



**NEW ZEALAND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM
BAMYAN, AFGHANISTAN**

Kiwi Base, Bamyan Airfield, Bamyan, AFGHANISTAN
Telephone: +PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1 Email: PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1
(Unclas)

NZPRT 2050-1-1

23 September 2010

**NZPRT BAMYAN SUPINTREP 005/10: MALAWI NEMATULLAH (JPEL RTAF
2306)**

Introduction

1. Operation BURNHAM was conducted on the morning of the 22 August 2010. Its aim was to kill/capture prominent TB leaders in order to disrupt the INS network planning attacks on ANSF/Coalition Forces and local population in BAMYAN and BAGHLAN provinces.
2. This SUPINTREP aims to summarise the effects of this operation in order to support further CF offensive action against Malawi NEMATULLAH.

OP BURNHAM Effects

3. From BDA and ongoing reporting, it is assessed that OP BURNHAM achieved the following effects:
 - a. Delayed an imminent TB offensive action against NZPRT/ANSF aimed at reinforcing the INS success of the fatal 3 August 2010 attack.
 - b. Dislocated TB from an established *safe-haven*: TB leaders have been forced out of the area and rank and file fighters have sought refuge in mountain *ailaqs*. Qari MIRAJ (JPEL RTAF 2305) fears for the safety of his family and has fled to PAKISTAN. Qari MUSA has been absent in PEK. PSR(sen)1 has been absent. KALTA and PSR(sen)1 have been forced into the hills around TIRGIRAN.
 - c. Reduced LN tolerance for harbouring active TB elements.
 - d. Reduced logistical ability for TB to conduct offensive action.
 - e. Increased TB fear of CF capabilities and reach.
 - f. Along with an increased ANSF presence, deterred offensive action during the 18 September 2010 election.

Current Situation

4. There has been no CF presence in TALA WA BARFAK since OP BURNHAM. This has allowed TB to reconstitute. TWB INS are once again assessed to be in a position to resume offensive action. They have been active in obtaining further weapons and increasing their IED capability. Additional munitions and RC-devices have been received. Suicide vests may also have been procured-along with ^{Foreign natio} national suicide volunteers. Reports also suggest the presence of ^{Foreign national} trainers.

5. Qari MUSA and PSR(sen)1 are resident in their respective compounds in BARFAK. MUSA's compound is at PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3, PSR(sen)1 is at ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}

6. PSR(sen)1 is living in the PAJMAN VY, supported by 18 fighters.

7. KALTA and NEMATULLAH are similarly active around their compounds in TIRGIRAN. They are supported by 25 TB fighters. KALTA's compound is at GR 42S VD 2313991462. NEMATULLAH's is at GR 42S VD 2309391150.

Analysis

8. Unless, further proactive action is undertaken by CF, TWB INS are likely to re-group to plan and execute further IED, RPG and small-arms attacks against NZ PRT and ANP. NEMATULLAH's revenge motive is strong. Following his self-proclaimed 40-day period of mourning, he is likely to orchestrate further offensive action. This action is likely to coincide with the 8 October 2010 announcement of preliminary election results and/or the 6-15 October RIP of NZ Force Elements. Previous RIPs have seen several attacks targeting this vulnerable period. Annex A refers.

Assessment

9. MLCOA. INS maintain surveillance of Key Points along MSR PSR(S)1 and KAHMARD seeking an opportunity to act. An IED, targeting a PRT patrol or ANP, remains likely.

10. MDCOA. A complex attack with IED supported by RPG/SAF targeting PRT/ANP patrol along MSR PSR(S)1, or in KAHMARD. An attempt to infiltrate KIWI BASE or ROMERO with INS using fake ANSF vehicles and uniforms.

DRAFTED BY: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

RELEASED BY: PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3

INT OP3

S2

Annex: Post OP BURNHAM Threat Reporting

Distribution:

PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

Post OP BURNHAM Threat Reporting

TWB TB Activity

1. On 230640 August 2010, PSR(sen)1 stated that TWB-based TB moved from TIRGIRAN to the *ailaq* south of the village. HUMINT reporting indicates the bulk of this group have family members who are PSR(sen)1. TB are likely to be staying with family members.
2. At 230820 Aug 10, ANSF stated that TB are currently with Nomadic people PSR(sen)1 2 km from TIRGIRAN/DAHANE NAYAK in a valley (NFI).
3. Map interrogation reveals two possible locations:
 - a. At PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3¹ approximately 3 km from DAHANE NAYAK is a KUCHI encampment.
 - b. Within a 500m radius of the above grid reference are three tented encampments. From the imagery there is a valley system running through the encampments that also links north through one ridge line into DAHANE NAYAK.
4. On 24 August 2010, PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 report that the remaining TB are continuing to move between the mosque in TIRGIRAN, PSR(sen)1 house and tents. The tents are in nearby valleys² and are regularly moved.
5. PSR(sen)1 report that Qari MIRAJ moved from Upper TIRGIRAN (GR 42S VD 2306 1 91545) to his house in ANADARAH PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 on the night of 29 August 2010.
6. On 4 September 2010, PSR(sen)1 reported the following:
 - a. Qari MIRAJ, PSR(sen)1 and three others (NFI) moved in a silver TOYOTA TOWN ACE van to TALA (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 They are believed to have travelled to TURMUSH (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 IOT meet with PSR(sen)1
 - b. Qari MIRAJ has moved his family back to ANADARAH PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 He is also reportedly travelling to PAKISTAN in the next 4-6 days.
7. OCC-P BAMIAN report that Maulawi NEMATULLAH (JPEL RTAF 2036), Qari MIRAJ (JPEL RTAF 2035) and Commander Abdullah KALTA (JPEL RTAF 2037) have gone into hiding in TIRGIRAN (GR 42S VD 23061 91545) and GARDENDEH (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3
8. NZPRT received a report, dated 1 September 2010, from BAMYAN OCC-P today that PSR(sen)1 and PSR(sen)1 held a meeting at Maulawi NEMATULLAH's house in TIRGIRAN (GR 42S VD23061 91545). The purpose of the

¹ PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

² Ref INTREP 022/10 para 5, likely nomadic encampment at PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3

meeting was to plan attacks on polling stations in SHIBAR, KAHMARD, SAYGHAN and Central BAMIAN. They also intend to attack the ANP CPs at DAHANE SAYGHAN PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 and ISH PESTA (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3) as well as conduct attacks on NZPRT patrols.

9. On 12 September 2010, NDS reported that TWB TB were located in BARFAK (GR 42S VE 23776 12088). The group donated food and had a meal with LNs for Akhtar (*Eid*) before conducting a meeting with local Elders. The TB group included:

- a. Qari MIRAJ (JPEL RTAF 2305),
- b. Qari MUSA (JPEL RTAF 1861),
- c. Commander Abdullah KALTA (JPEL RTAF 2307),
- d. Maulawi NEMATULLAH (JPEL RTAF 2306), and
- e. PSR(sen)1
- f. TB are currently in the BEDQOL (assess two possible locations: PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 and PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 and SARBOLAQ (GR 42S VE 14700 01816) areas looking to target GIRoA and NZPRT as the opportunity arises. They intend to use the same area as the 3 August 2010 KT2 ambush and also south of DAHANE SAYGHAN PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 to SHIKARI VY along MSR PSR(S)1

10. On 14 September 2010, ANSF related the following information:

- a. Two Foreign national men are staying at Qari MUSA's (JPEL RTAF 1861) house in BARFAK. These men are to conduct suicide attacks.
- b. On the night of 13/14 September 2010 a group of men under the command of PSR(sen)1 moved from BARFAK to the house of Commander Abdullah KALTA (JPEL RTAF 2307) in TIRGIRAN. The group included fighters from KALTA's group and four to five Foreign national. The Foreign national are advising the group on how to emplace IEDs and launch rockets.
- c. The group is currently in the mountains between GARDENDEH (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 and BAGHAK PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3).
- d. The targets are NZPRT or ANP. Target locations are unknown but could include ISH PESTA, DO ABE (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3) and SANGPAR (GR PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3).
- e. The timeframe for the attack is unknown but the planning has already been completed.

11. On 16 September 2010, 15 TB including Qari MUSA (JPEL RTAF 1861) and PSR(sen)1 left BARFAK Village for the *Ailaq* located south of TIRGIRAN Village.

12. On 16 September 2010, PSR(sen)1 report that PSR(sen)1 returned to BARFAK (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3) having spent the previous days in BAGHLAN JADID and PUL-E KHOMRI where he received money

from PSR(sen)1 for the people of TIRGIRAN (GR 42S VD 23061 91545). PSR(sen)1 also arranged the transportation of 18 anti-tank mines to BARFAK, using Qari MUSA (JPEL RTAF 1861) as the courier

LN Reaction in TWB

13. On 24 August 2010 ANSF stated that the INS has given a response to the operation of the night of 22 AUG 10. They (TB) will not just sit by. There will be a response.

14. PSR(sen)1 reports all is quiet in TIRGIRAN, people are staying away from the district centre (NFI).

15. At 241430 August 2010, NZPRT elements spoke with ANSF
Armed LNs have gone to TIRGIRAN to pledge support for the TB, KALTA is in charge of the group.

16. PSR(sen)1 TWB) reports a protest against NZPRT at the TALA District Centre (GR 42S VE 29287 16418). PSR(sen)1 stated that protesters demonstrated against NZPRT for killing innocent civilians during the 22 August 2010 operation in TIRGIRAN. PSR(sen)1 stated that 800-900 protesters protested for two and half hours over the deaths of six civilians, and 16 injured LNs. Protesters demanded that the Government come to TWB to sort the problem out. If their demands were not met, the next protest would block the road between BAMYAN and TALA. The protests were led by six PSR(sen)1(NFI).

17. On 28 August 2010 ANSF reported the following information:

- a. TIRGIRAN (GR 42S VD 23061 91545) is still busy with funerals.
- b. The protest of 2500 people in TALA DC (PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3 yesterday was not effective in gaining LN support. He also stated that the number of civilian casualties reported is part of TB propaganda.
- c. The leaders of the TB group are currently in TIRGIRAN.

18. On 8 September 2010, PSR(sen)1 reported that Qari MIRAJ has unsuccessfully tried to sell the AK variant rifle stolen from the ANP soldier murdered on 28 April 2010. MIRAJ was trying to sell the rifle to raise the funds needed to travel to PAKISTAN

TB Intent including Revenge

19. On 23 August 2010, PSR(sen)1 report that 50-60 INS in BARFAK and 20-25 INS in TALA have armed themselves and may be preparing to attack. One contact warned PSR(sen)1 to stay in their compound for 5 days. PSR(sen)1 speculate that INS may possibly attack ANP TALA (ANP HQ at the TALA District Centre MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3) or the PSR(sen)1 camp (MGRS PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3). Extra security measures are in place.

20. An NZPRT interpreter reported that on 23 August 2010, an ANP soldier approached him during a meeting and informed him that 40 people were killed and seven houses destroyed in TIRGIRAN (GR 42S VD 23061 91545) a couple of days

ago. The ANP soldier said that the target (NFI) was not at his home and escaped the area. However his family was home and were killed. As a result of this, the target is 'now like a wounded animal'. Instead of using RPGs in his next planned attack, he will now use a suicide vest.

21. On 24 August 2010, NZPRT contact reported that many TB further north of TIRGIRAN came with 12 RPGs to attack the helicopters during the operation. The helicopters left before the TB could arrive (NFI).

22. On 14 September 2010, ^{PSR(sen)1} report of a plan to poison the personnel in the LBG camp, and then follow-up with an attack.

23. On 15 September 2010, ^{PSR(sen)1} reported the following information:

- a. A 15 man TB group including Maulawi NEMATULLAH, Qari MIRAJ, Malawi ANWAR and Commander Abdullah KALTA are ready to conduct an attack on an NZPRT patrol.
- b. The group has already conducted detailed reconnaissance and planning for the attack.
- c. A serious attack will be conducted IVO the 3 August 2010 ambush location.
- d. The timeframe for the attack is from 'now onwards'.
- e. The group continues to look for 'weak' and opportune targets to attack.

24. On 8 September 2010, NZPRT elements conducted two telephone conversations with ANSF. The first was to ^{ANSF} the second to ^{ANSF}. Information included:

- a. TB are preparing to attack the LBG camp (^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}) as well as the TALA District Centre (^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}). The attacks are to occur during and after *Eid-Al Fitr* celebrations.

25. On September 2010, ^{PSR(sen)1} relayed the following:

- a. ^{PSR(sen)1} have received another warning of possible attacks on the ISH PESTA ANP CP (^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}) TALA District Centre (GR ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}), or the ^{PSR(sen)1} Camp (^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}). The attack is expected to occur 3-4 weeks from the end of *Eid-Al Fitr*.
- b. The INS group expected to conduct the attack is estimated to consist of 15 fighters. The group is led by Maulawi NEMATULLAH.
- c. The report states that some members of the TWB INS network may be acting without approval from TBSL.


26. On 14 September 2010, Cache provider ^{PSR(sen)1} reported the following information to FPB ROMERO (GR ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3})

- a. **PSR(sen)1, PSR(S)1** has 12 suicide vests in BARFAK.
- b. Two of these vests are possibly IVO ISH PESTA **PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**
- c. TB have taken photos of damage incurred during the 22 August 2010 operation in TIRGIRAN. The photos have been used to recruit bombers from PESHAWAR.
- d. TB are trying to source 120mm rockets to attack FPB ROMERO. The group will approach from the east IVO CHUKRIDARA (**PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3**) within a week. **PSR(sen)1** also stated that TB 'have a man on the inside who will open the gate.'
- e. TB will not attack ANP, as an incentive to ANP not to search for TB.

NZPRT RIP-Related Threat Events


~~(S//REL ISAF)~~

Significant Activities 2007 - 2009



(S//REL ISAF)

Significant Activities 2009 - 2010



BAGHLAN INS Activity

- 2005 Gp linked to the killing of German Journalists
- 29 March 08 IED attack against NZPRT
- 12 Apr 08 IED attack against DSG
- 07 Oct 08 IED attack against NZPRT
- Oct 08 IED attack against ANP. 1 x ANP KIA
- Oct 08 IED attack in BAMIAN Bazaar
- 29 Nov 08 RCIED with secondary device IVO D2 CP
- 15 Dec 08 IED recovered IVO KARIMAK
- 10 Jan 09 CWIED found by locals IVO TANGY MOIK
- 23 Apr 09 RPG fire at ISP PESTA CP
- 22 Jun 09 DO ABE Coordination building bombing
- 20 Aug 09 Atk ISH PESTA CP SAF/RPG
- 29 Jun 09 NZ forces contacted whilst at CITB
- 29 May 09 RCIED recovered IVO CHARTOK
- 29 Sept 09 CWIED found IVO KALIGE School IED malfunctioned
- 03 Jan 10 ISH PESTA CP atk RPG/SAF
- 01 Jun 10 RPG atk on ISH PESTA CP
- 9 Apr 10 IED attack against NZPRT
- 29 Apr 10 murder of ANP officer
- 28 Jun 10 IED strike IVO TANGY MOIK
- 05 Jul 10 IED attack against LBG
- 03 Aug 10 IED attack against PRT
- 22 Aug 10 Op Bumham – 13 EKIA
- 23 Aug 10 TB IO reaches international media
- 23 Aug 10 TF81 IO message offered to BSO
- 25 Aug 10 CF investigation team sent to investigate TB reporting of civilian casualties
- 27 Aug 10 TB organised protest against CF Op in TWB.
- 27 Aug 10 LN reported as not supportive of TB.
- 12 Sep 10 Qari MUSA reported back in TWB
- 14 Sep 10 QARI MIRAJ moves to Pakistan due to fear of CF attack

Assessment

- TB normally follow a pattern for atk on PRT:
 - Mar/Oct ^{PSR(S)2, PSR(S)3}
- TB have lost some LN spt in TWB post 22 Aug ANSF/CF Op.
- This TB group is financed from ^{Foreign national} .
- TB handing out food at the end of Eid to gain LN support.
- Return of Qari MUSA is assessed an attempt to raise TB profile in TWB.
- Reporting indicates Gp planning to conduct atk in ANSF/CF/ ^{PSR(sen)1} .