



**NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN**

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(Unclas)

28 JUL 2010

NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 209/10


Period: 2701830D JUL 10-281830D JUL 10

Executive Summary

WARDAK: INS have access to heavy weaponry.

BAGHLAN: Qari MIRAJ in GARDENDEH/TIRGIRAN planning attacks (NZPRT PIR 1; COM JFNZ PIR 2).

KAHMARD: ANSF report imminent attack on PSR(R)1 miners (NZPRT PIR 1; COM JFNZ PIR 2).



Area of Interest

1. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) **1** **WARDAK:** ANSF reported that INS operating in GHORBAND District, PARWAN Province may have access to heavy weapons from WARDAK Province including Anti-Aircraft guns and mortars. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** There are no indicators that these weapons have been transported to PARWAN. Any use in central PARWAN, would pose an enhanced risk to travel along PSR(S)1. It is possible that the air-route linking BAMYAN and KABUL may be threatened. **COMMENT ENDS.**

2. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) ² **BAGHLAN:** ANSF report that Qari MIRAJ left BARFAK Village (GR 42S VE 23776 12088) on 26 July 2010 and headed to the TIRGIRAN and GARDENDEH area to plan attacks on ANP CP between SHIBAR and SHIKARI VY. MIRAJ is reported to have 30 men under his command. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** It is possible that MIRAJ is now in the GARDENDEH/TIRGIRAN area planning future attacks. It is possible that any attack will be motivated by revenge for the killing of PSR(sen)1. **COMMENT ENDS.**

Area of Operation

GOVERNANCE

3. NSTR.

DEVELOPMENT

4. NSTR.

SECURITY

5. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) ³ **KAHMARD:** On 27 July 2010, ANSF stated they had received 'collaborated' reporting from multiple sources and ANSF in KABUL, of an imminent attack on the PSR(R)1 Engineers based at ISH PESTA PSR(R)1. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** A possible threat remains to the PSR(R)1 engineers. It is doubtful INS will attack the well-defended PSR(R)1 mining camp. It is possible INS remain in the reconnaissance and planning stage for an attack on a PSR(R)1 convoy travelling between the camp and KABUL. **COMMENT ENDS.**

72 Hour Assessment:

6. **MLCOA:** Locally based INS maintain some influence in their *safe-haven* in TALA-WA-BARFAK. It remains possible that INS will deploy IEDs against ANSF, CF and international actors between T-W-B and CP G1. A kidnapping attempt of PSR(R)1 mining personnel at ISH PESTA is possible. Given recent cooperation with PARWAN-based TB, INS activity in south SHIBAR is possible.

7. **MDCOA:** A complex attack with IED supported by RPG/SAF targeting ANP/CF patrols along MSR in SHIKARI VY or south SHIBAR remains possible. A suicide/IED targeting the BAMYAN SILK ROAD FESTIVAL (28 JUL-1 AUG) is possible.

**DRAFTED
BY:**

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

RELEASED BY:

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

INT OP

S2

Priority Intelligence Requirements

- a. PIR 1. What are the kinetic threats to stability within BAMYAN Province?
- b. PIR 2. What are the non-kinetic influences that have the potential to create instability within BAMYAN Province?
- c. PIR 3. What is the capacity and local perceptions of the security structures (ANP, NDS, OCC-P and NZPRT) within BAMYAN Province?
- d. PIR 4. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Development and Reconstruction within the BAMYAN Province?
- e. PIR 5. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Governance within the BAMYAN Province?

LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE	
CONFIRMED	Approximately 95 per cent or greater
PROBABLE	Approximately 75 per cent or greater
LIKELY	Approximately 50 per cent or greater
POSSIBLE	Approximately 15 per cent or greater
DOUBTFUL	Approximately 14 per cent or less

Distribution:

PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

List of internal and external recipients of this Instsum

