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Page 1 of 4



# NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN

Kiwi Base, Bamyan Airfield, Bamyan, AFGHANISTAN Telephone: PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1 Email: PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1 (Unclas)

7 SEP 2010

#### NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 250/10

Period: 061830D Sep 10 -071830D SEP 10

# **Executive Summary**

BAGHLAN: NAHREEN District governor killed by INS.

BAGHLAN: PSR(sen)1 has surrendered (NZPRT PIR 1; COM JFNZ PIR


2).

TALA WA BARFAK: TB leaders in TWB have gone into hiding (NZPRT PIR 1; COM

JFNZ PIR 2).

KAHMARD: PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

**AO BAMYAN:** ANA to deploy to BAMYAN for elections (NZPRT PIR 3; COM JFNZ PIR 5).



### SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO

Page 2 of 4

#### Area of Interest

- 1. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) BAGHLAN: At 061530 September 2010, PSR(sen)1, PSR(s)1 and driver were killed by an unknown number of INS. NZPRT S2 COMMENT: INS continue to conduct assassinations of political figures in the Al IOT dissuade LNs from voting. COMMENT ENDS.
- 2. **(S//REL ISAF, NATO)** BAGHLAN: OCC-P BAMIAN report that on 06 September 2010, PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)1 and seven others surrendered themselves and their weapons to NDS in PUL-E KHUMRI. The surrender was attributed to recent ISAF activity in southern TWB. NZPRT S2 COMMENT: To date this reporting remains uncorroborated. **COMMENT ENDS.**
- 3. (S//REL ISAF, NATO) TALA WA BARFAK: OCC-P BAMIAN report that Maulawi NEMATULLAH (JPEL RTAF 2036), Qari MIRAJ (JPEL RTAF 2035) and Commander Abdullah KALTA (JPEL RTAF 2037) have gone into hiding in TIRGIRAN (GR 42S VD 23061 91545) and GARDENDEH PSR(S)1 NZPRT S2 COMMENT: Given recent atmospheric reporting, it is doubtful that this group has gone into hiding as a result of the 22 August 2010 operation. It is likely the trio have gone into hiding in preparation for an attack: combat indicators continue to support the assessment that INS have completed reconnaissance and preparation for offensive action in AO BAMYAN and are looking for targets of opportunity. The area of concern continues to be along MSR PSR(S)1 between SHIKARI VY and DO ABE Village PSR(S)1 ). COMMENT ENDS.

## Area of Operations

**GOVERNANCE** 

# PSR(S)1

# **DEVELOPMENT**

NSTR.

#### SECURITY

6. (S//REL ISAF, NATO)

AO BAMYAN: OCC-P report that ANA is to deploy to BAMYAN Province over the election period. The ANA will conduct patrols in the SHIKARI VY, KAHMARD, ISH PESTA

PSR(S)1

) and ANADARAH (PSR(S)1

OCC-P will command and control these patrols. OCC-P also added that INS plan to create 'problems during the elections' in JALMESH VY, SHIKARI VY and ISH PESTA. NZPRT S2 COMMENT: The deployment of ANA is likely to increase the overall security of AO BAMYAN. Although

SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO

#### SECRET//REL ISAF, NATO

# Page 3 of 4

this is likely to be a positive development, it is possible that an increased ANSF presence will offer INS more opportune targets to attack. **COMMENT ENDS.** 

#### 72 Hour Assessment:

- 7. **MLCOA:** Some INS remain dispersed in *ailaqs* in TALA-WA-BARFAK. INS plan, recruit and conduct IO. An attempted complex attack, with IED supported by RPG/SAF targeting ANP/CF patrols along MSR PSR(S)1, is now assessed to be imminent. An IED event in the KAHMARD is also possible. A stand-off attack against ROMERO is possible.
- 8. **MDCOA:** An attempt to infiltrate KIWI BASE or ROMERO with INS using fake ANSF vehicles and uniforms.

DRAFTED

PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1

RELEASED BY:

PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1

BY:

INT OP

MAJ S2

# **Priority Intelligence Requirements**

- a. PIR 1. What are the kinetic threats to stability within BAMYAN Province?
- b. PIR 2. What are the non-kinetic influences that have the potential to create instability within BAMYAN Province?
- c. PIR 3. What is the capacity and local perceptions of the security structures (ANP, NDS, OCC-P and NZPRT) within BAMYAN Province?
- d. PIR 4. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Development and Reconstruction within the BAMYAN Province?
- e. PIR 5. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Governance within the BAMYAN Province?

LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE	
CONFIRMED	Approximately 95 per cent or greater
PROBABLE	Approximately 75 per cent or greater
LIKELY	Approximately 50 per cent or greater
POSSIBLE	Approximately 15 per cent or greater

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# Page 4 of 4

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DOUBTFUL	Approximately 14 per cent or less

Distribution:

PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1, PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

List of internal and external recipients of this INSTSUM