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Page 1 of 6

TF81 SITREP 28/10

11 JUL 10

COMJFNZ

TASK FORCE 81 (OP WATEA) – SITREP 28/10

J1. Personnel Matters

1. **Locations.** OP WATEA currently has ^{PSR(S)} people in theatre as follows:
 - a. PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 located in CAMP WAREHOUSE, KABUL.
 - b. PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 located at CRU Camp, KABUL.
 - c. PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 located at CRU Training Camp, PSR(S)1.
 - d. PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 located at PSR(S)1 KABUL.
 - e. PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 located at RC-E, BAGRAM.
2. PSR(S)4
3. RMO rotation per PSR(IC)3 is due to arrive in Kabul on or around 12 Jul. PSR(IC)3 will depart theatre on 15 Jul.
4. **Visitors.**
Other ISAF SOF
 - a. Two members of PSR(S)1 are visiting TF81 from 08 – 13 Jul IOT observe the training / operations model TF81 employ with the MOI and CRU.
5. **Medical.** The issue of identifying dental problems for personnel within the task force raised in last weeks sitrep is being dealt with by the J1 Med, TF81 RMO and OC Support Squadron at 1 NZSAS Gp.

J2. Intelligence.

6. See attached INTSUM (Annex A).

J3. Operational Matters.

7. Target development of threat networks in consultation, liaison and de-confliction with ISAF TFs in KABUL has occurred this week. TF81 continues to focus on operations with the Ministry of Interior (MOI) for short notice tasks in support of

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SECRET

Page 2 of 6

CRU^{PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2,1} through the disruption of insurgent movement, leadership and supply throughout Kabul and its surrounding provinces.

8. TF81 will continue to conduct partnered influence, interdiction and disruption operations throughout Kabul and its surrounding provinces. As we conduct these operations, TF81 is working to develop a strong and enduring partnership with ANSF and GIRoA.

J4. Logistic Matters.

9. TF81 Stocktake (PI) and LIA checks are continuing.

10. The TF81^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3} remain held up by^{PSR(Sen)2} Kabul. A further letter is to be delivered to^{PSR(Sen)2} KAIA on Monday 12 July attempting to secure the items release. The poor service to the Task Force by^{PSR(Sen)2} at^{PSR(Sen)2} is a cause for concern. TF81 is unsure what if any action can be taken from NZ to help resolve this situation, however if HQJFNZ movements staff have any ability to raise this issue through^{PSR(Sen)2} head office then assistance in this matter would be appreciated. POC for this is the TF81 S4

11. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

12. **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** NZLAV remains task worthy.

13. A CF18 Toughbook used by tactical elements for command and control has become U/S. It has been inspected and is beyond local repair. A loss and damage report has been raised with demand action will follow once the item has undergone 164 action.

J5. Plans.

14. TF81 continues to plan for short notice operations in Kabul and its surrounding provinces in response to time sensitive intelligence. The focus for the coming week will be the targeting of identified threats for prosecution in order to set the conditions for a secure Kabul Security Conference 20-21Jul 10.

15. Security planning is also underway for support Minister McCully's visit to Afghanistan and the visit by COMJFNZ. SNO TF81 is in possession of a draft copy of OPINST 102/10: COMJFNZ VISIT TO UAE AND AFGHANISTAN (AFG) 12-28 JUL10. This draft OPINST has been extremely helpful in allowing TF81 to plan accurately for the upcoming visit as it has highlighted a key point that TF81 and OP KEA had been planning on inaccurate dates for the COMJFNZ visit to Kabul. The completed OPINST is eagerly awaited.

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J6. Communications and Information Systems

16. NSTR.

J7. Training and Coordination.

17. NSTR.

J8. Mission observations, issues and evaluation.

18. NSTR.

J9. Finance Issues.

19. NSTR.

Command Comment

20. The effect of the new Commander ISAF Gen Petraeus has become clearer for ISAF SOF in the last seven days. The key take away is that there has been a change in command but not a change in strategy. COM ISAF has been briefed by COM ISAF SOF on ISAF SOF Operations. COM ISAF was 'surprised by just how effective and busy ISAF SOF has been.' Gen Petraeus has indicated that he does not intend to review ROE as they are right for this stage in the campaign. He noted that CIVCAS remains an issue for ISAF and all must remain very conscious of this in the application of the ROE. ISAF ROE is supported by COM ISAF tactical directive, which Gen Petraeus has indicated will be reviewed to ensure that the application of this directive by subordinate commands does not unnecessarily increase restrictions on soldiers applying lethal force. The reviewed tactical directive will be forwarded to JFNZ and HQNZDF when complete, however SNO OP WAATEA anticipates no red flags will arise for TF81.

21. COM ISAF has a number of key areas that he wishes to concentrate on. These are as follows:

- a. **CIVCAS.** ISAF must continue to kill, capture or turn insurgents. This must be achieved while sustaining the progress that ISAF has made in reducing CIVCAS. In the past 12 weeks CIVCAS are down 50% on the same 12 week period last year, while conversely insurgent CIVCAS have increased. ISAF must maintain this trend.
- b. **Maintaining Pressure on INS.** COM ISAF wants SOF to maintain pressure on INS while maintaining precision and keeping CIVCAS down.
- c. **STRATCOM.** There will be an increased emphasis on STRATCOM. Details of SOF operations will be released where possible however the nature of the Units involved will not. COM ISAF explained that he wants to ensure that all the good work that is going on is publicised, as the reality is that this information has just not been getting out. His quote was 'We must be first with the truth, we must not spin, but we must beat the

SECRET

Page 4 of 6

Taliban.' SNO Op WAATEA assess that STRATCOM will be a key feature of the new command.

- d. **Transition.** As Task Forces near completion of their partnering task, or as districts become increasingly secure, COMISAF may seek to reassign rather than withdraw troop contributions.

PSR(IC)3

SNO

Annexes

- A. INTSUM TF81-039

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Page 5 of 6

TASK FORCE 81
CAMP WAREHOUSE
KABUL

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY TF81-040
11 JUL 2010

SUMMARY OF THREAT ACTIVITY OVER PERIOD 05 - 11 JUL 10.

1. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Reporting this week continues previous reporting over the past month that the HQN Senior Leadership has facilitated multiple suicide bombers, explosives, and VBIEDs in order for Taliban INS to conduct suicide attacks in Kabul City. It is reported that INS are likely to be planning to conduct multiple suicide attacks before the commencement of the Kabul Conference on 20 Jul 10.

2. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ S2 COMMENT: CF operations in the last two days has resulted in the removal of key INS reported to be involved in the planning of attacks against KABUL. While it is probable that reports of INS planning to conduct spectacular attacks will continue, the disruption from the removal of these INS will make it unlikely that they will be able to coordinate these attacks. It is likely that sporadic SB and IED attacks against targets of opportunity will continue in Kabul.
END COMMENT.

AO REPORTING

3. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ KABUL CITY PDs 2, 5, 8 and 9 are assessed as posing a HIGH level of threat to ISAF forces ~~PSR(S)1~~ ISAF define a HIGH threat as:

PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

ISAF threat
determination
process

CCIR Reporting (IAW HQJFNZ OPINSTR 118/09)

4. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Significant changes in the threat environment (including IED/suicide type threats) in Kabul and TF81 Area of Intelligence Responsibility (AIR): Ongoing suicide bomber, IED and rocket threats remain prevalent.

5. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Specific threats to TF81 and Camp Warehouse (Kabul):
NSTR

6. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ ANSF capacity and effectiveness in TF81 AIR: NSTR

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Page 6 of 6

7. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ ISAF capacity and effectiveness in TF81 AIR: NSTR.
8. ~~(ISAF SECRET)~~ Other Points: NSTR.

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PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

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(CCIRM)

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