



## NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM BAMYAN

FOB KIWIBASE, BAMYAN Airfield, BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN  
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17 Jan 2011


### NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 017/11

Period: 161600D\* JAN 2011 - 171600D\* JAN 2011

#### Executive Summary

**KABUL:** Arrest of INS, QARI MIRAJ, PSR(sen)1 and three others operating in the TALA WA BARFEK District

**TALA WA BARFEK:** Additional information regarding the 12 January 2011 attack



#### Area of Interest

1. (~~S//REL ISAF, NATO~~) **KABUL:** On 16 Jan 11 ANSF with CF support conducted a successful operation to capture insurgents Qari MIRAJ, PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 (NFI) in KABUL. Exploitation of the Captured Personnel and Materiel continues.

2. ~~(S//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** Qari MIRAJ has been reported as an IED expert trained in PAKISTAN. He has been implicated in the murder of an ANP officer in TALA WA BARFEK and also in the murder of two German Journalists in 2006. A number of casual contacts have identified MIRAJ as being involved in attacks against CF, ANSF, local civilians and internationals within the last two years. MIRAJ was involved in the 03 Aug 10 attack on an NZPRT Patrol at KARIMAK and was probably the leader of the RPG and SAF attack on USAID/HUN PRT SW of DAHANE TURMUSH in TALA WA BARFAK District, BAGHLAN on 12 Jan 10.

3. ~~(S//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ Previous reporting indicates that MIRAJ is the commander of the active service unit (action arm) of the TALA WA BARFAK-based INS and reports to the Operational Commander and former TB-era TALA WA BARFAK DSG **PSR(sen)1**, his 2IC Mulawi NEMATULLAH and ultimately to the TB Shadow District Sub-Governor for TALA WA BARFAK **PSR(sen)1**. **PSR(sen)1** was reported to be the logistics and personnel organiser for this group and a close confederate of MIRAJ. With several of the TB leaders for the TALA WA BARFEK area reported to be in PAKISTAN, there is now a junior leadership vacancy. It is likely that until this leadership position is filled, INS may have more difficulty coordinating the conduct of successful attacks. It is likely that with MIRAJ's arrest there is a knowledge gap in the INS group operating in TALA WA BARFEK and it is possible that attacks involving IEDs may decrease. Once MIRAJ's position is filled the new leader may have something to prove which could lead to an increase in attacks in southern TALA WA BARFEK and northern BAMYAN Province. It is likely that MIRAJ's arrest will create uncertainty amongst the mid-level TB that are linked to the TALA WA BARFEK District as it could be seen that INS are now not going to be able to conduct attacks without reprisals from CF elms, as was also shown by the 22 Aug 2010 operation. **END COMMENT.**

4. ~~(S//REL ISAF, NATO)~~ **1** **TALA WA BARFEK:** Over the last two days NZPRT received two additional reports regarding the attack SW of DAHANE TURMUSH. The first report came from **PSR(sen)1**, who mentioned that one **PSR(sen)1** (probably **PSR(sen)1**) was responsible for ordering the attack. **PSR(sen)1** reported that **PSR(sen)1** motivation was due to the proposed wage cut for ANP in the TWB district, as the attack would demonstrate the necessity of the ANP in the area. **PSR(sen)1** was seen to be talking to the spotters before the attack. The second report came from **PSR(sen)1** and **PSR(sen)1**. They both emphasised that the attack was ordered by the District Sub-Governor **PSR(sen)1** and **PSR(sen)1** mentioned that the motive for the attack was that USAID in BAGHLAN Province had organised a peace jirga in TALA WA BARFEK. USAID had chosen 40 locals to attend and that **PSR(sen)1** had disagreed to who was chosen. Both men mentioned that **PSR(sen)1** had contacts to the TB, especially **PSR(sen)1** and getting the TB to attack the convoy as it was returning to POL E KHOMRI was easy. **NZPRT S2 COMMENT:** It is probable that **PSR(sen)1** and **PSR(sen)1** are the same person, being the DDCoP of TALA WA BARFEK **PSR(sen)1** who is known locally as **PSR(sen)1**. In the reports **PSR(sen)1** comments on two different reasons for the motivation for **PSR(sen)1** to order the attacks. Both reasons are credible as attempting to secure jobs and pay through orchestrated attacks is a common tactic for ANSF in NZPRT's AO and AI. It is also plausible that **PSR(sen)1** was irked at not having any input into the organisation of the meeting and it is possible that through his connections he organised this attack to show that if desired goals of CF elms are to be achieved his input would be vital. **END COMMENT.**

<sup>1</sup> **PSR(sen)1**

are two distinct and separate identities

**Area of Operations**

GOVERNANCE

5. NSTR.

DEVELOPMENT

6. NSTR.

SECURITY

7. NSTR.

**Threat Courses of Action:**

8. **MLCOA:** A complex attack by a small group of insurgents (four to ten) initiated with an IED and reinforced with SAF targeting an NZPRT or ANSF patrol or foreigners in the north east of BAMYAN Province on MSR **PSR(S)1** from Check Point G22 to DO ABE3 and east to ISH PESTA Check Point<sup>4</sup> . Likely atk on mobile patrols on isolated portions of the route by day and on static positions by night.

9. **MDCOA:** A change in TTP's, involving a secondary device targeting likely ICPs and/or a secondary complex attack targeting first responders.

**DRAFTED BY:** PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1

**RELEASED BY:** PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1

INT OP

S2

<sup>2</sup> G2 Check Point MGRS Grid **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

<sup>3</sup> DO ABE MGRS Grid **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

<sup>4</sup> ISH PESTA Check Point MGRS Grid **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

**Comd TU CRIB XVII Priority Intelligence Requirements**

- a. PIR 1. What are the kinetic threats to stability within BAMYAN Province?
- b. PIR 2. What are the non-kinetic influences that have the potential to create instability within BAMYAN Province?
- c. PIR 3. What is the capacity and local perceptions of the security structures (ANP, NDS, OCC-P and NZPRT) within BAMYAN Province?
- d. PIR 4. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Development and Reconstruction within the BAMYAN Province?
- e. PIR 5. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Governance within the BAMYAN Province?

<b>LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE</b>	
<b>CONFIRMED</b>	Approximately 95 per cent or greater
<b>PROBABLE</b>	Approximately 75 per cent or greater
<b>LIKELY</b>	Approximately 50 per cent or greater
<b>POSSIBLE</b>	Approximately 15 per cent or greater
<b>DOUBTFUL</b>	Approximately 14 per cent or less

**Distribution:** List of internal and external recipients of Intsum

PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

