



Cabinet

CAB (09) 439

Copy No: []

Summary of Paper

7 August 2009

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Review of New Zealand's Commitment to Afghanistan

Portfolios	Foreign Affairs / Defence
Purpose	This paper reports on the outcomes of the review of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan, and seeks agreement to change the shape of New Zealand's engagement there.
Previous Consideration	In February 2009, Cabinet agreed to continue New Zealand's security effort in Afghanistan for one year from 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010, and that New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan beyond September 2010 be reviewed and reported to relevant Ministers by mid-2009 [CAB Min (09) 5/3A].
Summary	<p>New Zealand's participation in Afghanistan began in 2002, and has grown incrementally. It now has military, police, intelligence, and development assistance components. The largest element is the <u>140 person Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)</u> in Bamyan Province.</p> <p>The review was undertaken by an inter-agency group involving New Zealand agencies represented in Afghanistan, or with a direct interest in New Zealand's commitment there. The report on the <i>Review of New Zealand's Commitment to Afghanistan</i>, which contains 12 recommendations, is on pages 10-35.</p> <p>The report outlines an exit strategy for New Zealand from Afghanistan, which involves a phased transition from military engagement to a greater emphasis on development assistance (consistent with the revised international strategy). The report recommends a whole-of-government framework for implementation and oversight of the changes.</p> <p>Endorsement is sought of the strategy, which includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• continuing New Zealand's participation in the international mission in Afghanistan in the medium-term (up to five years). Bamyan Province will continue to be the principal focus of New Zealand's effort in Afghanistan; <p><u>Withdrawal from the PRT</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• extending the current mandate of New Zealand Defence Force elements in Afghanistan until September 2011, on the understanding that a military drawdown from the PRT will commence before the current mandate ends in September 2010, with a view to exiting the PRT no later than September 2011;• transferring the responsibility for security to the Afghan National Police, and commencing a process to identify a partner country to take over the lead responsibility for the PRT;

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- deploying other military capabilities to Afghanistan during and after withdrawal from the PRT to signal New Zealand's continuing commitment to the international strategy. The nature and timing of such deployments will take into account the benefits for key bilateral relationships;

Official Development Assistance focus

- progressively increasing New Zealand's Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocations to Afghanistan, with a greater emphasis on agriculture, and continuing high priority given to education and health;
- appointing a development advisor to the PRT to facilitate the realignment of the New Zealand effort towards development, and to help bring greater coherence and co-ordination to international assistance in Bamyan Province. The appointee might also serve concurrently as the PRT's civilian co-leader;

Representation in Afghanistan

- stationing a senior diplomat in Kabul for up to two years to manage the transition of the New Zealand effort at the political level;

Whole of government oversight and management

- oversight of the whole-of-government effort in Afghanistan by a group of Ministers with relevant portfolios, who will be supported by formal regular reporting.

The future of the New Zealand Police's deployment to Bamyan Province is currently under review by the Commissioner of Police.

Financial Implications

The operating costs for Vote Defence are appropriated to September 2010. The drawdown of the PRT is expected to reduce the existing costs of the deployment in 2009/10 and 2010/11.

The indicative cost of extending the PRT and related commitments through to September 2011 is between \$30 to \$35 million. An appropriation will be sought for the period from September 2010 to September 2011 in a later paper.

The estimated cost of the development advisor (\$0.157 million in 2009/10 and \$0.628 million over the next two financial years) will be met from within the existing baseline of either Vote Foreign Affairs and Trade or Vote ODA.

The estimated cost of the senior officer stationed at Kabul (\$0.445 million in 2009/10 and \$0.891 million in 2010/11) will be met from within existing Vote Foreign Affairs and Trade baselines.

Legislative Implications

None.

Timing Issues

The mandate of the New Zealand PRT in Afghanistan runs until 30 September 2010. It is proposed that a military drawdown commence in September 2009, and conclude by September 2011.

Announcement

The paper indicates that appropriate publicity will be given to the decisions that are made in relation to New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan.

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- Consultation** Paper prepared by MFAT, NZAID, Defence, NZDF, Police, DPMC, NZSIS, GCSB, EAB, and Treasury were consulted.
- The Prime Minister has been consulted. The Minister of Foreign Affairs indicates that there will be discussion with the government caucus, but not with other parties represented in Parliament.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence recommend that Cabinet:

Background

- 1 note that in February 2009, Cabinet:
- 1.1 agreed to continue New Zealand's current security effort in Afghanistan for one year from 1 October 2009 until 30 September 2010;
 - 1.2 agreed that a review of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan beyond September 2010 be undertaken to examine more deeply the needs and opportunities for change, taking account of:
 - 1.2.1 developments in Bamiyan Province and other parts of Afghanistan;
 - 1.2.2 moves towards Afghanistan and the re-balancing of military and non-military effort by other international contributors;
 - 1.2.3 the policies of the new United States (US) Administration and its expectations of partners;
 - 1.2.4 addressing options for smaller, more focussed military contributions beyond the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) commitment, and international benefits derived from ongoing engagement;
 - 1.3 noted that the findings of the review, including the financial implications of recommended options, would be reported to relevant Ministers by mid-2009;

[CAB Min (09) 5/3A]

Report on Review of New Zealand's Commitment to Afghanistan

- 2 note the report on the *Review of New Zealand's Commitment to Afghanistan*, attached to the paper under CAB (09) 439;
- 3 note that the threat to international peace and security that justified New Zealand's original commitment to Afghanistan has not been neutralised;
- 4 note that the report sets the direction of a strategic shift in New Zealand's engagement with Afghanistan, and a framework for implementation and oversight of the changes;
- 5 note that this strategy involves continuing New Zealand's participation in the international mission in Afghanistan in the medium term (up to five years);

- 6 note that, consistent with the new international strategy for Afghanistan, New Zealand's efforts during the medium term will be refocused away from military engagement, and towards development and governance assistance, with the concept of operations of the Bamyan PRT amended to facilitate the transfer of lead responsibility for security in Bamyan Province to the Afghan National Police;
- 7 endorse the strategy outlined in paragraphs 3 to 6 above;

New Zealand contribution to the Provincial Reconstruction Team

- 8 8.1 agree that the drawdown of the PRT begin before the current mandate ends in September 2010;
- 8.2 direct officials to develop a roadmap for exiting the PRT no later than September 2011 (including the financial implications of the proposals), and report to the Cabinet External Relations and Defence Committee by late 2009;
- 9 agree in principle, subject to the report referred to in recommendation 8.2 above, to the extension of the current mandate of all New Zealand Defence Force elements in Afghanistan until September 2011, on the understanding that drawdowns will occur with each PRT rotation from September 2009;
- 10 agree that a process to identify a partner country to take over lead responsibility for the PRT as New Zealand draws down be conducted expeditiously;
- 11 agree that other military capabilities should be deployed to Afghanistan from time to time during and after withdrawal from the PRT to signal New Zealand's continuing commitment to the international strategy, with the nature and timing of such deployments be determined to maximise the benefits for key bilateral relationships, especially the US and Australia;
- 12 note in this context the separate, but related, proposal to deploy the New Zealand Special Air Service Group to Afghanistan in the near future;

Official Development Assistance focus

- 13 agree that Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocations to Afghanistan be progressively increased, with a greater emphasis on agriculture, and continuing high priority given to education and health;
- 14 note that an ODA programming mission being undertaken later in 2009 will develop specific and costed proposals for the future;
- 15 agree that Bamyan Province be the focus of New Zealand's development assistance;
- 16 note that the future of the New Zealand Police's deployment to Bamyan Province is currently under review by the Commissioner of Police;
- 17 17.1 agree that, to facilitate the realignment of the New Zealand effort towards development, and to help bring greater coherence and co-ordination to international assistance to Bamyan Province, a development advisor be appointed to the PRT;

- 17.2 note that the estimated cost of appointing a development advisor is \$0.157 million in 2009/10, and \$0.628 million over the next two financial years, and will be met from within the existing baseline of either Vote Foreign Affairs and Trade or Vote ODA, depending on the precise definition of the role;
- 18 note that a suitably qualified appointee to the development advisor position might also serve concurrently as the civilian co-leader of the PRT to symbolise the change of focus, and to align New Zealand with the practice in other PRTs;

Representation in Afghanistan

- 19 19.1 agree that, for up to two years, the diplomatic accreditation to Afghanistan be transferred from Tehran, Iran to an officer stationed in Kabul, who will co-ordinate and manage at the political level the reorientation of New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan;
- 19.2 note that the cost of the officer stationed in Kabul will be \$0.445 million in 2009/10 and \$0.891 million in 2010/11, and will be met from within the existing baselines of Vote Foreign Affairs and Trade;

Whole of government oversight and management

- 20 agree that the whole of government effort in Afghanistan be overseen by a group of Ministers with relevant portfolios who will receive regular and formal reporting on progress toward the achievement of New Zealand's objectives for future engagement with Afghanistan.

Saphron Powell
for Secretary of the Cabinet

Distribution:
The Cabinet

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Chair,
Cabinet

REVIEW OF NEW ZEALAND'S COMMITMENT TO AFGHANISTAN

Proposal

This paper reports the outcomes of the review of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan and makes recommendations to change the shape of our engagement after September 2010, when the current mandate of the Provincial Reconstruction Team expires, by reducing the military profile, adjusting our diplomatic representation, and increasing development assistance.

Executive Summary

2 In February 2009, when renewing the mandate of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Afghanistan's Bamyán Province until September 2010, Cabinet directed that a review be undertaken of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan beyond that date [CAB Min (09) 5/3a]. New Zealand participation in the international effort to promote security, good governance and development in Afghanistan began with a Special Air Service (SAS) deployment in 2002 and grew incrementally in response to circumstances. It now has military, police, intelligence and development assistance components. The largest element is the 140 person PRT in Bamyán Province, which the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has led and manned since 2003.

3 The review was an inter-agency process involving New Zealand Government agencies represented in Afghanistan or with a direct interest in the New Zealand commitment. The review report, attached as an annex to this paper, recommends an exit strategy which involves a phased transition from military engagement to a greater emphasis on development assistance, within which agriculture, education and health will have highest priority. This approach is consistent with the revised international strategy adopted following the Obama Administration's review of US policy towards Afghanistan. The military drawdown will be effected by changing the focus of the PRT towards the transfer of lead responsibility for security to the Afghan National Police with a view to a New Zealand exit from the PRT no later than September 2011. PSR(R)1

■ New Zealand is likely to have to find a coalition partner to take over the PRT progressively as the NZDF draws down.

4 While this drawdown is proceeding, other military resources may be deployed to Afghanistan from time to time to demonstrate that exit from the PRT is

not the end of New Zealand participation in the international effort. The shift to a greater development focus will be reinforced by the appointment of a senior development adviser to the PRT. To manage the transition of the New Zealand effort at the political level in Afghanistan, it is proposed to station a senior diplomat in Kabul for a finite period as coverage from the embassy in Tehran is not sufficient for the more intensive engagement with the Afghan authorities, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and coalition partners that is envisaged.

5 The review also recommends that Ministerial oversight should be strengthened, and supported by formal reporting on a whole of government basis on progress towards achievement of New Zealand's objectives under this strategy.

Background

6 In February 2009, when extending the mandate of the New Zealand PRT in Afghanistan for a further year until 30 September 2010, Cabinet agreed that "a review of New Zealand's commitment to Afghanistan beyond September 2010 be undertaken to examine more deeply the needs and opportunities for change, taking account of: developments in Bamiyan Province and other parts of Afghanistan; moves towards Afghanisation and the re-balancing of military and non-military effort by other international contributors; the policies of the new US Administration and its expectations of partners; and addressing options for smaller, more focussed military contributions beyond the PRT commitment, and international benefits from on-going engagement." [CAB Min (09) 5/3a]

7 The review was undertaken by an inter-agency group from New Zealand Government agencies represented in Afghanistan or with a direct interest in the New Zealand commitment there. It drew on diplomatic reporting; reviews conducted for NZAID, New Zealand Police and the NZDF on their activities in Afghanistan; and reports by UN agencies, NATO and governmental and non-governmental bodies, including think-tanks, in countries participating in the international coalition in Afghanistan. Some information has been provided in response to specific requests to other governments.

8 The review report is attached as an annex to this paper. The first seven pages provide background information. Subsequent sections address the future of New Zealand's commitment. We have broadly endorsed the findings of the report, but propose some different emphases.

9 The principal findings and recommendations of the report, as modified by Ministers, are:

- New Zealand needs an improved whole of government framework for the next stage of its engagement in Afghanistan which is predicated on a phased transition to exit from the military commitment. Ministers expect the drawdown from the PRT to begin before the current mandate expires in

September 2010 with recommendations available by then, including financial implications, for a road-map to exit by September 2011, which would be two years from this review and the end of the 18th NZDF rotation to the PRT;

- The whole of government framework should be based on a shared objective from which each New Zealand agency can derive objectives and strategies specific to its mission, with benchmarks against which to evaluate progress at regular intervals;
- Ministerial oversight should be strengthened, and supported by formal reporting on a whole of government basis;
- New Zealand should continue to participate in the international mission in Afghanistan in the medium term. The threat to international peace and security that led to the original commitment in Afghanistan has not been neutralised. This is why Cabinet is being invited to approve another deployment to Afghanistan by the SAS. The principal focus of New Zealand's effort should continue to be Bamyan Province, where New Zealand leads the PRT;
- New Zealand's efforts in Afghanistan should be aligned to the new policy settings which have emerged from recent international conferences on Afghanistan and from the Obama Administration's review of United States policy. In particular, the concept of operations for the PRT should be re-oriented towards building the capacity of the Afghan National Police (ANP) to facilitate an accelerated transfer of the lead security role in Bamyan to the ANP and a phased reduction of NZDF personnel. Since the weak capabilities of the ANP raise serious doubts about its readiness to take early responsibility for security, New Zealand is likely to have to find a coalition partner, to whom the running of the PRT can be transferred progressively as the NZDF draws down. Identifying a suitable partner should be a high priority;
- The re-alignment of New Zealand's effort should include a greater emphasis on development assistance and promoting good governance. The development assistance component should focus more on agriculture, with health and education continuing to receive significant funding allocations. To facilitate this re-alignment, and to bring more coordination and coherence to support for the Bamyan Provincial Government, a development advisor should be appointed to the PRT. A suitably-qualified appointee to this position might serve concurrently as civilian co-leader of the PRT to emphasise the change of focus;
- For a finite period, the diplomatic accreditation to Afghanistan should be transferred from Tehran to an officer stationed in Kabul to coordinate and manage at the political level the transition of the New Zealand effort in Afghanistan. Cross-accreditation from Tehran is not sufficient for the more

intensive engagement with the Afghan authorities, ISAF, UNAMA and coalition partners that is envisaged during the transition. Ideally, this officer will be co-located in the embassy of a friendly country; and

- Options for smaller, focussed military contributions in Afghanistan should be kept under review, taking into account other commitments, force sustainability issues, conditions in Afghanistan, and foreign policy considerations. Opportunities to work more closely with Australia should be among the factors weighed when considering other military options.

Comment

10 Although it does not say so very explicitly, the review report outlines a New Zealand exit strategy from Afghanistan. New Zealand has been involved there since 2002, but our engagement has expanded piece-meal in response to circumstances, rather than within a time-bound strategy which had clear objectives. The review report sets the direction of a strategic shift in our engagement with Afghanistan and provides a framework for implementation and oversight of the changes.

11 New Zealand has made a significant contribution for a country with limited military resources located far from Afghanistan. In addition to leading and manning the Bamyán PRT since 2003, we have deployed the SAS three times, assigned military staff and liaison officers to the headquarters of ISAF and UNAMA; provided navy frigates in counter-terrorist operations in the Gulf, and P3 Orions and Hercules aircraft in support roles. A number of medical, communications, logistics and intelligence specialists have also served in Afghanistan, along with New Zealand Police and army trainers. Development assistance has increased from \$1.5 million in FY 2005/06, when a three year programme was first approved, to more than \$9 million in the current financial year.

12 The sustained New Zealand commitment and the quality of our contributions have been acknowledged by coalition partners, especially the United States. We could reasonably argue that New Zealand has "done its bit" for Afghanistan, and that the NZDF needs to re-focus on important training, refreshment and re-equipment tasks that have been displaced by a sustained high tempo of off-shore operations in Afghanistan, Solomon Islands and Timor Leste.

13 But a precipitate withdrawal from Afghanistan is not in our interests for the following reasons:

- the threat to international peace and security from terrorists based in Afghanistan has not been neutralised. The recent bombing in Jakarta was conducted by people inspired by Afghan-based terrorists (and the perpetrators of some of Indonesia's earlier bombings were trained in

Afghanistan). We have a national interest in contributing to the international effort to deny terrorists a base in Afghanistan;

- a new US strategy, which has been endorsed by coalition partners, is being implemented. It involves a short-term increase in military resources to conduct more assertive operations against the insurgents, and significantly increased efforts in development and governance under civilian leadership. The objective of the enhanced military effort is to provide a platform for improved security, from which Afghan military and police forces can play a larger security role;
- announcing withdrawal at a time when the international effort is being re-focused and resources for Afghanistan increased would send a negative signal to the Government of Afghanistan, its allies and partners about our confidence in the revised international strategy and provide a propaganda asset to the insurgents;
- the general belief among coalition partners that the next year may be pivotal for the international effort reinforces the need to avoid sending such a signal; and
- New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan has played an important part in the improvement of the bilateral relationship with the United States. Careful management of our exit from Afghanistan will be essential if these gains are not to be eroded. The presentation of the outcomes of the review should highlight the change of mission which aligns New Zealand with the new international strategy, rather than the intention to reduce New Zealand's investment.

14 Although the review report outlines an exit strategy, it is not possible at present to determine every step along the exit path. This is particularly true for the NZDF role in the PRT, where other partners will have to be consulted and arrangements made to continue the functions currently performed by New Zealand. This implies a phased exit from the PRT with a range of phasing options to be investigated, with a particular focus on identifying a suitable third party to progressively assume leadership of the PRT by September 2011.

15 As part of the exit strategy, contributions of other military capabilities may be made from time to time to counter the impression that withdrawal from the PRT means an end to New Zealand's commitment. The proposed SAS deployment, which is separately before Cabinet, will have this demonstration effect, quite apart from the purely military justifications for it. These future military contributions, which will be subject to other commitments, force sustainability, and conditions in Afghanistan, should be timed to maximise the benefits for key bilateral relationships.

16 The strategy envisages increases in the New Zealand development assistance effort, where possible with an identifiable New Zealand character. An

NZAID mission is planned for October 2009 to begin re-shaping the Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme. Representatives of other agencies may join the October mission if it suits their planning purposes. The Police Commissioner has just visited Afghanistan to review the Police deployment in Bamyan and consider its future. By the end of the year, these visits and other work by the New Zealand Government agencies involved in Afghanistan should produce a more detailed picture of New Zealand's future engagement within the broad parameters set by the review report.

Consultation

17 The following agencies have been consulted during the preparation of this submission: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (including NZAID); Ministry of Defence; New Zealand Defence Force; New Zealand Police; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; External Assessments Bureau; New Zealand Security Intelligence Service; and the Government Communications Security Bureau, and the Treasury.

Financial Implications

18 There are no additional deployments of personnel or baseline increases proposed in this Cabinet paper within the current mandate. For Vote Defence Force, operating costs are fully appropriated through to September 2010. The drawdown of the PRT beginning with the rotation due in September 2009 is expected to reduce the existing costs of the deployment during the financial years 2009/10 and 2010/11. Any reduction to the existing annual appropriations for the Departmental Output Expense: Operationally Deployed Forces as a result of early drawdown between now and September 2010 would be managed by Joint Ministers through a baseline exercise. Indicative costs of extending the PRT and related commitments through to the proposed date of withdrawal in September 2011 are \$30-35 million. Subsequent papers will address the detailed path to extraction, assess the actual costs, and seek appropriation for the period from September 2010 to September 2011. In the interim, indicative deployment costs will be disclosed as a specific fiscal risk. The proposed expenditures beyond September 2010 for Vote Foreign Affairs and Trade and Vote Official Development Assistance can be accommodated within existing baselines.

Human Rights Implications, Legislative Implications, Regulatory Impact and Business Compliance Cost Statement

19 This paper has no inconsistencies with the Human Rights Act 1993. There are no legislative implications or regulatory impacts arising from the recommendations in this submission.

Publicity

- 20 Appropriate publicity will be given to the decisions taken by Cabinet.

Recommendations

- 21 The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence recommend that Cabinet:
- 1 note the report on the Review of New Zealand's Commitment to Afghanistan;
 - 2 note that the threat to international peace and security that justified New Zealand's original commitment has not been neutralised;
 - 3 note that the report sets the direction of a strategic shift in New Zealand's engagement with Afghanistan and a framework for implementation and oversight of the changes;
 - 4 note that this strategy involves continuing New Zealand participation in the international mission in Afghanistan in the medium term (up to five years);
 - 5 note that, consistent with the new international strategy for Afghanistan, New Zealand's efforts during this period will be re-focussed away from military engagement and towards development and governance assistance, with the concept of operations of the Bamyán Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) amended to facilitate the transfer of lead responsibility of security in Bamyán Province to the Afghan National Police (ANP);
 - 6 endorse the strategy outlined in recommendations 3 to 5;
 - 7 agree that the drawdown of the PRT should begin before the current mandate ends in September 2010, with recommendations available by late 2009, including financial implications, for a road-map to exit no later than September 2011;
 - 8 agree in principle, for planning purposes and subject to recommendation 7 above, to the extension of the current mandate of all NZDF elements in Afghanistan until September 2011 on the understanding that drawdowns will occur with each PRT rotation from September 2009;
 - 9 agree that a process to identify a partner country to take over lead responsibility for the PRT as New Zealand draws down should be conducted expeditiously;

- 10 agree that other military capabilities should be deployed to Afghanistan from time to time during and after withdrawal from the PRT to signal New Zealand's continuing commitment to the international strategy, the nature and timing of such deployments to be determined to maximise the benefits for key bilateral relationships, especially the United States and Australia;
- 11 note in this context the separate but related proposal to deploy the SAS to Afghanistan in the near future;
- 12 agree that Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocations to Afghanistan should be progressively increased, with a greater emphasis on agriculture and continuing high priority to education and health;
- 13 note that an ODA programming mission later this year will develop specific and costed proposals for the future;
- 14 agree that Bamyan Province should be the focus of New Zealand's development assistance;
- 15 note that the future of New Zealand Police involvement in training is currently under review by the Commissioner of Police;
- 16 agree that, to facilitate the re-alignment of the New Zealand effort towards development and to help bring greater coherence and coordination to international assistance to Bamyan Province, a development advisor should be appointed to the Provincial Reconstruction Team, at an estimated cost of \$0.157million in FY09/10 and \$0.628 million in the next two financial years, to be met from within existing baseline of Vote: Foreign Affairs and Trade or Vote:ODA, depending on the precise definition of the role;
- 17 note that a suitably qualified appointee to the development advisor position might serve concurrently as civilian co-leader of the Provincial Reconstruction Team to symbolise the change of focus and to align New Zealand with practice in other Provincial Reconstruction teams;
- 18 agree that, for up to two years, the diplomatic accreditation to Afghanistan should be transferred from Tehran to an officer stationed in Kabul, who would coordinate and manage at the political level the reorientation of New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan, at a cost of \$0.445 million in FY 09/10 and \$0.891 million in FY 2010/11, to be met from within existing baseline of Vote: Foreign Affairs and Trade; and


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19 agree that the whole of government effort in Afghanistan should be overseen by a group of Ministers with relevant portfolios who should receive regular and formal reporting on progress toward the achievement of New Zealand's objectives for future engagement with Afghanistan.



Hon Murray McCully
Minister of Foreign Affairs

4 AUG 2009



Hon Wayne Mapp
Minister of Defence

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Review of New Zealand's Commitment to Afghanistan

Why New Zealand is Involved in Afghanistan

1.1 The planning of the 9/11 terrorist attack on New York and Washington, and the training of those who carried it out, were conducted in Afghanistan. Earlier and subsequent terrorist incidents, including the Bali and London bombings, had similar Afghanistan connections. The terrorist infrastructure has since been severely disrupted by coalition military action, and the core Al-Qaeda leadership operates from bases in Pakistan. As a country which has sustained casualties in terrorist incidents linked to Afghanistan, and which has consistently supported collective security through the United Nations, New Zealand has a direct interest in supporting the international effort to eradicate the terrorist threat and to assist the Government of Afghanistan in maintaining sovereign control of its territory. The spread of instability into Pakistan has broader strategic implications which will also affect a range of New Zealand's interests in the adjacent region and beyond.

New Zealand Support for the International Effort in Afghanistan

2.1 New Zealand's engagement began as a military operation in a purely military context, the US-led counter-terrorism intervention in Afghanistan, under a Chapter VII UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate, against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The initial contribution was a deployment of the Special Air Service (SAS) in 2001-2, followed by further deployments in 2004 and 2005. After the Taliban-led government fell, the international mission in Afghanistan was transformed into a different operation, a combination of security, development and peace-building. In this context, New Zealand agreed to take over the Bamyan Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) from 2003 to enable the US, which established it, to replicate the PRT in another region.

2.2 New Zealand's early military deployments were made under Operation Enduring Freedom, the US national effort in Afghanistan, but the current mandate is from the UNSC to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which is tasked to assist the Government of Afghanistan to restore security and counter the ongoing insurgency. OEF and ISAF are now coordinated under a single US command. ISAF implements NATO's Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan (CSPMP) for Afghanistan. In addition to leading and manning the PRT, New Zealand also provides headquarters staff and liaison officers to ISAF, and specialists in logistics and medicine and training for the Afghan National Army (ANA). Air logistics support for this effort is provided through a transit base out of theatre. New Zealand military deployments in support of the international assistance effort in Afghanistan have also included naval and air patrols in the Gulf and contiguous waters.

2.3 The non-military international assistance effort in Afghanistan is under the coordination mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). New Zealand's non-military contribution to Afghanistan includes relief and development assistance, and Police advisors. Before 2005, New Zealand made a number of one-off grants through NZAID to Afghan agencies, NGOs and multilateral funds. In 2005 a 3-year programme of NZAID assistance was established, targeting sustainable rural livelihoods, education, health, governance, women and human rights, with a focus on Bamyan Province. A renewal of the programme for a further three years (2008-2011), aligned with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (2008-2013), was again focused on Bamyan Province and \$21 million allocated for the three year period. In addition to the areas outlined above, New Zealand development assistance in Bamyan supports training for the Afghan National Police (ANP) conducted by New Zealand Police officers under the European Union Police (EUPOL) Mission's programme. NZDF also provides military liaison staff to UNAMA.

2.4 New Zealand considered diplomatic representation in Afghanistan at an early stage but for reasons of cost, operating difficulty and relative priority, decided on cross-accreditation from the Embassy in Tehran. New Zealand has been represented at major international meetings on Afghanistan, including London (2006), Paris (2008) and The Hague (2009) as well as the NATO/ISAF Summit on Afghanistan in Bucharest in April 2008. New Zealand Ministers have visited Afghanistan about once a year on average since 2002. High level visits from Afghanistan to New Zealand have been rare.

The Situation in Afghanistan

3.1 Since the beginning of the international intervention, Afghanistan has recorded some notable achievements in development, admittedly from a very low base. After more than a quarter century of conflict, Afghanistan's infrastructure was devastated; large numbers of people had been displaced by conflict, many to neighbouring countries or further afield; the central government, never strong, had little or no influence in large parts of the country; and national sentiment was weak in comparison to tribal or ethnic loyalties. Afghanistan's economy was in crisis, and will be heavily dependent on international assistance for a long time to come. The capacity of the state to borrow is limited, as is its institutional capacity to finance and implement poverty reduction and economic development programmes. Severe drought, endemic corruption, and the reliance of many Afghans on narcotics production and trade for their livelihood continue to impede development efforts, contribute to persistent insecurity and undermine good governance.

3.2 After the fall of the Taleban-led government the international community supported the preparation of a new Constitution. Its adoption was followed by

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the successful conduct of elections for national legislative representatives, an executive President, and provincial councils. Efforts to revive the provincial branches of central government departments have had limited success and central authority remains weak. The quality and effectiveness of governance at all levels are variable, and **PSR(R)1**

3.3 That said, Afghanistan's per capita GNP has doubled (from US\$180 to US\$355) between 2004 and 2007; the proportion of the population receiving basic health care rose during the same period from 9 percent to 80 per cent, with infant mortality decreasing by 24 per cent; more than 5 million children, around 30 per cent of them female, attend school; the number of universities has increased from one (2001) to ten; and more than 5 million refugees have returned from exile. The national currency has been relatively stable, and trade growth has been quite strong.

The Security Situation

4.1 The initial successes of the international intervention against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have not been consolidated. Armed resistance to the Afghan Government and its international backers has not only persisted but has increased in intensity and expanded geographically. The insurgents have not been able to match the international coalition forces in set-piece engagements, and have increasingly employ asymmetric methods such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers. Their successes have undermined perceptions of security, leading many Afghan citizens to hedge their support for the central government and the international coalition.

4.2 South and east Afghanistan are the focal points of armed conflict. Proximity to sanctuaries in Pakistan makes the insurgents more difficult to counter in these regions; these are bases for refit, resupply and training of insurgents as well as for planning and carrying out attacks. Outside the south and east, Kabul is a particular focus of insurgent actions; attacks there are intended to erode the confidence of the government and have high international visibility. The security situation in provinces neighbouring Kabul has been deteriorating.

4.3 The current fighting season has seen a marked upswing in the number of security incidents compared to the previous year. Some of this increase reflects greater confidence on the part of the insurgents, and may be intended to disrupt the forthcoming Presidential and provincial council elections. Some is due to the heightened tempo and more assertive posture of coalition military activities following the arrival in theatre of additional US forces. Although increasing numbers of casualties are likely, it is too soon to draw conclusions from this higher level of conflict about trends in the security situation.

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4.4 These conditions make it more difficult for the international community, whether multilateral agencies, government agencies or NGOs, to deliver development and humanitarian assistance in some areas. Improvement of the security situation thus remains a prerequisite for sustainable development and improved governance. A key objective of the international coalition is to strengthen the capacity of local security forces so that responsibility for security can be transferred gradually to them. This involves building up the numerical strength and skill levels of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Both will require commitment by the international community over a long period of time.

4.5 Of the two Afghan forces, the ANA is the farther advanced. It now numbers 92,000 (of a targeted strength of 134,000 including reserves and support elements); combat strength is around 55,000. The ANA has developed a competent counter-terrorism capability, and carries a considerable burden of the fighting in the contested areas in the south and east but has weaknesses in planning, logistics and combat support that will leave it dependent on ISAF forces for a long time to come. The ANA has taken over primary responsibility for security in Kabul Province.

4.6 The operational capacity of the ANP is considerably lower. The various organisations that constitute the ANP have a total authorised strength of 82,000 but current operational strength is around 60,000. ANP personnel are poorly trained and poorly paid, and **PSR(R)1**

International support for ANP development has not been commensurate with its needs nor has it been well coordinated. If local security is to be sustained in areas from which insurgents have been cleared, an effective Police force is essential. ANP personnel have been increasingly targeted by the insurgency and take a disproportionate share of Afghanistan Government casualties.

The Situation in Bamyan

5.1 Bamyan, where the NZPRT is located and where most of NZAID's activity takes place, is among the most secure provinces in Afghanistan. There is no ANA presence in the province. There have been security incidents in the border areas of the north-east corner of the province which stemmed from a combination of insurgent and criminal elements (narcotics traffickers, coal smugglers). The population of Bamyan, approximately 600,000, is dominated by the Hazara ethnic group, a minority in Afghanistan. Bamyan lacks the ethnic tensions found in many other provinces, although there are seasonal stresses over the migration of nomadic ethnic Pashtun Kuchi from adjacent Wardak Province into Hazara grazing lands in south Bamyan. In earlier times the Hazara were ignored by the central government or treated as second class citizens, and the province remained poor and under-developed. As adherents to the Shia stream of Islam the Hazara were badly treated by the Taleban, who

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are Sunni and Pashtun. They therefore do not welcome Taleban influence but neither are they instinctively supporters of the government in Kabul. The current Governor, Afghanistan's only female provincial leader, is energetic and well-regarded as an administrator by both Afghan and donor communities. Should she be replaced after the Presidential election in August, the operating environment for the PRT may well become less favourable.

5.2 The provincial economy is based on subsistence agriculture and pastoralism. Before Afghanistan's descent into conflict, Bamyan also had a tourist industry focussed on historical Buddhist sites and scenic lakes. Altitude and climate limit the productive season and affect transport routes out of the province in winter. Afghans in Bamyan consider that they have been denied equitable access to development resources since the international community arrived; in fact, a recent Oxfam report places Bamyan Province 5th or 6th in terms of per capita funding. A number of international development agencies, NGOs and bilateral donors are active in the province. Changes in US policy are delivering increases in the quantum and range of US assistance to Bamyan.

Changing International Approach to Afghanistan

6.1 Despite the renewed affirmations of commitment given at the 2006 London Conference, the international community has since become increasingly concerned about the negative trend of developments in Afghanistan, in both the security and development areas. There has been increasing questioning of an international strategy for Afghanistan built on the assumption that the insurgency would die out as the Afghan government increasingly extended its authority throughout the country, with international support increasingly focussed on large scale development and governance assistance within areas of government control. The central government has failed to establish a credible presence in much of the country, and has under-performed where it is present. Progress in development and improvements in governance have been slow. The insurgency has remained strong.

6.2 In looking at the reasons why the international strategy was failing, analysts and policy-makers in a number of governments and international organisations have generally accepted that, in addition to the weaknesses of the Afghan government, the efforts of the international community in the security, development and governance spheres have been at times under-resourced, and lacking in coordination and coherence.

6.3 As a result, the last two years have seen a renewed and increased commitment to Afghanistan by the international community. The UN Security Council gave UNAMA a strengthened mandate for coordination of international non-military assistance under the guidance of a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). A conference in Paris in June 2008 saw pledges of US\$20 billion to support implementation of the Afghan National Development

Strategy. At its Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 NATO adopted a Comprehensive Strategic Political-Military Plan (CSPMP) designed to better coordinate ISAF military support to Afghanistan and international civil/military assistance with UNAMA. A new emphasis was placed on training the Afghan National Army and Police but few offers of additional personnel for ISAF or OEF forces were received (at least until US announcements following its review of Afghanistan policy). Despite these efforts to improve the coherence of an increased commitment to peace-building, the situation in Afghanistan has not markedly improved. Indeed, the international community has had to recognise that unless the insurgency can be denied safe haven and replenishment in Pakistan, it is unlikely to be defeated.

New US Strategy

7.1 A similar conclusion was a key outcome of the policy review conducted by the new US administration. Its principal findings, announced in March this year, were that:

- the main US goal should be defeating Al Qaeda (rather than nation-building in Afghanistan);
- because of Al Qaeda's use of safe havens in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan had to be viewed as "two countries, one theatre";
- civilian efforts in both countries should be increased to build the capacity of their security forces to take a lead role in countering terrorism with reduced US assistance;
- 17,000 additional US troops would be deployed to Afghanistan to bolster the military effort and another 4,000 would be deployed to train Afghan security forces;
- the US development effort would be substantially increased in both capacity and coherence, working with UNAMA, the Afghan Government, allies and partners, with the objective of enabling Afghan self-reliance in governance, economic development and security at central government, provincial and district levels; and
- the US would support a nation-wide, Afghan-led reconciliation process.

7.2 This policy re-orientation has been endorsed by other international contributors in Afghanistan, who have welcomed the re-balancing of the security, development and governance pillars of the international effort and the attention to improved coordination among international participants, between civil and military contributions and between the international community and the

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Afghan government. The additional resources flowing to Afghanistan in the wake of the new US policy have so far come largely from the US.

The Reasons for a Review of New Zealand Policy

8.1 There are national imperatives for reviewing the nature of our contributions to Afghanistan. For a number of years the New Zealand Defence Force has sustained a high operational tempo involving off-shore deployments in three different theatres (Afghanistan, Timor Leste, and Solomon Islands), displacing important training, refreshment and re-equipment activities. The PRT commitment has been reviewed and reconfirmed on an annual basis but on each occasion questions have been raised about the length of time a small defence force can sustain it alongside other demanding deployments. This remains a live issue.

8.2 As a long-time contributor to Afghanistan, New Zealand has observed with increasing concern the unsatisfactory trends described earlier in this report and shared the desire that they be addressed. The re-orientation of the international effort, well encapsulated in the US policy review outcomes, provides a new context within which to consider whether our current contributions remain appropriate.

8.3 Even before the US policy review, considerable analytical effort had been undertaken within ISAF and in several national governments to assess the work of PRTs, with a view to achieving more effective coordination between military security operations and civilian development activities carried out by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community, to spreading PRT "best practice", and to better matching the activities of individual PRTs to the specific security conditions in their location. The relatively benign security conditions in Bamyan, and the presence there of a range of development agencies, make this province a logical place for early implementation of the emerging consensus on the role of PRTs. In fact, PRTs in other more secure locations, such as Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, have moved quite quickly to adopt the new approach, bringing in civilian leadership and expertise to facilitate development activities and to support Afghan national programmes.

8.4 Both the NZAID and New Zealand Police elements of the commitment to Afghanistan have been reviewed within the past year. These reviews broadly validated the contributions made by NZAID and New Zealand Police but drew attention to the lack of an overall framework for New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan. In seeking to align New Zealand's effort more closely with the new international policy settings, there is an opportunity to address this deficiency by defining a New Zealand objective from which such a national framework might be developed. Individual agencies would then derive objectives and strategies specific to their mandates.

A New Zealand Objective

9.1 Given the defence sustainability issues discussed in paragraph 8.1, an appropriate objective will have to acknowledge New Zealand's interest in an exit point from its commitment to Afghanistan, especially in the military sphere. It will also have to recognise that, because New Zealand is an active partner in a complex international effort, this has diplomatic and reputational dimensions, as well as implications for development programming, which require careful balancing with purely military considerations. The transition will have to reflect a package approach involving contributions from several government agencies, with the balance of effort among them shifting over time; some (eg NZAID) will continue to contribute after others (eg NZDF as the PRT) have departed. A key assumption is that Bamyan will continue to be the main focus of the New Zealand effort.

9.2 The following draft objective seeks to encapsulate the notion of a phased transition to exit from Bamyan as responsibility for security is transferred to Afghan security forces while at the same time adjusting the New Zealand effort towards the new international strategic emphasis on development:

The Government of Afghanistan is supported to assume early responsibility for security in Bamyan Province within the framework of the new international community emphasis on facilitating development and governance in line with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and in close consultation with key partners (Afghanistan, UN, NATO, US, UK, Australia)

9.3 The draft objective does not propose a firm exit date for the PRT or for other New Zealand elements. Ministerial guidance indicates a three to five year time frame for completion of the military mission (ie to 2013 or 2015). Given the known deficiencies of the ANP, it is highly likely that this will not be long enough to complete a transition to Afghan responsibility for security in Bamyan but it should be enough time to put in place other security arrangements to enable a phased New Zealand draw-down from the PRT.

9.4 Each of the New Zealand agencies engaged in Afghanistan should derive from this objective one or more subordinate objectives relevant to their areas of focus or expertise as a reference point for time-bound strategies of their own. These should include bench-marks to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of progress in the phased transition towards the exit point. The timing of exit may differ from agency to agency.

Recommendation 1

New Zealand's overall objective in Afghanistan beyond the current deployments should be:

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The Government of Afghanistan is supported to assume early responsibility for security in Bamyan Province within the framework of the new international community emphasis on facilitating development and governance in line with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and in close consultation with key partners (Afghanistan, UN, NATO, US, UK, Australia)

Recommendation 2

Each New Zealand agency involved in Afghanistan should derive one or more subordinate objectives as reference points for their own strategies, which should include benchmarks to facilitate monitoring and evaluation of progress in a phased transition towards the exit point.

Future of the PRT

10.1 The PRT is the largest element of the New Zealand commitment. What happens to the PRT has implications for other agencies operating in Afghanistan as well as for the Government of Afghanistan, the Bamyan provincial authorities and coalition partners. Decisions about the PRT are the key to New Zealand's future engagement. In addition to New Zealand policy considerations, there are external factors to take into account, including encroachment of Bamyan town on the PRT base, proposals to re-locate the airfield through which the PRT is serviced, and the need for base infrastructure enhancements.

10.2 The current commitment to lead and man the PRT expires at the end of September 2010. New Zealand will then have completed seven years as lead country in the Bamyan PRT. A decision could be taken to end the commitment at that point. New Zealand was an early contributor and has made a credible commitment to Afghanistan over a sustained period of time, a more substantial military contribution than some NATO members have offered. It can reasonably be argued that New Zealand has done its bit for Afghanistan.

10.3 New Zealand withdrawal would not close down the Bamyan PRT. ISAF will want it to continue under the leadership of another contributor. There are precedents for withdrawal from PRTs in which a departing country has been replaced by another. But New Zealand's departure from Bamyan would cast doubt over the New Zealand Police contribution, which is conducted from a base in the PRT, because the original Cabinet approval was predicated on reliance on the PRT for security and logistics. There may be some implications for the management of the NZODA programme, although this would be easier to continue because much of New Zealand's assistance is delivered through partner agencies which have a presence in Bamyan.

10.4 For a number of reasons withdrawal from the PRT from October 2010 is not recommended:

- announcing withdrawal at a time when the international effort is being re-focused and resources for Afghanistan increased would send a negative signal to the Government of Afghanistan, its allies and partners about our confidence in the revised international strategy and thus provide a propaganda asset to the insurgents;
- the general belief among coalition partners that the next year may be pivotal for the international effort reinforces the need to avoid sending such a signal;
- a decision to withdraw would have to be advised to coalition partners at least a year ahead of the implementation date to allow time to identify and prepare another country to take over the Bamyān PRT. From a practical and logistical perspective, the time is fast approaching when partners would have to be notified. As yet they have been given no indication that withdrawal is under consideration, and the diplomatic repercussions of such a notification, especially one requiring rapid action to identify a replacement for New Zealand, are likely to be negative.

10.5 New Zealand's interests would be better served by aligning our Afghanistan commitment with the revised international strategy. This would involve conducting a phased transition to exit from the PRT as responsibility for security is transferred to Afghan security forces and/or to another contributor country, and boosting New Zealand's contributions to development, including through the establishment of a New Zealand civilian presence in-country to improve facilitation of all activities. Within that framework formal advice can be given of the intention to withdraw from lead responsibility for the PRT in a way and at a time that is acceptable to our partners.

Recommendation 3:

The option of withdrawal from the PRT at the end of September 2010 should not be exercised. Consistent with the proposed objective, a phased transition to exit from the PRT should be carried out by transferring the lead responsibility for security in Bamyān Province to the Afghan security forces (represented in Bamyān by the ANP).

Transition Options

11.1 An NZDF review of options for managing a transition to exit from the PRT considered four possibilities. The minimalist option would be to give notice of New Zealand withdrawal early enough for ISAF to plan and implement a transition to another lead country for the Bamyān PRT; realistically that would

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probably require New Zealand leadership until the end of 2011 or mid-2012 and to commit to providing key people to facilitate the transition through an extended hand-over and mentoring period. Because the decision would have to be taken while the new international strategy was still in a relatively early stage of implementation, this option would not be welcomed by NATO/ISAF or the US. They would see it as a lack of confidence in the strategy by New Zealand and be concerned lest New Zealand's example be followed by others. Accordingly, this option is not recommended.

11.2 The other three options are variations on a theme of phased withdrawal. The differences arise from assumptions about the degree of engagement with the broader international strategy. In one, the focus would be on the transfer of lead responsibility for security with minimal attention to increasing New Zealand's development efforts in Bamyan. In another, the transfer of lead security responsibility would be accompanied by a significant boost to the New Zealand development and governance efforts. A variation on both of these would be to partner with another country in operating the PRT. Before exploring these options, some background comment on the nature of the security transition is necessary.

Preparing the Ground for Transfer of the Lead Security Role

12.1 The ANA has no official role or presence in Bamyan. This is unlikely to change within the time-frames contemplated for New Zealand's transition to exit. If there is to be a transfer of the lead security role (TLSR) to an Afghan force in Bamyan it will be to the ANP. This will require ANP personnel to have some quasi-military training that they currently do not receive. The New Zealand Police trainers in Bamyan are focussed on civil policing skills.

12.2 Decisions already taken will help to fill this gap. The US has offered, and is beginning to deploy to Bamyan, US military police contingents which, working under the operational control of the PRT Commander, will provide appropriate training to the ANP. As part of the training the PRT would include ANP and USMP personnel in suitable patrols and focus those patrols on ANP tasking. Over time the intention is to reduce progressively the number of NZDF personnel in the PRT and to place more emphasis on developmental and governance functions.

12.3 One caveat to note is that ISAF is developing criteria for transfer of the lead security role which, once approved, will apply to all PRTs. These criteria, which have not yet been promulgated, may affect the manner and speed with which transition can proceed in Bamyan.

Re-focussing the Security Effort

13.1 The current concept of operations of the PRT is no longer appropriate. Most of the current security effort is directed to force protection within a defensive posture. Building of ANP capacity has not been a focus of the PRT. This has to become the priority of the security effort if transfer of the lead security role to the ANP is to be realised. In the short-term this is unlikely to lead to a significant change in the size and nature of the New Zealand commitment to the PRT. As already noted, the injection of a US military police training capability will help to make the re-focussing possible. One visible manifestation of the change would be the inclusion of ANP personnel and US MPs in selected patrols by the PRT, with more of these patrols responding to ANP tasking.

13.2 Training ANP personnel in civilian policing skills and mentoring the Bamyan Chief of Police will continue to be necessary. There is a risk that paramilitary training will crowd out the civil police training which forms the core of the EUPOL programme within which the New Zealand Police deployment operates. The New Zealand Police effort should continue to concentrate on these areas. EUPOL intends to deploy two more Police to Bamyan.

13.3 A review of the New Zealand Police effort in Bamyan conducted in 2008 concluded that both the training and mentoring elements had produced good results but saw a need for more systematic monitoring and evaluation through follow-up to training courses and for additional mentoring in the management and administration functions of the Police Provincial HQ. Neither of these suggestions can be carried out within the current size and shape of the New Zealand Police team. The Commissioner of Police is shortly to visit EUPOL headquarters and Afghanistan as part of an assessment of New Zealand Police options for the future.

13.4 If the necessary resources can be found, and satisfactory arrangements made, additional New Zealand Police/EUPOL effort would be helpful in managing a more rapid transition to ANP leadership for provincial security. The need to mentor senior staff and strengthen institutional development at provincial and district Police headquarters will be all the greater if the ANP is to succeed in an earlier handover of responsibility for security. It will also be important to follow-up staff already trained to assess how ANP personnel have benefitted, whether the training has been internalised, and whether modifications are needed to training programmes in light of experience of their return to the field.

Recommendation 4:

To facilitate the transfer of the lead security role to the ANP, the concept of operations for the PRT should be re-oriented from force protection within a defensive posture to building the capacity of the ANP to discharge the responsibility effectively.

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Civilian Leadership of the PRT

14.1 The new international policy settings in Afghanistan, and specifically the re-orientation of PRTs, require more civilian leadership and coordination to achieve the economic and social development necessary to counter the insurgency. A number of PRTs run by other countries already have civilian leaders or joint civil/military command arrangements. This is consistent with the greater emphasis on civilian outcomes under the new international strategy. If New Zealand followed this trend, it would signal adherence to the new policy settings. The civilian head would lead PRT activities focussed on development and reconstruction; facilitate coordination with the provincial government and with other donors, including UN agencies and NGOs. The civilian head of the PRT could also offer support to the Governor of Bamyan; work closely with non-New Zealand civilian personnel based in the PRT; and improve coordination between Bamyan and Kabul. The PRT military commander would then become responsible for providing security and guiding the para-military capability-building of the ANP. The relationship between the two, and their respective areas of responsibility and accountability, would have to be carefully delineated.

14.2 Ideally, a significant boost to New Zealand development assistance and governance support should accompany a shift to civilian leadership of the PRT. In fact, additional financial resources will be modest, although an increase of approximately 25 percent on current contributions is planned. The next period of New Zealand engagement will see the continuation of several development activities begun in previous years, and expansion of some, especially agricultural programmes. Within these programmes significant numbers of New Zealand technical advisors or experts are unlikely to be deployed in-country, except perhaps on short-term assignments. There are security reasons to be cautious about expanding numbers of New Zealand civilians.

14.3 A civilian PRT leader could support improved coordination by UNAMA of the considerable amounts of assistance flowing to Bamyan from international agencies, bilateral donors and NGOs, and to leverage additional contributions as the benefits of coordination are demonstrated. If New Zealand decided to invite a partner country to share in running the PRT, one criterion for candidates might be the potential to attract additional contributions for development and governance in Bamyan.

14.4 If a civilian leader is appointed, a suitable timing would be the April 2010 rotation of PRT personnel.

Recommendation 5:

As part of the re-orientation of the PRT, a civilian leader should be appointed to the PRT to facilitate New Zealand engagement in the

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economic and social development of Bamyan Province through improved collaboration with other donors and more effective coordination by UNAMA; to support the Governor of Bamyan and provincial officials; and to improve coordination between Bamyan and Kabul.

Partnership in the PRT

15.1 The current upsurge in US interest and activities in Bamyan is already extending the NZ/US partnership in Afghanistan. It is uncertain how long some of the new US initiatives will continue but, while they do, more US military and civilian personnel seem likely to be embedded in the PRT. Increased US financial resources are flowing to Bamyan; much of this is being disbursed in roading projects supervised by US personnel based in the PRT. Despite this increase in the US presence in Bamyan, it should not be assumed that the US, which passed command of the PRT to New Zealand in 2003, will want to resume command if New Zealand steps aside. The US is likely to prefer the introduction of a new lead country.

15.2 As part of its transition strategy, New Zealand might seek a partner to whom over time it could progressively transfer responsibility for leading and staffing the PRT. It is not necessary to decide now whether New Zealand should do this but the option should be explored expeditiously. If partnership is considered to offer benefits to New Zealand in the transition to exit, a deliberate process should be established to identify potential partners and to test their willingness to engage.

Recommendation 6:

If New Zealand decides to seek a partner country to which responsibility for leading and staffing the PRT would be transferred over time, a process to identify potential partners and to test their interest should be conducted expeditiously.

Development Assistance

16.1 Before 2005 NZAID provided funds for disbursement by the PRT to facilitate reconstruction and development activities in support of the provincial government. In 2005 an ODA mission visited Afghanistan and shaped a three year programme of assistance, focussed largely on Bamyan. This programme, which allocated \$15 million over three financial years, was founded on the following principles:

- a focus on delivery of basic services – rural livelihoods, including agriculture, health and education; police capacity-building; and small infrastructure;

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- working within the provincial and national development strategies;
- leveraging off larger donors and credible organisations already implementing successful programmes;
- empowering locals ("leading from the rear"); and
- minimising a New Zealand civilian presence, except for short term technical assistance (TA) assignments, by working through established and proven professional development agencies.

16.2 The logic of aligning New Zealand with the renewed emphasis on strengthening civilian-led development activities under the new international policy settings is that the amount of ODA funding for Afghanistan should increase further. New Zealand is unable to increase resources flowing to Afghanistan on anything like the scale required by needs in that country but it can contemplate modest funding increases during the period ahead. At the same time, some re-orientation of the programme will be possible, in particular to meet Ministerial direction to put more resources into the agriculture and horticulture sector. For the three years beginning in 2009/10, the allocation has been increased to \$29 million.

16.3 The programme agreed in 2005 included commitments to fund PRT small infrastructure projects and training activities by the New Zealand Police at \$1 million a year each. Neither of these funding commitments had a finite term. Consistent with the new orientation of the PRT both should continue to be funded. Consideration is being given to increasing funding to the New Zealand Police component.

16.4 The scope for immediate re-allocation of funds within the current programme is limited by contractual obligations. Some commitments run to the end of the current financial year, and others through 2010/11. The recent review of the NZAID programme in Afghanistan recommended that a reduction in funding for the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) be considered; the funding level for the past three years was \$800,000 a year. Acting on this recommendation would provide a source of some funds for re-allocation elsewhere in the programme.

16.5 The first phase of the Sustainable Agricultural Livelihoods in East Hazarajat (SALEH) programme has been completed successfully. Planning of a second phase with the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), AusAID and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) offers opportunities for New Zealand to allocate more funding to the agriculture and horticulture sector and to shape a contribution that is identifiably New Zealand's. There is potential to link this programme to Bamyan University's agricultural training and research programmes and to provision of agricultural scholarships

for study in New Zealand. There is also scope to align flood protection and small infrastructure work carried out by the PRT with the second phase of the SALEH programme and New Zealand's focus on agriculture.

16.6 NZAID-funded education activities in Bamyan have recently been reviewed. The review found that the accelerated teacher education programmes were making good progress and that valuable gains had been made, in particular for girls and young women. It found room for improvement in the Teachers Training College which is very newly established. NZAID has funded the Aga Khan Foundation to undertake this work. Continuing engagement in this sector is necessary for longer term economic development. In out-years, as current funding commitments in the education sector are completed, consideration should be given to whether the focus on teacher training remains appropriate.

16.7 In Bamyan New Zealand's activities in the governance sector have revolved around Police training and mentoring and providing advice and support to the Governor of the province. Future Police engagement is under review separately. Other donors are making more resources available in Bamyan for governance assistance. New Zealand should be alert for opportunities to provide technical assistance and expert assignments in this field.

16.8 The proposal to appoint a civilian leader in the PRT has obvious implications for the recommendation in the review of the ODA programme that a development advisor be stationed in the PRT. (The proposal is elaborated in section 18.2 and 18.3 of this report.) The functions of a civilian leader would be to support and facilitate New Zealand's development efforts, including coordination with other donors, advice to the PRT in development matters, and facilitation of linkages between central and provincial government agencies to support effective implementation of national programmes in Bamyan.

16.9 Considerable work will be needed to flesh out the proposals in this section. They should be seen as a guide to future re-shaping of ODA to Afghanistan. A planning mission involving interested New Zealand agencies would be helpful in carrying this forward.

Recommendation 7:

The re-alignment of New Zealand's effort should lead to more effective development assistance through improved coordination and collaboration with international donors and the national and provincial governments. In this context more resources should be directed to agriculture, with health, education and tourism initiatives continuing to receive significant funding. The appointment of a civilian leader in the PRT should facilitate

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this re-alignment and help to improve programme coherence and the impact of international support to Bamyan Province.

Other Military Options

17.1 The NZDF currently maintains up to five staff officer positions within ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, two trainers with the UK Leadership Training Team based out of Kabul and two medical specialists as part of the Canadian-led Multinational Medical Unit (MMU) in Kandahar. With a new US medical facility replacing the MMU in September 2009, the establishment of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and restructuring within ISAF Headquarters, some adjustments to these NZDF contributions are likely to be required. The NZDF considers that these roles will remain valid and viable, although their designations may change, and does not propose any immediate change to the current mandate.

17.2 Since 2001 New Zealand has made other contributions to the international campaign centred on Afghanistan. These have included deployments of:

- the SAS to Afghanistan;
- RNZN frigates in the Gulf; and
- P3 Orion and Hercules aircraft in support roles under Operation Enduring Freedom.

All of these assets are potentially available for future deployments. The only New Zealand capability available in the short-term is the SAS. Consideration of another SAS deployment has been a separate process overlapping with this review. In the naval and air cases, other commitments and sustainability issues will influence the timing of any deployment.

17.3 New Zealand has received many requests from coalition partners to consider deploying other capabilities to Afghanistan, usually in partnership with, or integrated into, that partner's forces. Recent examples include:

- a fire support team;
- an artillery detachment;
- an Operational Mentoring and Liaison team (OMLT);
- staff officers for Regional Command or Task Force level Headquarters positions.

17.4 Each of these presents capacity problems for NZDF that, while not insurmountable, could determine the feasibility or the timing of a positive New Zealand response. Deployments in this group, except for the staff officer option, would also involve enhanced risk to personnel because of the nature of the tasking.

17.5 Decisions on these deployments do not need to be taken as part of this review but, especially in the cases in which responses to specific requests are awaited by partners, steps need to be taken quickly to clarify whether a positive response is possible. This may be dependent on drawdown in other missions to which NZDF is currently committed. If deployment is feasible, further work will be needed on the timing, and any conditions attached to it. To the extent possible, the timing of future smaller and more focussed military contributions should take account of foreign policy considerations.

17.6 The coming year is widely considered to be critical to the ultimate success of the international effort. While the new policy settings give greater weight to the developmental side of the international strategy, they also envisage more intense military operations. This is the background to the requests for New Zealand to consider a range of additional military contributions.

Recommendation 8:

Options for smaller, focussed military contributions in Afghanistan should be kept under review, taking into account other commitments, force sustainability issues, conditions in Afghanistan, and foreign policy considerations.

Representation in Afghanistan

18.1 New Zealand accredits its Ambassador in Iran to Afghanistan. In recent times this has not been as effective as we would like as a vehicle for monitoring the situation in Afghanistan, for protecting or promoting New Zealand interests or for influence on Afghan or international agencies or coalition partners. Communications between Tehran and Kabul are unreliable and of poor quality and, for various reasons beyond the Embassy's control, including security concerns, visits from Tehran have not been possible as frequently as in the past. With the renewed emphasis on development, governance and civilianisation, different arrangements would better serve New Zealand's needs in the period ahead. Four possibilities were considered:

- the appointment of a senior development advisor in the PRT, as recommended in the review of NZAID's programmes in Afghanistan;
- the appointment of a diplomatic representative in Kabul;

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- the appointment of a civilian leader in the PRT in Bamyan; and
- a single appointment combining the functions of the second and third options above.

18.2 The recommendation to appoint a senior development advisor to the PRT flowed from the conclusions in the review of NZAID's programme that:

- New Zealand assistance could be delivered better within an agreed inter-agency strategy which identified shared objectives and clearly specified each agency's roles;
- the PRT was not expert in development. It required, and had received, guidance from NZAID but this had not been sufficient to meet the needs;
- opportunities were being missed to collect and share information about assistance from a variety of sources being channelled through the PRT and to coordinate and improve the coherence of its delivery.

18.3 The review therefore proposed that a development advisor should:

- act as the focal point for humanitarian and development assistance for provincial government, UN, NGOs and other donors with a view to improving donor coordination, increasing donor funding and enhancing the overall impact of development activities within Bamyan Province;
- advise the PRT on development and humanitarian matters as a member of the PRT Development Group, and provide support for monitoring and evaluation of PRT project activities; and
- participate in conferences, meetings and other activities to facilitate linkages between the provincial and central governments, and liaise with national programmes and donor funding mechanisms in Kabul to support effective implementation in Bamyan.

NZAID concluded that the position, if established, should be filled on a contract basis. Funding for the position, estimated to cost \$780,000 annually, could then come from the programme allocation. This sum would account for a substantial portion of the additional ODA funding currently allocated for Afghanistan in the new financial year.

18.4 The rationale for the proposal to station a New Zealand diplomat in Kabul was the need to be able better to monitor and interpret developments affecting New Zealand interests at a time of rapid change and in a context in which, without a presence on the ground, New Zealand might become hostage to the

priorities of other countries and organisations. The role of the appointee would thus be to:

- coordinate and manage at the political level the transition of New Zealand assistance in Afghanistan including the handover of security in Bamyán;
- work with those with most power to influence the shape and speed of that transition, especially the US and the Government of Afghanistan;
- monitor and report on developments in Afghanistan, especially those with a bearing on the transition to provide prompt, credible advice on how New Zealand's interests can best be pursued or protected in a fast-evolving environment;
- represent New Zealand's approach in a way that maintains cooperation and engagement by key partners; and to
- lead "NZ Inc" in Afghanistan.

To secure access at appropriate levels in Kabul, the appointee would have to be designated Ambassador. This need not imply a long-term commitment to resident representation; reversion to accreditation from Tehran should again be sufficient once the transition towards exit has reached a certain point.

18.5 Co-location of the appointee within another diplomatic mission appears to be a viable option, and would make an appointment of finite duration more feasible. Co-location would have financial, security and operational benefits but would be expensive; the most extensively researched co-location option would cost at least \$800,000 a year, including salary and allowances.

18.6 The functions of a civilian leader in the Bamyán PRT were addressed in section 14 of this report. Other arguments in favour of this option are:

- there is a supporting New Zealand infrastructure within which the appointee can be accommodated and operate, thereby reducing some costs;
- virtually all of New Zealand's effort is focussed on Bamyán, which is the place where aligning our own activities with the new policy settings and managing the transition to exit will be carried through; and
- the security regime in Bamyán is less stringent than in Kabul, reducing some of the costs of mitigating security risks.

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18.7 Leaving aside the question of costs, there are strong arguments for establishing both a diplomatic position in Kabul and a civilian leader in the Bamyan PRT. The argument for a development advisor is somewhat less strong if, as proposed, the functions of the civilian leader were to focus on facilitation of development assistance, and NZAID continued to conduct visits to Afghanistan each year to evaluate and monitor New Zealand's programmes, to provide advice on development and humanitarian matters, and to maintain relationships with development partners. Development expertise would not be an essential criterion for appointment to the PRT civilian leader position but an experienced development professional might well be a suitable appointee.

18.8 Considerations of cost invite examination of the option of a single appointee covering some of the functions of both positions, probably from a base in Bamyan (for the reasons in section 18.6). While this would be possible, their proposed functions are demanding enough and different enough to pose a risk of failure to deliver results in both roles if they were combined. For that reason, this option is not recommended.

18.9 Questions concerning length of tours of duty and conditions of service are for later consideration but there is a strong case for appointees to these positions, if they are created, to serve for 12 or 18 months to ensure continuity and a more strategic over-view of New Zealand activities and interests than is possible in short rotations (PRT personnel turn over every six months).

Recommendation 9:

The diplomatic accreditation to Afghanistan should be transferred from Tehran to a diplomat stationed in Kabul. This arrangement would last for a finite period and be subject to periodic review. The role would complement that of the civilian leader of the PRT in Bamyan.

Pakistan

19.1 The new US strategy regards Afghanistan and Pakistan as two parts of a single theatre of conflict. Greater US attention is being paid to the Pakistan dimension of the broader problem through the appointment of a Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, and through increased development assistance flows and military assistance to Pakistan. A number of other countries are following the US example.

19.2 New Zealand's ability to join them is constrained by our very modest relationship with Pakistan – no resident representation; no ODA programme; no defence links; limited trade and economic contact – and thus negligible scope to exercise influence there. Just as our effort in Afghanistan has been focussed largely on one province, it makes sense to concentrate our limited resources on the Afghanistan theatre rather than try to spread them to Pakistan as well.

19.3 As a gesture of solidarity with Pakistan, New Zealand was represented at a Friends of Democratic Pakistan Conference in Tokyo in April 2009 and pledged a \$1 million contribution to help Pakistan deal with serious economic problems. Further gestures of this kind could be made in future, resources permitting. With a recent increase in staff in Tehran there may be some scope to increase contacts with Pakistan, to which the Tehran Embassy is accredited.

Recommendation 10:

While acknowledging the relevance of the concept of “two theatres, one conflict”, New Zealand should not seek to expend scarce resources in Pakistan.

Whole of Government Oversight and Management

20.1 The commitment to Afghanistan involves personnel from six New Zealand government agencies directly: MFAT (diplomatic representation from Tehran); NZDF (PRT personnel in Bamyan, military observers and staff and liaison officers with ISAF and the UN); NZ Police (trainers attached to PRT); NZAID (programme manager visiting twice a year); GCSB and NZSIS (providing communications and intelligence support). Other agencies, including EAB, DESS, DPM&C, MoD and CTAG, provide analysis or monitoring and oversight in Wellington.

20.2 Before 2007, when Cabinet agreed to adopt a Whole of Government approach to participation in major peace support operations, inter-agency coordination below the level of ODESC was somewhat ad hoc. Since 2008 an Afghanistan Reference Group (ARG) of interested agencies has met regularly in Wellington under MFAT chairmanship to exchange information, coordinate operational matters, align strategies and discuss policy proposals. The current review has been conducted partly through the ARG.

20.3 The ARG has helped to improve information flows, thus improving knowledge and understanding of the total picture of New Zealand's involvement; it has provided a framework for coordination between and among agencies; and it has helped to promote better information-sharing among ARG agencies. Despite these gains, there is still room to improve the Whole of Government dimension. A significant gap highlighted in recent reviews of aspects of New Zealand's engagement is the lack of a national objective for Afghanistan as the basis of an overarching strategy for Afghanistan within which all agencies make their contributions.

20.4 The nature of the New Zealand presence in Afghanistan explains the lack of an overarching strategy in the past. De facto, the PRT has provided the leadership on the ground. There is no resident diplomatic or other civilian

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representative who might coordinate or oversee the total New Zealand effort in-country, and it is not reasonable to expect diplomats accredited from a small post in a neighbouring country to do this effectively. Most reporting from New Zealand agencies in the field goes directly to their own agencies, and only rarely beyond, which accentuates the difficulties of coordination in Wellington. At a time when we are trying to orchestrate an orderly exit, effective coordination among agencies is all the more important.

20.5 For these reasons, it is desirable that suitably senior civilians be assigned to Afghanistan and that coordination and oversight arrangements in Wellington be strengthened.

20.6 Strengthening at the Wellington end might involve:

- confirmation of a national objective for New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan as the basis of an over-arching strategy within which all agencies make their contributions (an objective is proposed in section 9 of this report);
- establishment of a group of oversight Ministers for Afghanistan policy. The Ministers with Power to Act would be the logical group. (Consideration might be given to extending their oversight to the other multi-agency deployments in Solomon Islands and Timor Leste);
- a requirement to report formally to this Ministerial group on developments and policy issues, at least once each quarter, through the chair of the ARG; and
- a requirement to submit to oversight Ministers once each year through ODESC a formal assessment of progress in implementing the Whole of Government NZ effort.

Recommendation 11:

Oversight of the whole of government effort in Afghanistan would be improved by a requirement for regular and formal reporting to a group of Ministers with relevant portfolios on progress towards achievement of New Zealand objectives.

Implementation

21.1 This report proposes a re-orientation of New Zealand's engagement in Afghanistan beyond the end of the current mandate of the PRT. Some of its proposals can and should begin to be implemented before then. Because what is proposed is at a high level of generality, a good deal of detailed work will be needed to implement the recommendations. In some cases, as more detailed

information is taken into account or as assessments of conditions in Afghanistan are reviewed, this may lead to changes in specific aspects.

21.2 The detailed implementation effort should proceed within a whole of government context, with the Afghan Reference Group as the pivot. The ARG should be responsible, as a matter of high priority, for developing a whole of government framework based on the overall objective proposed in Recommendation 1 and for coordinating the work on subordinate objectives by individual agencies proposed in Recommendation 2. The outcomes of this work should include an agreed framework for regular reporting to Ministers that will facilitate future decisions about New Zealand engagement. An inter-agency planning mission to Afghanistan would also be helpful in advancing implementation.

Recommendation 12

The Afghan Reference Group should be the pivotal body for whole of government implementation of the recommendations in this report, as approved by Ministers, with priority given to implementing Recommendations 1 and 2.

Financial Implications

22.1 At this stage of elaboration of New Zealand's future commitments in Afghanistan it is difficult to be precise about costs. A key assumption of this report is that the transfer of lead responsibility for the PRT will be progressively achieved over a three to five year period, with the number of NZDF personnel deployed to Bamyan reducing as the ANP and/or another partner takes over the security lead. This should produce significant financial savings over time but volumes and the timing of reductions cannot be estimated until the processes on the ground are further advanced. NZDF is undertaking reviews of current deployments to determine whether some reductions can begin even before the end of the current PRT mandate.

22.2 In the short term, the overall cost of the Afghanistan commitment will be more likely to increase because:

- the largest single cost element, the PRT, will not reduce in size much, if at all, before its current mandate expires on 30 September 2010;
- the proposed civilian positions are new, and thus will require additional expenditure;
- the ODA programme will also see a modest increase in resources; and
- deployment of the SAS will require additional resources.

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In effect, aligning New Zealand's participation with the new international policy settings requires a short-term resource increase to position us for a transition to exit.

22.3 If we followed strictly the model that seems to be developing for PRTs under the new policy settings, at least some of the resources freed up from military commitments should be re-directed to development and governance activities. This is not easily achieved in New Zealand's case because there is no Afghanistan funding pool within which re-allocations may be made among a number of agencies; most funding is provided within the Votes of individual participating agencies (New Zealand Police is a partial exception because Police participation is largely funded by Vote: ODA). But a notional overall budget for Afghanistan could be established as a framework within which to relate changes made in individual Votes each year, with the ARG responsible for monitoring and reporting.

22.4 There is no automaticity about re-allocations under the emerging PRT model, and the US for one is increasing resources for both military and civilian purposes. At bottom, it is a matter of national policy choice whether and to what extent New Zealand transfers resources between military and civilian effort.

22.5 In the tables below, the figures are orders of magnitude based on available information rather than precise costings. The distribution across financial years involves some assumptions that remain to be tested. The regular monitoring and reporting proposed in this report will allow adjustments to be made, and reductions and re-allocations to be factored in, as Ministers track progress towards the objective in Afghanistan.

Replace
with:
"name of
base."

Forward Commitments to Afghanistan (NZ\$million)				
	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13
NZDF*				
PRT and support	28.96	28.96	28.96	28.96
PSR(R)1, PSR(R)2	1.337	1.337	1.337	1.337
Operational HQ	0.425	0.425	0.425	0.425
UNAMA MiAD	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.068
Medical specialists	0.135	0.135	0.135	0.135
ANA training	0.238	0.238	0.238	0.238
Subtotal	31.163	31.163	31.163	31.163
MFAT				
Kabul diplomat**	0.445	0.891	0.952	
Civilian leader, PRT***	0.157	0.628	0.628	
NZAID****	9.06	10	10	10
Subtotal	9.662	11.519	11.58	
Total	40.825	42.682	42.743	41.163

Notes

* Out-year figures a forward projection of FY2009/10 figures.


** Assumes appointment begins January 2010. Costing based on co-location in UK Embassy, the co-location option about which we have most information. (Others are being investigated.) MFAT budget can accommodate the costs within current base-line for the first two financial years, but not beyond; hence no allocation for 2012/13. No provision is included for war insurance for either proposed MFAT position.


*** Assumes appointment begins April 2010. Costing based on location within PRT. MFAT budget can meet these costs from within current base-line for the first two financial years but not beyond; hence no allocation for 2012/13.

**** Totals from Draft Forward Aid Programme - see separate annexe

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Consultation on Cabinet and Cabinet Committee Submissions

Certification by Department:	
Guidance on consultation requirements for Cabinet/Cabinet committee papers is provided in the CabGuide (see Procedures: Consultation): http://www.cabguide.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/procedures/consultation	
Departments/agencies consulted: The attached submission has implications for the following departments/agencies whose views have been sought and are accurately reflected in the submission: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (including NZAID); Ministry of Defence; New Zealand Defence Force; New Zealand Police; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet; New Zealand Security Intelligence Service; Government Communications Security Bureau; External Assessments Bureau; and the Treasury.	
Departments/agencies informed: In addition to those listed above, the following departments/agencies have an interest in the submission and have been informed:	
Others consulted: Other interested groups have been consulted as follows:	
Name, Title, Department: Michael Green, Acting Deputy Secretary, MFAT	
Date: 4/8/2009	Signature 

Certification by Minister:	
Ministers should be prepared to update and amplify the advice below when the submission is discussed at Cabinet/Cabinet committee.	
The attached proposal:	
<i>Consultation at Ministerial level</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> has been consulted with the Minister of Finance [required for all submissions seeking new funding] <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> has been consulted with the following portfolio Ministers: <i>Prime Minister, Defence</i> <input type="checkbox"/> did not need consultation with other Ministers
<i>Discussion with National caucus</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> has been or <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> will be discussed with the government caucus <input type="checkbox"/> does not need discussion with the government caucus
<i>Discussion with other parties</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> has been discussed with the following other parties represented in Parliament: <input type="checkbox"/> Act Party <input type="checkbox"/> Maori Party <input type="checkbox"/> United Future Party <input type="checkbox"/> Other [specify] <input type="checkbox"/> will be discussed with the following other parties represented in Parliament: <input type="checkbox"/> Act Party <input type="checkbox"/> Maori Party <input type="checkbox"/> United Future Party <input type="checkbox"/> Other [specify] <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> does not need discussion with other parties represented in Parliament
Portfolio <i>Foreign Affairs</i>	Date <i>4 10 09</i>
Signature 	

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