



NATO/ISAF SECRET

PURPOSE

- Our perspective.
- We will be open and candid.
- Using our in theatre expertise we aim to provide you with situational awareness allowing you to make informed decisions.

SCOPE

- ISAF SOF Laydown
- Mission
- Task Force 81 and **PSR(R)1** (CRU)
- Detention Operations
- Future Operations
 - Obj Burnham
 - Logar
 - Wardak
- TF81 Extension Options Planning
- Misc Issues

RESTRICTED

$PSR(s)_1, PSR(s)_2, PSR(s)_3$

INTRODUCTION

- Kabul is the Strategic heart of Afghanistan.
 - International community, GIRoA and the INS.
 - Reinforced by INS tactics.
 - Complex and spectacular attacks.
 - Battleground for legitimacy in eyes of Afghan citizens and the International community.

RESTRICTED

MISSION

NZDF Mission:

The NZDF is to provide a SOTF to ISAF in Afghanistan from September 2009 for up to 18 months in order to maintain stability, defeat the insurgency and mentor the Crisis Response Unit (CRU).

TF81 Mission:


TF 81 is to enable the CRU operational capability and disrupt INS threat groups in order to provide a sustainable security environment.

~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~

TF 81 STRUCTURE



PSR(sen)1




PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

GDPSU

MOI Deputy Minister
Of Security
LTG MANGAL

General Directorate of
Police Special Units
BG QASIM


PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3




NATO/ISAF SECRET REL-GIROA

PSR(S)1

Female member of the CRU Ready Squadron fast ropes onto an OBJ



CRU buddy teams fire and maneuver on a down range target



CRU Ready Squadron pers conduct Room Combat pairs drill



CRU female team members train alongside their male counterparts



~~NATO/ISAF-SECRET-Rel-GIROA~~

**STORYBOARD - MOI - AIR INTERDICTION UNIT AND CRISIS RESPONSE UNIT
QRF TRAINING - 29 MAY 10**




CRU TROOPS PROTECT AIU Mi17



CRU TROOPS DISMOUNT AIU Mi17



CRU TROOPS IN FORMATION



AIU Mi17 LIFTS OFF

DEVELOPMENT

- Personnel
 - Selection, fitness tests, deselect unsuitable personnel
- Equipment
 - Op Result
- Operations
 - Ops Planning / Command Course
- Infrastructure
 - **PSR(S)1**

STORYBOARD - MOI - CRISIS RESPONSE UNIT - PSR(S)1 CAMP
DEVELOPMENT - 16 AUG 10

PSR(S)1

DETENTION OPERATIONS



NATO/ISAF SECRET

Bk39.003.000001

DEFINITIONS

- **Partnering**: A habitual relationship between ANSF and ISAF Units that must pervade all aspects of life for an ANSF Unit through mutual co-operation and a responsibility for planning preparation, execution and post operational assessments towards the achievement of joint operational effects.
- **Mentoring**: Coach and teach ANSF Units, provide the conduit for Command and Control and when required support the operational planning of the ANSF Unit for which they are aligned, in order to support the development of a self sufficient, competent and professional ANSF.

SECRET

DEFINITION – PARTNER ENABLED OPERATIONS

- Partnered operations do not establish a transfer of authority between ISAF and the ANSF. The ANSF is the supported command and ISAF is the supporting command.
- In respect to GIRoA led operations which see ANSF assume the lead with ISAF in support, these enabled operations will require:
 - The operation to be **planned** and authorised by GIRoA
 - GIRoA is responsible for incident management.
 - The ANSF element is responsible for battlespace de-confliction with other ANSF Units.
 - The operation will be visibly identifiable as Afghan led coupled with an ANSF request for ISAF combat enablers.

DETENTION GUIDELINES

- TF 81 is authorised to detain where ANSF are not present or reasonably available to do so.
- All TF81 operations are partnered with ANSF who are the sole detaining authority for the operation.
- TF 81 enable **CRU** operations under an MOI Arrest Warrant signed by an GIRoA prosecutor and executed by **CRU** (partner enabled operation).
- TF 81 assists in the planning and conduct of operations but does not conduct the detention itself.
- TF 81 has not detained anyone since operations commenced last year. ANSF has detained 82 pers on partnered operations with TF 81 ^{PSR(C)1} of these pers were detained by NDS.

SECRET

DETENTION PRACTICES

- **PRIOR TO OPERATION –**
 - IAW GIRoA criminal law only a state prosecutor or a judge may issue an arrest warrant.
 - Current TF 81 SOP is to not assist in conducting a detention operation without an arrest warrant signed by an GIRoA prosecutor who is satisfied that there is enough evidence to judicially prosecute an individual.
 - The GIRoA prosecutor deploys with TF 81 and **CRU** on all enabled operations after a signed copy of the arrest warrant is scanned and emailed to HQ ISAF SOF.

SECRET

DETENTION PRACTICES

- **DURING OPERATION** –
 - **CRU** is first through the door and is the “detaining force”.
 - GIRoA Prosecutor is responsible for evidential collection and ensuring detention is carried out IAW GIRoA law and international humanitarian law.
 - **CRU** detains the individual and completes required documentation.
 - TF 81 observes detention process. Troops have been ordered via ROE Briefs to report any observations which would indicate any mistreatment of ANSF detainees. (NOTE: Not one incident of detainee mistreatment has ever been observed)

DETENTION PRACTICES

- **POST OPERATION 1** –
 - TF 81 reports **CRU** detainee details to ISAF SOF IAW ISAF Detention Notification Directive 13 Apr 10.
 - TF 81 LSO follows up on detainees and enters obtained details on an informal ANSF detention database. The limitations are as follows:
 - TF 81 does not have a legal right to detainee information as the matter is the responsibility of the sovereign GIRoA.
 - The information obtained is ad hoc and necessitates goodwill and a network of contacts that is constantly evolving.
 - It is the responsibility of ANSF to report their detainees to ICRC.
 - The ICRC will not release any known ANSF detainee details to TF 81 IAW their doctrine of neutrality.

DETENTION PRACTICES

- **POST OPERATION 2 –**
 - As TF 81 is not the detaining authority we have no right at law to obtain information about detainees who were captured during ANSF detention operations.
 - However, TF 81 notes the moral obligation and does make best efforts to informally track detainee progress via a network of contacts within GIRoA, ISAF and the diplomatic community.
 - The recent UK judgment does not address the issue of NZDF obligations that may arise if a person owing allegiance to Afghanistan is arrested or detained by Afghan authorities.
 - TF 81 LSO will be following this matter up with **PSR(R)1**

SECRET

**DELIBERATE DETENTION
OPERATIONS**

PSR(S) 1



PSR(R)1, PSR(sen)1



Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Interior

PSR(sen)1, PSR(R)1

GIRoA / ISAF Partnering Operation

Warrant of Arrest:

Who:

Gul Agha son of Sayid Agha

PSR(R)1, PSR(sen)1

When: Immediate

This arrest warrant is served on the above named person for suspicion of terrorist activities within the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Pashto content

This warrant will be effective on signature of the official undersigned GIRoA

THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PSR(R)1, PSR(sen)1

THEREFORE THIS INDIVIDUAL SHOULD BE DETAINED.

NATO/ISAF SECRET REL GIROA

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Operation
unrelated to ToR




PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Operation
unrelated to ToR

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Operation
unrelated to ToR

FUTURE OPERATIONS



SECRET

BK39.003.000001

OBJECTIVE BURNHAM

Who: TF81 ^{PSR(S)}, CRUI, ^{PSR(R)}1 FSN


What: DDO

Where: TALAWE BERFAK DISTRICT, BAGHLAN PROVINCE

(A1 - 42SVDD2303691463, A2 - 42SVDD2307591473, A3 - 42SVDD2309291151)

When: ON TRIGGER. (POD 21-22AUG 10)

Why: DISRUPT INS NETWORK ELEMENTS PLANNING ATTACKS ON ANSF / COALITION FORCES AND LOCAL POPULATION AND ENHANCE THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY OF GIROA.




NATO/ISAF SECRET


Bk39.003.000001

Intelligence Summary

- Targeting of Obj **PSR(sen)1** and Obj MUSELI from May 10 **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**
- Following 3 Aug TIC
 - Various reporting indicates Obj BURNHAM's involvement in KT2 TIC
 - Reports identifying POI/COI within TIGARAN Village and other areas of interest
 - Continued use of ISR **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3** Obj BURNHAM (to date 24 Hrs) and other POI
 - JPEL's submitted and approved for Obj BURNHAM, NOVA and YAMAHA
 - Continue to conduct liaison with various sources to maintain situational awareness

INS Link Chart






NAIQA/SAF-SECRET



BK39-003.000001



TF81 EXTENSION OPTIONS PLANNING



~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~

Bk39.003.000001

SITUATION

- Partnering is a key aspect for the ISAF security arm of nation building in Afghanistan. This is achieved through enabling ANSF capacity.
- The ISAF partnering mission with the CRU will be incomplete in March 2011.
- **PSR(R)1**
- Potential option to maintain a presence in Afghanistan through the continuation of TF81 mentoring and partnering of the CRU.

SECRET

PROPOSED MISSION

- TF 81 is to enable the CRU operational capability in order to disrupt INS threat groups and provide a sustainable security environment.

SECRET

TASKS

- Maintain an effective partnering relationship with the CRU.
- Prevent spectacular attacks in RC-C.
- Disrupt high profile INS activity in Kabul and six surrounding provinces.
- Develop CRU operational capability.
- National tasks as directed.

SECRET

GROUND

- KABUL city
- RC-Capital and six surrounding provinces.



SECRET

PROPOSED STRUCTURE

PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3, PSR(S)1

PARTNERING APPROACH

- ISAF embedded partnering concept requires partner Units where possible to reside with the ANSF unit they partner.
- Drawdown of TF81.
- The entire force would collocate to the new CRU camp to support this msn.
- Significant benefits to being collocated with partner force.
 - Economy of Effort
 - Concentration of Force
 - Simplicity
 - Maintenance of Morale
 - Co-operation
 - Security

SECRET

$PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3$

MISC ISSUES

- CIVCAS
- Information Operations
- Insurgent Assessment

QUESTIONS?

PSR(sen)1

PSR(sen)1

PSR(sen)1

PSR(sen)1

“SHONNA BI SHONNA”
“SHOULDER TO SHOULDER”