airborne force. There is no indication at this stage on the evidence presented to the IAT that there was anything other than the correct application of force to a clear and present INS threat, and that any CIVCAS caused by the AWT would be collateral and unintended. This point is still to be verified”...

PSR(R)1, PSR(C)2 TF81 [redacted] FSN (3) conducted a partnered Level 2 time sensitive deliberate detention operation (DDO) IOT kill / capture OBJ BURNHAM (B1 - ABDUL KALTA - RTAF 2307) and OBJ NOVA / PSR(S)1 (B2 – NEMATULLAH – RTAF 2306) IVO 42S VD 23036 91463 over the period 212217 – 220500 AUG 10 IOT disrupt INS atk cell, increase the security in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN province, protect ANSF, Coalition Forces and enhance the legitimacy and authority of GIRoA.

Disrupt INS network elements planning attacks on ANSF / Coalition Forces and local population in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN Province and enhance the authority and legitimacy of GIRoA.

ISAF and ANSF executed a HAF to TIGIRAN VILLAGE. On infil AWT and AC130 engaged PID armed insurgents moving to target FF. CRU and TF81 moved to COI conducting callout and clearance, graduating to EMOE. All COI were cleared and found to be empty. A1 and A3 yielded a qty of INS weapons and ammunition. A2 was an agricultural building. During clearance a collapsed wall resulted in 1 x TF81 cas. Ongoing INS activity resulted in several more engagements. The des of INS ammo by charge in the vic of A1 resulted in a fire within A1. A3 also caught fire due to an unattended cooking fire left by withdrawing INS. All FF exfil by HAF to CW.

KLE conducted.
IO posters placed on COI.

No detainees
13 INS KIA (JACKPOT PENDING)
1 x RPG launcher, 1 x AK47, 7 x RPG rockets, 5 x RPG rocket motors, 1 x bipod (assessed as an RPG bipod), 6 x boxes of small arms ammunition, 2 x RPK belts, 1 x AK-47 magazine (full), 1 x pistol holster, 1 x drum mag. These items were destroyed on the target location.

~~NATO / ISAF SECRET~~

22 AUG 10

OP RAHBARI
OBJ BURNHAM (42S VD 23036 91463)

PSR(S)1



MAMS



PSR(S)1

CALL-OUT UNDERWAY (A1)

~~NATO / ISAF SECRET~~

133

S116

Classified Register
Ser No: OCDF / 387 / 2011
IN: 1 / 9 / 2011
OUT: / /

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

COVER SHEET

To accompany documents to

Minister of Defence

Subject:	**OPERATION WĀTEA: HQ ISAF CIVILIAN CASUALTY INVESTIGATION INTO OPERATION BURNHAM 22 AUGUST 2010**		
MOD File No.	MoD Tracking #.		Minister's Tracking#: *(For Minister's office)*
NZDF File No.	NZDF 03130/DSC/2 NZDF Tracking #		
Priority:	ROUTINE	Request Ministerial response by:	
Contacts:	1. PSR(IC)3 2. PSR(IC)3		

Sheet not to exceed one page. Please complete shaded areas.

Purpose:	The purpose of this note is to inform you that HQ ISAF have initiated a Civilian Casualty Investigation stemming from the operation conducted by the ~~Afghan National Security Forces~~ and TF81 on Sunday 22 August 2010, in Baghlan province, Afghanistan.
Recommendations:	a. **Note** that their have been allegations made by the Governor of the TALA WA BARFAK district that civilians were wounded and killed in the operation conducted by Afghan National Security Forces and TF81 on Sunday 22 August 2010. b. **Note** that HQ ISAF have initiated an investigation into the allegations and appointed a Brigadier as the investigating officer. c. **Note** that the SNO and OC TF81 have been interviewed by the investigating officer. d. **Discuss** this note with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.
MOD/NZDF Consultation	NZDF
Minister's comments:	
Minister's Action:	Signed / Noted / Agreed / Approved / Declined Referred to:
Signature:	**Date:**

J MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Date

NZDF 03130/DSC/2

August 2010

Minister of Defence

OPERATION WĀTEA: HQ ISAF CIVILIAN CASUALTY INVESTIGATION ON OPERATION BURNHAM 22 AUGUST 2010

Purpose

1. The purpose of this note is to inform you that HQ ISAF have initiated a Civilian Casualty Investigation stemming from the operation conducted by the ~~Afghan National Security Forces~~ and TF81 on Sunday 22 August 2010, in Baghlan province, Afghanistan.

Background

2. ~~Afghan National Security Forces~~ (Crisis Response Unit) and TF81 conducted a disruption operation targeting the insurgent group operating within the Bamyan/Baghlan north east border region. This insurgent group conducted the recent fatal attack on the NZPRT patrol on 3 August 2010. During the operation a number of armed insurgents were engaged by the ground and air force and killed. Afghan citizens within the TALA WA BARFAK region have alleged that innocent civilians were killed during the operation and HQ ISAF has commenced an investigation into the allegations.

3. HQ ISAF has a policy of investigating all alleged civilian casualties as a result of operations conducted by coalition forces. A Brigadier has been tasked to lead the investigation into the allegations and he has already spoken to the Senior National Commander (SNO) and Officer Commanding (OC) TF81 on Tuesday evening. He then reviewed the gun tapes from the Apache helicopters and AC-130 Gunship that were involved in the operation to determine if they had adhered to coalition Rules of Engagement (ROE). Over the next two days he plans to travel to Baghlan and speak to the German Commander of Regional Command North, and to the Governor of Baghlan province in order to ascertain the veracity of the claims and gauge the atmospherics of the region. If security permits he will travel to the TALA WA BARFAK region to meet with the local Governor of the district.

4. The investigating officer complimented the SNO and OC for their thorough post operational assessment and for providing extensive, open and honest comment. He explained that the process is not a "witch-hunt", but is intended to ensure that the

coalition treats fairly any civilians casualties that were directly attributed to the operation conducted on ~~Sunday.~~ 22 August.

5. I will keep you ~~appraised as to~~ apprised of any developments and outcomes and would recommend that you discuss this with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

Recommendations

6. It is recommended that the Minister:

a. **Note** that there have been allegations made by ~~the~~ Sub Governor of the TALA WA BARFAK district that civilians were wounded and killed in the operation conducted by ~~Afghan National Security Forces and TF81~~ ISAF and ANSF (TF Blackhawk) on Sunday 22 August 2010.

b. **Note** that HQ ISAF have initiated an investigation into the allegations and appointed a Brigadier as the investigating officer.

c. **Note** that the SNO and OC TF81 have been interviewed by the investigating officer.

d. **Discuss** this note with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister.

J. MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

COVER SHEET

To accompany documents to

Minister of Defence

Subject:	**CRU AND NZSAS OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2010**		
MOD File No. **NZDF File No.**	MoD Tracking #. NZDF Tracking #		Minister's Tracking#: *(For Minister's office)*
Priority:	ROUTINE	Request Ministerial response by:	
Contacts:	1 PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 2	Tel:PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 Tel:	A/H:PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 A/H:

Sheet not to exceed one page. Please complete shaded areas.

Purpose:	The purpose of this note is to provide releasable information to the Prime Minister of the operations conducted by the Crisis Response Unit (CRU) and NZSAS Task Force in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan on 22 August and 03 October 2010.
Recommendations:	**Note** the risks associated with releasing the information. **Refer** this note to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs for public release.
MOD/NZDF Consultation	NZDF
Minister's comments:	
Minister's Action:	Signed / Noted / Agreed / Approved / Declined Referred to:
Signature:	**Date:**

J MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Date

CRU AND NZSAS OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND OCTOBER 2010

1. On 3 August 2010, a daytime NZPRT Patrol led by Lt O'Donnell was ambushed in the North Eastern region of Bamian province by an insurgent group that had an active history of targeting Afghan National Security and coalition forces within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. This insurgent group was based in the neighbouring province of Baghlan, centred on the Talewa Berfak district (approx 20km away).

2. Following this attack, the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) Crisis Response Unit (CRU) supported by the NZSAS Task Force and other ISAF coalition partners, commenced planning to disrupt this insurgent groups capacity and capability to target coalition forces, including the NZPRT within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. ~~The mission~~ was launched on the night 21 August ~~and was approved by~~ the MOI and Commander ISAF. The MOI issued Arrest Warrants for the two principal insurgent commanders and these were to be enforced by the members of the CRU.

The CDF planned the operation and it

after gaining additional approval from

The force for the operation consisted of a

3. ~~The~~ combined ground force ~~comprising~~ PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2 CRU personnel, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 NZSAS personnel supported by coalition helicopters and ~~aircraft~~ fixed wing a/c including UAV landed at 00.30am on Sunday 22 August. The force was on the ground for approximately three hours and during that time a large number of armed insurgents, operating in small groups attempted to outflank the force and fire on them from high ground. The armed insurgents were engaged by coalition helicopters and aircraft. The ground force searched three buildings and destroyed a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives, but did not locate the two insurgent leaders. The ground force departed at approx 3.30am. During the operation nine armed insurgents were killed by the coalition helicopters and aircraft and one NZSAS soldier was wounded when a wall collapsed on him and he was evacuated and subsequently returned to NZ for further medical treatment.

4. Following the operation allegations were made that up to twenty (20) civilians had been killed by aerial bombardment and twenty (20) houses destroyed by fire[1]. Based on these allegations a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defence and ISAF officials conducted a full assessment of the operation. The assessment team visited the provincial and district capitals, the hospital where the alleged casualties were receiving treatment, viewed the gun tapes from the coalition aircraft and spoke to NZSAS personnel. As a result of their investigation the assessment team concluded that "having reviewed the evidence there is no way that civilian casualties could have occurred" and the actions of the ground force and coalition air were cleared of all allegations. .

5. Headquarters ISAF assess that as a result of this operation the insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations had been disrupted. A follow-on operation was conducted on the night of 2 October, but passed without incident with no insurgents encountered nor any shots fired.

Risk Associated with Releasing Information

6. The most obvious risk is posed from the Talewa Berfak insurgent group and others operating within the Baghlan province, who still possess an ability to target the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and NZPRT operating within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. These groups have recently been reported making threats to target ANSF, coalition forces and the NZPRT. Up to this point in time, no ISAF coalition member has been singled out and identified as participating in the operations of 22 August and 3 October. If New Zealand is identified as the main coalition force on these operations, then there is the potential that the insurgent groups will be more determined in their actions to target the NZPRT along similar lines to their attack on 3 August 2010.

7. **Risk Mitigation.** As a result of the ambush on 3 August and recent threats by these insurgent groups, the NZDF and NZPRT have taken active measures to increase their force protection when operating in this border region.

Note:

1. During the operation two of the three buildings searched caught fire, the first was caused by explosives igniting the structure and the second was caused by an unattended cooking fire left burning when the local inhabitants departed.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE/NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

COVER SHEET

To accompany documents to

Minister of Defence

Subject:	**NZSAS (TF81) OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER 2010**		
MOD File No.:	MoD Tracking #.	Minister's Tracking#: *(For Minister's office)*	
NZDF File No.:	NZDF 3130/DSO/4 NZDF Tracking #		
Priority:	ROUTINE	Request Ministerial response by:	
Contacts:	1 PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 2	Tel: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 Tel:	A/H: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 A/H:

Sheet not to exceed one page. Please complete shaded areas.

Purpose:	The purpose of this note is to inform the Prime Minister of the operations conducted by the NZSAS Task Force and Crisis Response Unit (CRU) in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan on 22 August and 03 October 2010.
Recommendations:	**Note** that the intelligence concluded that the insurgent group responsible for the ambush of the NZPRT patrol on 3 August 2010, was commanded and comprised of personnel from the village of Tigiran, located within the adjacent province of Baghlan. **Note** that the Response Task Force comprising CRU and NZSAS personnel and supported by PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 , ISAF ISR assets and coalition air targeted the insurgent group located within the village of Tigiran on 22 August and 3 October 2010. **Note** that ISAF has determined that the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations has been severely disrupted as a result of the operations. **Note** that the allegations into civilian casualties and destroyed houses were investigated by a joint assessment team and they concluded that the allegations were baseless and cleared the actions of the Response Task Force and coalition air of all allegations. **Refer** this note to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
MOD/NZDF Consultation:	NZDF
Minister's comments:	
Minister's Action:	Signed / Noted / Agreed / Approved / Declined Referred to:
Signature:	**Date:**

J MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

Date

3130/DSO/4

December 2010

Minister of Defence

NZSAS (TF81) OPERATIONS IN BAGHLAN PROVINCE AUGUST AND OCTOBER 2010

Purpose

1. The purpose of this note is to inform the Prime Minister of the operations conducted by the NZSAS Task Force and Crisis Response Unit (CRU) in Baghlan Province, Afghanistan on 22 August and 03 October 2010.

Background

2. On 3 August 2010, a daytime NZPRT Patrol led by Lt O'Donnell was ambushed in the North Eastern region of Bamian province by an insurgent group, which operated from the Talewa Berfak district of Baghlan province, approximately 20km away.

3. As a direct result of this insurgent activity, the NZSAS Task Force supported by embedded PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 and ISAF Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, commenced active intelligence gathering on this insurgent group. The intelligence gathered over a two week period established that the insurgent group's leadership and base of operations was centred on the village of Tigiran, within the Talewa Berfak district of Baghlan. Commander ISAF, General Petraeus, approved the designation of the two principal insurgent commanders of this group as "medium value targets" and their names were added to the ISAF Joint Prioritisation Effects List (JPEL)[1].

4. From the intelligence provided the CRU, supported by the NZSAS, developed an operation plan targeting the insurgent leadership which was approved by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Commander ISAF to disrupt the insurgent operations centred on Tigiran village. The operation was conducted on the night and early morning of 21/22 August, and a follow-on operation was conducted on the night 2/3 October.

[1] PSR(S)1

Outcome: Operation One 21/22 August 2010

5. The intent of the combined CRU/NZSAS Response Task Force (RTF) operation was to disrupt the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to target coalition forces, including the NZPRT within the Baghlan-Bamian border region. Prior to the launch of the operation the Ministry of Interior Criminal Investigations Division issued two Arrest Warrants for the two principal insurgent commanders and these were to be enforced by the members of the CRU participating in the operation.

6. The combined RTF comprising PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 CRU personnel, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 NZSAS personnel, and supported by ISAF ISR assets, and coalition air support from helicopters and planes operated in the vicinity of Tigiran village. The RTF landed near the village at 0030 hours on Sunday 22 August. The RTF was on the ground for approximately three hours and in that time sustained one casualty (PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 – please protect). Coalition air support and the RTF engaged a number of insurgents throughout the operation and it is estimated that up to nine insurgents were killed by the coalition air support. The RTF searched three buildings and destroyed a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives. During the operation two of the three buildings searched caught fire, the first was caused by explosives igniting the structure and the second was caused by an unattended cooking fire left burning when the inhabitants departed.

7. Following the operation Afghan citizens from the Talewa Berfak district alleged that up to twenty (20) civilians had been killed by aerial bombardment and twenty (20) houses destroyed by fire. Based on these allegations and reported in the New York Times, a joint assessment team composed of representatives from the Afghan Ministries of Interior and Defence and ISAF officials conducted a full assessment of the operation. The assessment team visited the provincial and district capitals, the hospital where the alleged casualties were receiving treatment, viewed the gun tapes from the coalition air assets and spoke to the NZSAS personnel. As a result of their investigation, the joint assessment team concluded that the allegations were baseless and categorically cleared the actions of the RTF and coalition air of all allegations. The assessment concluded that "having reviewed the evidence there is no way that civilian casualties could have occurred". The joint assessment team's report has not been released beyond Headquarters ISAF and our knowledge of the findings are based on the comments provided by the NZSAS Task Force commander, who was permitted to read the report.

8. Furthermore, Headquarters ISAF has determined that the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations has been severely disrupted as a result of the operation, with nine insurgents killed, a quantity of weapons, ammunition and explosives destroyed and the two insurgent commanders reported to have moved to safer areas, including Pakistan and more remote areas of Baghlan province.

Outcome: Operation Two 2/3 October 2010

9. Following on from the successful operation of 22 August, further intelligence reported that the principal insurgent commander had returned to Tigiran village and was located at his house. The RTF then commenced planning for a follow-on operation based on this new intelligence; this was approved by the Ministry of Interior and Headquarters ISAF. The operation was conducted in a similar style to the previous mission, but utilised different landing and recovery zones. The Task Force comprised PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 CRU personnel, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 NZSAS personnel, and was supported by ISAF ISR assets, and coalition air helicopters and planes. Upon landing the Task Force quickly secured the target building and searched the premises, but no Afghans were present and the force extracted from the area without incident.

10. Headquarters ISAF assess that this operation had a further disrupting effect on the insurgent group, notwithstanding the fact that the insurgent commander was not detained by the CRU.

Recommendations

11. It is recommended that the Minister:

a. **Note** that the intelligence concluded that the insurgent group responsible for the ambush of the NZPRT patrol on 3 August 2010, was commanded and comprised of personnel from the village of Tigiran located within the adjacent province of Baghlan.

b. **Note** that the Response Task Force comprising CRU and NZSAS personnel and supported by PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 ISAF ISR assets and coalition air targeted the insurgent group located within the village of Tigiran on 22 August and 3 October 2010.

c. **Note** that ISAF has determined that the Tigiran based insurgent group's capacity and capability to conduct further operations has been severely disrupted as a result of the operations.

d. **Note** that the allegations into civilian casualties and destroyed houses were investigated by a joint assessment team and they concluded that the allegations were baseless and cleared the actions of the Response Task Force and coalition air of all allegations.

e. **Refer** this note to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

J. MATEPARAE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force

From NZSAS SNO at the time...

..." Firstly yesterday I put you wrong in that I stated an Investigation was being conducted. In fact what has been occurring has been an IAT (Initial Assessment Team) has been convened to look at the operation and decide if an investigation into a CIVCAS incident needs to occur. Yesterday the IAT interviewed the District Governor of TWB.

PSR(S)1, PSR(R)1, PSR(IC)4

Reference to content of partner-controlled video of operation.

PSR(S)1, PSR(IC)4

This is good news. It has to date verified that our actions were correct and in accordance with the threat presented. This will likely be looked at by IJC from two fronts. Actions by the ground force, (no problems I can see) and actions by the Airborne force. There is no indication at this stage on the evidence presented to the IAT that there was anything other than the correct application of force to a clear and present INS threat, and that any CIVCAS caused by the AWT would be collateral and unintended. This point is still to be verified"...

Pages 13-15 of this document are an annotated copy of the IAT Executive Summary. This report has not been approved for public release so is therefore withheld from this bundle.

Pages 13-15 of this document are an annotated copy of the IAT Executive Summary. This report has not been approved for public release so is therefore withheld from this bundle.

Pages 13-15 of this document are an annotated copy of the IAT Executive Summary. This report has not been approved for public release so is therefore withheld from this bundle.