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New Zealand Security Intelligence Service  
Support to Military Operations  
Kabul, Afghanistan

Reference: KAB0452  
Date: 5 November 2010

To: SMOA, OCM,  
Info:  
Precedence: Routine  
Attachments:  
References: KAB039815 of 15 September 2010

### MEETING WITH NDS OF 2 NOVEMBER 2010

1. On 2 November 2010 I met **PSR(sen)1, PSR(IC)3** from the National Directorate of Security's Foreign Liaison Department. **PSR(sen)1, P:** assistant **PSR(IC)3, PSR(sen)1** was present for the duration of the meeting. I get the impression that Farhad will be a regular feature of meetings with **PSR(sen)1, P:** from now on (much like **PSR(sen)1, P:** from Department **PSR(s)**).

2. This was a follow up meeting to one held on 15 September 2010 to address New Zealand's concern over detainee issues. At the previous meeting NDS had agreed to answer (through us) any questions that New Zealand (MFAT) has on the issue. They also agreed to show me inside their Detention Centre known as Department **PSR(se)**.

3. It had been some time between our first and second meeting on this issue and **PSR(se)** noted as much. I had received no response from MFAT with regard to the provision of requirements on, or questions for, NDS. I raised this with the Ambassador who suggested that it might be best to let sleeping dogs lie on that issue. There will be no follow up questions for NDS. I advised NDS that at this stage "New Zealand" appeared happy with NDS' willingness to answer questions and while they reserved the right to ask them in the future did not have anything that required answering at the moment. **PSR(se)** thanked me for this.

4. A tour of their detention facility had already been arranged so I indicated that I would continue with that. **PSR(se)** will advise timings and detail. A similar tour had been arranged for representatives from the Political Sections of the Embassies of **PSR(sen)**. **PSR(sen)** said that he had arranged a separate tour for me since I was from a 'brother intelligence Service'. The fact that we approached this issue with NDS directly, one intelligence service to another, rather than through our Ministry of Foreign Affairs like other countries have was received very well by NDS and has definitely earned us some credit.

5. On an unrelated issue **Out of scope**

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
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6. Out of scope

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