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NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN

Kiwi Base, Bamyan Airfield, Bamyan, AFGHANISTAN Telephone: +PSR(IC)3, PSR(Sen)1 Email:PSR(Sen)1, PSR(IC)3 (Unclas)

NZPRT 2050-1-1

29 June 2009

NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 165 /09 Period: 281830DJUN09 – 291830DJUN09

Executive Summary

KAPISA: INS elm re-using IED emplacement sites

KAHMARD: IED strike IVO TANGY MOIK

SHIBAR: PSR(Sen)1 reportedly holds meeting in GHANDAK


Area of Interest

- 1. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) KAPISA. PSR(S)1 reporting indicates that INS may be using previous IED sites for attacks on ANSF/CF elm. PSR(S)1 reported that an IED was placed along PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 (IVO 42S WD 58058 70695) IVO a previous IED site. In a separate incident, three unidentified males were seen emplacing an IED near a bridge, IVO ANARJOY village (42S WD 601 573). An IED was detonated previously on the opposite side of the bridge, killing CF pers.
- 2. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) NZPRT S2 COMMENT. INS have allegedly re-used IED sites (same hole, crater) some as little as 24hrs old. This can lull CF into a false sense of security thinking yesterdays IED crater is cleared. In BAMYAN INS have favoured old MUJAHADEEN positions and emplaced IED in the same areas but not yet the same actual site. It is possible that INS in BAMYAN will reuse recent IED sites in the KAHMARD and SHIBAR areas. END COMMENT.

Area of Operation

3. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) KAHMARD. At 28 2115L Jun 09, an NZPRT patrol moving west, along PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 struck an IED IVO TANGY MOIK (42S VE 03478 04396). The IED detonated approximately 20m in front of the second vehicle in the convoy, on the left side of the road, with no casualties reported. After clearing the immediate area of all suspicious individuals, NZPRT elm withdrew to secure position at DO ABE substation (GR 42S VE 08812 02254).

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- 4. (S//REL-ISAF, NATO) On 2 Jun 09, an NDS source stated that PSR(sen)1 and Mulawi NEMATULLAH were recruiting people to conduct IED attacks IVO SANGPAR (GR 42S VD 0962 9017), SHIBAR district and DO ABE (GR 42S VE 098 028). The use of television parts was also mentioned in the construction of IED.
- 5. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) NZPRT S2 COMMENT. NDS and ANP believe there are three groups responsible for conducting attacks between ISH PESTA and SHIBAR. While it cannot be confirmed that these groups are responsible for the IEDs in DO ABE within the last week,² it cannot be discounted. It is possible that this device was designed to isolate a CF C/S in preparation for a possible attack with small arms.
- 6. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) It is assessed the IED was either CW or RC initiated. PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

At this stage however, there is no further evidence to support this. The search and questioning of people in the area at the time of the attack drew no further information.

¹ Refer NZPRT BAMYAN INTSUM 139 09

² Refer NZPRT INTREP 17-09

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7. (S//REL-ISAF, NATO) Further reporting has indicated that

Mulawi NEMATULLAH⁴ recently entered BAMYAN from TALA-WA BARFEK. They allegedly arrived in the TANGY MOIK area 2 days ago with 7 others pers. These include PSR(Sen)1, and two sons of PSR(Sen)1 is linked to PSR(Sen)1 and other TB INS and possibly PSR(Sen)1. At this stage, these pers are likely behind this IED attack and may also be linked to the recent attacks in DO ABE. Reporting indicates that these pers may be moving and operating armed with AK-47 and with 7-15 pers. END COMMENT.

- 8. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) SHIBAR. On 28 Jun 09, NZPRT elm met with HoS GHANDAK valley, Commander PSR(Sen)1 stated that on 15 Jun 09 there was a meeting with alleged TB representative PSR(Sen)1 and other Mullahs in GHANDAK village. PSR(Sen)1 was accompanied by an unidentified individual from KAHMARD. PSR(Sen)1 had no knowledge of what the agenda of this meeting was.
- 9. (S//REL_ISAF, NATO) On 29 Jun 09, there were reports of KAHMARD mullahs holding a meeting within BAMIAN (NFI).
- 10. (S//REL_ISAF, NATO) NZPRT S2 COMMENT. While it is unconfirmed what the intention of the meeting was, PSR(Sen)1 reportedly has ties within GHANDAK. The possibility of TB elm using the area to plan operations cannot be discounted. END COMMENT.

DRAFTED BY:

PSR(Sen)1, PSR(IC)3

RELEASED BY:

PSR(Sen)1, PSR(IC)3

INTELLIGENCE OPERATOR

S2

Distribution:

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1

List of NZ and partner entities INTSUM was distributed to

³PSR(Sen)1 & Mulawi NEMATULLAH reportedly has TB affiliations and has been reported on by the HUNGARIAN PRT

⁴PSR(Sen)1 & Mulawi NEMATULLAH reportedly has TB affiliations and has been reported on by the HUNGARIAN PRT

⁵ PSR(Sen)1 has been reporting to NZPRT elm and seems very pro-PRT.

⁶PSR(Sen)1 has reported TALIBAN affiliations and allegedly sells weapons on their behalf.

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PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1

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