



## NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM BAMYAN

FOB KIWIBASE, BAMYAN Airfield, BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN  
Telephone: +PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1 | Email: PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1


4 June 2011

NZPRT BAMYAN DAILY INTSUM 154/11

Period: 031600D\* JUN 2011 - 041600D\* JUN 2011

### Executive Summary

BAMIAN: Meeting with PSR(sen)1



**Area of Interest**

1. NSTR

**Area of Operations**


GOVERNANCE

2. NSTR

DEVELOPMENT

3. NSTR.

SECURITY

4. ~~(S//REL ISAF/NATO)~~  **BAMIAN:** On 04 June 11, **PSR(sen)1** met with NZPRT. Regarding the Kidnapping of **PSR(sen)1** on 03 June 11, **PSR(sen)1** believes it was a group of TB of TAJIK ethnicity, possibly from DOSHI. Separate reporting received today gave an indication of TTPs used in the kidnapping. An unarmed dicker notes the registrations of vehicles on the road and passes that on to the snatch group who stop the vehicle, search it and kidnap ANSF/GIROA officials and people who work for CF. If the vehicle fails to stop on being hailed by the snatch group, a third group further down the road fires on the vehicle.
5. ~~(S//REL ISAF/NATO)~~ NZPRT continues to receive reporting that indicates Qari MUSA is alive sustaining only minor injuries in the airstrike alleged to have killed him. **PSR(sen)1** has allegedly seen Qari MUSA in person.
6. ~~(S//REL ISAF/NATO)~~ Reporting received in this meeting, and from others indicates the KALIGE coal mines are a hub for criminal and potential INS activity. **PSR(sen)1** says **PSR(sen)1** is a PASHTU businessman working out of the coal mines.
7. ~~(S//REL ISAF/NATO)~~ **PSR(sen)1** believes External Intelligence is behind the increased INS activity in the north of AFGHANISTAN and has further plans to destabilize the north, possibly including KAHMARD. The recent reporting WRT a rocket attack on FPB ROMERO is possibly linked with External Intelligence
8. ~~(S//REL ISAF/NATO)~~ **PSR(sen)1** indicated that KALTA wishes to settle with NZPRT before he reintegrates with BAMYAN local governance.



9. ~~(S//REL ISAF/NATO)~~ NZPRT S2 CELL COMMENT: The possibility of a BAGHLAN based INS group holding PSR(sen)1 cannot be ruled out. Confusion still exists over Qari MUSA. On the average of reports, MUSA is probably alive. PSR(S)1 have the means and intent to affect AFGHANISTAN at the national level, therefore such a design cannot be ruled out. Reporting received continues to suggest KALTA will only reintegrate once he has settled his accounts with NZPRT, which would not be seen as reintegration as this is a provincial governance function. Large amounts of actionable intelligence could result from such a meeting, which is recommended; however care would have to be taken to ensure his safety from interdiction by other INS who are still active. **END COMMENT**

**Threat Courses of Action:**

**MLCOA:** A complex attack by a small group of INS (four to ten) initiated with an IED and reinforced with SAF that targets an NZPRT patrol, ANSF patrol, or NGO/Aid workers in the north east of BAMYAN Province on MSR PSR(S)1 from Check Point G2<sup>1</sup> to DO ABE<sup>2</sup> and east to ISH PESTA Check Point .

**MDCOA:**

- a. **Force:** A complex attack that is initiated to isolate elements of an NZ patrol so that the insurgents are able to capture a PRT member. This would be likely to be coupled with setting a secondary device aimed at first responders to maintain isolation effect.
- b. **Mission:** Loss of confidence by the people of Bamyan in the ability of the PRT/ANSF to provide for their security during the Transition process.

**DRAFTED BY:** PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

**RELEASED BY:** PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

INT OP

S2

<sup>1</sup> G2 Check Point MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

<sup>2</sup> DO ABE MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

<sup>3</sup> ISH PESTA Check Point MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

**Comd TU CRIB XVIII Priority Intelligence Requirements**

1. PIR 1. What is the capacity and local perceptions of Governance within the BAMYAN Province?

**PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

2. PIR 2. What are the outside influences in your area?

3. PIR 3. What is the level of criminal activity in your area, and who is involved?

4. PIR 4. What is the level of insurgent activity:

**PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

LEVELS OF CONFIDENCE	
CONFIRMED	Approximately 95 per cent or greater
PROBABLE	Approximately 75 per cent or greater
LIKELY	Approximately 50 per cent or greater
POSSIBLE	Approximately 15 per cent or greater
DOUBTFUL	Approximately 14 per cent or less

Distribution: List of internal and external recipients of Intsum

**PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3, PSR(S)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**

