

NZPRT MEETING RECORD

Meeting Name	Update from PSR(sen)1
Date and Time	141430
Location (MGRS)	KB
NZPRT Staff Present	INT OP PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 Terp PSR(sen)1
Purpose of Meeting	General Update from PSR(sen)1
Duration	1hr 20mins
Other Attendees of Note	Nil

Issues Discussed:

- TB activity
- CT PSR(sen)1
- 22 August 2010 Operation

Security:

This meeting was the second time PSR(S)2, P have met PSR(sen)1. PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 is currently in the process of handing PSR(sen)1 over to PSR(S)2, P. In the absence of PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, INT OP continued the hand over process. PSR(sen)1, a logic-type personality, tested PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3, PSF at the end of the meeting, in what can be described as 'feeling out' period. PSR(sen)1 appeared satisfied by the answers given and asked PSR(sen)1 more questions about how long he was due to be working in BAMYAN. The final result was PSR(sen)1 taking PSR(sen)1, P number.

PSR(sen)1 stated at the beginning that he did not have a lot of information and had come to see PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 and Commander PSR(sen)1, F (KT3 LO PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3 PSR(sen)1 related the following information:

- PSR(sen)1 and Qari MUSA, along with 10 fighters, came to TWB from PAKISTAN, one to two days before Eid.
- The pair used the GHORBAND route to move into TIRIGRAN.
- PSR(sen)1 brought money from PAKISTAN and distributed it to families in TIRGIRAN who had lost members in the 22 august 2010 operation.
- TB currently does not have a plan, but are looking for revenge. They will do some of attack after elections.
- PSR(sen)1 did not know of any suicide vests.
- 50-70 TB is the total number of TB for all of TWB.

INT OP COMMENT: The route taken through GHORBAND continues to indicate TB use of established tracks through valley systems such as the ASHARAF VY. PSR(sen)1 explained that the giving of money to families in TIRGIRAN was a separate event and not part of normal *Eid* customs. **COMMENT ENDS.**

PSR(sen)1 was asked if Commander PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 had been to TIRGIRAN to pay their respects, as they had previously intended to. PSR(sen)1 stated that PSR(sen)1 had visited 2-3 days prior to Eid, but PSR(sen)1 did not go. He had not spoken to either of them since the visit, but had spoken to PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1. PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 had reported that TB had lost confidence, particularly KALTA and NEMATULLAH. NEMATULLAH had only just begun to repair the damage done to his house. NEMATULLAH was living in the house again.

Asked how well PSR(sen)1 knew TWB officer PSR(sen)1 PSR(sen)1 replied that he knew him very well. PSR(sen)1 described him as young, inexperienced with no education. PSR(sen)1 also stated that he is not very active. Asked to clarify what he meant, PSR(sen)1 laughed and said PSR(sen)1 waits for people to come to him with information. PSR(sen)1 stated that PSR(sen)1 did not have TB connections, and suggested that this was actually not a good thing; "Being a TB in BARFAK helps." **INT OP COMMENT:** Very little is known about PSR(sen)1 and his motivations or intentions.

PSR(sen)1 report paints PSR(sen)1 as a PSR(sen)1 officer who happens to have some good

informants, but is not active in pursuing information. It can not be discounted that ^{PSR(sen)} displays a different side to PSR(sen)1 and does in fact have TB links. **COMMENT ENDS.**

Asked if knew about weapons missing from the 3 August 2010 attack, PSR(sen)1 stated that he was unaware of the missing rifle but had heard of a pistol. He stressed that the pistol was found in TIRGIRAN and not stolen from the contact site. MIRAJ brought the pistol for a very small amount from a small child who had found it. PSR(sen)1 then asked about NZPRT and SF involvement, stating that he could not understand how NZPRT was not involved when LN had found a hat, pistol, uniforms and a bloody bit of a uniform. INT OP told PSR(sen)1, that the operation was conducted by MOI, and the only involvement NZPRT had was refuelling the aircraft. PSR(sen)1 again asked how this could be when LN had found uniforms and the pistol. INT OP expressed that the bloody segment of uniform was news to NZPRT. PSR(sen)1 indicated the bloody uniform had come from a leg area. He made a cutting motion across his thigh several times during the conversation.

Asked about the hat and uniform, PSR(sen)1 said he was unsure of the details but LN had found a small pile of uniforms near where the helicopters had landed.

INT OP COMMENT: The report of MIRAJ buying the pistol from a little child corroborates reporting of this event. This is the first report of a hat and uniform being left behind. It is possible that a segment bloody uniform from the WIA may have been left behind. **COMMENT ENDS.**

PSR(sen)1 finished the meeting by stating that NZPRT should not travel around until after the elections to avoid a repeat of the 3 August 2010 attack.

Conclusion

PSR(sen)1 continues to a valuable source. Although not offering as much detail as other sources, PSR(sen)1 reports offer a benchmark to verify other reporting against. PSR(sen)1 allows reporting to be put into context, establishing whether COAs reported a feasible in a wider context.

A/S2 COMMENT: It appears that PSR(sen)1 was *fishin*g for information regarding the operation in TIRGIRAN. PSR(S)1

Lack of IO response may have further aggravated the stories circulating by LN including TB. **COMMENT ENDS.**

Drafted by: PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1

Released by: PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1 A/S2

Date: 15 September 2010

Distribution:
TF 81 S2 Cell